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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this Study is to contribute to the Impact Assessment of a possible 
revision of Council Directive 1992/83/EEC on the harmonisation of the structure of excise 
duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages. The Study includes a baseline assessment of a 
series of issues emerged from the previous evaluation of the Directive and analyses how 
these problems may evolve if no EU action is taken. Secondly, the Study formulates a 
set of possible policy options to address these problems, assesses their likely impacts 
(legal certainty, market functioning, administrative costs, tax revenues, alcohol control 
policies, fraud etc.), and compares the outcome with the baseline situation.  
 
The main issues analysed in this Study includes: the uncertainties in the excise duty 
classification of certain new ‘borderline’ products; the functioning of Article 27 
concerning the exemptions extended to denatured alcohol; the reduced rates applicable 
to low-strength alcoholic beverages and to small producers; the exemption for private 
production and home consumption; and the disparities of methods for measuring the 
Plato degree of sweetened and flavoured beer. The underlying evidence is based on the 
triangulation of in-depth interviews with stakeholders from the Member States, the 
results of an open public consultation online, a quantitative analysis of the market, and 
the review of other literature and documentary sources.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Nature and purpose of the assignment 
 
This Final Report (the ‘Report’) has been prepared in the framework of the assignment 
titled ‘Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol 
and alcoholic beverages’ (the ‘Assignment’ or the ‘Study’). The Report is submitted to 
the European Commission – Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG 
TAXUD) by a grouping led by Economisti Associati and including the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research, wedoIT-
solutions GmbH, and ECOPA (‘the Consortium’) and involving Ipsos as sub-contractor for 
this specific contract (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the Consultant’). 
 
The overall purpose of this Study is to contribute to the Impact Assessment (IA) of the 
policy options for a revision of Directive 92/83/EEC (‘the Directive’). The Study has three 
main objectives, namely: 
 
 gather and analyse the evidence on the existing costs and benefits arising from 
the Directive, with the main focus on analysing the scale of the problems 
identified in the previous evaluation study;1  
 assess the evolution of the problems if no further action at EU level is taken 
(dynamic baseline scenario); 
 assess the economic, social and environmental impacts of the possible options 
to address the problems identified. 
 
Additionally, the Assignment envisages assisting the Commission in conducting an Open 
Public Consultation (OPC) to collect stakeholders’ comments and feedback on the 
issues identified and the possible options for a revision of the Directive. 
 
In accordance with its objectives, the Study focused on a set of specific issues that 
emerged from the evaluation study completed in 2016 (the ‘Ramboll Evaluation’) and 
were taken up in the following Commission Report to the Council.2 The Council discussed 
the Commission Report and adopted conclusions on 6 December 2016.3 In these 
Conclusions the Council requested the Commission to carry out an impact assessment on 
the possible revision of Directive 92/83/EEC. On 1 March 2017, DG TAXUD adopted an 
Inception Impact Assessment (IIA)4 and a Consultation Strategy5 that laid out the 
general framework of the exercise and the perimeter of the problem areas and policy 
options under scrutiny. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Ramboll Management Consulting, Coffey, Europe Economics, ‘Evaluation of Council Directive 92/83/EEC on 
the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages’, 2016. Hereinafter: 
Ramboll Evaluation (2016). 
2 ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the evaluation of Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the 
structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages’, Brussels, 28.10.2016, COM(2016) 676 final. 
Hereinafter: COM(2016) 676 final. 
3 ‘Council Conclusions on the Commission Report to the Council on the evaluation of Council Directive 
92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages’, 06.12.2016. Hereinafter: 
Council Conclusions (2016). 
4 ‘Inception Impact Assessment on the Structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages’, 
01.03.2017. Hereinafter: IIA (2017). 
5 ‘Impact Assessment on the possible revision of Council Directive 1992/83/EEC of 19 October 1991 on the 
harmonisation of the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages - Consultation strategy’, 
available at: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/alcohol_consultation_strategy.pdf 
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1.2 Background to the initiative 
 
1.2.1 The legal framework 
 
In late 1992, the Council adopted Directive 92/83/EEC on the harmonisation of the 
structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (‘the Directive’).6 The 
Directive provisions are essentially of three kinds: 
 
 Provisions aimed at classifying alcohol and alcoholic beverages – as defined in the 
Combined Nomenclature – into five different fiscal categories. 
 Provisions on the tax structures applicable to the various fiscal categories. 
 Provisions on the exemptions and reduced rates for certain products. 
 
The tax regimes established in the Directive for alcohol and alcoholic products are 
summarised in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1– The excise duty provisions applicable to alcohol and alcoholic products 
Fiscal Category  Tax Structures and Rates 
Beer  Excise duty fixed by reference to: (i) the number of hectolitres of finished product; 
AND (ii) the degree Plato OR (ii) the actual alcoholic strength by volume (ABV). 
 Possibility of applying reduced rates to small producers (<200,000 hectolitres (hl) 
per year), not less than 50% of the standard rate, as well as to low-strength 
products (below 2.8% vol). 
 Possibility of exempting beer produced for private consumption. 
Wine  Excise duty fixed by reference to the number of hectolitres of finished product. 
 Possibility of applying reduced rates to low-strength products (below 8.5% vol). 
 Possibility of exempting wine produced for private consumption. 
Fermented 
beverages other 
than wine and beer 
(OFB) 
 Excise duty fixed by reference to the number of hectolitres of finished product. 
 Possibility of applying reduced rates to low-strength products (below 8.5% vol). 
 Possibility of exempting OFB produced for private consumption.  
Intermediate 
products (IP) 
 Excise duty fixed by reference to the number of hectolitres of finished product. 
 Possibility of applying a single reduced rate to low-strength products (below 15% 
vol), not less than 40% of the standard rate AND of the rate applied to wine and 
OFB). 
 Possibility of applying a single reduced rate for certain products of a regional and 
traditional nature, not less than 50% of the standard rate AND of the minimum 
rate for intermediate products. 
Ethyl alcohol  Excise duty fixed by reference to the number of hectolitres of pure alcohol. 
 Possibility of applying reduced rates to low-strength products (below 10% vol). 
 Special reduced rates applicable in specific Member States (MS), i.e. BG, CZ, HU, 
RO and SK.  
Exemptions  MS shall exempt alcohol when completely denatured (Article 27(1)(a)), or 
denatured and used for the manufacture of any product not for human 
consumption (Article 27(1)(b)). 
 MS shall also exempt alcohol when used to produce vinegar, medicines, flavours 
for foodstuffs and non-alcoholic beverages, or foodstuffs (Article 27(1) from (c) to 
(f)). 
 MS may exempt alcohol used for scientific or medical purposes, for manufacturing 
products that do not contain alcohol, or component products that are not subject 
to excise duty (Article 27(2)).  
Source: Directive 92/83/EEC. 
 
While the Directive defines the structures of excise duty, and for this reason it is 
sometimes referred to simply as the ‘Structures Directive’, the minimum rates of excise 
                                                          
6 Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on 
alcohol and alcoholic beverages, OJ L 316, 31.10.1992, p. 21. Later amended in 2004 and 2007: ‘Act 
concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic 
of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded’ OJ L 236, 23.09.2003, p. 33; and ‘Act of accession of Bulgaria and Romania’ OJ L 
157, 21.06.2005, p. 29 
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duty are set in a separate act, the Directive 92/84/EEC,7 which does not fall within 
the scope of this Study. 
 
The EU excise system is regulated by Directive 2008/118/EC (also known as the 
‘Horizontal Directive’), which laid down the general provisions applicable to harmonised 
excise goods, and leaving Member States free to establish non-harmonised consumption 
taxes on other goods.8 Among other things, the Horizontal Directive regulates how and 
where excise duties are paid and collected, the regime applicable to operators under 
duty suspension, and the rules for distant selling. It also laid the basis to create a 
computerised procedure to monitor the movement of excise goods, which has been later 
adopted with the name of Excise Movements and Control System (EMCS).9 Since 
January 2011, all movements of excise goods under suspension of excise duty are 
carried out under EMCS. 
 
  
1.2.2 The Evaluation of Directive 92/83/EEC and the issues at stake 
 
The Directive was selected for a retrospective evaluation under the Commission’s 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT), and an independent evaluation 
study was carried out in 2014/2016 by a consortium led by Ramboll Management 
Consulting (hereinafter the ‘Ramboll Evaluation’).10 The recommendations and findings of 
the Ramboll Evaluation were largely taken up in the subsequent Commission’s report, 
which was submitted to the Council in October 2016 (hereinafter the ‘Commission 
Report’).11 According to it, while the Directive has proven to be effective and generally 
appropriate for the collection of excise duties, some inefficiencies however persist, 
causing possible distortions of the internal market and generating unnecessary 
administrative and compliance costs for tax administrations and economic operators. The 
ECOFIN Council discussed the Commission Report and adopted its conclusions in 
December 2016, which among other things invited the Commission to carry out the 
relevant background work (technical analysis, public consultations and impact 
assessment) for a possible revision of the Directive.12 
 
In March 2017, the Commission published the Inception Impact Assessment on a 
possible revision of the Directive, and laid down the problem areas to be assessed and a 
preliminary set of potential policy options. Based on that, the issues at stake in this 
Study have been structured into six problem areas, as outlined in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2 – Overview of the issues at stake 
# Problem area Problem outline 
1 Classification of 
certain alcoholic 
beverages  
The Directive defines the categories of alcoholic products subject to harmonised 
excise duty in accordance with their customs classification, i.e. the Combined 
Nomenclature (CN) codes. The correspondence between the fiscal categories and 
the CN codes is however not straightforward especially for certain novel products 
of the ‘other fermented beverage’ class, which did not exist when the Directive 
was adopted and may arguably take advantage in certain circumstances of an 
unduly favourable tax treatment. Classification uncertainties may lead to 
disparities of treatment across MS and similar products, with possible adverse 
effect on fair competition, tax revenues, and legal disputes.  
There are also uncertainties with the interpretation of the notion ‘entirely 
                                                          
7 Council Directive 92/84/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of the rates of excise duty on alcohol 
and alcoholic beverages, OJ L 316, 31.10.1992, p. 29. 
8 Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty 
and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC, OJ L 9, 14.1.2009, p. 12. 
9 Decision No 1152/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 2003 on computerising 
the movement and surveillance of excisable products, OJ L 162/5, 1.7.2003. 
10 Ramboll et al., ‘Evaluation of Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the harmonisation of the structures of excise 
duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages’, June 2016. 
11 Commission Report (2016). 
12 Council Conclusions (2016). 
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# Problem area Problem outline 
fermented origin’ with respect to aromatised beverages containing added alcohol 
as flavour-carrier, which may affect market functioning.  
Finally, the lack of a separate Excise Product Code (EPC) for ‘other fermented 
beverages’ may hamper monitoring and control, and a proper enforcement of the 
excise duty system. 
 
2 Exemptions for 
denatured alcohol 
 
The Directive stipulates that alcohol produced not for human consumption shall 
be exempted from excise duty – but in order to prevent tax fraud or evasion (i.e. 
to eliminate the risk that alcohol intended for other purposes is sold as potable 
alcohol), the alcohol has to be denatured with the addition of chemical 
substances. The different regulatory and supervisory frameworks in use in the 
MS, including the proliferation of denaturing procedures and formulations, and 
rules for mutual recognition that are not always clear, can create legal 
uncertainty, barriers to trade and additional costs for economic operators, and 
enforcement costs for the competent authorities in the MS. 
 
3 Reduced rates for 
small producers 
Member States have the option of granting reduced excise duty rates to small 
producers of beer and ethyl alcohol. This provision allow MS to support the 
competiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) versus large 
players, in the case of beer, and to protect traditional productions, in the case of 
ethyl alcohol. Reduced rates, however, cannot be granted to small producers of 
wine, other fermented beverages, and intermediate products. This may affect 
conditions for competition, and it prevents MS from pursuing the same policy 
objectives in the markets for the excluded categories. 
 
4 Reduced rates or 
exemptions for low-
strength alcoholic 
beverages 
For each fiscal category, the Directive sets the thresholds (in ABV) below which a 
product can be considered of low-alcoholic strength. MS may apply reduced rates 
to these products, but only a few of them have adopted this option. It is unclear 
if such limited uptake is due to uncertainties with the intended policy objectives, 
the relevance of the coverage thresholds selected, or other factors.  
 
5 Exemptions for 
private production 
Beer, wine and other fermented beverages produced by a private individual for 
his/her own consumption or that of his/her family and guests may be exempted 
from excise duty, provided that no sale is involved. The same provision, 
however, is not available for intermediate products and ethyl alcohol. 
 
6 Calculation of 
excise duties on 
sweetened / 
flavoured beer 
using the Plato 
method 
 
The Directive allows MS to calculate the excise duty on beer by reference to 
either the strength by volume (ABV) or the Plato degree of the finished product. 
While for traditional beer the methods are clear and consistent, there may be 
issues with the calculation of the excise duty for sweetened/flavoured beers in 
countries adopting the Plato method, due to diverging interpretations of the 
terms ‘finished product’. As a consequence, the tax treatment, and hence the 
competitive conditions, of these products may be uneven. 
 
 
 
1.3 Overview of methodology 
 
1.3.1 Data collection methods 
 
1.3.1.1  In-depth consultation of stakeholders  
 
 THE INTERVIEW PROGRAMME 
 
The bulk of the data collection activities was centred on an in-depth on-the-field 
consultation of stakeholders in several Member States and at the EU level. Overall, 161 
stakeholders were consulted, for an estimated total of over 215 individual 
participants (many interviews were attended by multiple participants). This largely 
exceeded the initial minimum target of 120 interviews. As initially envisaged, interviews 
were conducted in the six countries selected for core fieldwork (DE, FR, IT, PL, RO, UK), 
as well as in the other six MS selected for the thematic research on specific issues (AT, 
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BE13, CZ, ES, FI, NL). The geographical distribution of interviews is provided in Table 3 
below.     
 
With respect to the typology of informants involved in the interview programme, 
attention was paid to ensure an appropriate balance between different types of 
stakeholder and in particular:  
  
(i) public authorities and private sector players;  
(ii) industry representatives and public health representatives (including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and experts);  
(iii) large players and SMEs;  
(iv) economic operators from different alcohol beverage segments (beer, wine, 
other fermented beverages, intermediate products, ethyl alcohol), as well as 
representatives of industrial alcohol producers and users (e.g. cosmetics, 
bioethanol and other industries).  
 
The organisation of interviews was relatively smooth, although certain segments of the 
liqueurs and spirits industry required additional efforts. Overall, one-third of the entities 
contacted refused the interview or did not followed up. A breakdown of the interviews 
conducted, by type of respondent is provided in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3 – Breakdown of in-depth interviews, by type of respondents and country of 
origin     
Respondent Type No. of 
stakeholders 
interviewed  
 
Country of origin No. of 
stakeholders 
interviewed 
European Commission staff 5 France 26 
MS Competent Authorities 33 Germany 15 
- Tax/customs authorities 21 Italy 19 
- Public Health authorities 7 Poland 17 
- Other (Agriculture authorities, etc.) 5 Romania 10 
Economic operators and trade associations 112* United Kingdom 14 
- Beer sector 30 Austria 6 
- Wine sector 34 Belgium 8 
- Cider and OFB sector 33 Czech Republic 6 
- Spirits and liqueurs sector 30 Finland 9 
- Industrial alcohol sector 32 Netherlands 9 
- Other (e.g. home brewers association, etc.) 5 Spain 4 
Public health NGOs 7 Other MS** 2 
Others (e.g. experts etc.) 4 EU level 16 
    
Grand total 161 Grand total 161 
Notes: (*) the total for this category does not add up to the number of interviews per sector, since various 
interviewees operate in more than one sector; (**) from MS not included in the selected sample. 
 
All interviews were based on the checklists for discussion that were developed in the 
inception phase – and further refined and consolidated during the data collection phase. 
In various instances, the standard checklists were further customised to better address 
the nature of the respondent and the specific MS legal framework. The checklists were 
generally sent to interviewees a few days ahead of the meeting in order to allow for the 
preparation of the discussion. Interviews were almost entirely conducted by senior 
members of the team (99%), preferring face-to-face meetings (74%) over phone 
interviews (24%) and written consultations (2%). The average duration of interviews 
was of 60-90 minutes, with a few meetings lasting up to 2.5 hours. 
 
                                                          
13 Belgium replaced the initially selected Estonia during the inception phase, based on considerations on its 
greater relevance for themes like (i) reduced rates for small producers, and (ii) the calculation of excise duties 
on sweetened beer using the Plato method. 
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Members of the study team also took part in two EU-level meetings of relevant groups of 
national experts: 
 
 Meeting of the Indirect Tax Expert Group (ITEG) and the Excise Committee, on 21 
March 2017, which included a discussion on the draft Commission Implementing 
Regulation on the procedures for completely denatured alcohol (CDA). 
 Meeting of the Fiscalis Project Group (FPG) 013 on CDA, on 5 July 2017, which 
discussed a range of issues related to the Eurodenaturant including transitional 
periods and standard operating procedures (SOP). 
 
 
1.3.1.2  Open Public Consultation 
 
The Consultant assisted DG TAXUD in the preparation and implementation of an Open 
Public Consultation (OPC) aimed at gathering the views of EU citizens and stakeholders on 
a possible revision of the Directive.14 The questionnaire included a total of 58 questions, 
divided into four thematic sections. The questions primarily concerned (i) the respondents’ 
perception of the issues at stake; (ii) the agreement / disagreement with a set of possible 
options and approaches to the issues at stake, and (iii) the respondents’ expectations 
about the impact that may derive from the adoption of certain measures. 
 
In order to take into account the potentially high diversity of respondents’ backgrounds, 
each thematic section of the OPC included general questions suitable for all type of 
respondents and more specific questions requiring an in-depth knowledge of (or specific 
interest in) the technical functioning of the Directive. Respondents were allowed to 
complete only the section(s) they were more interested in or familiar with and skip the 
other questions or even entire thematic sections. In addition to the various thematic 
sections, the questionnaire also included: a ‘general information’ section to present the 
background and objective of the consultation, a ‘respondent’s profile’ section to determine 
the nature, origin, and eventual specific interests of the respondent, and the possibility to 
upload additional documents. 
 
The English version of the OPC was launched on 18 April 2017, while the translated 
versions – which included all EU languages – went online around the 10 May 2017. It 
remained open until 11 July 2017, for a total of 12 weeks for the English version and 9 
weeks for the other versions. A total of 165 valid responses were registered,15 from 21 
MS. The majority of respondents were industry stakeholders, with 61 economic operators 
(i.e. 37% of the total) and 58 industry associations and similar entities with specific 
interests (35%). In addition, respondents also included 37 private individuals (22%), 3 
public authorities (2%), 2 public health NGOs (1%) and 6 other miscellaneous 
respondents (4%). 
 
 
1.3.1.3  Desk research 
 
Statistics and databases. The preparatory work for the analysis of quantitative 
impacts required the acquisition and systematisation of data and statistics from various 
sources. Several documentary sources and datasets were reviewed throughout the 
Study, in particular:  
 
 Alcoholic beverages market data. Various market intelligence data providers were 
considered as possible sources of market data on alcoholic beverages. The 
                                                          
14https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/consultations-get-involved/customs-consultations/public-
consultation-structures-excise-duties-applied-alcohol-and-alcoholic-beverages_en 
15 Not including 4 completely blank responses and counting only once a response that was submitted two times 
by the same respondent. 
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Consultant compared the relative strengths and weaknesses of the main providers, 
based on detailed information and system previews and, in agreement with DG 
TAXUD, opted for the IWSR database.16 The main reasons included: (i) a significant 
number of brand-lines covered by IWSR especially in important areas like ready-to-
drink (RTD) / alcopops and medium strength liqueurs; (ii) country summaries 
produced by sector specialists; (iii) high granularity in the classification of beverages 
by sub-categories; (iv) flexibility in the customisation of the product, which enhanced 
the value-for-money. In the end, the data acquired include: 
  
o Brand-line data (volume, value, price, owner, distributor, country of origin) 
for a total of 1,374 products, belonging to 15 subcategories deemed relevant 
for the Study (flavoured beers, pre-mixed cocktails, long drinks, liqueurs, 
flavoured alcoholic beverages, etc.), for the 12 sample MS, covering the 
period 1990-2016, and including forecast until 2021.17  
o Top-line data (volume, value) for main categories of alcoholic beverages and 
for all EU28 MS, in order to analyse the scale of the above subcategories in 
the overall market.  
o Country analytical ‘profiles’ for all the EU28 MS.    
 
The IWSR is comprehensive for all the categories of products considered, with the partial 
exception of ciders, for which the level of granularity is lower. According to the cider 
industry, none of the major market intelligence companies is able to provide aggregated 
and robust figures on this market, with the partial exception of Canadean which has 
market overviews for the UK and a few other EU countries in its portfolio. These reports 
are however based on 2015 data, and no updates were foreseen during the life of the 
Study so it was decided not to use them.  
 
 Industrial alcohol market data. For the ‘denatured alcohol’ case-study, data on 
the market of industrial alcohol (e.g. employed in cosmetics, screen-washes and 
detergents, biofuels etc.) was sought. In agreement with DG TAXUD, the Consultant 
eventually purchased the report and dataset published by the LMC International on 
the European Market for Industrial & Potable Alcohol. This source only partly satisfied 
the information needs, as it contains data on industrial alcohol but not on the 
amounts that are denatured, and not broken-down by end use in great detail. 
Moreover, the report is not very recent (data are from 2014). However, it 
nonetheless provided a useful overview of the size and the main market trends in the 
production, consumption and price of alcohol across the EU Member States.      
 
 Tax rates and revenues data. Based on DG TAXUD’s Excise Duty Tables (EDT) 
series, the Consultant has compiled a database with the information on how the tax 
rates (including reduced rates) have evolved in all EU28 MS in the 2010-2017 period, 
and the excise revenues trends per category of product (2008-2016 period). This 
information has been used in the analytical model to identify market effects induced 
by a variation in the excise duty and predict possible impacts of the proposed policy 
options. The granularity of the information was however not always optimal, since 
‘OFB’ and ‘Wine’ figures are generally aggregated, and some MS provide consolidated 
data also for other categories of product. So, we have estimated the hypothetical tax 
revenue from these product categories combining EDT data with the above IWSR 
data, as well as figures provided directly by some MS authorities.  
 
 Production and consumption statistics. Other useful indicators and statistics on 
the production and consumption of alcoholic beverages have been collected and 
processed. These include:  
                                                          
16 https://www.theiwsr.com/index.aspx 
17 For respect of IPR agreement no individual brand data is reported in the Study.  
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o Production and trade statistics published by Eurostat (Prodcom and Comext 
databases). Since Eurostat data is based on the NACE 2 nomenclature, the 
Consultant also accessed the latest version of the correspondence table 
between Prodcom and CN codes available in the Ramon database. 
o Consumption and heavy consumption data – by gender, age group, level of 
education, level of income, and degree of urbanisation – available on 
Eurostat. 
o The statistics on consumption of pure alcohol, also including estimates of the 
unrecorded consumption, elaborated and published by WHO-GISAH, and 
those collected by ESPAD on consumption of alcohol among young people and 
children. 
o Three Special Eurobarometer surveys (331 of 2010, 272b of 2007, and 186 of 
2003) on the attitudes of EU citizens towards alcohol, with special reference to 
consumption figures by gender and age group. 
o DG AGRI’s figures on the production, consumption and prices of wine. 
 
 European Binding Tariff Information database. The information contained in the 
publicly-accessible section of the EBTI database have been downloaded and 
organised for further processing. The methodology presented in the Inception Report 
envisaged a possible linkage of the EBTI with the sales data contained in the IWSR, 
with the aim of estimating the possible market effects of tax treatments induced by 
BTI decisions and assessing the extent and frequency of disparities of treatment. 
However, it was not possible to obtain access to the confidential section of the 
database to conduct an in-depth research. So the EBTI database was used to identify 
possible disparities of treatment among similar products, based on a qualitative 
review of the general description of BTI decisions that is publicly available.       
 
Other documentary sources. In addition to the above-mentioned databases, the 
Consultant collected and mapped over 250 additional documentary sources of various 
nature, primarily – but not exclusively – MS-level documents, often suggested by the 
counterparts met during fieldwork.18 However, in some areas there is a scarcity of 
systematic and reliable data, and this required sometimes complex triangulation and 
extrapolation of information from heterogeneous sources, as well as the formulation of 
strong assumptions and hypothetical scenarios.   
 
Overall, the documentary materials collected during fieldwork include: 
 
 Relevant EU pieces of legislation and policy documents, including for instance 
Directives, Regulations, Judgements of the CJEU, etc. 
 National legislation transposing Directive 92/83/EEC into national law and other 
relevant acts and laws concerning the regulation of alcoholic beverages. 
 Annual reports of Tax Authorities, Finance Authorities, Customs Authorities, and 
Agriculture Authorities. 
 Strategy documents and other programmes of Public Health Authorities on alcohol 
consumption control policy objectives and results. 
 Industry reports on the market of alcoholic beverages (volume and value). Also 
position papers, studies commissioned for consultancies and other relevant materials 
on tax-induces effects.  
 Consumer surveys and behavioural studies, including articles published by alcohol 
consumption control NGOs and experts. 
 EU-level materials including funded research, evaluation studies, Fiscalis’ outputs, 
previous conferences and forums outputs, etc.    
 Scientific literature, media articles and other ‘grey’ literature etc.     
                                                          
18 The complete bibliography is available in the annexes. 
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1.3.2 Data analysis and judgment 
 
1.3.2.1 Structuring the work 
 
The initial phase of the Assignment was dedicated among other things to structuring the 
analytical framework of the Study. In addition to various preliminary data gathering 
activities and a stakeholder analysis, the main focus consisted of refining the two main 
scenarios for comparison for all the issues at stake, i.e.:  
 
i. The ‘no change’ scenario, i.e. no amendment of the Directive. This scenario 
coincides with the business-as-usual situation. However, since markets evolve 
and MS may continue regulating the above matters at national level, the impact 
of the Directive would inevitably change, even if the text were not modified 
(‘dynamic baseline’). 
ii. The policy change scenario, i.e. a formal amendment of the Directive and/or 
non-regulatory measures. In some instances, this may introduce new provisions 
and norms, in others it may consist of clarifications of the existing provisions 
and/or other supporting measures for their proper implementation. 
 
Firstly, this entailed conducting a problem analysis to determine the nature, relevance and 
magnitude of the specific issues considered. Secondly, it required a critical assessment of 
the policy options under consideration with a view to clarify them and to firm-up the list of 
those that qualified for a more in-depth impact assessment. Thirdly, it envisaged a 
preliminary identification of the relevant impacts that can be expected from those options, 
as well as of their salient features. The results of this analytical work were provided in the 
Inception Report.  
 
 
1.3.2.2  Baseline analysis 
 
The baseline analysis is an essential cornerstone of the analytical work, since it sets out 
the terms for comparison of the proposed policy options. The implementation of the 
Directive had been extensively assessed in the Ramboll Evaluation, whose findings are the 
basis of this Study. In the baseline analysis these findings were further investigated and in 
particular: (i) certain issues have been quantified (based on the evidence available); (ii) 
some information has been updated and verified due to evolving legal and market 
frameworks; and (iii) the expected trends, in the absence of policy changes, have been 
projected.  
 
The implementation of the baseline analysis involved various dimensions, which varied 
across the issues at stake, including among other things: the tax treatment of certain 
products (legal and procedural provisions), the monitoring system in place in the MS, the 
market structure, size and trends (including consumer trends), the estimated amount of 
excise duty collected and possible tax ‘gaps’, the extent of illicit trade and of tax avoidance 
practices, the trends and outcomes of alcohol consumption control policies (see Table 4 
below).   
 
Table 4 – Overview of issues for the baseline assessment across problem areas 
Problem area Relevant issues for the dynamic baseline assessment 
Classification of 
alcoholic beverages  
 Segmentation and market data analysis of ‘borderline’ product. 
 Review of MS ad hoc regulations (premixes / alcopops taxes, special tax regimes 
for cider etc.). 
 Existence of incentives for ‘borderline’ products, due to tax differentials. 
 Extent of tax-induced impact on the demand (via price levels) and affordability 
of alcoholic beverages (as a proxy for impacts of public health relevance). 
 Estimated substitution effects across categories. 
 Frequency and cost estimates of administrative measures (e.g. BTI) and 
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Problem area Relevant issues for the dynamic baseline assessment 
disputes. 
 Coherence with sectoral regulation, and international trade implications. 
 Market analysis of the products facing possible disparities of treatment.  
Exemptions for 
denatured alcohol 
 Production, use and cross-border trade in denatured alcohol. 
 National denaturing procedures and supervisory regimes and their implications 
for economic operators. 
 Implications of national differences for the functioning of the Single Market, 
including problems of mutual recognition and other trade barriers. 
 Fraud with surrogate alcohol from different sources / origins (as a proxy for 
impacts of public health relevance). 
Reduced rates for 
small producers 
 Legal framework, MS implementation and other schemes supporting small 
producers. 
 Industry analysis of the relevance of small producers across the five product 
categories (representative product). 
 Issues with functioning of the reduced rates for small breweries: (i) 
appropriateness of the threshold, (ii) administrative burdens and enforcement 
costs; (iii) legal certainty; and (iv) functioning for cross-border operators. 
 Appropriateness of the threshold for small distilleries. 
 Uneven treatment of small producers of other alcoholic beverages (wine, other 
fermented beverages, and intermediate products) and more limited possibility 
for MS to correct potential market imbalances in these markets. 
 Impact on per capita consumption (as a proxy for impacts of public health 
relevance). 
Reduced rates for 
low-strength alcohol 
 Definition of low-strength beverages across the fiscal categories, and market 
analysis thereof. 
 Tax impacts of reduced rates for low-strength alcohol. 
 Rationales for applying reduced rates to low-strength alcohol and effects of the 
current thresholds. 
 Impact on per capita consumption (as a proxy for impacts of public health 
relevance). 
Exemptions for 
private production 
 National legal frameworks for the private production of alcoholic beverages. 
 Amount of illicit private distillation.  
 Effects of private production of fermented beverages: market distortions, cross-
border impacts, tax frauds, administrative burdens, enforcement efforts, health 
effects. 
 Effects of private distillation: foregone revenues, market distortion, cross-border 
impacts, tax frauds, administrative burdens, enforcement efforts, health effects. 
 Impact on per capita consumption (as a proxy for impacts of public health 
relevance). 
Measurement of 
Plato degree for 
sweetened / 
flavoured beer 
 Market and product analysis of sweetened and flavoured beer. 
 National approaches to the measurement of the Plato degree of sweetened and 
flavoured beer. 
 Tax revenues from sweetened and flavoured beer. 
 Impacts of different measurement approaches on tax treatment.  
 Legal disputes.  
 Impact on per capita consumption (as a proxy for impacts of public health 
relevance). 
 
 
1.3.2.3 Impact analysis and comparison of scenarios 
 
The proposed policy options for the revision of the Directive may determine a variety of 
different economic and social impacts for various different stakeholder groups, primarily 
MS competent authorities and economic operators, secondarily consumers and public 
health stakeholders. The different typologies of impacts assessed in this Study can be 
gathered in five main categories, as follows:  
 
i. Direct charges. Direct charges include taxes and fees paid by economic operators or 
consumers. In line with the nature and scope of Directive 92/83/EEC, the focus of this 
Study is excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, and the related excise duty 
revenues of Member States. This dimension has been examined across all thematic 
areas considered. Unless differently stated, all references to ‘tax rates’, ‘tax 
structures’, ‘tax revenues’ etc. in this Report relate to excise duties. However, in some 
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cases, the analysis has also encompassed VAT, and in particular the share of VAT that 
is imposed on the excise duty since this causes a multiplier effects on the variation of 
excise duty levels.          
 
Importantly, tax revenues have distributional impacts: what is a benefit for tax 
authorities may be a cost for consumers and/or manufacturers. In the assessment and 
comparison of policy scenarios these impacts where primarily examined from the 
perspective of tax authorities. In this sense an increase of tax revenues is rated 
positively and vice versa. Impacts on tax revenues can be triggered by variations of: 
(i) rates applicable to excisable products, which is outside the scope of the Study, with 
the exception of provisions on reduced rates or methods for the calculation of 
applicable tax; and (ii) scope of the tax system (exemptions / inclusions) and of 
individual tax category, with the possible re-classification of certain products in 
different categories. It is also worth mentioning that these variations may also trigger 
other impacts, considered below under market or social effects, such as tax-induced 
substitution between products, per capita consumption effects, demand for illicit 
products and fraud. 
 
ii. Compliance, administrative burden, costs and cost savings. Compliance costs 
have been considered with respect to the changes to business practices linked to the 
administrative requirements concerning denatured alcohol. Administrative burden for 
economic operators have been assessed in various policy options implying a revision of 
the Directive. For instance, the creation of a new fiscal category for certain products 
may generate administrative burden for economic operators, who have to update their 
licenses and IT systems. Another example is the quantification of the current 
administrative burden generated by the reduced rate scheme for small brewers, and 
the costs associated with its revision, or to the extension of the scheme to small wine 
producers and cider makers. 
 
iii. Enforcement costs and benefits. As regards enforcement costs and benefits, two 
main types have been considered: 
 
1) enforcement costs and cost savings stricto sensu, which are those borne by 
public authorities to apply the revised Directive provisions; and  
2) judicial costs and cost savings, which are costs borne by public authorities and 
economic operators related to the need to interpret unclear legal provisions 
and, in case of judicial disputes, uphold them in court, as well as benefits (cost 
savings) where interpretations and judicial disputes are no longer needed after 
a clarification or legal revision.  
 
iv. Market effects. Market effects concern distortions of the quantity exchanged and of 
the equilibrium price of the various products. Taxation, by definition, distorts any 
market from the equilibrium that it would reach based on the free adjustment of 
demand and supply. For this reason, the Study did not attempt to assess market 
distortions per se, but those that might go beyond the intended objectives of the 
regulator, in terms of Single Market functioning. Four categories of possible market 
effects and distortions have been considered: 
 
1) Tax-induced substitution across products, i.e. when the demand for a certain 
product is favoured (hampered) by the higher (lower) taxation imposed on one 
or more substitute products.  
2) Cross-border distortions and illicit markets. This may be the case when 
consumers decide to purchase a certain product (e.g. alcoholic beverages, 
denatured alcohol) in another MS, or stop importing the same product from 
another MS, because of the different tax or regulatory treatment. Effects on 
illicit (or informal) markets also include impacts from and on the quantity of 
‘unrecorded alcohol’, i.e. alcohol which is not taxed and is outside governmental 
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control. This includes cross-border shopping (both legal, and smuggling / 
‘bootlegging’) and, most importantly for the policy issues considered, surrogate 
products obtained from previously denatured alcohol and home production.  
3) Single Market functioning, and possible distortions induced by diverging legal 
treatments or uneven application of Directive provisions or other administrative 
obstacles hampering the circulation of products or affecting fair competition.  
4) SME competitiveness, since certain impact may have a differential effects on 
small producers versus large manufacturers. This is specifically the case for the 
analysis of the ‘reduced rates for small producers’ issue, where both the 
baseline assessment and the impact analysis consider whether and to what 
extent the norms at stake change the competitive position of SME. 
 
 
v. Indirect social effects. This category includes impacts that poorly lend themselves to 
a quantification in monetary terms, but are nonetheless important since they concern 
the underlying values and principles of policy action that are linked to social well-being 
in the broad sense. Two areas of social impact that have been considered related to 
the policy options at stake - although indirectly - are namely: (i) public health (through 
alcohol control policy and measures); and (ii) tax fraud. 
 
The final step of the analysis of impacts consisted of the comparison of the policy 
options. The issues at stake in this Study require policy revisions that are relatively 
independent from one another. Therefore, the comparison of options have been performed 
for each thematic area separately, rather than in a cumulative way. Given the different 
nature of the impacts considered, the final comparisons required combining different 
approaches, and specifically, a partial cost-benefits analysis (CBA) approach for 
quantifiable (monetary) impacts, such as market effects, tax revenues and – where 
feasible – regulatory costs, and a multi-criteria analysis (MCA) for non-quantifiable or 
mixed ones.  
 
 
1.4 Structure of the Report  
 
The Report is divided in two volumes: Volume 1 – Main Text, and Volume 2 – 
Annexes. The rest of Volume 1 includes three Sections, whose structure follows a cross-
thematic approach, meaning that every Section is further subdivided into six parts, each 
one focusing on one of the issues at stake (see Table 2 above). The three Sections include 
the following: 
 
 Section 2 deals with the problem analysis and provides a dynamic baseline 
assessment of the six identified problem areas (and the relative issues at stake), 
including both a discussion of the current situation and an analysis of the expected 
evolution in the absence of any Commission intervention. 
 Section 3 defines the various policy options identified to address the issues at stake, 
analysing the nature and – whenever possible – the magnitude of the respective 
positive and negative impacts they would have. 
 Section 4 compares the various impacts expected from both the dynamic baseline 
scenario and the identified policy options, leading to a final set of conclusions. 
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2 ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE 
 
2.1 Classification of alcoholic beverages 
 
2.1.1 Background and structure of this Section 
 
 BACKGROUND OF THE CLASSIFICATION ISSUE  
 
The evaluation of Directive 92/83/EEC conducted in 2016 by Ramboll et al. under the 
REFIT Programme19 provided a generally positive appreciation of the functioning and 
effectiveness of the Directive, with the main exception of some classification issues 
concerning certain categories of products. In the Staff Working Document accompanying 
the Commission Report20 on the evaluation of the Directive, the classification-related 
issues are articulated as follows21:  
 
 There are different MS interpretations of the meaning of the ‘entirely of 
fermented origin’ provision, leading to disparities of treatment of the same 
product across different national markets.  
 The differential between the tax treatment of different categories of product may 
create incentives to develop and market ‘borderline’ products exploiting 
classification ambiguities to obtain favourable treatment and circumvent what 
was arguably the intention of the legislator.   
 The issue of classification of these types of products may be significant in terms 
of the potential revenue loss, with potentially hundreds of millions of Euros of tax 
revenue at stake per annum.  
 The track-record of disputes related to the classification of certain alcoholic 
beverages may show that the intention of the legislator is not being interpreted 
coherently across the EU, with potential consequences in terms of legal certainty, 
competition and the overall functioning of the internal market. 
 
According to the Commission Report, excise classification issues relate primarily to 
uncertainties in the customs classification of certain products and, in particular, to the 
application of codes 2206 and 2208 of the Combined Nomenclature.22 The Commission 
Report also notes that the attempts to resolve excise classification issues through legal 
interpretation of the CN codes - i.e. the CJEU jurisprudence - have not proved effective 
so far. 
 
On this basis, in December 2016 the Council adopted a series of Conclusions giving the 
Commission the mandate to consider amending the Directive to eliminate certain 
ambiguities and distortions in the tax treatment of particular types of alcohol and 
alcoholic beverages. The expected benefits may also include the collection of excise 
duties and the reduction of administrative burden for both economic operators and tax 
administrations in Member States. In particular, the Council Conclusions state:  
 
 the need to clarify and to harmonise further the classification rules for products 
manufactured as mixtures of different categories of alcoholic beverages or as 
mixtures of alcoholic beverages with non-alcoholic beverages in order to unify the 
treatment for excise purposes of the same products across the Member States, 
and so ensure legal certainty and clarity for economic operators; 
                                                          
19 Ramboll Evaluation (2016). 
20 COM(2016) 676 Final.  
21 SWD(2016) 336 Final. Author’s summary of the issues at stake. 
22 Respectively defined as: ‘Other fermented beverages (for example, cider, perry, mead, sake); mixtures of 
fermented beverages and mixtures of fermented beverages and non-alcoholic beverages, not elsewhere 
specified or included’, and ‘Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of less than 80% vol; 
spirits, liqueurs and other spirituous beverages’. 
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 the need to ensure uniform treatment of alcoholic beverages, which are the 
mixture of fermented beverages and alcohol, and in this context, for the purposes 
of legal certainty, to clarify the notion of ‘entirely of fermented origin’ in Directive 
92/83/EEC.23 
 
In the same vein, the Commission’s Inception Impact Assessment for a proposed 
revision of Directive 92/83/EEC recognises that: ‘the product categories as currently 
defined in the Directive are incomplete, leading to tax incentives being exploited by 
manufacturers of certain alcoholic beverages’ and therefore envisages ‘to redefine the 
category of ‘other fermented beverages’ and the term “entirely of fermented origin”’.24  
 
 STRUCTURE OF THIS SECTION 
 
Before assessing the nature and magnitude of the ‘classification’ issue it is necessary to 
properly describe the terms and the origins of the problem, with reference to the 
different and incoherent definitions and classifications of alcoholic beverages that exist 
(Section 2.1.2) and the origin and nature of the legal (and market) issues that occurred 
in the past (Section 2.1.3).  
 
Once the context of the problem is defined, a baseline assessment is conducted (Section 
2.1.4) including: (i) the identification and definition of the ‘problematic’ products; (ii) an 
assessment of their market size and trends; and (iii) a review of the fiscal treatment and 
regulatory measures adopted at national and supranational level to deal with certain 
products, and the tax revenue at stake.  
 
Finally, Section 2.1.5 outlines the features of the three ‘policy problems’ identified, 
analysing causes, drivers and adverse effects, i.e.: legal uncertainties, administrative 
burden, market distortion, foregone tax revenues, and possible impact on public health 
objectives. The analysis is preceded by a general assessment of the dynamics prevailing 
in the alcoholic beverage market, in particular: cross-product substitution, the impact of 
taxes on demand, affordability and per capita consumption.        
   
 
2.1.2 Definition and classification of alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
Alcoholic beverages are defined and categorised at multiple levels and for different 
purposes. These different layers only partly coincide and this lack of coherence seems to 
be the single most important cause of all further classification issues analysed here. Four 
main dimensions exist and are considered in this Report: 
 
(i) sectoral legislation and established practices; 
(ii) customs classification; 
(iii) excise duty classification; 
(iv) commercial and other non-standardised classifications.  
 
 SECTORAL LEGISLATION AND ESTABLISHED PRACTICES  
 
Most of alcoholic beverages are subject to sectoral regulation and administrative 
procedures, which define among other things common rules for the definition, 
denomination (including protected designation of origin – PDO and protected 
geographical indication - PGI), labelling, admitted practices etc. of products and 
production processes. EU-level sectoral regulation exists for wine, including aromatised 
                                                          
23 Council Conclusions (2016). 
24 IIA (2017). 
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wine, and spirits (see Table 5 below). Beer is instead mostly regulated within broader 
agriculture frameworks, while currently there is no EU-level definition of cider and other 
fermented beverages. In this respect, there is an ongoing initiative promoted by cider-
makers and their trade associations aimed at establishing common legal definitions for 
cider, perry, and other fruit wines.  
  
The sales and consumption of alcohol and alcoholic beverages is also subject to various 
national and EU rules and policies on prevention and control of alcohol-related health 
and social risks. Even if this dimension is not at the core of the classification issue 
discussed in this Study, it is important to consider that health-related concerns are at 
the basis of national measures, like the ‘alcopop’ taxes, aimed at restricting the access of 
consumers, especially young people, to certain products. As discussed further below, this 
raised non-trivial questions on how to define ‘alcopops’ and the target products in 
general.25 
 
Table 5 - Overview of relevant EU sectoral legislation and policies (non-exhaustive)26 
Sector/ 
theme 
Legislation/documents Subject matter 
Wine 
Regulation (EU) 1308/2013  Basic regulation - establishing a common 
organisation of the markets (CMO) in agricultural 
products. 
Regulation (EU) 251/201427  
(upcoming delegated act on production 
practices) 
Definition, description, presentation, labelling and 
the protection of geographical indications of 
aromatised wine products. 
Commission Regulation No 606/2009 
(implementing Council Regulation 479/2008 
on CMO in wine) 
Oenological practices and restrictions. 
Designations of origin and geographical 
indications. Protection and control. 
Beer28 
Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 (and 
Implementing Regulation No 668/2014)  
General framework, defining quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs, including 
beer. Rules for the description of the product and 
production method. Proof of origin. 
Commission Regulation 470/2012, 
471/2012, and 505/2014 amending Annex 
II to Regulation No 1333/2008 
Regulations regarding the use of specific 
ingredients in beer.  
Spirits 
Regulation (EU) 110/2008  Definition of spirit drinks. Origin of ethyl alcohol. 
Geographical indications. 
Public 
health 
related 
policies 
Communication to support Member State in 
reducing alcohol related harm 
COM/2006/0625 final 
Protect young people. Reduce injuries and deaths.  
Prevent alcohol-related harm. Inform, educate, 
and raise awareness. 
Action Plan on Youth Drinking and Heavy 
Episodic Drinking by the CNAPA 
Reduce heavy episodic drinking. Reduce 
accessibility & availability of alcohol. Reduce 
exposure to alcohol marketing. 
Recommendation on the drinking of alcohol by 
young people, in particular children and 
adolescents (2001/458/EC) 
Producers should not target young people. 
Educate young people. Increase involvement of 
young people. 
Draft Council Conclusions on ‘An EU strategy 
on the reduction of alcohol related harm’, 
December 2015 
Reduce alcohol-related harm. 
                                                          
25 With respect to the definition of ‘alcopop’ it is worth citing the Commission latest Report on Regulation (EU) 
No 1169/2011: ‘On the basis of the information reviewed, the Commission has not identified objective grounds 
that would justify the absence of information on ingredients and nutrition information on alcoholic beverages or 
a differentiated treatment for some alcoholic beverages, such as “alcopops”. At this stage, the Commission 
therefore sees no need or clear added value for a specific definition of “alcopops” for labelling purposes.’ 
Source: COM(2017) 58 final. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
regarding the mandatory labelling of the list of ingredients and the nutrition declaration of alcoholic beverages. 
26 Notably, the Table does not display General Food Law (Reg. 178/2002) and other legislation applicable to 
alcoholic beverages on e.g. labelling, nutrition, food additives, packaging etc. that are not relevant to the 
subject of this Section.    
27 Regulation (EU) No 251/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine 
products and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1601/91, OJ L 84, 20.3.2014. Hereinafter: ‘Regulation 
251/2014’. 
28 There is no EU-level product definition for beer. The overall acquis on agricultural products apply.   
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The EU-level framework is complemented by abundant national-level rules and industry-
level codes of practices covering especially, but not exclusively, PDO/PGI (Protected 
Designation of Origin/Protected Geographical Indication) and locally-relevant products. 
In the case of wine and spirituous beverages of vitivinicultural origin, this is 
supplemented by the supranational rules, definitions and guidelines established within 
the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV).29   
 
The harmonised definitions, accepted practices and denominations adopted at a 
supranational are relevant for international trade.30 This is an important component of 
the EU external trade: in 2016, the value of alcoholic beverages trade from/to the EU 
amounted to an overall EUR 24 billion (export) and EUR 4.5 billion (import), with wine 
accounting for 41% and 58% of the respective totals.31 To facilitate trade, the EU has 
signed numerous agreements and treaties with international partners (e.g. OIV)32 and 
third countries, especially on wine and in a few cases covering also spirits (e.g. Canada). 
A few examples of bilateral trade agreements (BTA) include, for instance: (i) USA 
(2006), (ii) Australia (2008); (iii) Canada (2004); (iv) Chile (2002); (v) South Africa 
(2002).33 An important aspect of BTAs is the definition of wine and the oenological 
practices permitted. The external partner countries do not necessarily have the same 
rules as the EU, and the product definitions may slightly change across BTAs. In some 
cases, this may lead to products formally imported or exported as ‘wine’ but released on 
the market with a different denomination. The matter is delicate, since the lack of 
mutual recognition may eventually cause barriers to trade and disputes at WTO level, 
although so far it has seldom occurred.34             
 
The sectoral classification is also relevant for the statistics and monitoring data on the 
production of manufactured goods. To this end, the Eurostat’s Prodcom attributes an 8-
digit code35 to the different types of manufactured products, which may or may not 
correspond to the Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes (see below). For alcohol and 
alcoholic beverages, 20 different Prodcom codes are defined, corresponding to 171 
different CN codes. The correspondence is univocal: Prodcom codes may aggregate more 
CN codes, but each CN code corresponds to only one Prodcom code.  
 
                                                          
29 In particular: OIV, International Code of Oenological Practices, 2016 Issue. This work constitutes the 
technical and legal reference document for the standardisation of products of the vitivinicultural sector, and it 
is intended for the establishment of national or supranational regulations and the international trade. 
30 While the official classification for trading purposes is the customs classification (see next point), the OIV and 
other sectoral legislation remains important to define the denomination and the characteristics of specific 
products in a more detailed manner.  
31 Source: Comext. 
32 See for instance, the recent ‘Commission Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the position to be 
adopted on behalf of the European Union with regard to certain resolutions to be voted in the framework of the 
International Organisation for Vine and Wine (OIV)’, COM(2016) 579 final 
33 A full list of bilateral agreements with third countries established by the European Commission is available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/wine/third-countries_en 
34 Only one WTO case is known in this area: in 2002, Argentina requested consultations with the EC regarding 
several EC regulations and other mandatory provisions on oenological practices and on trade in wine. 
Argentina’s complaint was in respect of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1493/1999 and Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 883/2001, which relate to the administration and the common organisation of the market in wine, the 
establishment of authorised oenological practices and the regulation of trade between the countries of the EU 
and third countries.  
Source: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds263_e.htm 
A few other WTO disputes involving the EU on alcoholic beverages issues regarded special fees and other 
discriminatory measures, but did not directly concern the definition or classification of products.   
35 The first four digits are drawn from the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community (NACE). 
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 CUSTOMS CLASSIFICATION 
 
The relevant classification for trading purposes of alcohol and alcoholic beverages is the 
customs classification. Laid down in the Combined Nomenclature (CN)36 - a further 
development of the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature of the World Customs 
Organization (WCO)37 - this classification is used to determine the applicable tariff 
(‘tarification’) to goods declared to customs in the EU. As discussed further below, the 
CN classification determines also the excise duty category of products and is therefore at 
the core of the ‘classification issue’ described in this Section.  
 
CN codes have (on CN level) 8-digits. The first 4-digits are the most important, since 
they define the product ‘heading’ and are relevant for the determination of the excise 
duty. In a few cases, however, the tax categorisation of certain products make reference 
to 6-digit or 8-digit sub-headings (e.g. for sparkling wine and other fermented 
beverages). As of the latest revision38, the customs classification included an overall 180 
8-digit sub-headings clustered into six main headings as in Table 6 below.  
 
Table 6 – Structure of the HS/CN classification of alcohol and alcoholic beverages             
CN / HS headings (4 digits) 6-digit39 8-digit  
2203 Beer made from malt. none 3 subheadings 
2204 Wine of fresh grapes, including fortified wines; grape must other 
than that of heading 2009. 
5 subheadings 126 subheadings 
2205 Vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes flavoured with plants 
or aromatic substances. 
2 subheadings 4 subheadings 
2206 Other fermented beverages (for example cider, perry, mead); 
mixtures of fermented beverages and mixtures of fermented 
beverages and non-alcoholic beverages, not elsewhere specified or 
included.    
none 7 subheadings 
2207 Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of 
80% vol or higher; ethyl alcohol and other spirits, denatured, of any 
strength. 
none 2 subheadings 
2208 Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of 
less than 80% vol; spirits, liqueurs and other spirituous beverages. 
7 subheadings 54 subheadings 
 
The CN, and its parent HS, are closed systems designed to comprehend all traded 
products, so each heading includes one or more residual ‘other’ category(ies) to cover 
products not explicitly mentioned in the definitions. This entails that new products not 
strictly matching the definitions provided should in any case fit into one of the existing 
CN codes. To facilitate coding, the CN (and the HS) is underpinned by non-binding 
Explanatory Notes (CNEN), which are revised and adjusted periodically.  
 
For legal certainty on the correct ‘tarification’ of beverages, and to prevent the risk that 
the attribution of a certain CN code is challenged (and fined) by customs or tax 
authorities when the product is already commercialised, economic operators may apply 
for a Binding Tariff Information (BTI). These are classification decisions issued by the 
customs administration of any Member State, which are binding throughout the EU for a 
period of normally three years (unless the classification code changes or it is affected by 
EU or international customs tariff measures or by a CJEU judgement). For products of 
dubious classification, such as certain new products, BTIs represent a practical solution 
to avoid disparities of treatment and ensuing disputes with customs authorities. 
However, since the tax classification is determined by the CN code, BTIs may also 
become a source of controversy between countries. Economic operators may be tempted 
                                                          
36 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:294:TOC 
37See http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/instrument-and-tools/hs-nomenclature-2017-
edition.aspx 
38 Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2016/1821 of 6 October 2016 amending Annex I to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, OJ 
L 294, 28.10.2016. 
39 Until the 6-digit level the CN and the HS codes coincide.  
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to request a BTI in jurisdictions where it is more likely to obtain a more favourable (tax-
wise) classification, in order to get competitive advantages across all EU national 
markets.       
 
According to the database maintained by DG TAXUD, there are 1,025 alcoholic 
beverages in the EU that are covered by a BTI decision.40 Of course, BTIs do not only 
address products that intend to obtain a more favourable treatment, however a cursory 
analysis of the distribution across CN subheadings (Table 7) may provide a first hint of 
the areas where classification ambiguities prevail. In particular: 
 
 Other fermented beverages, other than cider and perry (CN 2206 0039 and CN 
2206 0059), alone account for a quarter of all BTIs, nearly as many as beer, wine 
and all other fermented beverages altogether. 
 There are also frequent BTIs in the area of aromatised wine product (AWP)41 
below 18% vol (CN 2205 1010), which is another area of accelerated innovation. 
 The high concentration of BTIs in categories like other spirituous beverages (CN 
2208 9069) and liqueurs and cordials (CN 2208 7010) may be partly explained by 
borderline products, e.g. certain ‘mixed drinks’ that did not manage to obtain a 
more favourable CN 2206 classification.       
     
Table 7 – Distribution of BTIs across CN codes and EU countries  
CN Heading and Sub-heading No. of BTI Most Frequent MS of emission 
All Beer (2203) 75 DE, UK 
All Wine (2204) 66 DE, FR 
Flavoured wine < 18% vol (2205 1010) 81 IT, FR 
Rest of flavoured wine (2205) 15 FR, UK 
OFB, sparkling other (2206 0039) 89 UK, FI 
OFB, still other (2206 0059) 163 FR, DE, PT, UK, FI 
Rest of OFB (2206) 55 UK, FR 
Ethyl alcohol > 80% (2207) 61 NL, CZ 
Liqueurs and cordials (2208 7010) 64 IT, IE 
Other spirituous beverages (2208 9069) 258 FR, UK, CZ, SK, EE 
Rest of Ethyl alcohol < 80% (2208) 98 FR, FI, DE 
Source: Author’s analysis of EBTI database (accessed in February 2017). 
Note: The CN codes reported in this Table relate to the latest version, i.e. Impl. Reg. 2016/1821.   
 
There have been cases where disparities in the interpretation of the CN classification 
prompted the issuance of a normative act that eventually repealed existing BTIs on 
certain products. In particular, this was the case with Regulation 1967/2005, which ruled 
that a certain beer product flavoured with tequila should be considered beer as defined 
under CN 2203.42   
 
 EXCISE DUTY CLASSIFICATION 
 
The excise duty classification is determined by the harmonised definitions laid down in 
Directive 92/83/EEC. According to Article 26 of the Directive, reference should be made 
                                                          
40 DG TAXUD, European Binding Tariff Information database, available at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/ebti/ebti_consultation.jsp?Lang=en, last accessed on 02 May 
2017. 
41 In this Report, ‘aromatised wine products’ (abbreviated as AWP) refer generically to any kind of such 
products, including the three main subcategories laid down in Regulation (EU) No 251/2014: (1) aromatised 
wines; (2) aromatised wine-based drinks; and (3) aromatised wine-product cocktails (see Article 3 for the 
respective definitions). In practice, subcategory (1) is of little relevance for our analysis, and references to 
‘AWP’ should be interpreted as primarily referred to subcategories (2) and (3) (sometimes made explicit in the 
text). It is important to highlight that our analysis focuses on fiscal classification of products and not to sectoral 
classification (as it is the case with Regulation 251/2014), so in our understanding ‘AWP’ includes all products 
that may be taxed accordingly, irrespectively of the ‘blurred’ boundaries between the product definitions 
established in Regulation 251/2014.                
42 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1967/2005 of 1 December 2005 concerning the classification of certain 
goods in the Combined Nomenclature, OJ L 316, 2.12.2005. 
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to the CN ‘version’ in force at the time of adoption, i.e. Regulation 2587/91.43 However, 
as discussed above, the CN codes and the related explanatory notes are periodically 
revised. So Regulation 2587/91 is no longer in force, replaced by more recent ones (the 
latest being Commission Implementing Regulation 2016/1821). In this sense, the 
Directive contains references to CN codes that are, in principle, outdated. The issue was 
analysed in the Ramboll Evaluation, which concluded that it is not a source of practical 
problems and primarily a purely administrative issue (see Box 1 below). For this reason, 
and in agreement with the Commission, this matter is not in the scope of this Study. 
 
 
Box 1 – Article 26 of the Directive and the issue of references to outdated CN codes 
 
Article 26 establishes that the references to CN codes contained in the Directive relate to the version in force at 
the time of adoption, i.e. Regulation 2587/91. However, since Regulation 2587/91 is no longer in force, 
repealed by more recent version of the Combined Nomenclature (the latest being Commission Implementing 
Regulation 2016/1821), this means that the Directive contains references to CN codes that are, in principle, 
outdated.  
 
On a closer look, the issue regards only two 8-digit CN codes no longer in use since recent versions of the 
nomenclature introduced further sub-headings. As shown in the excerpt reproduced in Table 8 below, there is 
no textual difference in the definition / description of the sub-heading in the two versions. The only difference 
lays in the fact that in Regulation 2016/1821 the numerical code is no longer mentioned. All other CN codes 
cited in the Directive are still valid today.  
 
Table 8 – Comparison between outdated and updated versions of the CN codes 
 
Commission Regulation 2587/91   Commission Implementing Reg. 2016/1821 
  
  
 
In theory, legal references to CN codes no longer in force may cause incongruences and uncertainties, but 
since the definitions have not changed there is no tangible consequences in using the outdated or the updated 
nomenclature version for the purpose of tax categorisation, in particular there is no risk that a product 
imported using a ‘new’ CN code could not be identified for excise duty purposes. Some CNEN have changed 
over time, but since CNEN are not legally binding (and are not explicitly mentioned in Article 26) they cannot 
fuel legal issues in the excise duty classification of the concerned products.  
 
The matter was explicitly addressed in the Ramboll Evaluation, in particular:44 
   
 According to Ramboll ‘these outdated references in the Directive were not reported by the stakeholders as 
a source of problems.’ (p. 116), and ‘there are no major, immediate and urgent negative consequences 
stemming from the reported inconsistencies’ (p.141). The results of our interviews confirm this conclusion. 
 Ramboll recommends to address this point in the next revision of Directive 92/83/EC. For the Commission 
this recommendation ‘concerns minor technical changes’ and is about ‘outdated references / good 
housekeeping’, i.e.: no relevant impact is envisaged (source: Commission Report to the Council 
COM(2016) 676 final).        
 
 
The five categories established in the Directive (see Table 9) are defined primarily with 
reference to CN 4-digits headings but the classification structure is partly different. In 
particular, there is no separate tax category for vermouth and other flavoured wine (like 
                                                          
43 Ibid. 
44 Ramboll, 2016.  
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CN 2205) and there is only one category for ethyl alcohol including spirits instead of two 
– CN 2207 and CN 2208. On the other hand, the excise duty classification contains the 
‘intermediate products’ (IP) category that is not present in the CN classification. The tax 
and customs classifications differ also at a more granular level, and the result is that 
each tax category of Directive 92/83/EEC may comprise of products that fall under 
multiple CN headings (see Table 10). 
A second important difference is that, unlike the CN classification, all tax categories are 
defined with reference to an explicit minimum and maximum alcohol strength, beyond 
which a product may change category, regardless of its nature. For instance, any 
fermented or mixed beverage, including wine, beer and cider, above 22% vol is taxed as 
‘ethyl alcohol’. The harmonised tax categories may also contain reference to specific 
characteristics of the products, although not systematically (e.g. reference to the entire 
fermented origin of the beverage, enrichment etc.). 
 
Table 9 – The five excise duty categories of alcohol and alcoholic beverages (Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Category  Definition 
Beer  
(Article 2) 
Any product falling within CN code 2203 or any product containing a mixture of beer with 
non-alcoholic drinks falling within CN code 2206, in either case with an actual alcoholic 
strength by volume exceeding 0.5% vol. 
 
Wine  
(Article 8) 
Still Wine:  (Paragraph 1) 
All products falling within CN codes 2204 and 2205, except sparkling wine as defined in 
paragraph 2: 
— having an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 1.2 % vol but not exceeding 15 
% vol, provided that the alcohol contained in the finished product is entirely of fermented 
origin, 
— having an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 15 % vol and not exceeding 18 
% vol provided they have been produced without any enrichment and that the alcohol 
contained in the finished product is entirely of fermented origin. 
Sparkling Wine (Paragraph 2) 
All products falling within CN codes 2204 10, 2204 21 10, 2204 29 10 and 2205: 
— are contained in bottles with ‘mushroom stoppers’ held in place by ties or fastenings, or 
they have an excess pressure due to carbon dioxide in solution of three bar or more, 
— have an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 1.2 % vol but not exceeding 15 
% vol, provided that the alcohol contained in the finished product is entirely of fermented 
origin. 
 
Fermented 
Beverages 
other than 
Wine and 
Beer (OFB) 
(Article 12) 
Still OFB (Paragraph 1) 
All products falling within CN codes 2204 and 2205 but not mentioned in Article 8 above, 
and products falling within CN code 2206, except other sparkling fermented beverages as 
defined in point 2 of this Article and any product covered by Article 2: 
— having an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 1.2 % vol but not exceeding 10 
% vol, 
— having an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 10% but not exceeding 15 % 
vol, provided that the alcohol contained in the product is entirely of fermented origin. 
Sparkling OFB (Paragraph 2) 
All products falling within CN code 2206 00 91 as well as products falling within CN codes 
2204 10, 2204 21 10, 2204 29 10 and 2205 not mentioned in Article 8 above which: 
— are contained in bottles with ‘mushroom stoppers’ held in place by ties or fastenings, or 
they have an excess pressure due to carbon dioxide in solution of three bar or more, 
— have an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 1.2 % vol, but not exceeding 13 
% vol, 
— have an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 13%, but not exceeding 15 % vol, 
provided that the alcohol contained in the product is entirely of fermented origin. 
 
Intermediate 
Products (IP) 
(Article 17) 
 
All products of an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 1.2% vol, but not 
exceeding 22 % vol and falling within CN codes 2204, 2205 and 2206 but not covered by 
Articles 2, 8 and 12. 
 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 12, Member States may treat as an intermediate 
product any still fermented beverage falling within the scope of Article 12 (1) which has an 
actual alcoholic strength exceeding 5.5 % vol and which is not entirely of fermented 
origin, and any sparkling fermented beverage falling within the scope of Article 12 (2) which 
has an actual alcoholic strength exceeding 8.5 vol. and which is not entirely of fermented 
origin. 
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Ethyl Alcohol 
(ET) (Article 
20) 
— all products with an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 1,2% volume which fall 
within CN codes 2207 and 2208, even when those products form part of a product which 
falls within another chapter of the CN, 
— products of CN codes 2204, 2205 and 2206 which have an actual alcoholic strength by 
volume exceeding 22 % vol, 
— potable spirits containing products, whether in solution or not. 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Directive 92/83/EEC. 
 
The misalignment between the CN and the excise duty classifications may cause a 
certain degree of complexity in the categorisation of certain products. For example, an 
aromatised wine product (AWP) coded CN 2205 may be taxed according to three 
different categories, i.e. Articles 8, 12 or 17 depending on the addition of alcohol, the 
overall strength, and its specific denomination. Similarly, a ‘mixed drink’ may be subject 
to Articles 12, 17 or 20 depending, again, on the alcohol origin and blend, the strength, 
and other factors.       
 
For the purpose of movement and monitoring within the EU, excise goods are given a 
harmonised Excise Product Code (EPC). The EPC are based on the tax categories 
described above, but do not fully comply with them. In particular, in the EPC system 
wine and OFB are merged (the distinction between still and sparkling products is 
maintained), which may be a source of ambiguity (discussed in Section 2.1.5.3). 
Secondly, ethyl alcohol and spirits falling under Article 20 are split into four EPC, as 
follows:     
 
 B000 - Beer; 
 W200 - Still wine and still fermented beverages other than wine and beer; 
 W300 - Sparkling wine and sparkling fermented beverages other than wine and 
beer; 
 I000 - Intermediate products; 
 S200 - Spirituous beverages; 
 S300 - Ethyl alcohol; 
 S400 - Partially denatured alcohol; 
 S500 - Other products containing ethyl alcohol. 
 
For the reasons described above, the correspondence between EPC and CN codes is 
‘many-to-many’ i.e. there can be several CN codes for the same Excise Product Code or 
vice versa.45 Table 10 below summarises the possible correspondences (not exhaustive) 
between the two systems, highlighting the cases where multiple correspondences are 
possible. In most cases, the correspondence is straightforward, nonetheless it is 
interesting to note that beverages under CN 2206 00 39 (‘other sparkling OFB’) may 
correspond to five different EPC, and similar degree of ambiguity can be found with 
various other CN 2206 products and – to a lesser extent – CN 2205 and CN 2204 
products.     
 
Table 10 – The multiple correspondences between CN and EPC46  
CN headings / subheadings Excise product codes 
 B000 W200 W300 I000 S200 S300 S400 
2203 X 
      
2204 10 and  
2204 29 10   
X 
    
2204 21 06 - 2204 21 09 
 
X X 
    
2204 21 11 - 2204 21 84 and 
2204 29 11 - 2204 29 84 and 
2204 30 
 
X 
     
2204 21 85 - 2204 21 91 and 
2204 29 85 - 2204 29 91 and   
X 
 
X 
   
                                                          
45 DG TAXUD, ‘Functional Excise System Specifications (FESS)’, version 3.65-EN, 16.09.2014. 
46 EPC S500 is not displayed since it refers to products that does not fall in the CN 22 Chapter’s Headings for 
alcoholic beverages and spirits that are relevant in this Study.    
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CN headings / subheadings Excise product codes 
 B000 W200 W300 I000 S200 S300 S400 
2204 21 86 - 2204 21 91 
2204 21 92 and 
2204 29 92     
X 
  
2204 21 93 - 2204 21 98 and 
2204 29 93 - 2204 29 98  
X 
 
X X 
  
2205 10 10 and 
2205 90 10  
X X X 
   
2205 10 90 and 
2205 90 90    
X X 
  
2206 00 10 and 
2206 00 51 and 
2206 00 81 
 
X 
 
X X 
  
2206 00 31 
 
X X X X 
  
2206 00 39 X X X X X 
  
2206 00 59 and 
2206 00 89  
X X 
 
X X 
  
2207 10 
     
X 
 
2207 20 
      
X 
2208 20 - 2208 70 and  
2208 90 11 - 2208 90 78     
X 
  
2208 90 91 
     
X 
 
2208 90 99 
     
X 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of FESS-Appendix B. 
Note: CN headings / subheadings as in Regulation 2016/1821. 
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the EU-level tax classification rules are sometimes 
complemented by national-level rules. These may regard the establishment of non-
harmonised taxes for specific categories of products like the so-called ‘pre-mix’ or 
‘alcopop’ tax in FR and DE; or MS-level distinctions within harmonised categories, such 
as the Romanian differentiation between cider & perry and other OFBs; or additional 
levies for products above a certain strength, etc. These specificities are based on 
domestic definition and criteria that add up to the harmonised ones and may create 
additional fiscal sub-categories that are relevant only locally.        
 
 OTHER COMMERCIAL AND NON-STANDARDISED CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
The legal and administrative definitions and classifications described above do not 
necessarily correspond with the product denomination used by consumers and/or the 
taxonomies used by industry and market analysts to segment among the different 
classes of products. There is no reference standard in this area and the classifications 
used for commercial purposes may vary significantly depending on national contexts and 
classification needs (e.g. to segment by end-use, by brand quality, by production 
process, etc.). 
 
In this Study, we have chosen the IWSR database as the main source of market data. 
This database distinguishes the product categories at four level of depth (see Table 11 
below). At the highest level, there is a good correspondence between the IWSR database 
and the legal classification of products. However, more granular IWSR categories seldom 
correspond to legal ones, except where the products are defined in the sectoral 
legislation (e.g. PDO / PGIs). In the case of mixed drinks and new products in general, 
the commercial taxonomy becomes blurred, and the correspondence with legal and 
administrative classifications is uncertain. For this reason, the quantitative analysis 
carried out in this Study required a meticulous re-classification of several IWSR classes 
of products into formal customs and tax categories.47         
 
                                                          
47 Inevitably, this entails a certain degree of uncertainty and the need to formulate assumptions and ‘educated 
guesses’ on certain niche products. 
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Table 11 – The IWSR classification of alcoholic beverages 
IWSR Classification (4 levels) 
Beer  Spirits 
Flavoured Beer Agave-Based Spirits 
Other Flavoured Beer Mezcal 
Radler Tequila 
Low-alcohol Beer (4 sub-categories)  
Traditional Beer Brandy 
(4 sub-categories) Cognac / Armagnac 
Cider (2 sub-categories)  
Mixed Drinks Other Brandy 
FABs (Flavoured Alcoholic Beverage) (6 sub-categories) 
FAB Blends Cane 
Other FABs Flavoured Spirits 
Long Drinks Aniseed 
Pre-Mix Cocktails (9 sub-categories) 
Pre-Mix Blends Bitters / Spirit Aperitifs 
Other Pre-Mix Bitters 
Wine (3 sub-categories) 
Fortified Wine Spirit Aperitifs 
Other Fortified (2 sub-categories) 
(8 sub-categories) Fruit Eaux de Vie 
Port / Port Style (2 sub-categories) 
(3 sub-categories) Liqueurs 
Sherry / Sherry Style Advocaat / Egg Liqueurs 
Light Aperitifs Amaretti 
Fruit Based Aperitifs Cassis 
(2 sub-categories) Coffee Liqueurs 
Vermouth Cream Liqueurs 
Wine Aperitifs Licorette 
Other Wines Limoncello 
Flavoured Wine Liqueur Ranges 
Ginger Wine Low Strength Flavoured Genever 
Gluehwein Low Strength Flavoured Korn 
Other Flavoured Wine Low Strength Flavoured Vodka 
Sangria Low Strength Lemon Brandy 
Fruit Wine Maraschino 
Fortified Fruit Wine Other Liqueurs 
Sparkling Fruit Wine Ponche / Cremas 
Still Fruit Wine Traditional H. S. Liqueurs 
Other Other Wine Gin and Genever 
Other Other Wine (7 sub-categories) 
Sparkling Wine National Spirits 
Champagne (5 sub-categories) 
Other Sparkling Rum 
(7 sub-categories) (6 sub-categories) 
Still Wine Vodka 
Carbonated Wine (2 sub-categories) 
Fruit Flavoured Still Wine Whisky 
Traditional Still Wine (31 sub-categories) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR database. 
Note: The entire IWSR taxonomy includes 143 sub-categories. For better readability, the sub-categories of 
limited relevance for this Study are displayed in aggregated form.     
 
 
2.1.3 Origin and nature of classification issues 
 
Despite the complexity described above, in most cases the definition and demarcation 
between the different tax categories do not pose relevant interpretation problems to 
economic operators and administrations. This is certainly the case with spirits under CN 
2208, beer under CN 2203, and standard wine under 2204. Less clear-cut is the tax 
treatment of certain CN 2205 products, such as aromatised wine products, as defined 
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under Regulation 251/2014,48 which can be excised in three different ways, with 
sometimes subtle distinctions49:  
 
(i) Under Article 8 (‘wine’), for an aromatised wine of 14.5%-15% vol or 14.5%-18% 
vol without enrichment, or an aromatised wine-based drink of 7-14.5% vol 
without addition of alcohol, or an aromatised wine-product cocktail with 7-10% 
vol. 
 
(ii) Under Article 17 (intermediate products), for an aromatised wine of 18-22% vol 
or 15%-18% vol with enrichment, or an aromatised wine with addition of alcohol, 
or an aromatised wine-based drink with an authorised addition of alcohol (certain 
aromatised fortified products, the Spanish ‘Zurra’ etc.) with 10-14.5% vol (or 7-
14.5% in MS that have enacted the option foreseen in Article 17(2) – see Table 9 
above). 
 
(iii) Under Article 12 (OFB), for an aromatised wine-based drink with an authorised 
addition of alcohol and a strength of 7-10% vol, unless the country has opted to 
classify them as an intermediate product in accordance with Article 17(2).       
 
As emerged from the fieldwork interviews, the distinction between CN 2205 products 
categorised as ‘wine’ or ‘OFB’ is not entirely straightforward. However, since wine and 
OFB are equally taxed in most of EU countries (some 20 MS), and the EPC do not require 
/ allow to distinguish between the two categories, the issue is mostly theoretical and 
does not cause hindrances or uncertainties to the movement and taxation of the 
concerned products.         
 
Instead, as the Ramboll Evaluation and the previous study made by London Economics 
on the same subject show,50 there are classification problems with some fermented 
beverages on the ‘border’ between CN 2206 and CN 2208 class, which have repercussion 
on their categorisation for excise duty purposes as ‘other fermented beverage - OFB’ 
(Article 12), ‘intermediate products - IP’ (Article 17), or ‘ethyl alcohol - ET’ (Article 20). 
 
Both in the CN (2206) and excise classifications (Article 12), the definition of ‘other 
fermented beverages’ is less strict than for other alcoholic beverages. This reflects at the 
same time the heterogeneity of the products comprised (e.g. cider, perry, mead, other 
fruit-wines, and mixtures), the variety of national production practices (‘cider’ designates 
products with marked differences across MS), and the absence of the harmonised 
product definition and production rules that exist in the case of wine and spirits. Like 
wine, cider and fruit wines are agricultural products with a traditional origin, especially in 
Northern and Central Europe, and enjoy a similar fiscal regime. In particular, the 
Directive 92/83/EEC did not impose a minimum excise duty, and the majority of MS 
applies the same rates of wine, which in nearly half of MS is zero (for still OFB), and 
namely in: BG, CZ, DE, ES, HR, IT, CY, LU51, AT, PT, RO52, SI, and SK. 
 
This favourable tax treatment, combined with a certain flexibility of the criteria used to 
define this category, made room for the development in recent years of various novel 
products, based on new production techniques, arguably designed to take advantage for 
                                                          
48 Regulation  (EE)  No  251/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council of  26  February  2014 
on  the  definition,  description,  presentation,  labelling  and  the  protection  of  geographical  indications of  
aromatised  wine  products  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1601/91. 
49 The information in this paragraph is based on CEEV - Comité Européen des Entreprises Vins’ interpretation of 
the regulatory framework, which was shared with the Authors. 
50 London Economics, ‘Study analysing possible changes in the minimum rates and structures of excise duties 
on alcoholic beverages’, May 2010. 
51 Luxemburg has an additional duty for products containing a mix of fermented alcohol and non-alcoholic 
drinks. 
52 The zero rate applies only to cider and perry, and to some specific hydromel.   
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competition purposes of the low excise duty levied on OFB. Before reviewing them 
systematically, it is important to highlight that in many instances these novel products 
have been the subject of classification disputes between economic operators and 
customs administrations, which in a few cases escalated to the level of the Court of 
Justice (CJEU). These landmark cases and the related CJEU jurisprudence are essential 
to understand the current policy problem. 
    
 COURT OF JUSTICE LANDMARK CASES AND DEVELOPMENTS 
 
In the past few years, the Court of Justice (CJEU) has been called upon various times to 
rule on disputes regarding the customs classification of certain controversial products. 
The cases concerned fermented beverages mixed with distilled alcohol and/or other 
additives, as well as products consisting of a fermented base ‘cleaned-up’ so as to 
remove certain organoleptic characteristics. The CJEU had to establish whether 
fermented products produced through certain new techniques could be still classified as 
CN 2206 or should instead be classified as CN 2208. In all the four cases, reported in 
Box 2 below, the CJEU eventually established that the CN 2208 should apply.  
 
 
Box 2 – Summary of CJEU landmark cases on the classification of alcoholic beverages 
 
 Case C-150/08 (Siebrand) regarded alcoholic beverages – in specific the three beverages ‘Pina 
Colada’, ‘Whiskey Cream’ and ‘Apfel Cocktail’ – with a cider base to which distilled alcohol, water, 
sugar syrup, various aromas, colourings, and in one case a cream base had been added. The basic 
question was if these beverages may maintain the CN 2206 code – due to their cider base – or 
should be classified under CN 2208 as established by the Dutch customs. The Court eventually 
ruled that when a fermented beverage loses the taste, smell and/or appearance of a beverage 
produced from a particular fruit or natural product, due to the addition of distilled alcohol, water, 
sugar syrup, aromas, colourings and cream, it no longer falls under CN 2206, but CN 2208 applies. 
53 
 
 C-196/10 (Paderborner Brauerei) concerned the fermented beverage ‘Salitos Ice’ and its ‘malt 
beer base’. The ‘malt beer base’ was produced from brewed beer with an alcoholic strength by 
volume of approximately 14%, which was clarified and then processed with ultrafiltration 
techniques. The base obtained was then employed for the production of a light beer-based mixed 
drink. The question was if such a product had to be classified under CN 2203 or CN 2208. The 
Court ruling established that ‘a liquid described as a “malt beer base”, such as that in issue in the 
main proceedings, with an alcoholic strength by volume of 14% and obtained from brewed beer 
which has been clarified and then subjected to ultrafiltration, by which the concentration of 
ingredients such as bitter substances and proteins has been reduced, must be classified under 
heading 2208”. 54 
 
 The joined cases C-532/14 and C-533/14 (Toorank) tackled the fermented beverage called 
‘Ferm Fruit’ and a range of beverages with a ‘Ferm Fruit’ base to which other ingredients were 
added. Ferm Fruit was prepared using an alcohol resulting from the fermentation of fruit, which 
was then purified through ultrafiltration so that its smell, colour and taste resulted neutral. The 
question was if ‘Ferm Fruit’ (Question 1) and ‘Ferm Fruit-based beverages’ (Questions 2&3) had to 
be classified under CN 2206 or CN 2208. On question 1, the CJEU ruled that ‘a beverage, such as 
Ferm Fruit, which is obtained through fermentation of an apple concentrate and is designed to be 
consumed either undiluted or as a base in other beverages, being neutral in terms of colour, smell 
and taste as a result of purification (including ultrafiltration) and having an alcoholic strength by 
volume, without the addition of distilled alcohol, of 16% falls under heading 2208 of that 
nomenclature’. According to this sentence, also ‘Ferm Fruit-based beverages’ (Questions 2 and 3) 
had to fall under CN 2208. 55 
 
 
                                                          
53 Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 7 May 2009, ‘Siebrand BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën’, C-
150/08 – Siebrand. 
54 Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 14 July 2011, ‘Paderborner Brauerei Haus Cramer KG v 
Hauptzollamt Bielefeld’, C-196/10 - Paderborner Brauerei Haus Cramer. 
55 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 12 May 2016, ‘Toorank Productions BV v Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën’, Joined Cases C-532/14 and C-533/14. 
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The jurisprudential consequences of the CJEU rulings are far-reaching. Although the 
cases referred to specific products, the Court rulings de facto provided more general 
orientations on how to interpret the classification rules with respect to new products and 
production techniques. In particular, the principle was established that in order to fall 
under CN 2206 a fermented alcoholic beverage should maintain the characteristics of 
smell, taste and appearance of the fruit or natural product from which it derives. It was 
also laid down that certain filtration processes (e.g. reverse osmosis and the like) and 
other technologies that neutralise the organoleptic characteristics typical of a fermented 
beverage, as well as the addition of distilled alcohol and other additives like sugar, 
water, cream, aromas etc. may elicit the application of CN 2208.  
 
Following the CJEU rulings, a note was added to the CNEN concerning heading CN 2206 
00 and stating that: ‘As regards the classification of fermented alcohol-based beverages 
to which distilled alcohol, water and other substances (such as syrup, various aromas 
and colourings, and, in some cases, a cream base) have been added, see the judgment 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-150/08. In accordance with the 
judgment, if those additions result in losing the taste, smell and/or appearance of a 
beverage produced from a particular fruit or natural product, that is to say a fermented 
beverage of heading 2206, classification under heading 2208 takes place’.56 Although not 
binding, this note is at the centre of various national approaches that has been 
developed to distinguish between 2206 and 2208 products. At the same time, as 
discussed further below, the underlying criteria are not of immediate implementation and 
may be differently interpreted. It is reported that the CN Committee and the competent 
Commission service are developing a regulation on this subject.57      
 
The CJEU cases are coherent with some classification opinions issued by the WCO 
Harmonised System Committee (HSC) in 2011. In three cases, the HSC concluded that 
(i) a malt beer base cleaned-up and filtered (no. 220890/4), (ii) a fermented fruit juice 
cleaned-up and filtered (no. 220890/5) and (iii) a mixture of fruit wine and cleaned up 
and filtered alcohol (no. 220890/6) should be classified under heading 2208.58 In 2012, 
the HSC made changes to the HS definition of ‘ethyl alcohol’ in order to bring its 
explanatory notes in line with its classification decisions. The industry reacted raising 
deep concerns on the implication of this decision in terms of legal uncertainties and the 
market functioning.59    
   
In conclusion, it has to be noted that on one hand the CJEU rulings effectively indicated 
how to interpret the old rules vis-à-vis new products, but on the other hand the criteria 
selected to distinguish between CN 2206 and CN 2208 remain somehow subjective - 
taste, smell, appearance60 - or indefinite (no specific thresholds or methods to determine 
the prevalent origin of the alcohol used). In this sense, the risk of disparities in the 
application of these criteria across national administrations persist, and the need for 
clearer and objective classification rules has possibly become even more pressing.  
 
                                                          
56 Explanatory notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Union, OJ C 76, 4.3.2015. 
57 At the time of writing the draft text of this new regulation was not available, so it could not be considered in 
the analysis of the baseline scenario.    
58 See decision NC 1500E1a of the Harmonised System Committee. 
59 An in-depth assessment was conducted by the FIVS-22 (Customs Classification) committee. Source: 
https://fivs.org/wm/strategicInitiatives/fivs22.htm 
60 ‘Appearance’ should be considered in relation to the intended use of the product. As written in the Court’s 
judgment C‑150/08: ‘it is important to note that the intended use of a product may constitute an objective 
criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being 
assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (…) It is common ground that 
the objective characteristics and properties of products such as those at issue in the main proceedings, 
including the form, colour and name under which they are marketed, correspond to those of a spirituous 
beverage.’ 
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 PRODUCT FEATURES AND UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CLASSIFICATION ISSUES 
 
The classification issues analysed here are essentially determined by the introduction of 
new production technologies and practices and the related development of products 
departing from the concept of ‘traditional fermented products’ that – also according to 
CJEU’s jurisprudence – was the target of Article 12. This Section briefly reviews the 
processes that proved problematic in this sense and the type of products concerned. To 
this end, we have updated the results of previous evaluations of the Directive 92/83/EEC 
with the evidence collected through fieldwork. Overall, the problematic practices 
examined are of two main kinds: (i) the use of an alcoholic base that has lost its 
essential fermented character, and (ii) the addition of alcohol of distilled origin and other 
additives to a fermented beverage.              
 
The fermented base used to produce an alcoholic beverage can be processed in various 
ways in order to obtain, among other things, the desired strength and a neutral or partly 
neutral organoleptic character. These are accepted processes - although with restrictions 
for certain types of beverages – that are intended to optimise and stabilise the taste and 
smell of the product, to compensate for the effects of weather and other crop-affecting 
events, as well as to innovate. The OIV defines as ‘Application of Membrane 
Techniques’61 the range of practices enabling the selective holding back or passing of 
some compounds in the beverage, to obtain: (i) partial dehydration (concentration); (ii) 
partial dealcoholisation; (iii) tartaric stabilisation; (iv) adjustment of acidity and pH; (v) 
reduction of the concentration of certain organic acids; (vi) reduction of the volatile 
acidity; and (vi) the management of dissolved gas.  
 
There are different types of membrane techniques that are used alone or in combination, 
in the production of a vast range of fermented beverages, known as62: (i) microfiltration, 
(ii) ultrafiltration, (iii) nanofiltration, (iv) membrane contactor, (v) reverse osmosis, and 
(vi) electromembranes processes. 
 
The result of the application of membrane techniques may qualify as ‘cleaned up’ 
alcohol, i.e. alcohol derived from a fully fermented base, which has been subjected to 
processing that strip out (part of) the components that give it an essentially fermented 
character, and may therefore be treated in accordance with CNEN note on 2206 00 
above. However, it is important to highlight that this is not automatic. The use of 
membrane techniques can be modulated so as to remove only certain undesirable 
elements without altering substantially the fermented character of the beverage. 
Similarly, the CNEN note does not make reference to specific production techniques – 
which are not even codified – but to the end-product. In other words, the application of 
membrane techniques does not per se elicit CN 2208 and also other production 
processes not involving the above techniques may lead to a CN 2208 classification.               
 
For instance, in addition to the above techniques, the alcoholic strength of a beverage 
can also be increased and controlled through cryoconcentration techniques - consisting 
in partial freezing and physical removal of the ice thus formed – and other ‘subtractive 
enrichment techniques’ for the dehydration (elimination of water) of the alcoholic 
beverage.63 Being alternative processes to fortification by addition of alcohol, some 
stakeholders affirm that the resulting beverage should be treated as a fortified product.  
 
                                                          
61 OIV, International Code of Oenological Practices, 2017 edition. Hereinafter: ‘OIV (2017)’. 
62 There is no standardised description of these novel techniques that are at the moment, in most cases, only 
generically defined. In this sense, they poorly lend themselves to become subject to any regulatory provisions. 
OIV is reportedly working on a detailed description, evidently with reference to their use in the production of 
wine and wine-based products.  
63 OIV (2017). 
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The production of ‘cleaned up’ alcohol requires heavy equipment and a process that may 
qualify as ‘industrial’. As compared to distillation, the production costs are reportedly 
higher, so the economic rationale of using ‘clean up’ alcohol for competitive advantages64 
seems tightly connected to the tax differential that may exist between fermented and 
distilled alcohol. Membrane and other concentration techniques may also be used to 
increase the overall strength of a fermented base without adding alcohol. This allows a 
higher dilution of the final product and therefore a reduction of the unit production costs, 
that add-up to the tax advantage of not fortifying with distilled alcohol.       
 
Precise information on the utilisation of ‘clean up’ and other above-described techniques 
in specific products is seldom disclosed by producers. Therefore the relevant product 
categories could only be identified by combining qualitative evidence from interviews 
with assumptions derived from the market analysis. With a certain degree of 
approximation, the following categories may seemingly include some products containing 
‘cleaned up’ or otherwise concentrated alcohol: 
 
 Low and very-low strength mixed drinks with a fermented base. This heterogeneous 
category contains a vast range of products with a fermented base of different origin 
(cider, wine, malt, other fruits and grains) typically sweetened and flavoured and 
with an alcohol strength not exceeding 10% vol (or 5.5% vol in the case of very-low 
strength products). The commercial designation of these products varies and is not 
used consistently across countries and typology of stakeholders. Malt-based 
alcopops, ‘wine coolers’, un-hopped flavoured beer, cider and fruit-wine refreshers 
etc. as well as generic low-strength ‘ready-to-drink’ and ‘pre-mixes’ may all fall into 
this category.65 
 
 Medium-strength pre-mixes and fermented drinks up to 15% vol. This category 
includes certain pre-mix cocktails with an entirely or mixed fermented base, as well 
as certain cream liqueurs and other flavoured liqueurs, like ‘licorettes’. The 
fermented base is possibly mixed with (concentrated) juices, sweeteners, 
flavourings, creams or other ingredients. Minor quantities of distilled alcohol may be 
added. 
                            
 High-strength fermented beverages. This seems to be a niche category that is 
present only in a few national markets, and consists of product with a simple 
fermented base (e.g. beetroot sugar) that are highly concentrated so as to reach a 
strength of 15-22% and flavoured, and are presented as possible low price 
alternatives to spirits like vodka or whisky. 
 
The addition of distilled alcohol is a well-established practice for several types of 
special wines and other traditional fermented beverages, and as such is regulated in 
sectoral legislation. However, alcohol is added also to mixed drinks with a fermented 
base to increase their strength. As discussed above, the economic rationale is that 
alcohol from distillation is generally cheaper to produce than from fermentation, and the 
addition of alcohol achieves the desired final strength in an easier and more flexible way. 
For these products, there are evidently no traditional practices so their tax treatment is 
entirely determined by the interpretation of the CN and excise duty classification.  
 
                                                          
64 As discussed, membrane techniques may be used for a number of production purposes, whose purposes go 
well beyond obtaining fiscal advantages.  
65 The possibility of establishing a harmonised definition of ‘alcopops’ at EU-level has been considered in the 
framework of a possible review of the mandatory labelling obligations established by Regulation (EU) No  
1169/2011. However,  the Report published by the Commission in March 2017 eventually concluded that ‘at  
this  stage,  the  Commission  therefore  sees  no  need  or  clear  added  value  for  a specific definition of 
“alcopops” for labelling purposes’. COM(2017) 58 final. 
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
42 
 
Directive 92/83/EEC clearly prohibits the addition of alcohol to beer and wine, as defined 
under Article 2 and Article 8 respectively. It allows instead OFB below 10% vol not to be 
entirely of fermented origin (below 13% in the case of sparkling OFB).66 Fortified wines 
and fortified OFBs above the prescribed threshold can be taxed as Intermediate 
Products, provided they do not exceed 22% vol. However, Directive 92/83/EEC does not 
clarify the amount of alcohol of distilled origin that can be added to a fermented base 
before the tax category changes. Similarly, the CN 2206 heading admits products not 
entirely of fermented origin67, but the permitted amount is not specified68, and the 
jurisprudence in this area (i.e. the above mentioned C-150/08 case) did not establish 
any straightforward criteria. As a result, national customs administrations adopted 
different approaches to the classification of these products, combining objective criteria 
such as the share of distilled alcohol in volumetric terms or in terms of its contribution to 
the final ABV, and the subjective criteria laid down in CNEN note 2206 00. To the extent 
the differential in the tax rates applied to Articles 12, 17 and 20 products is high, there 
remains an incentive for economic operators to exploit this ambiguity. 
 
The C-150/08 CJEU ruling, and CNEN note 2206 00, mentioned also the addition of 
water and other substances like syrup, aromas, creams etc. along with distilled alcohol, 
as a factor that might elicit the application of CN 2208. However, it is not clear whether 
the addition of these substances may be sufficient per se to classify a product as CN 
2208 or only in conjunction with the addition of distilled alcohol. The evidence from 
fieldwork suggests that the latter interpretation prevails.  
 
Another class of products that might incur in classification issues determined by the 
addition of alcohol regards beverages that contains added alcohol as a flavour-carrier 
(AFC). The use of aromas diluted in ethyl alcohol is widespread in the preparation of 
aromatised wine products. In this respect, the sectoral legislation specifies that ‘the ethyl 
alcohol used to dilute or dissolve colorants, flavourings or any other authorised additives 
used in the preparation of aromatised wine products must be of agricultural origin and 
must be used in the dose strictly necessary and is not considered as addition of alcohol 
for the purpose of production of an aromatised wine product’.69 On the other hand, 
Article 8 of the Directive prescribed that wine must be ‘entirely of fermented origin’, so a 
restrictive interpretation of this provision may in principle lead to taxing certain 
aromatised wine products as intermediate products. To address this inconsistency some 
MS have adopted national thresholds below which the addition of alcohol as a flavour-
carrier is not considered as a fortification. 
  
In the case of OFB, the issue is evidently not relevant for products below 10% vol, but it 
can make a difference in the tax treatment of products above this threshold, since Article 
12 prescribed, again, that the alcohol employed is entirely of fermented origin. Unlike 
wine, there is no EU-level legislation on aromatised OFB, so the matter is entirely left to 
MS authorities, and the risk of disparities of treatment is greater. In the case of beer, a 
similar issue emerged with spirit-flavoured products (e.g. the beer aromatised with 
tequila). In this case, Commission Regulation 1967/2005 solved the matter by 
establishing that a beer containing an ethyl alcohol flavour resulting in only 0.04% of the 
                                                          
66 Below 5.5% for MS that have enacted the option foreseen in Article 17(2).    
67 The explanatory notes and classification opinions adopted by the HS Committee relating to Heading 2206 
states: ‘All these beverages may be either naturally sparkling or artificially charged with carbon dioxide. They 
remain classified under this heading even when fortified with added alcohol or when their alcohol content has 
been increased by further fermentation, provided that they retain the character of products classified under 
this heading.’ 
68 When goods are prima facie classifiable under two or more headings, the CN rules require that classification 
is effectuated as follows: ‘mixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or made up of different 
components, and goods put up in sets for retail sale, (…), shall be classified as if they consisted of the material 
or component which gives them their essential character, in so far as this criterion is applicable’. 
69 Regulation 251/2014. 
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product ABV can be still classified as CN 2203. Some MS have reportedly adopted higher 
threshold for the addition of alcohol as a flavour-carrier to beer.          
 
 THE CHALLENGE OF ANALYTICAL METHODS  
 
The difficulties of determining the criteria for classifying products containing ‘cleaned up’ 
alcohol or a mix of a fermented and a distilled base, are compounded by the more 
fundamental difficulty for customs laboratories of determining analytically the presence 
and the amount of ‘cleaned up’ or distilled alcohol within a finished product. Nine years 
ago, a working group consisting of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), DG TAXUD, and 
eleven Member States custom laboratories was set up with a view to providing scientific 
support on two fundamental questions70:  
 
i) The extent to which a fermented product may be subjected to a ‘cleaning-up’ 
process (ultra-filtration, reverse osmosis, etc.) and be classified as a 
fermented beverage, intermediate product or ethyl alcohol for excise 
purposes. 
ii) The amount of ethyl alcohol that could be added to a fermented beverage 
before it becomes a product of CN code 2208. 
 
The results of the work of the JRC working group were not encouraging. With respect to 
analytical methods allowing for the differentiation between ‘fermented’ and ‘distilled’ 
(‘non-fermented’) beverages, the report concluded that it would be extremely difficult or 
even impossible to create workable models based on analytical methods, and that 
difficulties would be greater precisely with those categories that are the most 
problematic for excise classification purposes. On the issue of 'added alcohol' the 
working group affirmed that it was not plausible to determine the amount through an 
analysis of the finished product only. In this sense, the issue at stake with certain 
products is not limited to possible tax circumvention but includes also the risk of fraud.     
 
Over the years, the analytical capacities of customs has clearly evolved, and most MS 
have established methodologies and protocols for determining the nature of the alcohol 
contained in new products. In particular, various MS have set up procedures to detect 
with a reasonable degree of precision the presence of the by-products of fermentation in 
finished products and their concentration. However, the methods and the criteria vary 
across MS and is therefore possible that the same test carried out in different context 
leads to different outcomes. This may have relevant market and tax implications when 
such test is linked to the adoption of a Binding Tariff Information decision.                     
 
 
2.1.4 Baseline assessment 
 
2.1.4.1 Scope of the analysis  
 
In this Section, we provide a more in-depth review of the products that might cause, for 
different reasons, classification issues. The starting point of the analysis are the four 
categories of problematic products identified in the Ramboll Evaluation.71 The Ramboll 
analysis remains valid, but in order to match with the legal categories defined in the 
Directive and the structure of the market data available, we have used in this Study 
                                                          
70 JRC Scientific and Technical Reports, ‘Analysis and Characterisation of Alcoholic Products (ACAP)’, Fiscalis 
Project Group, Final Report, 2008. 
71 I.e. (i) RTD products (also known as ‘alcopops’), (ii) Medium-strength fermented beverages between 10-
15% ABV, (iii) Fermented alcohol pushed to 15-21% industrially, bottled and sold to look like its equivalent, 
higher rate spirit, (iv) Other products such wine to which flavours containing alcohol have been added, beer to 
which alcohol of distilled origin is added, sparkling wine, and cooking wine which contains additional ingredients 
other than alcohol. 
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partly different definitions and segmentation of the problematic products. In particular, 
the classes of beverages that may contain problematic products include:       
   
1) Mixed drinks, including a variety of products also referred to as ‘alcopops’, 
ready-to-drink (RTD), pre-mixes etc. with an alcohol strength varying from very 
low (up to 5,5% vol) to low (up to 10% vol). When totally or partly based on a 
fermented beverage, these products may fall under Article 12, except in MS that 
have enacted Article 17(2) allowing to tax OFB with an ABV exceeding 5.5.% vol 
(8.5% vol for sparkling products) as Intermediate Product (in our sample only 
Italy). Medium-strength (up to 15% vol) and high-strength (up to 22% vol) 
mixed drinks also exist (although as a niche), but their classification issue is 
different, since they may fall in the border between Intermediate Products (Article 
17) and Ethyl Alcohol (Article 20) category. An exception is medium-strength 
mixed drinks entirely of fermented origin, which may still be classified under 
Article 12. However, these products are very rare and therefore negligible for the 
purpose of our analysis.72    
 
2) Medium/high strength beverages with a fermented base, with 10-15% vol 
(medium) or 15-22% vol (high). It consists of flavoured fermented beverages, 
possibly with a cleaned-up and/or a base of concentrated fermented alcohol, 
which have typically the appearance of higher strength liqueurs or spirits (e.g. 
‘licorettes’, certain cream-liqueurs, vodka or whisky). In some cases they may 
also contain added alcohol. As discussed, the distinction with the above medium-
strength mixed drinks with an entirely fermented base is blurred, since both 
classes of products can be classified (or aim at being classified) as Intermediate 
Products.     
 
3) Cider, perry and fruit wines. While these products do not constitute per se a 
problematic category, the lack of a clear and harmonised definition at EU level 
may cause uncertainties in the proper classification of non-traditional products 
with characteristics similar to RTD. So, part of them may present the same issues 
as the above mixed drinks. 
 
4) Aromatised beverages (wine, beer, cider etc.) containing added alcohol as a 
flavour-carrier.73 
 
With the exception of the 4th group, for which a different approach is required (see 
Section 2.1.5.2), it can be noted that all problematic products are potentially on the 
border between CN 2206 and CN 2208, and as such may fall under Article 12 or Article 
17 of the Directive or – if CN 2208 prevails – under Article 20. In other words, it is the 
‘OFB cluster’ in broad sense that is at stake in this Study. The articulated composition of 
this cluster, and the boundaries between the various segments is shown in Table 12 
below. The ‘core’ of the cluster is formed by cider, perry and other fruit wines and mixed 
drinks with a fermented base. The CN 2206 heading covers also beer mixes – intended 
as the mix of beer and a non-alcoholic beverage (taxed under Article 2) – ‘piquette’, 
which is wine according to Regulation 1308/2013, and aromatised wine-based drinks and 
                                                          
72 Out of 234 brands of mixed drinks analysed in-depth, only one product seemingly belonged to the group of 
medium-strength OFB with an entirely fermented base.    
73 The Ramboll Evaluation included in this residual group also sparkling wine (because of the disparities in the 
definitions used for excise purposes or customs purposes) and cooking wine with additional non-alcoholic 
ingredients. These issues have been discarded from the present Study at the inception phase following the 
clarifications provided by the Commission’s Inter-Service Steering Group. In fact, the disparities in the 
definition of sparkling wine are being discussed and addressed by the Customs Code Committee, while a new 
CN Explanatory Note has been recently published (OJ C 92/9 of 24.03.2017) classifying explicitly cooking wine 
and all cooking alcohols under CN 2103 90 90 i.e. outside of Chapter 22.  
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cocktails below 7% vol.74 For comprehensiveness, Table 12 also shows that certain 
mixed drinks and OFB with alcohol added and/or with a ‘cleaned-up’ base may be 
classified as CN 2208 – hence taxed under Article 20 - instead of CN 2206, as a results 
of the abovementioned CJEU jurisprudence.      
 
Table 12 – The OFB ‘cluster’ of products and the applicable tax categories 
(corresponding Articles of the Directive) 
CN 2205 / 2206 2206 2208 
Product 
AW-product 
cocktail 
AW-based drink Piquette Cider, perry Other  
        Still Spark.  
     Flav. Trad. 
Beer 
mixes 
MD / OFB MD / OFB 
base 
% vol  
efo efo aa efo efo efo efo aa efo aa 
aa /  
clean-up 
0.5%-1.2%  
  
   
2 
     
4.5%  
12.1 12.1 12.1 
12.1 
12.1 
12.2 
12.2 
20 
5.5% 12.1 
12.1 
12.1 
7.0%   
12.1* 8.5% 
8** 
8** 
12.1* 
10.0%  12.2* 
13.0%  17.1 
17.1 
 
14.5%     
15.0%    17.1 17.1 
22.0%    17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1   
>22%     20 20  20 20 20 20 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of the existing legislation and commentaries provided by some trade 
associations. In some borderline areas not explicitly covered by legislation the information reflects the Author’s 
interpretation. 
Legend: the numbers displayed in the cells of the diagram refer to the applicable Article of the Directive. AW: 
aromatised wine; MD: mixed drink; flav.: flavoured; trad.: traditional / non-flavoured; ‘efo’: entirely of 
fermented origin; ‘aa’: alcohol added. (*): in accordance with Article 17(2) some MS may consider these 
products as Intermediate Products; (**): these products are under CN 2205 heading.         
Notes: the ‘% vol’ column displays only the upper limit for each ABV class considered. So the ‘4.5%’ class 
comprises products with an ABV exceeding 1.2% (upper limit of the lower class) and not exceeding 4.5%.   
In principle, Article 12 may apply also to CN 2204 products other than those displayed, which do not comply 
with Article 8 definition. However, to the best of our knowledge the issue has negligible relevance. 
It has been assumed that all CN 2205 products fit into one of the three categories of Reg. 251/2014. According 
to some stakeholders, this may not always be the case, however for the purpose of this analysis this seems an 
acceptable approximation. 
 
For the purpose of this Study the concept of ‘OFB cluster’ shown in the above Table is 
fundamental. ‘OFB products’ exist in both the customs and the excise duty classifications 
but the two classifications do not coincide and there are products that are not captured 
by the existing definitions. In this sense, there are ‘fiscal’ OFB that comes under CN 
2205, and ‘customs’ OFB that are taxed under Article 17 (IP). Moreover, there are 
fermented beverages that according to the CJEU criteria may be classified as CN 2208 
and taxed under Article 20, despite being similar to other mainstream OFB. These 
blurred boundaries are the core of our assessment. For this reason, in this Study 
the term ‘OFB’ typically refers to the ‘OFB cluster’, which does not necessarily coincide 
with CN 2206 (‘customs OFB’) or Article 12 (‘fiscal OFB’) category of products.        
 
 
                                                          
74 Above this threshold these products would fall under CN 2205, as established in the additional note 8 of the 
CN code, but in the case of certain fortified wine-based drinks Article12 may still apply. 
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2.1.4.2  Analysis of market trends  
 
 MIXED DRINKS  
 
In this Study, ‘mixed drinks’ (MD) designates a commercial (non-legal) category of 
products consisting of a blend of a CN 220675 and/or CN 2208 products with another 
beverage (alcoholic or non-alcoholic) and/or water, sugar, aromas or other substances. 
The result is a ‘ready-to-drink’ (RTD) beverage with a strength that varies from less than 
5.5% vol (‘light’ mixed drinks, as the majority of ‘alcopops’), to 10% (most of RTD ‘long 
drinks’), and up to 15% (typically pre-mix cocktails). Certain mixed drinks can be found 
also above this threshold, but these drinks are a niche market. In principle, the category 
of mixed drinks does not include OFB like cider, perry, fruit-wines etc., but as discussed 
further below in some cases the distinction is blurred, especially for products flavoured 
and/or with added alcohol.    
 
The overall data on the mixed drink markets are drawn from IWSR database, which 
further distinguishes between flavoured alcoholic beverages (FABs), long drinks, and 
pre-mix cocktails. However, these sub-categories have been redefined over time so 
there are breaks in time series. Furthermore, the IWSR classification does not always 
coincide with the CN and excise duty classification. For this reason, we have re-classified 
all mixed drinks covered by IWSR into sub-groups based on alcohol strength and type of 
alcohol base, which are the two main variables to determine the tax treatment. The 
analysis has been conducted on the six sample MS selected, then extrapolated at EU 
level, using IWSR top-line data. The methodology required web research on a 
representative sample of 234 products, representing almost 90% of the mixed drinks 
market in the sample MS. Findings and assumptions were cross-checked through 
interviews with stakeholders (where available) and the analysis of selling prices.   
 
The outcome of the exercise (Table 13 and Table 14 below) provides a general estimate 
of the market trends for mixed drinks in the EU, but have to be taken with some caution 
for two main reasons. First, the alcohol base used in a mixed drink is typically not 
disclosed. The fact that a certain product contains e.g. rum or vodka does not prevent 
that also fermented alcohol is included (in unknown proportion). This may eventually 
determine if the product comes under CN 2206 or CN 2208.76 Secondly, the same 
product may be commercialised in different MS with different formulas or alcohol 
strengths. These characteristics may also vary over time, since mixed drinks typically 
have a short life-cycle and are modified every few seasons. Changes may be driven by 
consumers’ preferences but also by ‘tax optimisation’ opportunities.  
  
Table 13 – Market trends for mixed drinks, in million litres (2003-2016 and forecast 
growth rate for 2017) 
MS [2003] 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 F2017 CAGR 
2003-
2016 
CAGR 
2010-
2016 
DE 81.41 14.00 18.53 21.56 22.57 23.12 23.90 25.79 3.5% -8% 5% 
FI 25.90 48.78 50.63 48.17 39.50 38.00 34.70 31.94 -11.1% 2% -3% 
FR 25.26 11.15 11.09 10.32 9.95 10.57 10.72 9.88 -1.6% -7% -1% 
IT 50.40 29.77 29.79 26.86 23.85 21.89 20.19 19.40 -3.5% -7% -3% 
NL 20.43 9.23 9.48 9.82 9.68 8.94 9.29 9.90 2.3% -5% 1% 
RO 0.31 0.72 0.86 0.87 0.64 0.60 0.29 0.32 3.2% 0% -6% 
EU 517.41 300.39 303.11 283.11 256.07 244.39 232.59 221.91 -4.1% -6% -2% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR data. 
Note: The CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) is the mean annual growth rate over the time period 
considered. 
 
                                                          
75 In a few special cases, also CN 2205.  
76 In the absence of a BTI, national authorities may have different positions in this regard. 
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Table 14 – Estimated distribution of mixed drinks by ABV strength (in million litres), and 
alcoholic base (2016)   
ABV 
strength 
DE FI FR IT NL RO 6 MS 
aver. 
EU Ferm. 
% 
(EU) 
Ferm. 
amount  
(EU) 
Very low 
<= 5.5% 
vol 
8.91 31.66 3.87 3.40 4.27 0.29 54% 119.40 61.7% 73.64 
Low 
<= 10% 
vol 
14.30 0.23 0.00 15.82 5.40 0.03 34% 74.48 6.4% 4.76 
Medium 
<= 15% 
vol 
2.05 0.04 2.44 0.13 0.23 0.00 6% 13.62 15.4% 2.55 
High 
>15% 
vol 
0.52 0.00 3.57 0.05 0.00 0.00 6% 14.40 <0.1% <0.01 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR data. 
Notes: the distribution of products across ABV strength categories is based on a sample of 234 products, 
which represent 90% of the market size according to IWSR. Then, the distribution observed has been extended 
to the entire mixed drinks category ‘pro quota’. The EU-level distribution is estimated using the average 
proportion among the ABV strength categories of the six sample MS (simple average). 
The ‘Ferm.’ data refer to the amount and share of mixed drink with a fermented base or a mixed fermented / 
distilled base likely to be classified CN 2206. The estimate is based on an analysis of the above sample of 234 
products in the six sample MS and, given the absence of official data, is subject to a high degree of 
approximation. The ‘EU %’ is calculated as the simple average of the distributions estimated for the six sample 
MS, assuming it is representative of the entire EU market. The amount in million litres derives from the 
estimated percentages per ABV strength category. 
 
The market trends displayed in the above Tables show a general decline in the 
consumption of mixed drinks, both in the long (2003-16) and medium (2010-16) terms. 
The estimated overall sales in the EU have fallen from more than 500 million (‘mn’) litres 
in 2003 to some 300 mn in 2010 and further down to ca. 222 mn last year. The trend 
was uneven across countries: (i) in IT, FR and NL the decline was steady, although in FR 
and NL it was more marked in the earlier period, and since 2010 the market is 
fluctuating; (ii) in DE there was a steep drop after the introduction of the ‘alcopop’ tax in 
2003, now the market is catching up thanks to the introduction of fermented-based 
mixed drinks; (iii) RO and FI followed opposite trends, with a steady growth until 2011-
12 followed by a quite rapid decline.77 The outlook for the near future is negative, and 
the EU market is overall set to further decline at a -2% rate per annum. The 
stakeholders’ views collected via OPC are only slightly more optimistic: according to the 
industry, RTDs are mostly stable, while individual respondents perceived an increase in 
the spirit-based RTDs.  
 
The geographical concentration of markets is moderately lower than before. In 2003, the 
three main markets (UK, DE and IT) accounted alone to some 70% of the EU market, 
while in 2016 the aggregated volume of sales in the three biggest markets (UK, DE, and 
FI) amounted to some 53%. Finland is the singularity of the distribution. Low-strength 
long drinks RTD are extremely popular in the country. The consumption per capita 
exceeds 6 litres / year.78 For comparison, in the UK – which is still the biggest market for 
mixed drinks – the per capita consumption amounts to less than one litre / year.   
 
                                                          
77 The estimates provided here somehow differ from the market data contained in the Ramboll Evaluation, 
which were based on Euromonitor instead of IWSR database. As discussed, ‘mixed drinks’ is not a legally 
defined category, so market estimates may vary according to the definition used and the classification 
methodology. The main discrepancy regards the German market that, according to Euromonitor, amounted to 
an overall 110 mn litres in 2014 (instead of 23). However, the definition used in the Ramboll report includes 
also some 75 mn of wine-based RTD, that IWSR likely classified among aromatised wine products (under the 
‘wine’ heading). On the other hand, spirit-based RTDs are estimated by Ramboll some 16 mn, which is 
perfectly in line with our estimate provided in Table 14. 
78 To which part of the Estonian 1.5 mn litres sales should be added, due to the intense cross-border shopping 
between the two countries. 
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Based on our analysis of a large sample of products, very low strength mixed drinks with 
an ABV below 5.5% account for more than half of the category (54%). Products between 
5.5% and 10% vol represent approximately one-third of the total (34%) and the 
remaining 12% is evenly divided between medium-strength (10% - 15% vol) or high-
strength (> 15%) beverages, typically certain pre-mix cocktails. A significant variance 
exists across countries, so these estimates have to be taken with some caution. The 
distribution often follows the opportunities, for instance: (i) in Finland products below 
4.7% vol may be sold in supermarkets, so most of ‘long-drinks’ fall under this threshold; 
(ii) similarly in NL, products above 15% vol may be sold only in authorised liquor shops, 
so products right below this ABV threshold have proliferated; (iii) in France there is both 
the ‘pre-mix tax’ affecting products below 12% vol and an extra charge on products 
exceeding 18% vol, so there are various mixed cocktails falling in this ABV window. 
Notably, the same brands of mixed drinks sometimes have different ABV strength in 
different countries. Moreover, as discussed below, the sales of mixed drinks is related 
with national consumption habits of other products, so the ‘low-strength’ category is 
nearly nil in France, where AWP aperitifs are very popular. In Germany, the ‘very low’ 
category has to compete with a wide offer of fruit-wine drinks.  
 
The fermented or spirit-based nature of products was more difficult to assess. The 
labelling information may partly help, especially for products that are entirely of one 
kind, but the possible blend of fermented and distilled alcohol in the same product had to 
be inferred triangulating interview information, miscellaneous web sources, and an 
analysis of the price and possible tax-bearing capacity of products. Ultimately, the 
distinction that is of relevance for this Study is between products that are treated as CN 
2206 or as CN 2208. But since the uncertainty of this distinction is precisely the reason 
why the matter is being examined, it is evident that our attribution entails a certain 
margin of error. This is even more probable, since a qualitative review of the EBTI 
database showed that there are products with apparently similar descriptions that are 
classified differently across MS (see Box 5 below). 
 
The results of the analysis of the alcohol base used in mixed drinks relate only to the EU 
level, since the number and type of observations available at country level were too 
heterogeneous to formulate robust statements at such level. Overall, we have estimated 
that about 36.5% of the mixed drinks market (in volume of end-products) is made of 
products with a complete or partial fermented base sufficient to be classified as CN 2206 
and taxed under Article 12 (OFB), or Article 17 (IP) for products exceeding 10% vol. The 
rest is presumably entirely or prevalently spirit-based beverages, classified as CN 2208, 
and taxed under Article 20 (ethyl alcohol). The share of CN 2206 mixed drinks seem 
higher below 5.5% vol – where Article 12 regime is ‘guaranteed’; smaller in the 5.5%-
10% vol range, which some MS may consider as Intermediate Products in line with 
Article 17(2)79 and where special taxes on mixed drinks hit the most; and moderate in 
the 10-15% vol range, where there could be greater tax incentives to compete with 
spirit-based products. The market volume of fermented mixed drinks above 15% vol is 
negligible.                                                       
 
 MEDIUM/HIGH STRENGTH BEVERAGES  
 
The second category of products that potentially pose classification challenges includes 
medium / high strength beverages (i.e. 10% to 15% vol, or 15% to 22% vol) with an 
entirely fermented base or including added alcohol (in which case the distinction with 
mixed drinks become blurred). The category described here does not include traditional 
Intermediate Products like fortified wine or aromatised wine products which are clearly 
regulated, and it should only comprise of ‘borderline’ products, i.e. products that might 
                                                          
79 It has to be considered also that a mixed beverage of 9-10% vol is difficult to obtain using only fermented 
alcohol, and probably requires some concentration process.     
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take advantage of classification ambiguities to obtain a more favourable tax-treatment. 
The category includes so-called ‘licorettes’, as well as a various range of similar products 
for which there is no specific, commercial denomination.    
 
This category of products is at the basis of the CJEU landmark classification disputes C-
150/08, C-532/14 and C-533/14, which regarded respectively a range of liqueurs with a 
mixed fermented and distilled base, and an alcoholic strength of 14% vol, and a cleaned-
up fermented beverage – denominated ‘Ferm Fruit’ - to be consumed either undiluted or 
as a base in other beverages of 14% vol. The CJEU rulings evidently put a major 
stumbling block on this type of beverages, but the evidence from interviews suggests 
that ‘licorettes’ and other flavoured liqueurs with a fermented base are still on the 
market, although their prevalence across countries and product categories is difficult to 
estimate precisely. In a few cases, the entirely fermented nature of the beverage was 
clearly indicated on the label or was retrieved through commercial platforms and 
interviews with distributors. In other cases, we have tried to infer it comparing the price 
and characteristics with other products in the same categories, discounting the 
applicable excise duty. The underlying assumption, which was confirmed in all interviews 
with stakeholders, is that ‘borderline’ products are generally found in the ‘value’ segment 
of the market, where tax optimisation is more important than for premium brands.  
 
During fieldwork, we have also collected evidence of entirely fermented beverages with a 
strength up to 21% that are placed on the market as end-products80, or traded in bulk 
for subsequent dilution and preparation of various beverages. According to some sectoral 
experts, it can be assumed that this type of products have undergone reverse osmosis or 
other alcohol concentration processes in order to reach such a high ABV. The issues are 
of two kinds: (i) in the case of end-products, there seems to be diverging views across 
MS on how to treat them tax-wise; (ii) in the case of bulk products, the classification of 
the beverages produced from these bases may be uncertain. Unfortunately, trade data 
on this ‘niche’ typology are unavailable so only a qualitative assessment was possible.    
 
Table 15 below provides an overview of the market trends for flavoured spirits, which is 
the broader category that probably includes the ‘borderline’ products described above. 
The following Table 16 reports the result of our in-depth analysis of a sample of 116 
products aimed at identifying those possibly having a possible fermented base and thus 
classifiable as Intermediate Products and at estimating their volume in the six sample 
MS and at EU level. 
 
Table 15 – Market trends for flavoured spirits, in million litres (2003-2016 and forecast 
growth rate for 2017)  
MS [2003] 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 F2017 CAGR 
2003-
2016 
CAGR 
2010-
2016 
DE 150.13 148.95 149.12 143.15 143.25 140.99 138.69 139.52 0.2% -0.6% -1.1% 
FI 4.09 4.71 4.71 4.38 4.23 3.86 3.81 3.83 -0.2% -0.5% -3.4% 
FR 176.29 147.42 145.33 136.07 134.50 130.47 127.73 126.04 -1.1% -2.5% -2.6% 
IT 76.72 77.53 77.94 74.53 72.49 73.97 72.81 72.57 -1.1% -0.4% -1.1% 
NL 24.36 24.84 24.30 24.07 23.70 21.94 20.63 19.66 -3.7% -1.6% -3.8% 
RO 76.01 73.29 71.75 70.09 69.49 66.75 64.69 64.28 -5.2% -1.3% -2.2% 
EU 797.95 777.27 773.85 748.89 743.35 723.14 708.41 704.37 -0.7% -1.0% -1.6% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR data. 
Note: The CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) is the mean annual growth rate over the time period 
considered. 
 
                                                          
80 In the Ramboll Evaluation, these products were defined as ‘fermented alcohol pushed to 15-21% industrially, 
bottled and sold to look like its equivalent, higher rate spirit’.  
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Table 16 – Estimated consumption of medium/high strength beverages with a 
fermented base (2016)   
 DE FI FR IT NL RO EU 
MHS Ferm. (million litres) 6.12 1.00 14.10 4.08 4.43 4.56 72.94 
as a % of Flavoured Spirits 4.4% 26.1% 11.2% 5.6% 22.5% 7.1% 10.4% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR data. 
Legend: MHS Ferm.: medium/high strength beverages with a fermented base (other than wine and beer).  
Notes: the IWSR sub-categories that entered this analysis included: bitter/spirits aperitifs, coffee liqueur, 
cream liqueur, licorettes, advokaat/egg liqueur, ponche / cremas, rabarbaro, liqueur ranges, other spirit 
aperitifs, and other liqueur. The residual ‘other’ categories account for the majority of the supposed MHS Ferm, 
followed by liqueur ranges and licorettes. In the other categories the amounts of MHS Ferm are marginal. 
Based on a sample of 116 products representing 73% of the market for the identified categories. In the first 
step a distinction between possible MHS Ferm and products falling under CN 2208 was made, based on a 
review of label information, price and other miscellaneous information sources. The estimated share of MHS 
Ferm in our sample was then propagated to the total volume of the sub-category, then summed to the other 
sub-categories. Then the share of MHS Ferm on the macro-category of flavoured spirits is estimated for each 
country. The simple average of these measures was applied to the total EU market of flavoured spirits (Table 
15) to estimate the total EU market of MHS Ferm. 
 
Market data indicate that the overall Flavoured Spirit category of product has been 
slowly but steadily declining for many years. From nearly 800 mn litres in 2003 sales 
have seemingly decreased to ca. 700 mn litres in 2016. This process was seemingly 
faster in recent years in NL and FI than in DE or IT, and the short-term perspectives are 
similar. Looking into sub-products, all types of beverages have been declining except the 
bitter / spirit aperitifs whose increased consumption have partly compensated losses in 
other categories like liqueurs and aniseed beverages. As discussed, estimating the share 
of products possibly classified as CN 2206 required some strong assumptions, so results 
have to be taken with great caution. Country-level data have limited significance due to 
the high margins of error, but overall the exercise led to formulating an EU-level 
assumption that seems plausible for further analysis. According to it, some 73 mn litres 
of medium/high strength beverages with a fermented base (other than wine and beer) 
are possibly traded in the EU every year.  
 
The existence of such products is confirmed through other ways by the analysis of the 
BTI decisions taken in different MS (see Box 5). More details on the individual products 
are difficult to gather since, as said, the category seems to mainly consist of a long tail 
of minor brands (often ‘private label’ products) with limited sales volumes and a quite 
short life-cycle.    
     
 CIDER, PERRY AND FRUIT WINES   
 
Cider is defined in several MS legislation but not at the EU level. The CN classification 
distinguishes at the 8-digit level between cider & perry and other fermented beverages, 
while there is no reference at all to cider in Directive 92/83/EEC. The definition of cider 
as well as of perry and other fruit wines, and the admitted practices, vary greatly across 
countries, so that a product that is considered cider in one country may be treated as a 
generic OFB in another one. Since the customs tariff and the excise duty category 
generally does not change (with the exceptions of FR and RO), the issue has however 
limited implications in this regard. Instead, definition matters for commercial 
denomination and labelling aspects: i.e. French cidre, Spanish sidra, German apfelwein, 
Romanian cidru etc. are regulated denominations that can be used only by products 
meeting certain requirements. Other OFB products may still be placed on these market 
using the generic term ‘cider’ (in English). 
 
The IWSR database seemingly adopts a pragmatic approach to cider definition, and 
whatever is marketed as cider is recorded as such, regardless of specific national 
denomination rules. This entails that the IWSR market data reported in Table 17 may 
actually include an heterogeneous range of beverages, which may differ, inter alia, by: 
(i) raw materials (apple, pears, other fruits and blends of them, etc.); (ii) production 
processes (minimum amount of fresh juice, addition of sugar and syrup, carbonation, 
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‘ice cider’ etc.); (iii) alcohol strength (there is a ‘cap’ at 8.5% vol in SE, FI, UK, but not 
in BE, IE etc.); and (iv) possible flavourings. The addition of alcohol for fortification 
purposes is generally not admitted, but it can be used in some contexts as a flavour-
carrier. 
 
It has to be noted that the IWSR estimates do not always match with market estimates 
collected at national level. For instance, in the case of Germany, the IWSR estimates are 
lower than the estimates reported by the national trade association on apfelwein and 
related products.81 For the overall coherence of the exercise it seems nonetheless 
preferable to use one single source of data rather than a patchwork of different national 
sources.82 
 
Table 17 – Market trends for cider, in million litres (2003-2016 and forecast growth rate 
2017)  
MS [2003] 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 F2017 CAGR 
2003 
2016 
CAGR 
2010 
2016 
DE 42.40 43.50 44.50 45.00 45.50 45.50 45.00 46.00 1.6% 0.6% 0.9% 
FI 54.49 50.00 47.25 43.50 36.20 34.12 29.55 27.00 -6.3% -5.3% -9.8% 
FR 113.39 92.79 89.09 87.99 87.99 87.49 85.47 81.49 -1.7% -2.5% -2.1% 
IT .. 0.10 0.12 0.22 0.35 0.47 0.60 0.72 13.8% n/a 39.1% 
NL .. 1.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.40 4.70 5.20 5.8% n/a 23.0% 
RO .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.93 25.4% n/a n/a 
EU 974.93 1103.72 1112.15 1139.66 1167.69 1227.33 1217.06 1236.89 1.18% 1.8% 1.9% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR data. 
Note: The CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) is the mean annual growth rate over the time period 
considered. 
 
The geographical distribution of cider consumption in the EU is highly skewed. A few 
countries with a solid tradition of cider-making – including UK, IE, FR, ES, DE (including 
fruit wines) FI, and the Baltic states – constitute 93% of the total European market. The 
UK alone consumes two thirds of the total. In recent years, cider has gained some 
popularity in MS that had no significant tradition, like RO, PL, CZ, HU, PT and the NL. In 
absolute terms, the level of consumption is still modest, but it is growing at a very fast 
rate. This growth compensates the opposite trend registered in some cider traditional 
countries: in France consumption dropped from 113 mn in 2003 to 82 mn last year; in 
Finland the decline was even faster, close to -10% on an annual basis. The result of 
these opposite dynamics is a slow, steady growth at EU level of 1-2% per year. This is 
confirmed by most OPC of respondents, for whom cider consumption is mostly stable, 
except for some industry players who see a moderate increase.     
 
Interestingly, the recent success of cider in countries with no established tradition is 
mostly due to a few mainstream brands introduced by big international manufacturers 
rather than to local market development. These products are generally more in line with 
the more ‘permissive’ definitions of cider - as regards the minimum amount of fresh juice 
and other substances added - and they would not qualify as real cider according, e.g., to 
the Romanian or French definitions. The matter is discussed further in the following 
Sections, but it is useful to anticipate that for the purpose of the market analysis it is 
very difficult to draw a line between what is a ‘traditional’ or ‘real’ cider and what is a 
cider-like beverage, ‘white cider’ or an OFB containing apple flavour.  
 
                                                          
81 Source: VdFw, ‘Arbeitsbericht’, 2017. The overall fruit wine and fruit wine cocktails cluster is estimated at 75 
mn litres per year, of which cider and perry would amount to 37 mn.    
82 According to AICV estimates (based on Canadean market intelligence), also the Finnish market is greater 
than in IWSR estimates: i.e. 40 mn. Finnish THL provides an in-between estimate of 35 mn of litres. The same 
for NL that according to Canadean consumes 7.7 mn litres per year. In the case of RO, instead, Canadean 
provides a much smaller figure (7.8 mn), but the IWSR data seem more in-line with industry estimates 
collected during the fieldwork (16 mn). The estimates for France are coherent.     
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For analytical purposes, we have anyway attempted to differentiate between ‘traditional’ 
cider – as variously defined across MS – and other ‘mass-market’ products based on 
cider (or other OFB). Since according to certain national definitions the latter would not 
qualify as cider in strict sense, in this Study we designate them as ‘borderline’ cider. In 
this respect, it must be highlighted that, unlike mixed drinks and the ‘borderline’ OFB 
and IP described above, ‘borderline’ cider are arguably not designed to obtain a more 
favourable tax treatment, since both traditional and non-traditional products fall in any 
case in the OFB (Article 12) category. The economic rationale of ‘borderline’ cider seems 
lower production costs, through the possible use of concentrated juice, sugar, water etc.   
 
Of the six MS in our sample, IT and NL are minor cider markets, so the distinction has 
limited relevance. The situation in the other four MS seems skewed: (i) in France, 
traditional cidre seems the overwhelming majority;83 (ii) in Germany, the legal definition 
is a bit more permissive so it is possible that a certain share of the market (estimated at 
about one-third) correspond to the ‘borderline’ category; (iii) in Romania and Finland the 
overwhelming majority of ciders seem of the ‘borderline’ type. Extrapolating these 
estimates to the EU level requires some caution, not only for the margins of error in the 
attribution of products to the two sub-groups, but also since the sample MS represent 
only 15% of the total cider consumed in the EU, due to the big outlier, the UK, which 
account for two-thirds of the total EU cider. Based on our market analysis, the 
‘borderline’ cider in the sample MS amounts to an estimated 36%, i.e. some 65 mn 
litres. Assuming a similar incidence of ‘borderline’ cider across the EU, the amount of 
‘borderline’ cider would amount to approximately 152 mn litres - without the UK - or 435 
mn litres including the UK.        
 
 PRODUCTS CONTAINING ALCOHOL AS FLAVOUR-CARRIER   
 
The last category of products that potentially poses classification challenges are 
fermented beverages of all kinds (beer, wine, cider, fruit-wines) that are flavoured with 
aromas diluted in ethyl alcohol. As discussed, the Directive definitions exclude the 
possibility of adding alcohol to these beverage (except for OFB below a certain ABV), 
therefore a strict interpretation of it would in principle lead to categorise several 
aromatised beverages as Intermediate Products. In practice, this seldom happens since 
EU and national sectoral legislation and administrative rules have established ‘safe 
havens’ for the addition of minimal amounts of alcohol for exclusive flavouring (and not 
fortification) purposes. In some cases, explicit limits have been set, in others it is left to 
case-by-case decisions.  
 
From a market analysis perspective it turned out unfeasible to determine with a 
sufficient degree of accuracy which products contain alcohol as a flavour carrier (AFC) 
and which ones do not, since this is not used as a differentiating criterion in any of the 
existing classifications. Similarly, customs administrations and trade associations were in 
general not able to provide estimates because under a certain threshold there is no 
requirement to declare this addition.  
 
Against this background, only hypothetical scenarios about the size of the market of 
these products can be drawn. To this end, Table 18 below shows the market trends for 
certain product categories (commercially defined) that may contain an unknown share of 
products flavoured with aromas diluted in ethyl alcohol. The analysis is limited to AWP 
and flavoured beer. OFB is not included since under 10% vol the addition of alcohol is in 
any case permitted and above this threshold flavoured cider or fruit wines are rare. The 
three hypothetical scenarios drawn in Table 18 assume that the share of products 
possibly using alcohol as a flavour-carrier is respectively (i) 25%, (ii) 50%, or (iii) 75%.     
                                                          
83 Our assessment based on IWSR data was confirmed by the French trade associations, which estimate 
traditional cider above 95%.   
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Table 18 – Market size of product categories possibly containing alcohol as a flavour 
carrier  
Categories 6 MS EU 
Ratio  
6 MS / EU 
CAGR*** 
Share (%) of products containing 
AFC - hypothetical scenarios 
I - 25% II - 50% III - 75% 
 mn litres mn litres  2014-17 mn litres mn litres mn litres 
Flavoured Beer* 224.9 554.1 41% 12.6% 138.5 277.1 415.6 
Vermouth** 43.4 101.7 43% -3.2% 25.4 50.8 76.3 
Other flavoured 
still wine 
82.7 189.2 44% 8.2% 47.3 94.6 141.9 
Other flavoured 
sparkling wine 
5.6 10.5 53% 9.7% 2.6 5.3 7.9 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR data 
Note: (*) radler beer is not included; (**) vermouth is typically fortified, so only a small share of this category 
seems relevant for the issue at stake; (***) the CAGR includes IWSR’s forecast for 2017.  
 
The market data above show that the most important category for both size and growth 
rate is flavoured beer. Approximately half billion litres of flavoured beer (not considering 
radler beer) was consumed in the EU in 2016, of which approximately half in the six 
sample MS. The compounded growth rate in this segment amounts to a significant 
12.6% per year. Based on stakeholders’ views, spirit-flavoured beer, like beer 
aromatised with rum or tequila, represents a high share of this category. As discussed, 
these products were addressed by Regulation 1967/2005 and therefore do not pose 
classification issues.  
 
With the exception of vermouth, the market of aromatised wine products also seems to 
be growing steeply. In absolute terms, still products account for the most of it (ca. 190 
mn litres), while sparkling are still a niche (ca. 10 mn litres). Typology of products and 
patterns of consumption are highly country-related, but the six MS considered seemingly 
provide a fairly robust representation of the overall EU consumption.  
 
2.1.4.3  Excise Duty Treatment and Regulatory Measures 
 
 EXCISE DUTY LEVELS AND TRENDS  
 
The excise duty rates applied to the different categories of products are not per se in the 
scope of the impact assessment, however their respective levels and trends are 
important to consider, in order to better understand the market and the fiscal policy 
context of classification issues.      
 
The excise duty level applied in the MS have remained substantially stable over the past 
few years (Table 19). Of the six sample MS, Germany has never adjusted its rates, while 
in Finland, Italy and the Netherlands only a few minor changes amounting to less than 
5% on an annual basis have been registered. More marked has been the revision of 
rates in France, where the standard excise duty for beer jumped from EUR 2.7 to EUR 
7.2 in 2013, and the excise duty on high strength ethyl alcohol increased by 30% in 
2012. In Romania, significant fluctuations were registered in the 2014-2016 period: (i) 
the excise duty on still OFB initially dropped (2014) and a distinction with ‘traditional’ 
cider, perry and hydromel was introduced, then, in 2016, the rate for other generic OFB 
was raised to almost the pre-2014 level (the same level of IP); (ii) the rate on sparkling 
OFB remained constant until 2016, when the above distinction between sub-classes of 
OFB was introduced, and the tax rate was significantly reduced; (iii) as regards spirits, a 
significant increase of ca. 40% was adopted in 2014, but then in 2016 the rate went 
back to the 2013 level. 
 
The dynamics registered in the six MS examined are not dissimilar to the general EU 
trends and the sample offers a balanced representation of the overall EU average.  With 
specific regard to the OFB category that is examined in this Study, it is interesting to 
note that nearly all MS apply the same tax treatment to wine and OFB. In the case of 
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still products, only HU and MT have a different standard rates, while for DK, IE, PL, and 
RO some differences exist only with sub-categories of products (e.g. cider and perry v. 
other OFB). In the case of sparkling products, only FR and MT set different excise duty 
levels. In this sense there is still a general recognition that OFB and wine deserve the 
same tax treatment. Many countries also apply the same rate to still and sparkling OFB 
(and wine), the only exceptions being BE, CZ, DK, DE, IE, HU, NL, AT, SK and UK who 
tax sparkling OFB more heavily, and RO who tax them less heavily (except cider, perry 
and hydromel). 
 
Overall, the excise duty levied on OFB is among the lowest, especially for still products. 
Some 12 MS apply a zero rate on still OFB (8 MS in the case of sparkling OFB) and the 
overall average excise duty is EUR 73/hl (still) and EUR 119/hl (sparkling).84 The 
variance of OFB tax rates is high (rates vary from nil to more than EUR 400/hl) but not 
higher than for other categories of product. 
 
Table 19 – Excise duty levels and overtime evolution 2010-2016 (six sample MS and the 
EU) 
 DE FI FR IT NL RO EU average 
Beer 
(€/hl/% vol or €/hl/° 
Plato) 
0.79* 32.05 7.41 3.04* 3.45* 0.75* 
Plato: 1.86* 
Vol: 11.6 
CAGR 2010-16 0.0% 3.6% 18.3% 4.4% 2.9% -0.02% 4.0% 
Wine still 
(€/hl) 
0.00 339.00 3.77 0 88.36 0.00 80.65 
CAGR 2010-16 0.0% 3.1% 1.0% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 7.0% 
Wine sparkling 
(€/hl) 
136.00 339.00 9.33 0.00 254.41 20.73 131.73 
CAGR 2010-16 0.0% 3.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.9% -7.9% 5.9% 
OFB still 
(€/hl) 
0.00 339.00 
1.33 – 
3.77 ** 
0.00 88.36 
89.87 - 
0.00** 
72.99 
CAGR 2010-16 
0.0% 3.1% 1.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
-2.0% - 
-100.0%** 
4.0% 
OFB sparkling 
(€/hl) 
136.00 339.00 
1.33 – 
3.77 ** 
0.00 254.41 
10.73 - 
0.00** 
119.02 
CAGR 2010-16 
0.0% 3.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
-21.0% - 
-100.0%** 
4.6% 
Intermediate 
products 
(€/hl) 
153.00 670.00 
188.41 – 
47.11*** 
88.67 149.29 89.87 188.63 
CAGR 2010-16 0.0% 2.8% -2.8% 4.4% 3.3% -9.6% 3.1% 
Ethyl alcohol 
(€/hl of pure alcohol) 
1,303.00 4,555.00 
1,737.56 -
2,295.46**** 
1,035.52 1,686.00 748.88 1,823.19 
CAGR 2010-16 
0.0% 2.5% 
2.3%- 
5.4%**** 
4.4% 1.9% -0.02% 2.4% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of EDT series. 
Notes: EU-level data are calculated as a simple (non-weighed) average of the 28 MS. The table reports only 
standard rates applicable to standard products in each category. Reduced rates and other national specific 
provision are not taken into consideration. 
CAGR: compound annual growth rate. 
For beer, in the case of multiple excise duty ranges by Plato degree, the median value is reported.  
(*) excise duty expressed in EUR per hl / degree Plato 
(**) France and Romania applies differentiated excise duty to cider, perry and hydromel (and ‘pétillants de 
raisins’ in FR). 
(***) France apply a different rate for ‘vin doux naturel’. It also applies an additional levy for IP exceeding 
18% vol.  
(****) France applies an additional levy for Ethyl alcohol exceeding 18% vol.   
 
 NATIONAL REGULATION AND APPROACHES  
 
A number of MS have adopted ad hoc measures for the tax treatment of OFB – and 
where relevant IP - arguably motivated by the need to differentiate between 
                                                          
84 The comparison with beer is not immediate since it depends on the strength. For example, the average rate 
in the EU of a beer with 5% vol is ca. 58 €/hl (for MS using the ABV scale).   
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subcategories of products. As discussed above, the OFB category has expanded overtime 
to include a variety of new products: first and foremost mixed drinks with a fermented 
base, but also sweetened and flavoured cider, aromatised wine products (below 7% vol), 
and - at a higher-strength level - liqueurs with an entirely fermented base. The IP 
category has seen the proliferation in some MS of ‘licorettes’ and other medium/high 
strength liqueurs with a fermented base. Some of these ad hoc approaches are evident 
from the analysis of the national tax regulations, others emerged from the direct 
interviews with administrations and stakeholders. Three aspects in particular are 
analysed in the following paragraphs: (i) the differential tax treatment of traditional and 
mass-market OFB; (ii) additional non-harmonised taxes for special products (alcopops, 
pre-mixes etc.); (iii) national approaches to the criteria to distinguish between CN 2206 
and CN 2208.   
 
 Differential treatment among different types of OFBs. Five MS have differential 
treatments for OFB of different natures, namely: IE, PL, FR, RO, HU, and UK. With 
the exception of HU that has introduced a zero rate for ‘unflavoured still mixture of 
wine and carbonated water below 8.5% vol’, in all other cases the distinction regards 
cider, perry and sometimes hydromel versus any other unspecified OFB. In these 
cases, the definition of cider and other products is laid down in national legislation: 
agricultural legislation in the case of FR85, PL86 and RO87, tax or general sectoral 
legislation in the UK88 and IE89. According to AICV, at least seven more MS have a 
national legal definition of cider but this is apparently not used for tax differentiation 
purposes.90 The differences between definitions clearly reflect domestic markets and 
production practices, and more generally, reveal the concern that certain OFB of 
uncertain composition may have access to a tax structure that was designed for 
‘traditional’ agricultural products. This may apply to countries where a cider tradition 
is well established (such as FR, IE and the UK) as well as countries of more recent 
introduction of these products (RO and PL).  
 
As seen above, some national definitions are restrictive while others more 
permissive. For instance, in Romania it is required that cidru is made with 100% 
fresh apple juice and no water can be added; France imposes that at least 50% 
comes from fresh juice, and water is admitted only to reconstitute the apple 
concentrate; Sweden requires a minimum 15% juice in the final product; no 
minimum juice content is required in e.g. Ireland, Belgium and others. Sugar and 
flavourings are admitted in most countries, but some countries restrict their use to 
certain phase of the process or specific categories of products. What is real cider and 
what is instead a generic OFB is debated also at the level of industry and consumers, 
with different positions and views on permissive versus restrictive definitions. Trade 
associations are reportedly considering a rather ‘permissive’ definition of cider91 – i.e. 
no minimum amount of fresh juice, sugar and certain additive permitted, but no 
fortification allowed – which de facto comprises all ‘mass-market’ products currently 
on the market. Conversely, the consumers’ organisation Campaign for Real Ale 
(CAMRA) drafted a list of products that they do not consider ‘real’ cider primarily 
because they have been carbonated, pasteurised, micro-filtered, or are based on 
                                                          
85 Decret No 87-600, 1987 and Arreté of 13 November 1987.  
86 Polish Ministry of Agriculture, ‘Act on the Production and Bottling of Wine Products, Trade in these Products, 
and Organisation of the Wine Market’, 2010. 
87 Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Order No 474/2014 of 28.03.2014, abrogated by Order No 1541/2014 of 
08.10.2015. 
88 Annual Finance Acts and subsidiary Regulations, Customs and Excise management Act 1979, Alcoholic Liquor 
Duties Act 1979, HMRC Notice No 162 (permitted practices).   
89 Specific excise legislation, 10 June 2010 and products classification laid down in the Finance Act 2003. 
90 Source: AICV, ‘Code of Practice’, 2015 
91 Draft definitions of ‘perry’ ‘flavoured cider/perry’ and ‘fruit wine’ are also being considered. Since they have 
not been officially released (yet), they are not explicitly reported in this Study.     
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concentrate juice.92 Since the list contains several ‘mass-market’ products, the 
adoption of a restrictive definition would be tantamount to expelling the majority of 
the market out of the cider category. Also various small cider-makers interviewed 
would be in favour of more restrictive definitions.   
 
The tax differential can be minimal, as in the case of France, moderate (PL, IE and 
UK) or huge as in the case of Romania (see Table 19 above) where ‘traditional’ cider 
is tax-exempt while other OFBs are taxed like Intermediate Products. The actual 
impact of these measures on excise revenues is however limited in Romania, due to 
certain enforcement mechanisms. Products coming from another MS that carry the 
cider CN codes (2206 00 31 or 51 or 81) are de facto treated like ‘traditional’ cider 
even when they do not meet the domestic criteria for it. In fact, a re-classification of 
these products would imply challenging the CN code attributed in the country of 
origin which is not practicable in the absence of a harmonised definition of cider. 
Eventually, these measures affect only the domestic industry, which is practically 
non-existent for non-compliant products, since they could not compete with foreign 
products that have access to the preferential tax treatment.        
    
 National tax measures. Certain MS have adopted national non-harmonised taxes 
targeting specific classes of OFB, variously defined as ‘alcopops’, ‘pre-mixes’ and the 
like. The following examples can be cited:  
 
o Introduced in 2004, the German alcopop tax was one of the first of its kind.93 
The tax was established within the law for the improvement of the protection 
of young people from dangers of the alcohol and tobacco consumption, and 
consisted of an extra duty of EUR 5,550 per hl of pure alcohol, applicable to 
blends of alcoholic beverages with non-alcoholic beverages between 1.2% and 
10% vol that are ‘ready-to-drink’. To underline its social orientation, it was 
established that the revenues from this tax would fund the Federal Centre for 
Health Education, to finance its addiction prevention activities. The tax 
addresses spirit-based drinks falling under CN 2208, and is added to the 
ordinary excise duty levied on ethyl alcohol. Its effectiveness in reducing the 
consumption of these products is demonstrated by the trends in revenues, 
which have fallen from EUR 10.0 mn in 2005, to about EUR 1.0 mn in 2014. 
On the other hand, since CN 2206 alcopops are excluded, this tax caused a 
major shift of both supply and demand to fermented-base alternatives. The 
effects of the German alcopop taxes have been analysed in detail in an EU-
funded study94 whose salient results are summarised in Box 3 below.95  
 
Similar approaches have been adopted also in Denmark and Luxembourg, 
both of which apply an additional duty on products containing a mixture of 
ethyl alcohol and a non-alcoholic drink. 
 
 
Box 3 – Impact of the ‘alcopop tax’ in Germany – summary of the HAPI Study 
results96 
 
‘(…) The total volume of spirit-based RTDs fell by 74.2% in Germany between 2005 and 2010. In 
fact the sales of alcopops plummeted so markedly that it had a profound effect on some of the 
largest retailers of alcoholic products in Germany. However, when considering the annual spending 
                                                          
92 http://www.camra.org.uk/cider-not-recognised-as-being-real 
93 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/alkopopstg/gesamt.pdf 
94 Anderson P., Suhrcke M. and Brookes C., ‘An overview of the market for alcohol beverages of potentially 
particular appeal to minors’, HAPI, 2012. Hereinafter: ‘HAPI Study (2012). 
95 Also the Ramboll Evaluation observed a steep growth of wine-based RTDs in the past few years, from an 
estimated 30 mn in 2009 to in excess of 70 mn in 2014.   
96 Source: Excerpts from the HAPI Study (2012). 
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per capita on RTDs and high-strength pre-mixes (HS), a totally different picture emerges. 
Although a decline in spending can be observed after the introduction of the alcopop tax in 2004, a 
steady increase since then has brought per capita annual spending on RTD/HSs of the legal 
drinking age population to EUR 39, nearly the same amount Germans were spending on RTDs and 
high-strength pre-mixes before the introduction of the ATL (EUR 40). This suggests that the 
alcohol industry as a whole responded to the alcopop tax by introducing new RTDs and high-
strength pre-mixes that are exempt from the tax. Of the 33 key new product developments in 
Germany in 2009 and 2010, 14 were new RTDs or high-strength pre-mixes. 
 
The introduction of malt-based RTDs (generally beer-mixes) contributed to the increase on 
spending on RTDs. With a growth of 41.4% in total volume since 2005, this was the strongest 
growing RTD type in Germany. Due to their malt or beer base, these beverages do not fall under 
the term “alcopop” as defined by the alcopop tax. They are therefore a cheaper alternative to 
alcopops, while being similar in flavour, colouring and marketing. Additionally, the legal age of 
purchase for beer-based products is 16 years, making malt-based pre-mixes more readily 
available to a younger consumer group. Since the alcopop tax applied to products with an alcohol 
concentration of between 1.2% and 10%, a number of high-strength pre-mixes have been 
introduced as an alternative to alcopops. These include traditional long drinks such as gin and 
tonic, vodka and cranberry, or rum and coke, as well as a number of pre-mixed cocktails such as 
canned “mai tais” or ready-to-drink daiquiris and piña coladas. The exotic flavours and the 
resemblance to popular soft drinks create the same appeal for minors as malt-based RTDs. (…)’  
 
 
o The French premix tax97 is more comprehensive than the German alcopop tax 
in that it is not related to the spirit-base of the drink but to two alternative 
criteria: (i) the blend of an alcoholic and a non-alcoholic beverage; or (i) a 
content of sugar exceeding 35g per litre, or corresponding amount of other 
sweeteners. The tax applies to products with an ABV comprised between 
1.2% and 12%, and amount to EUR 11 per decilitre of pure alcohol. The scope 
of application has slightly modified overtime to reflect market trends and 
production practices. The last revision, in March 2016, introduced certain 
exemptions to the application of the tax to AWP, and expanded the list of 
sweeteners covered.98 In 2016, the pre-mix tax yield amounted to EUR 1.4 
mn, down from ca. EUR 20 mn since a decade ago. After the initial drop, in 
more recent years the revenue trend is fluctuating, possibly in relation with 
periodical review of the scope of application. Interestingly, the French pre-mix 
tax may apply to alcoholic beverages falling under any CN code except CN 
2204 (wine) and CN 2205 (vermouth etc.) products, and in this sense it has 
possibly contributed to the significant growth of AWP markets of the last few 
years. The magnitude of the effects of the pre-mix tax are illustrated in Annex 
3 of the Circulaire 16 Mars 2016 of the Ministry of Finance, reproduced in Box 
4 below. 
 
 
Box 4 – Scope and impact of the ‘pre-mix tax’ in France  
 
To help to understand the scope of applicability of the tax, the Circulaire provides a few 
example for each of the two salient criteria. As regards the blend of an alcoholic and a non-
alcoholic beverage, examples include: 
 a beverage composed of orange juice mixed with vodka, with an ABV of 6.5%; 
 a beverage composed of beer (80%) and lemonade, with an ABV of 1.4%; 
 a beverage composed of cola mixed with whiskey, with an ABV of 8%; 
 a beverage composed of red wine with orange juice, with an ABV of 7%;  
 a beverage composed of beer, fruit juice, sugar and aromas, with an ABV of 5%.  
 
The second criterion applies to products that are not compliant with the first criterion, and   
regards the addition of more than 35g of sugar per litre (expressed as inverted sugars). The 
concrete examples made are:  
 a beverage mostly composed of vodka, orange aroma, colours, sparkling water, and 
containing 40 g of sugar, with an ABV of 5.5%; 
                                                          
97 Introduced by Law 2004-806 on public health and codified under Article 1613 bis of the general Tax Code, 
updated by the Circular of 16 March 2016.  
98 Rebaudioside A has been added.  
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 a beverage mostly composed of cider, with a 5% addition of cassis liqueur,  and 
containing 65 g of sugar, with an ABV of 4.5%; 
 a beverage composed of beer (95%), with a rum addition, and containing 70 g of sugar, 
with an ABV of 6.5%; 
 a beverage composed by an alcoholic fermented beverage, with an addition of sparkling 
water, aromas, colours, and containing 100 mg/l of aspartame and 150 mg/l of 
acesulfame K, which correspond to 21 g and 32 g of sugar respectively, with an ABV of 
5%.  
 
A simulation of the tax applicable to concrete products is also provided in the Circulaire (Table 
20 below). 
 
Table 20 – Simulation of the effect of French pre-mix tax on specific products 
Quantity of 
products 
expressed in hl  
Rum + fruit 
juice (CN 2208) 
Fermented base 
+ aroma + 
colours + 55g of 
sugar (CN 2206) 
Cider + vodka + 
65 g of sugar 
(CN 2208) 
Beer + water + 
aroma + 60 g of 
sugar (CN 2203) 
Price before 
tax 
€400 €60 €100 €80 
ABV 7% 5.5% 8% 6% 
Excise duty  €121.63 €3.77 €139 €44.46 
Pre-mix tax  €770 €605 €880 €660 
VAT €258.33 €133.75 €223.80 €156.89 
Total tax  €1,149.96 €742.52 €1,242.80 €861.35 
Final Price €1,549.96 €802.52 €1,342.80 €941.35 
Source: Circulaire, 16 March 2016. 
 
 Criteria to distinguish between CN 2206 and CN 2208. The last aspect that is 
important to consider is that the subjective criteria at the basis of the distinction 
between CN 2206 and CN 2208 may be interpreted differently by customs 
administrations, leading to possible disparities of approach to similar products across 
MS, or within the same country over time. The matter is of significant concern for the 
global industry, as the International Federation of Wine and Spirits (FIVS) clarified in 
the aftermath of the HSC adoption of decision NC1500E1a on admitting cleaned-up 
fermented beverages under CN 2208. FIVS wrote: ‘The Draft EN Amendment would 
create enormous uncertainty surrounding classification of products that do not go 
through distillation, particularly intermediate fermented alcohol products, opening the 
door to conflicting determinations among Members regarding the classification of 
fermented products that have gone through some degree of purification, including 
products that to this point have uniformly been classified as fermented products.’99 
One of the underlying studies forecast market disruptions, trade issues, enforcement 
problems and other difficulties stemming from this approach.100 
 
Member States have generally taken cautious approaches towards the translation of 
CJEU criteria and CNEN note 2206 00 into classification practices. Based on 
interviews with customs authorities, the subjective criteria of taste, smell and 
appearance have been often addressed introducing a certain degree of objectivity in 
the assessment methods, in particular through laboratory analysis of the 
concentration of certain by-products of fermentation in order to establish the 
prevalent character of the product. In some cases, this is accompanied with an 
increased ‘professionalisation’ of the classification process: with some MS having 
established ad hoc ‘task forces’ for it. In parallel, administrations encourage the 
collaboration with industry and in particular the preliminary submission of product 
samples and dossiers for a classification opinion. Nearly all the competent officers 
interviewed on this point affirmed that with the current definitions and notes the 
distinction between CN 2206 and CN 2208 remains however not fully clear.   
 
                                                          
99 Source: https://fivs.org/resources/virtualLibrary.htm?a=report&start=0&documentIds=495 
100 FIVS, ‘When is a Fermented Beverage not a Fermented Beverage?’ 05.08.2010. 
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While the above processes have reportedly reduced the risk of classification 
disparities within the same country (as confirmed inter alia by various economic 
operators and trade associations), it has evidently not eliminated the risk of 
inconsistencies across MS, due not only to different views and criteria employed, but 
also to the specificities of certain markets (customs laboratories’ priorities varies 
across MS) and, evidently, the analytical methods and technologies used. In this 
sense, certain MS are seemingly more conservative with respect to CN 2208 
definition and apply it essentially to distilled products, while others are more likely to 
use it also for cleaned-up fermented beverages and mixtures. Of the sample MS 
analysed, it is interesting to cite the case of France that has adopted at the end of 
2016 a circular stating explicitly that cleaned-up fermented bases, and the beverages 
made from them, should be treated as spirits.101         
 
To reduce legal uncertainty, and prevent the risk of fines for misclassified products 
already on the market, economic operators make frequently recourse to Binding 
Tariff Information (BTI) decisions. But since, as seen, criteria and methods vary 
across MS, the outcome of a BTI may also vary, and products with similar 
characteristics may eventually be treated differently. A review of the BTI descriptions 
available in the EBTI database returned some evidence of such disparities of 
approach. A few possible examples are reported in Box 5 below.102    
 
 
Box 5 – Review of selected BTI decisions (from the EBTI database) 
 
Case 1 – Fruit-wine based alcoholic beverages with addition of ethyl alcohol 
 
The UK classified as 2206.0059 (still other 
fermented beverage other than cider and perry) a 
mixture of cider (obtained from the fermentation 
of apple juice and sugar) and water, sugar, citric 
acid, fruit flavours, colours and preservatives, 
fortified with the addition of ethyl alcohol to bring 
the strength up to 21.9%. 
Poland classified as 2208.9069 (other spirituous 
beverages) a mixture of fruit wine (obtained from 
the fermentation of an unspecified fruit 
concentrate and glucose syrup) and water, colours 
and flavours, fortified with the addition of ethyl 
alcohol to bring the strength up to 21%. 
 
Case 2 – Fruit-wine based alcoholic cream 
 
The UK classified as 2206.0059 (still other 
fermented beverage other than cider and perry) a 
‘country cream’ obtained by mixing fermented 
apple wine with cream, with a 14.8% vol. 
Ireland classified as 2208.7010 (liqueurs and 
cordials) a ‘country wine based cream’, with a 
14.9% vol. 
 
Case 3 – Wine-based ready-to-drink 
 
Germany classified as 2206.0039 (sparkling other 
fermented beverage other than cider and perry) 
an aromatised wine-based drink made of: wine 
(white wine or rosé wine), demineralised water, 
inverted sugar syrup, citric acid, lactic acid, 
sodium benzoate, flavourings, colours, sulphur 
dioxide, and carbon dioxide, with an alcohol 
content of 5% vol. 
The Netherlands classified as 2208.7010 (liqueurs 
and cordials) an aromatised wine-based drink 
made of: wine, sparkling water, syrup, citric acid, 
and natural flavours, with an alcohol content of 
5%, due to the fact that – after the addition of 
water, sugar and flavourings – the ‘character of 
wine had been lost’. 
 
Case 4 – Flavoured fortified wine 
 
In 2011, Ireland classified as 2208.9069 (other 
spirituous beverages) a fortified wine blended with 
sugars, flavours and colours. 
A few years later, in 2014, Ireland classified as 
2206.0059 (still other fermented beverages other 
than cider and perry) a fortified wine infused with 
                                                          
101 Circulaire 22.12.2016.  
102 Part of the examples reported were suggested in the report prepared for the Polish Council of Wine by 
Parulski & Wspolnicy, ‘Tariff and Excise Tax Classification of Fermented Beverages – Issues of Concerns’, 
September 2016. The report shows that certain products that in Poland are classified as 2208 are very similar 
to other products that other MS classifies as 2206.    
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botanical roots and citrus. 
 
Source: Author’s review of EBTI.  
Note: The Author did not have access to the full information on the BTI decision but only to the 
publicly-available section. It is therefore possible that some of the examples reported here are in fact 
only apparent similarities. At the same time it is possible that other similarities could not be detected 
due to the scarce amount of public information available for certain dossier.  
  
                  
 ESTIMATED TAX REVENUE FROM OFB 
 
Finally, in order to appreciate the relative magnitude of the impact of classification 
issues, we have estimated the overall excise duty yield from the various product 
categories, and its overtime evolution vis-à-vis market trends.  
 
The overall tax revenue collected from OFB has to be extrapolated from aggregated data 
since, as discussed, OFB and wine share the same excise product code (EPC) that is used 
to move products and pay excise duty. So the Excise Duty Tables (EDT) compiled by DG 
TAXUD do not distinguish between wine and OFB, and the same goes with tax revenue 
data collected by national tax authorities. It is possible that customs may be able to 
provide more accurate estimates based on CN monitoring data, but this reportedly 
requires major efforts and the results would not be exempt from uncertainties. On the 
other hand, MS often apply the same rate to wine and OFB and this greatly facilitates to 
disaggregate the respective revenue amounts using the IWSR market estimates. Another 
complication in this exercise is represented by the different rates that exist between still 
and sparkling products, which can be only partly dealt with through IWSR market data, 
since such level of granularity for OFB is not provided. Finally, the MS-level excise duty 
structure is made more complex by a series of special treatments, such as reduced 
rates, sub-categories, differentiated ‘tax-bands’ that make unfeasible a full reconciliation 
between the tax revenue that can be predicted based on sales data, and the actual 
aggregated revenue reported in the EDT.  
 
Table 21 below shows the overall trends in the excise duty collected at EU level, also 
disaggregated by category on the basis of our estimations.103 Overall the excise duty 
revenue from alcoholic beverages has increased from EUR 29.6 bn in 2010 to EUR 35.6 
bn five years later. In the same period, the amount of sales in litres has slightly 
decreased, while the overall market value has moderately grown. The increase in tax 
revenues was driven especially by OFB (+8.3% / year on average) and, to a smaller 
extent, by wine. In absolute terms, OFB remains the second smallest category for tax 
revenue after Intermediate Products. It contributes to less than 7% of the total revenue 
(with high variance across MS), against 16.2% of wine, 31.4% of beer, and 43.4% of 
ethyl alcohol.            
 
Table 21 – General EU trends in excise duty revenues vis-à-vis market trends, and by 
product category (2010-2016) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 CAGR 
Volume 
(bn litres) 
53.75 53.91 53.31 52.47 52.22 52.20 52.40 -0.42% 
Value (€ 
bn)  
185.44 188.31 192.17 190.73 194.84 203.91 207.20 1.87% 
Tax 
Revenue 
(€ bn) 
29.64 30.64 32.08 32.44 34.45 35.57 N/A 3.71% 
                                                          
103 The exercise requires to disaggregate MS tax revenue data among all pertinent sub-categories applying the 
ratio derived from market data (appropriately weighed by the excise duty rate applied). Then, MS-level 
disaggregated revenue data (for all EU28) have been summed up to obtain the EU-level estimates by product 
categories. A certain margin of error in the attribution of revenues to OFB and Wine is possible, as a result of 
the complex disaggregation exercise.  
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Revenue share by excise duty category 
Beer 31.1% 30.9% 31.0% 31.1% 32.2% 31.4% N/A 3.9% 
Wine  15.0% 15.1% 15.1% 15.5% 15.6% 16.2% N/A 5.3% 
OFB 5.6% 5.9% 6.0% 6.2% 6.7% 6.9% N/A 8.3% 
IP 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% N/A 0.4% 
ET 45.9% 45.9% 45.6% 45.0% 43.5% 43.4% N/A 2.6% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR data, EDT series and other qualitative sources. 
Note: the revenue share by category was calculated disaggregating at country level (for all MS28) the amount 
of duty paid by individual categories, based on IWSR sales data (in litres) and the rate applicable in a given 
year. 
Legend: OFB: other fermented beverages; IP: intermediate products; ET: ethyl alcohol. 
  
 
2.1.5 Problem analysis 
 
The problem areas identified in the framework of the REFIT process and defined in the 
inception phase of this Study are reviewed in this Section in the light of the evidence and 
results of the baseline assessment. The purpose is twofold: (i) on one hand, to provide 
our estimates on the actual magnitude and prospect of existing issues; (ii) on the other 
hand to define the problem drivers and likely impact areas (intended and unintended) 
that will support the formulation of policy options and the structuring of the impact 
assessment (see Section 3.1). In particular, three problem areas are analysed, of which 
the first is the most substantial, while the others are of more limited importance, 
namely:  
 
1) the uncertain scope of the category ‘Other Fermented Beverage’; 
2) the unclear application of the ‘entirely fermented origins’ provision to beverages 
containing alcohol as a flavour-carrier; 
3) the indefinite excise product code for wine and OFB.  
 
 
2.1.5.1  Uncertain scope of the category ‘Other Fermented Beverages’ 
 
 THE PROBLEM TREE 
 
There is room for uncertainties and disparities in the interpretation of the tax 
categorisation rules laid down in Directive 92/83/EEC in relation with the HS / CN coding 
system. As a consequence similar products may fall in different tax categories of the 
excise system depending on the criteria used by the competent authority of different MS. 
In principle this may require lengthy and costly classification efforts that may eventually 
results in disputes.104  
 
As discussed at length in the previous Section, these problems are concentrated in the 
areas of ‘other fermented beverages’ as defined under CN 2206, and its uncertain 
boundary with CN 2208. As this category is taxed more favourably than intermediate 
products or ethyl alcohol, there could be an incentive to develop and commercialise 
‘borderline’ products that take advantage of the existing ambiguities and disparities of 
views across MS. This may involve seeking for favourable BTIs in one MS to ensure the 
product classification is not questioned in other MS. The issue primarily stems from the 
development of new types of ‘borderline’ product mixing alcohol of different origins or 
using ‘cleaned-up’ fermented alcohol, in order to gain a competitive advantage over 
other types of product. This practice has potential consequences on the amount of excise 
duty revenue collected and possibly on the overall affordability of alcohol, including by 
protected categories of consumers.   
                                                          
104 As discussed in Box 1, there is also an administrative issue with Article 26 of the Directive, which prescribes 
to make reference to an outdated version of the CN codes. However, the matter is not a source of practical 
problems or market distortion so it was not included in the scope of this Study.  
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The categories of products potentially containing ‘borderline’ products are, as seen, 
mixed drinks of various ABV strength, certain ’borderline’ cider products, and medium-
high strength fermented beverages with characteristics similar to certain liqueurs and 
spirits. In this sense, ‘borderline’ products can be found both in the fiscal category of 
OFB (Article 12) and in the fiscal category of IP (Article 17), the latter being de facto 
fermented beverages other than wine and beer that do not fit into the Article 12 
definition.   
 
The landmark rulings of the CJEU established the possibility of classifying these products 
under CN 2208 and this gave MS a tool to tackle opportunistic practices and the risk of 
tax losses. On the other hand, the subjectivity of the criteria identified to distinguish 
borderline products from genuine OFB has possibly magnified the classification 
uncertainties.  
 
The above narrative summary of the problem can be represented with the causal model 
displayed in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 – The problem tree of classification issues 
 
 
 
 GENERAL DYNAMICS OF THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE MARKET  
 
To estimate the nature and the magnitude of the adverse effects potentially caused by 
the above classification uncertainties, it is necessary to consider at first the dynamics of 
the alcoholic beverage markets, including both the supply and the demand side. 
Needless to say, the mechanisms underlying this market are highly complex and the 
dynamics vary across market segments – in terms of both ‘type’ of beverage and price 
segment – and across geographical markets (i.e. consumption habits and consumer 
preferences).  
 
This Section reviews in particular: (i) the mechanism of substitution across products and 
its connection with price levels; (ii) the effects of excise duty and its variation on 
consumer prices; and (iii) the possible general correlation between tax level, affordability 
and demand/consumption. We have examined these mechanisms through an 
econometric analysis based on a combination of IWSR market data with tax levels and 
revenue data (Excise Duty Tables), also integrating other variables drawn from Eurostat 
and WHO GISAH. We have triangulated our results with the results of similar exercises 
from the economic literature, and with the qualitative assessments collected from the 
stakeholder consultation.    
 
 Cross-product substitution. This is conventionally measured through the ‘cross-
price elasticity’. When this variable is positive, products are substitutes and the 
increase of price in one category results in an increased consumption of another 
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category. When values are negative, products are complementary and follow the 
same trends (possibly influenced by an external third factors). When the correlation 
is not statistically significant, the analysed products are probably independent of 
each other.   
The latter is frequently the outcome that can be found in the literature that tried to 
examine the cross-price elasticity of alcoholic beverages, which generally returns 
inconclusive and statistically weak evidence (see Box 6). In practice, no clear and 
robust substitution effect induced by price variations can be observed. In fact, 
substitution can be more substantially driven by factors other than price, and 
connected to: socio-demographic and lifestyle changes, marketing strategies, 
awareness-raising campaigns, national regulatory frameworks on labelling, 
commercialisation, and drinking etc. The list of variables can be very long and differs 
across contexts, so eventually the economic research has progressively abandoned 
the econometric approach based on cross-price elasticity. Moreover, it has been 
observed that price levels of different categories of products are often positively 
correlated. When prices fluctuate coherently for all products and nonetheless the 
level of demand varies, this would further confirm that consumption patterns, 
including substitution across products, is prevalently determined by other factors. 
 
 
Box 6 – Selected excerpts from the literature review on cross-price elasticity for 
alcoholic beverages 
 
A first review of estimates of cross-price elasticities in alcoholic products conducted in early 2000s105 
showed a wide range of estimates of different sign, implying disagreement on whether beer, wine and 
spirits are complements or substitutes, and stressed the importance of extraneous factors, such as 
changes in consumer tastes and preferences. Still, the report concluded that the balance of evidence 
suggests that the drinks are substitutes, although cross-elasticities estimates have to be regarded with 
caution.  
 
More recently, Meng et al. (2014) attempted to estimate the cross-price elasticities of off- and on-trade 
beer, cider, wine, spirits and ready-to-drinks in the UK by applying a pseudo-panel approach to the 
cross-sectional data on private households’ expenditures.106 Only 6 out of 90 estimated cross-price 
elasticities were statistically significant and the suggested substitution and complementary relationships 
were very difficult to explain (46 estimates had a positive signs and 44 a negative one).  
 
A new study using cross-sectional data from the 2013 Australian arm of the International Alcohol 
Control survey employed a Tobit model approach to estimate cross-price elasticities of 11 categories of 
beverage, comprising on- and off-premise separately for regular beer (full strength), low-mid strength 
beer, bottle wine, spirits and ready-to-drinks, and off-premise cask wine.107 A significantly, positive 
relationship was detected between the prices of off-premise beverages with demand for the same 
beverage on-premise, while the cross-price elasticities among different beverage categories provided 
again indecisive results: very few statistically significant estimates (8 out 100) and a mix of positive and 
negative signs (49 and 51, respectively).  
 
Given the above challenges, other studies on excise duties on alcoholic beverages excluded cross-price 
effects, which were regarded of secondary importance to the own-price effect.108 
 
 
We have tested the cross-price elasticity for our ‘borderline’ categories of products, 
through a variant of the model used to estimate the own-elasticity of individual 
categories of product. In particular, we have tried to estimate if and how mixed 
drinks, ‘borderline’ ciders, and ‘borderline’ IP showed clear substitution correlations 
with other products. In some cases, a very small complementary correlation was 
registered, suggesting that other factors (such as the effect of the economic crisis, 
                                                          
105 Custom Associates Ltd, ‘Study on competition between alcoholic drinks’, 2001. 
106 Meng, Y. et al., ‘Estimation of Own and Cross Price Elasticities of Alcohol Demand in the UK. A Pseudo-panel 
Approach Using the Living Costs and Food Survey 2001-2009’, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 34, 2014. 
107 Jiang H. J., Livingston M., Room R., Callinan S., ‘Price elasticity of on- and off-premises demand for 
alcoholic drinks: a Tobit analysis’, in Drug and alcohol dependence, 2016. 
108 London Economics (May 2010), Study analysing possible changes in the minimum rates and structure of 
excise duties on alcoholic beverages.  
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the introduction of certain national regulations, the impact of information campaign 
etc.) might have simultaneously influenced the level of consumption of different 
product categories, regardless of price. Overall, the outcome was not statistically 
significant, so no substitution could be demonstrated. 109  
 
The above considerations should not be interpreted as a denial of the substitutability 
of all alcoholic beverages. In fact, this assumption is inter alia confirmed by certain 
marketing strategies, which increasingly abandon the approach ‘per class of product’ 
to adopt the ‘per consumption occasion / modality’ perspective (aperitif, refreshment, 
RTD, etc.). These complex marketing mechanisms, and their degree of success in 
moving consumers from one type of beverage to another, are outside of scope of this 
Study. For the purpose of our analysis, the key message is that a certain level of 
cross-products substitution cannot be systematically predicted by a variation in price.                   
 
 The impact of excise duty on demand. From the above it derives that excise duty 
– that is one of the determinants of price – cannot have a statistically-significant 
correlation with cross-product substitution. In other words, at a systemic level, we 
have not observed a clear relationship between the tax rate applied on the target 
classes of products and the level of consumption of competing products. This 
statement requires two important qualifications: (i) despite the lack of a general 
relationship, under specific circumstances the variation of excise duty level can still 
have profound market effects; and (ii) as the results of our model show, despite the 
lack of a robust estimate for the cross-price elasticity, the ‘own-elasticity’ of specific 
categories of products can be estimated with a certain degree of precision. 
 
With regard to the first point, the introduction of the ‘alcopop’ tax in Germany is a 
classical example of how taxes can indeed have a profound impact on substitution. 
This case, described in more detail in Box 7, was evidently caused by the very high 
level to which the tax was set and the fact that other potentially competitive products 
(malt and wine-based mixed drinks) were not targeted. However, in various other 
circumstances a significant increase of the excise duty applied to a specific category 
did not necessarily lead consumers towards other products. For instance, in 2013, 
the excise duty on beer in France increased by 160%, but the volume of sales 
continued to grow and no relevant changes were observed in other product 
categories.110 
              
 
Box 7 – Possible substitution effects induced by the introduction of the ‘alcopop tax’ 
in Germany 
 
Useful insights on substitution effects between different alcoholic products can be drawn from the review 
of the consumption trend of alcoholic beverages in Germany between 2000 and 2007. In the first three 
years of years 2000s, mixed drinks grew in popularity and their consumption recorded an impressive 
growth (about 78% per year, on average), which partly offset the decline in the volumes consumed of 
beer and spirits.  
 
                                                          
109  The very high correlation between prices across categories of product, which inflates the standard errors in 
multiple regressions (the ‘multicollinearity’ issue), and the fact that the model leaves out several independent, 
explanatory variables (the so called, ‘omitted variable bias’) do not allow firm conclusions about cross-price 
elasticities to be made. In the statistical model with fixed-effects at the product level, which allows for the 
controlling of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. consumer preferences across products stable over 
time), ten out 16 cross-price elasticities were statistically significant. However, this model is weak in dealing 
with time-variant unobserved factors at the product level (e.g. changes in consumer tastes over time that are 
different across product categories) and the results might be biased. Indeed, the statistical significance 
disappears when the HAC standard errors (heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors) are 
used, which allows accounting for serially correlated errors likely due to the previous omitted factors (e.g. 
consumer preferences across product categories that slowly change over time). 
110 There have been changes in the excise duty levels of other products as well but very modest and on a much 
smaller scale than for beer.  
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After the introduction of the alcopop tax in July 2004, consumers and the market responded negatively, 
and a major decline in consumption was recorded – i.e. amounting to some 50% per year between 2004 
and 2006. Looking at the trend in consumption of other beverages, it seems that some previous drinkers 
of mixed drinks switched to beer as indicated by the slowing down of its declining rate (see Figure 2 
below). 
 
The existence of a similar substitution effect has been confirmed by a study conducted in 2010 to assess 
the effects of the alcopops tax on alcohol consumption and beverage preference among adolescents in 
Germany.111 Based on 2003 and 2007 data from the cross-sectional survey of the European School 
Survey Project on Alcohol and other Drugs (ESPAD), the study confirmed a partial substitution of alcopops 
by spirits and beer among 12–17-year-olds. 
 
Figure 2 - Indexed consumption of alcoholic beverages in Germany (in ‘000 
hectolitres, 2001-2016) 
 
Source: Author’s elaborations on IWSR data.  
Note: For better readability the trend of mixed drink is displayed on a separate scale (right vertical axis).   
 
Secondly, the results of our econometric analysis allowed us to estimate with 
sufficient degree of reliability the impact of excise duty variations on the demand of 
certain target categories of products. The exercise required two steps. The first step 
consisted in estimating the ‘pass-through’ effect of taxes on price, i.e. the average 
change of price level caused by a variation of excise duty rates (inclusive of the VAT 
on the excise duty). The impact on prices resulted more than proportional in the case 
of ‘borderline’ IP, cider, as well as various other non-target products;112 it is instead 
less than proportional for most of the IP products analysed and spirit-based mixed 
drinks.113 In the case of mixed drinks with a fermented base the relation observed is 
not statistically robust, i.e. it is not possible to predict the effect on price of a 
variation in the excise duty rate. This result is not surprising, given the generally 
short life-cycle of these products and the importance played by marketing strategies. 
So, for analytical purposes we have assumed a conventional pass-through rate of 1 
(i.e. a ‘full pass-through’). 
 
The second step consisted in estimating the own-elasticity of the demand for the 
target categories of product, which in a nutshell is a measure of the variation of 
                                                          
111 Muller S, Piontek D, Pabst A, Baumeister SE, Kraus L., Changes in alcohol consumption and beverage 
preference among adolescents after the introduction of the alcopops tax in Germany. Addiction 2010; 
105:1205–13. 
112 An increase by one EUR in the excise duty per litre has been estimated to translate into a change of the 
retail price per litre of EUR 1.33, EUR 1.73, and EUR 1.14 for ‘borderline’ IP, ‘borderline’ ciders, and various 
other non-target products, respectively.  
113 The pass-through factor has been estimated at EUR 0.65 and EUR 0.28 for IP products, such as fortified 
wines and vermouths, and spirit-based mixed drinks, respectively.  
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consumption expected when the price changes. Predictably, in all cases analysed the 
model returned negative coefficients, i.e. an increase in price would determine a 
reduction in the demand. Certain categories like ‘borderline’ IP and mixed drinks with 
a fermented base turned out very elastic, with the estimated drop in consumption 
much greater than the corresponding price variation. In some cases, the statistical 
robustness of the coefficient was lower, including for mixed drinks, so a certain 
variability exists in the reaction of consumers to price change, which can be again 
explained by exogenous factors like the impact of marketing and the volatility of 
these products. 114        
          
 Tax, affordability and consumption.  According to the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) database, the total alcohol per capita115 consumption in Europe has decreased 
by -10.4% from 2007 levels. This trend is confirmed by the decline in the sales of 
alcoholic beverages per capita in the EU that we have estimated based on IWSR 
data.116 Accordingly, a decline of -4% was registered between 2010 and 2016, with 
an annual average reduction of about -0.7%. This reduction can be barely ascribed to 
a reduced average affordability of alcoholic beverages. The share of disposable 
income needed to purchase a fixed bundle of alcoholic beverages remained largely 
stable, recording a marginal increase from 1.73% in 2010 to 1.77% in 2015.117 The 
reason behind the stability of this ratio is that the average income growth in that 
period (+2.4% annually) largely kept pace with the average growth in the price level 
of alcoholic beverages (+2.8% annually).  
 
Using a more accurate measure of the affordability, which considers how the price of 
alcohol has evolved as compared to the price of all other consumers’ goods, i.e. the 
Relative Alcohol Affordability Index (RAAI)118, the relationship between affordability 
and consumption is even weaker. As shown in Figure 3Figure 3, the RAAI has risen 
over the last decade, driven by higher disposable income, whereas the indexed 
consumption declined, in an apparently unrelated manner.  
 
                                                          
114 Own-price elasticities for different groups of alcoholic beverages have been estimated by applying two 
common techniques for panel regressions, i.e. pooled ‘ordinary least squares’ (OLS) and ‘fixed effects’. 
Estimates achieved for different types of beverages, which have to be interpreted as the percent change in 
demand resulting from a 1% increase of their retail price, are the following: -1.15% and -2.99% for mixed 
drinks with a fermented base; (ii) -2.45% and -2.47% for ‘borderline ciders’, (iii) -1.74% and -3.23% for 
‘borderline’ IP, (iv) and -1.51% and -1.77% for other non-target products. A comparatively lower degree of 
statistical significance was found in the case of OFB groups of product; thus, in the case of ‘borderline’ ciders, 
the lower end of the range has been set at 1.3%, in line with the findings of the existing empirical literature 
(see, Stockwell, T.M. et al. (2012), ‘Does Minimum Pricing Reduce Alcohol Consumption? The Experience of a 
Canadian Province’, Addiction, Vol. 107, pp. 912-920; and Meng, Y. et al. (2014), ‘Estimation of Own and Cross 
Price Elasticities of Alcohol Demand in the UK. A Pseudo-panel Approach Using the Living Costs and Food 
Survey 2001-2009’, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 96-103).  
115 According to WHO, alcohol per capita (15+) consumption of pure alcohol is calculated as the sum of 
beverage-specific alcohol consumption of pure alcohol (beer, wine, spirits, other) from different sources. It is 
measured as litres of pure alcohol per person per year. 
116 The per capita consumption is calculated as the ratio between the total volume of alcohol in litres consumed 
across Europe (from IWSR) for each category and the total national population (from Eurostat).  
117 The bundle of alcoholic beverages is based on the per capita consumption of the five main categories of 
alcoholic beverages consumed in 2010 in EU, which included: (i) 70 litres of beer, (ii) 28 litres of wine, (iii) 5 
litres of spirits, (iv) 0.6 litres of mixed drinks, and (v) 2 litres of cider.  
118 We have used here the definition of the index provided by the UK National health Service (See: NHS 
Information Centre, ‘Statistics on Alcohol England, 2017 – Appendices’, the NHS Information Centre). The 
index has been recalculated at EU-level, based on the Eurostat’s harmonised indices of consumer prices and 
adjusted gross disposable income of households.   
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Figure 3 - Indexed trends in alcohol affordability and consumption (2005=100) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IWSR data (alcohol consumption) and Eurostat (harmonised indices of 
consumer prices and adjusted gross disposable income of households). 
 
There are evident limitations to this analysis, namely: the fact that it looks only at 
broader systemic trends, it does not distinguish among specific socio-economic groups, 
and it does not distinguish specific ‘niches’ of products that might have become 
significantly more affordable (e.g. the renowned issue of ‘white cider’ in the UK).119 A 
micro-level perspective would be more informative in this respect, but at that level it is 
national/regional and not EU policies and measures that matter. So, for the purpose of 
estimating the impact attributable to Directive 92/83/EEC, the systemic-level analysis 
seems more pertinent.          
 
The statistical analysis of the relationship between RAAI and per capita consumption 
suggests a positive relation, but with a small coefficient. In a nutshell, assuming all other 
factors neutral, a 1% decrease in alcohol consumption may require a 7% decrease in the 
affordability index. Under the strong assumptions that: (i) households’ disposable 
income grows at the same rate as the past 10 years (about 2% per year, on average), 
and (ii) the alcohol prices grow at the same pace of other consumables goods, such a 
leap in the affordability index would require an increase of the alcohol price by about 
10%. Based on the IWSR data, the gross average price of alcoholic beverages in 2016 
was about EUR 3.90 per litre, thus, a 10% increase will translate into an average 
increase in absolute terms of about EUR 0.40 per litre. With a conservative pass-through 
of excise duty on price equal to 100%120, and considering that the average excise duty 
levied on alcoholic beverages is EUR 0.68 per litre121, such effect on price would require 
a simultaneous increase of the excise duty rates by 57% (across all products in all MS).   
 
Historically, there are no known examples of comparable tax increases ever applied to 
the entire alcoholic beverage market, so there is no case-study evidence of the collateral 
effects of a similar fiscal measure. So, the above should be considered as a purely 
                                                          
119 https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/apr/17/cider-industry-protected-expense-alcoholics 
120 Our estimates of pass-through factor for different categories of beverages are typically higher than 1. These 
results are corroborated by the literature review. For instance, Sassi F. et al. (2103) conclude their meta-
analysis of tax pass–through across different types of alcoholic beverages stating that: ‘[g]enerally, alcohol 
taxes are more than fully passed through to prices.’ (see, Sassi F., Belloni A., Capobianco C., ‘The Role of 
Fiscal Policies in Health Promotion’, OECD Health Working Paper No. 66, 2013). According to a recent study 
commissioned by DG SANTE pass-through coefficients appear more mixed across MS (see: Rabinovich, et al., 
‘Further study on the affordability of alcoholic beverages in the EU - A focus on excise duty pass-through, on-
and off-trade sales, price promotions and pricing regulations’, RAND Europe, 2012). 
121 This value is based on the ratio between the total EU 28 revenue from excise duty on alcoholic beverage 
(EUR 35.6 bn) and the total volume of litres consumed (about 52 bn).     
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theoretical simulation whose main purpose is to show how moderate tax increases would 
only marginally affect overall consumption, at systemic level.122   
 
The implication for our Study is that since the ‘borderline’ products have negligible 
impact on the affordability of alcohol (in systemic terms), they are unlikely to represent 
a huge threat to the general public health policy on alcohol control. Of course, at local 
level, certain ‘borderline’ products may constitute a social problem (e.g. too affordable or 
appealing to young people and vulnerable social categories), and in this sense they call 
for localised solutions, as has happened already in various MS.         
 
 INCENTIVES CREATED BY TAX RATE DIFFERENTIALS  
 
A certain degree of substitution across different categories of products is, as discussed, a 
natural market dynamic that is related both to price levels and other factors. The excise 
duty level generally influences the price level, so it can be argued that a certain market 
configuration reflects, in part, the objective of tax policy.123 While this can be true at 
macro level, we have seen that the relation between tax and price is less evident at the 
micro level, and a smaller variation of the former is not always consistently reflected on 
the latter. 
 
So, assuming that a certain diversity of tax treatment across product categories is not 
per se discriminatory but the consequence of legitimate tax policy decisions, it remains 
to establish when a certain product is unduly taking advantage of a more favourable tax 
treatment causing unintended tax-induced substitution and distortion of competition. 
This analysis requires obviously a much thinner granularity than the overall cross-
substitution analysis described above and implies to look at the tax environment of 
specific MS, in order to identify the existence of sufficient incentives to pursue tax 
optimisation strategies.             
 
In other words, the pre-condition for tax-induced market distortion is that there exists a 
conspicuous tax differential across the different categories in a specific (geographical) 
market. In other words, ‘borderline’ products developed for tax optimisation purposes 
can arguably be found in geographical markets and within specific segments where there 
is a tax-saving incentive that clearly outweighs the production and marketing costs. This 
pre-condition is far from being obvious: first of all, it is generally acknowledged that - 
with due exceptions – the production costs of beverages with a predominant fermented 
base are higher than for a standard distilled-base beverages; secondly, the ‘borderline’ 
products at stake typically compete in the low-price segment where margins are very 
thin, and production costs are a relevant factor.    
 
We have developed synthetic diagrams to illustrate in a comparative perspective the tax 
rate applicable to the different types of product, in the six sample MS (Figure 4). As the 
tax differential changes with the strength (wine, OFB and IP are taxed per volume of 
finished product, while beer and ethyl alcohol by ABV/ Plato degree) the diagrams 
                                                          
122 In principle, the whole matter can be seen the other way round, i.e. a simultaneous, significant reduction of 
tax rates may induce an increase (or slower decrease) in the overall per capita alcohol consumption. This 
assumption is certainly compatible with the results of our Study as well as of other researches that investigated 
the link between taxation and demand (a relationship that is always mediated by the actual effects on retail 
prices). Some qualifications are nonetheless necessary: (i) the dependent variable in the above simulation is 
the consumption of ‘pure alcohol’, so the conclusions cannot be immediately extended to specific categories of 
product, especially products with a generally low ABV like beer, cider etc.; (ii) in particular, the reduced rates 
applicable in some MS to low-strength products may encourage the consumption of greater quantities, but this 
does not necessarily translate in an increase consumption of ‘pure alcohol’ (see Section 2.4 for details); (iii) the 
simulation regards a generalised variation in the price level, not only a segment of the market (as it is for 
instance the case with reduced rates for small producers, which – as discussed in Section 2.3 – concerns only a 
fraction of the overall EU market of alcoholic beverages).   
123 So, there are countries where wine is taxed lower than beer and vice versa. 
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display the tax level on a continuum of ABV values. The analysis of the diagrams allows 
a few observations:  
 
 Tax differentials vary significantly across MS. They are quite spread out, for instance 
in DE and FR, and much more compact in FI and NL, where there seems to be limited 
incentives for cross-over products. 
 However, more important is the differential between the specific categories at stake, 
i.e. OFB, IP and ET. In the first case, high differentials can be observed in MS with a 
zero rate on OFB (IT, DE, RO for ‘traditional’ cider) and to some extent in FR. 
Interestingly, in NL and FI, the excise rate applicable in the ‘critical’ 10%-15% vol 
band coincides.  
 The IP and ET lines intersect between 6.5% (NL) and 12.5% (RO). Before the 
intersection point, IP are taxed more heavily than ET and vice versa. Since IP below 
10% are rare it is fair to say that ET are always more taxed than IP, but some 
countries (FR, DE, FI, and NL) have partly bridged the gap by introducing reduced 
rates below a certain ABV. In FI and DE, the gap seems particularly small. 
 The differential between OFB and ET – which is particularly relevant for low-strength 
mixed drinks – is quite equally high in FR, DE, and IT. In FI there is virtually no 
difference; in NL the difference is small; in RO ‘generic’ OFB may be taxed much 
more heavily than ET in the low ABV band. Moreover, it has to be noted that where 
the gap is high (FR and IT) there are national measures in place (the pre-mix tax in 
FR and the Article 17(2) option in IT) partly reducing the tax advantage. In DE, 
where the alcopop tax tackles only spirit-based RTDs, there is a clear big incentives 
for malt-based or wine-based alternatives.  
 At medium / high ABV levels there seems to be generalised tax incentives that are 
more marked just below 15% (between OFB and IP) and just below 22% (between 
IP and ET). At lower ABV levels, the tax incentive for mixed drinks is less clear-cut. If 
any, it seems more marked just below 5% ABV.  
 
In conclusion, we should remind that tax differentials are not the only type of regulatory-
driven incentives and are possibly not the most important. Other national measures 
concerning advertising, distribution etc. may play a major role. Two examples are worth 
mentioning here, especially since they come from MS with limited tax differential 
incentives:  
 
(i) In the Netherlands alcoholic beverages with an ABV greater than 15% can be sold 
only in authorised liquor shops and not in the mass distribution retail channels. The 
diffusion in the country of low-price ‘licorettes’ with an ABV of 14.5% may therefore 
be to some extent motivated by this national policy rather than / in addition to 
possible fiscal advantages.  
(ii) Similarly, in Finland fermented (and not distilled) alcoholic beverages below 4.7% 
vol can be sold off-trade in grocery stores and other retail outlets. Above this 
threshold, they can be sold only through the State monopoly (Alko) or on-trade in 
licensed premises. The market share of these products against the other beverages 
is the highest in the EU.   
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Figure 4 – Comparison of excise duty rates on alcoholic beverages in selected MS (2017) 
France Romania 
 
 
Germany Italy 
  
Finland Netherlands 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of EDT series. 
Note: The vertical axis is represented on a logarithmic scale to facilitate the representation of quantities of 
incomparable magnitude.  
Certain special regimes like reduced rates or different rates for sparkling products are not displayed to help 
readability.  
Plato degrees have been converted into ABV using a conventional factor of 2.4. 
B
W / OFB
IP
ET
0,01
0,1
1
10
0
,5 2
3
,5 5
6
,5 8
9
,5 1
1
1
2
,5 1
4
1
5
,5 1
7
1
8
,5 2
0
2
1
,5 2
3
2
4
,5
€
 /
 L
% vol
B
W / OFB
IP
ET
0,01
0,1
1
10
0
,5 2
3
,5 5
6
,5 8
9
,5 1
1
1
2
,5 1
4
1
5
,5 1
7
1
8
,5 2
0
2
1
,5 2
3
2
4
,5
€
 /
 L
% vol
B
W st / OFB 
st
W sp / OFB 
sp
IP
ET
Alcopop
0,01
0,1
1
10
0
,5 2
3
,5 5
6
,5 8
9
,5 1
1
1
2
,5 1
4
1
5
,5 1
7
1
8
,5 2
0
2
1
,5 2
3
2
4
,5
€
 /
 L
% vol
B
W / OFB
IP
ET
0,01
0,1
1
10
0
,5 2
3
,5 5
6
,5 8
9
,5 1
1
1
2
,5 1
4
1
5
,5 1
7
1
8
,5 2
0
2
1
,5 2
3
2
4
,5
€
 /
 L
% vol
B
W St / OFB
Cid.
IP
ET
ET Reg
PM 2206
PM 2208
0,01
0,1
1
10
0
,5 2
3
,5 5
6
,5 8
9
,5 1
1
1
2
,5 1
4
1
5
,5 1
7
1
8
,5 2
0
2
1
,5 2
3
2
4
,5
€
 /
 L
% vol
B
W st / cid.
OFB sp / 
W sp
OFB st / IP
ET
0,01
0,1
1
10
0
,5 2
3
,5 5
6
,5 8
9
,5 1
1
1
2
,5 1
4
1
5
,5 1
7
1
8
,5 2
0
2
1
,5 2
3
2
4
,5
€
 /
 L
% vol
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
71 
 
The shaded rectangles highlight certain ‘critical’ ABV thresholds relevant for this Study, i.e. 5.5%, 10%, 15% 
and 22%.  
Legend: B: beer; W: wine; OFB: other fermented beverages; cid: cider; IP: intermediate products; ET: ethyl 
alcohol; ET Reg: reduced rate for ethyl alcohol from particular regions; PM2206: fermented-base pre-mix; 
PM2208: spirit-base pre-mix; st: still; sp: sparkling. 
 
 
Box 8 – Results from the OPC: perceived tax advantages between different 
categories of alcoholic beverage 
 
Ciders and ‘difficult-to-classify’ products, such as RTDs (both spirit- and fermented-based) and liqueurs 
based on fermented alcohol, are generally considered to be appropriately taxed. To the contrary, beer 
producers and private individuals believe beer is unduly penalised, especially when compared to wine 
(and other wine products, such as AWP and fortified wines), which is considered by the non-wine industry 
to be unduly favoured. Similarly, spirits producers are of the opinion that their products are currently 
unduly penalised. 
 
Question #18 - The current tax classification system may potentially create competitive advantages or 
disadvantages for different classes of products. In your opinion, which classes are unduly penalised or 
favoured by the current tax regime? 
 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Ind: rest of the industry (not included in the previous 
category); Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, public authorities, etc.). 
Note: industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol have been 
included in the ‘Ind’ category whenever present. If not present, they have been included in the residual 
‘Oth’ category. 
Producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
 
 THE SCALE AND TREND OF ADVERSE EFFECTS   
 
The possible adverse effects identified in the ‘problem tree’ (Figure 1 1) and the 
expected trends are analysed and – where feasible – quantified in this Section. To sum 
up, these include: (i) legal uncertainty and disputes; (ii) administrative burden caused 
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by classification issues; (iii) tax-induced competition issues; (iv) foregone tax revenues; 
and (v) possible negative effects on alcohol control policy and public health. 
 
 Legal uncertainty and disputes 
 
The level and severity of the legal uncertainty that may derive from the above 
classification issues is connected primarily to the specificities of national markets, and 
the classification rules adopted. Most of the CJEU landmark cases originated in the 
Netherlands, which according to various commentators are a major hub for the 
production and distribution of alcoholic beverages of industrial origin, including of 
innovative kind. It is therefore not surprising that the Netherlands anticipated other MS 
in the legal debate on the treatment of certain ‘borderline’ products and that in this 
country the disputes with economic operators have been more frequent than elsewhere. 
The peak period of cases was mostly prior to the CJEU C-150/08 ruling, during which 
some 15-20 disputes reportedly took place. After the CJEU ruling, the number of cases 
decreased and the focus of classification disputes gradually switched from the proportion 
of alcohol that can be added to a fermented beverage to broader criteria to measure the 
essential fermented character of a drink. In the other MS examined, the number of legal 
classification cases was seemingly much smaller: some authority reported just 1-2 
cases, while others none.  
 
Of course, court cases do not capture all instances of disagreement and disputes over 
the classification of products that took place in the various MS. In fact, especially where 
the matter is in the remit of customs offices instead of tax offices, the disputes are 
reportedly settled through alternative methods: when a misclassification is detected, the 
competent administration imposes the payment of a certain amount of tax arrears 
(with/without a fine) to the responsible entity. Economic operators prefer this procedure 
rather than opening a legal case, since it is faster, it often envisages the possibility of 
negotiations, and it does not imply public disclosure, so the potential reputational effects 
are minimised. However, for this very reason precise figures on the frequency of 
administrative cases are not available.  
 
In any case, legal or administrative disputes are only an imperfect indicator of the legal 
uncertainty for the simple reason that a dispute does not necessarily imply a ‘difficult-to-
classify’ dossier, but rather a divergence of views between customs authorities and 
economic operators. In other words, there can be disputes around products for which the 
classification is straightforward in customs authorities’ views, and there can be ‘difficult 
dossiers’ that do not end up in disputes because the dossiers are submitted only for a 
preliminary opinion. Actually, it can be argued that - after CJEU rulings – and the high 
costs borne by certain economic operators124, there remained limited appetite for 
litigation, and economic operators including both brand owners and wholesalers and 
distributors have become more risk-wary towards the placement on the market of new 
products if not clearly identified.  
 
The primary mechanism to prevent disputes is the issuance of BTI decisions for 
borderline products. As shown previously (see Table 7), of the nearly 1,000 active BTIs 
for alcoholic beverages, some half of them concern products falling in the residual sub-
heading of CN 2206 and CN 2208, clearly highlighting that the recourse to BTIs was 
mainly driven by the need to have a stable and predictable treatment for the type of 
‘borderline’ products analysed here. Reportedly, there have been also cases in the past 
of ‘BTI shopping’, i.e. requests for BTIs submitted in MS where a favourable classification 
was considered more probable. Of course, the BTI decision could not be precisely 
                                                          
124 Various companies have seen their turnover halved as a consequence of the re-classification of part of their 
portfolio under CN 2208, and there were cases of enterprises who nearly went bankrupt due to the high tax 
arrears.    
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anticipated and there have been certainly cases where the result was not in line with 
applicants’ expectations. For a ‘borderline’ product, being classified as CN 2206 or CN 
2208 is often a matter of commercial viability or not, and very likely the products that 
did not obtain the desired classification were withdrawn.125 Moreover, the BTI rules and 
practices have seemingly changed overtime: BTI shopping has become less feasible, and 
some customs release BTI decisions only to products for export. Finally, BTIs are not 
exempt from disputes, although concrete cases are rare, and national authorities rarely 
challenge a BTI issued by another MS. 
 
More generally, the risk of pervasive adverse effects on international trade due to 
classification disputes is taken in serious consideration so, according to some 
stakeholders, other countries’ classifications of beverages, including from third countries, 
are seldom the subject of legal challenges that might trigger broader trade issues.   
 
The cost of litigations could be significant also for public administrations, and for this 
reason certain countries encourage the recourse to preventive non-binding classification 
opinions. In France a specific platform, i.e. Soprano126, has been established to this end. 
The platform allowed authorised operators to submit classification dossiers to obtain a 
preliminary opinion in a faster way. The platform was launched in 2017 and is currently 
for voluntary use, but if successful it might become the standard procedure for the 
submission of applications. In addition to preventing disputes, the expected benefits of 
Soprano include also a reduced length of procedures, so a shorter ‘time-to-market’ for 
enterprises.    
 
With respect to future trends, it can be observed that there are no signs or sentiment 
among stakeholders of a possible recrudescence of legal disputes. Conversely, more and 
more countries have invested in updating their classification procedures and systems 
with the result that the number of ‘difficult to classify’ cases is now more modest than 
before. The nature of ‘borderline’ products is different across markets since it relates to 
specific consumer preferences and opportunities, but in general the problematic area 
seems to increasingly focus on fermented bases having undergone some form of 
concentration and/or cleaning, both traded as such or used in final beverages. Cases 
were reported of products stored in the producers’ tax warehouses as CN 2208, then 
dispatched to another country as CN 2206; beverages moved to a bordering country, re-
bottled and moved back with a more favourable classification; trade of entirely 
fermented bases with ABV of 22% coded as CN 2206 etc. In this respect, the type of 
products that originated the CJEU case ten years ago are no longer the core of 
classification issue, and other new challenges are seemingly emerging.         
 
 Administrative burden caused by classification issues 
 
Besides the risk and the costs of disputes, the lack of clear criteria and parameters for 
the classification of certain ‘borderline’ products makes the process more complex, long, 
and unpredictable, for both economic operators and administrations. Although the 
process concerns formally the customs classification, it is the consequent excise duty 
categorisation that is primarily at stake, so the administrative burden caused by 
uncertainties in the CN classification should be considered as directly related to the 
functioning of the excise duty system. 
 
For economic operators who develop and commercialise ‘borderline’ products the 
administrative burden related to a difficult classification process is likely factored-in, 
since it can be assumed that their aim is precisely to exploit classification ambiguities. Of 
                                                          
125 This possibly explains the fact that the internal analysis of the EBTI database carried out by DG TAXUD in 
support to this Study reportedly returned very limited matches with products currently on the market, 
according to the IWSR intelligence.   
126 https://pro.douane.gouv.fr/prodouane.asp 
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course, not all the ‘difficult-to-classify’ products are developed for tax optimisation 
purposes, and some of them are simply innovative products. But also in this case, there 
seems to be no particular extra burden besides the ordinary requirements (submission of 
a dossier and sample etc.) applicable to any innovative products to be launched on the 
market.      
 
The bulk of the extra burden is borne by competent authorities. This relates primarily to 
the additional efforts required to deal with complex classification cases, including 
laboratory tests and the extra labour to manage the dossier and liaise with the applicant. 
The level of effort evidently depends on the number of ‘problematic’ cases to handle, 
which in turns relate to the size and specificities of national markets and on the 
availability of a robust classification criteria and analytical methodologies. To cope with 
the mounting number of ‘borderline’ products various MS (e.g. DE, NL, FR) have set up 
ad hoc expert groups or panels in charge of defining detailed classification rules and 
procedures and to ensure consistency in their tax treatment. Typically, these groups 
operate at the central level, collating the difficult cases that cannot be solved by regional 
customs offices. It has also been reported an intensification of the collaboration and 
exchanges between customs authorities at EU and international level aimed at resolving 
the uncertainties in the interpretation and operationalisation of the subjective criteria 
concerning certain CN 2206 products.  
 
The customs administrations interviewed were generally not in the position to estimate 
the frequency of problematic products cases, and the administrative burden attributable 
to these dossiers, so only tentative estimates can be provided. In Table 22 below, we 
have elaborated a three scenarios for both the number of new classification dossiers 
undergoing laboratory analysis in a year (not including routine and periodical updates) 
and the average cost per dossier (staff/hours to evade it). The estimates are based on a 
few benchmarks collected during the fieldwork in the sample MS, and on average hourly 
tariffs derived from Eurostat. The central value between the upper and the lower limits 
falls in the region of EUR 1.0 – 1.5 mn per year at EU-level. The scenarios are highly 
speculative, so they have to be taken with caution and only as a possible measure of the 
scale of the problem.           
 
Table 22 – Hypothetical scenarios for estimating the administrative burden of classifying 
borderline products  
Scenarios Number of 
classification dossier 
undergoing laboratory 
analysis 
(EU28 / year) 
Number of hours / unit costs per dossier (laboratories + 
central administrations, where needed) 
Hourly tariff: EUR 23.2* 
  Low (5h) Middle (10h) High (15h) 
Low  2,000 €0.23 mn €0.46 mn €0.70 mn 
Middle 5,000 €0.58 mn €1.16 mn €1.74 mn 
High  8,000 €0.93 mn €1.86 mn €2.78 mn 
Source: Author’s estimates based on benchmarks collected from interviews, and Eurostat data on Hourly 
Earnings in the EU.  
Note: (*) Average tariff for ISCO 3 category ‘Technicians and associate professionals’, inclusive of Hourly 
Earnings adjusted + Non-wage Labour Costs + 25% Overhead.        
 
 Tax-induced competition issues 
 
In Section 2.1.4.2 above, we have estimated the market volume of the product 
categories that may contain the ‘borderline’ products, as defined in this Study. The 
underlying assumption is that unintended tax-induced substitution and the ensuing 
competition issues may happen, if any, within these categories. However, it is not 
feasible to determine precisely what share of these products have been developed purely 
for tax optimisation purposes, or what is the importance of an advantageous tax 
classification vis-à-vis other factors. For analytical purposes we have therefore treated all 
products falling into these categories as if they were ‘intended’ borderline products, 
liable to be addressed by a normative revision placing them in a more appropriate tax 
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category. This is evidently a speculative scenario whose primary merit is to allow an 
estimation of the order of magnitude of the phenomenon with respect to the ordinary 
alcoholic beverages.                
 
The Study findings suggest that the dimension of the categories containing ‘borderline’ 
products are limited in volume terms (see Table 23). The mixed drink category amounts 
to an estimated 78 mn litres that is approximately 6% of the ‘fiscal’ OFB category. 
According to the broad definition used in this Study, ‘borderline’ cider may amount to 
another 11% of fiscal OFB category (up to 32% if the UK market is considered). Overall, 
the ‘borderline’ products of OFB type represent about 0.44% of the total EU market of 
alcoholic beverages (nearly 1% if the UK cider is included).  
 
Another excise duty category potentially containing ‘borderline’ products is IP. As see, 
there are medium/high strength beverages and mixed drinks with a fermented base that 
are similar in various respects to equivalent spirit-based liqueurs (e.g. certain licorettes, 
cream liqueurs, RTD cocktails etc.), but are possibly taxed in accordance with Article 17 
instead of Article 20. In our estimation, this category amounts to some 75 mn litres. Also 
in this case the overall dimension of market at stake is moderate but not negligible, i.e. 
some 24% of the total IP. At general level, the size of this category of products is 
modest, accounting for only 0.14% of the total market of alcoholic beverages.  
 
Table 23 – Estimated market volume of ‘borderline’ products, and as a share of relevant 
excise duty categories and the overall EU market (2016)  
‘Borderline’  
products 
Fiscal category 
affected Quantity OFB IP All 
  mn litres 1,358.25 312.22 52,399.50 
‘Borderline’ OFB: low-
strength mixed drinks 
with  a fermented base) 
OFB (Art. 12) 78.4 5,77% .. 0,15% 
‘Borderline’  
cider 
OFB (Art. 12) 
152.0  
(435.3)* 
11,19% 
(32.05%)* 
.. 
0,29% 
(0.83%)* 
‘Borderline’ IP: 
medium/high  
strength beverages with 
a fermented base 
(including mixed drinks)  
IP (Art. 17) 75.5 .. 24,20% 0,14% 
Total  
 
305.9 
(589.2)* 
16.97% 
(37.83%)* 
24.20% 
0.58% 
(1.12%)* 
Source: Author’s estimates based on IWSR data and own market analysis. 
Notes: As regards medium-strength mixed drinks with a (supposed) entire fermented base only one product 
has been found, so they have not been included in the quantitative assessment. Medium-strength mixed drinks 
with a mixed base are often treated as ethyl alcohol. When not (only an estimated 2.5 mn litres), they have 
been added to the category of ‘borderline’ IP. High-strength mixed drink with a fermented base (and treated 
accordingly) are virtually non-existent so are not included in the analysis 
The estimates for ‘borderline cider marked with (*) include also the UK cider market. The cells marked with (..) 
indicate the ratio is not relevant, since the ‘borderline’ products considered may not affect the corresponding 
fiscal category. 
 
In theoretical terms, the above figures represent also the ‘upper limit’ of the tax-induced 
substitution potential of ‘borderline’ products, vis-à-vis the other tax categories. The 
comparison is obviously relevant with more heavily taxed categories, i.e.: (i) OFB versus 
IP, and (ii) OFB and IP versus ET. In the first case, it can be noted that low-strength 
mixed drinks represent one-fourth of the overall IP category, so under certain 
circumstances (actual tax rate differential) and for certain categories of products (i.e. not 
considering special products like PDO/PGI fortified wines) it can be assumed that mixed 
drinks may indeed constitute a competitive threat to other IP products. This potential is 
magnified if ‘borderline’ cider is considered, with the UK market alone nearly as big as 
the entire EU market of IP.       
 
The comparison with spirits is not straightforward, since these products’ average 
strength is typically 5-8 times higher. Taking into account the respective strengths, the 
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potential of mixed drink to induce substitution from spirits is negligible. Of course, in a 
micro perspective, mixed drinks with a fermented base may (and did) represent a 
cheaper alternative to spirit-based mixed drinks, thanks to the more favourable tax 
treatment, thus posing a potential competition issue. It is precisely in this respect that 
the scenario for a different tax treatment of mixed drinks have been developed in this 
Study. Since ‘borderline’ cider does generally not contain added alcohol the possible tax-
induced substitution with spirits (including spirits-based mixed drinks) seems of limited 
relevance. It is instead very relevant the substitution potential of ‘borderline’ IP with 
spirits, especially in specific segments like liqueurs and other flavoured spirits. In 
aggregated terms, the size of the impact appears limited, since ‘borderline’ IP represent 
only 3.3% of the Ethyl Alcohol category (and not considering the differences in the 
average strength), on the other hand, substantial distortions of competition seem 
possible for specific product lines and in certain geographical markets. 
 
 Foregone tax revenues 
 
The hypothetical tax-induced substitution described above may influence the amount of 
excise duty that is collected. Since we have defined ‘borderline’ products as products 
primarily conceived to take advantage of classification uncertainties to have access to 
favourable tax treatment, the impact on tax revenues stems directly from their raison 
d’etre. The above figures on their market dimension can be used to estimate the scale of 
foregone revenues possibly attributable to ‘borderline’ products. As for market 
dimensions, these estimates should be considered the upper boundary, since not all the 
products falling in the categories at stake are there (only) to exploit a more favourable 
regime. 
 
The exercise is highly speculative but may provide useful indication on the magnitude of 
the problems in absolute and relative terms. First of all, the type of tax advantage 
potentially sought is different. As discussed above:  
 
 ‘Borderline’ OFB (low-strength mixed drinks) may seek a competitive tax 
advantage against mixed drinks with a spirit base (taxed as ethyl alcohol), or 
against Intermediate Products; 
 The ‘borderline’ IP (medium/high strength beverages) considered here are 
arguably taxed as IP but compete with spirit liqueurs and other drinks of 
similar or higher strength that are taxed as Ethyl Alcohol;  
 ‘borderline’ cider is a special case, since it may primarily distort its own tax 
category (OFB), competing with other ‘traditional’ cider and OFB.  According 
to some views, ‘borderline’ cider is less expensive to produce than ‘traditional’ 
cider; secondly, it is often sweetened and/or flavoured and therefore similar, 
from consumer’s perspective, to certain pre-mixes and RTDs. Since they do 
not commonly contain ethyl alcohol it is more appropriate in this simulation to 
compare them with IP and not with Ethyl Alcohol - as it is the case for 
instance in RO, and to some extent in the UK, for non-cider OFB.  
 
As shown in Table 24 below, if taxed at the current average excise duty rates, 
‘borderline’ products would pay an overall excise of approximately EUR 311 mn (EUR 
589 mn including British cider). If low-strength mixed drinks and ‘borderline’ cider were 
taxed as IP at the current average rate, the virtual revenue (EU-wide) would increase by 
some EUR 267 mn (EUR 596 mn including British cider), while if ‘borderline’ OFB and IP 
were taxed as ethyl alcohol (taking into account the different alcoholic strength) the 
revenue increase would be of EUR 585 mn. These estimates are purely theoretical since 
as shown in details in Section 3.1.2.2, an actual increase in the tax rate would affect the 
level of consumption and therefore of tax revenue. In this sense, it is useful to consider 
also a radically different scenario: if the ‘borderline’ products were replaced by standard 
products, in the current proportion and taxed at the current average rate, there would 
be a net excise duty loss of nearly EUR 102 mn (EUR 116 mn including British cider). 
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Table 24 - Estimated tax revenue from ‘borderline’ products under hypothetical 
substitution scenarios 
Problematic 
products 
Volume  
(mn L) 
Average 
ED rate – 
EU28 
(€/L) 
Baseline 
ED 
revenue 
(€ mn)  
Virtual ED 
revenue as 
IP 
(€ mn) 
Virtual ED 
as 
adjusted 
ET  
(€ mn)   
Virtual revenue if 
substituted in line 
with market 
distribution 
(€ mn)  
‘Borderline’ OFB: 
low-strength mixed 
drinks with  a 
fermented base) 
78.4 
0.73 
(OFB) 
57.2 148.2 211.7 53.4 
‘Borderline’  
cider 
152.0 
(435.3)* 
 
0.73 
(OFB) 
111.0 
(317.8)* 
287.3 
(822.7)* 
111.0 
(317.8)* 
103.6 
(296.6)* 
‘Borderline’ IP: 
medium/high  
strength beverages 
with a fermented 
base (including 
mixed drinks)  
75.5 
1.89 
(IP) 
142.7 142.7 573.8 51.4 
Total 
305.9 
(589.2)*  
310.9 
(517.7)* 
578.2 
(1,113.6)* 
896.4 
(1,103.2)* 
208.4 
(401.5)* 
Difference w/ baseline 
+267.2 
(+595.9)* 
+585.5 
-102.4 
(-116.2)* 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IWSR data and EDT and own simulations. 
Notes: the average excise duty (ED) rate refers to the simple EU28 average, therefore the ‘baseline’ ED 
revenue is not the ‘actual’ revenue but the hypothetical ED revenues obtained multiplying the quantity of 
product to the average ED rate applicable. This approach allows to neutralise MS-level specificities in the 
estimates.     
The ‘adjusted’ ET scenario takes into account the strength of equivalent beverages. For ‘borderline’ OFB, it is 
equal to €2.7 / litre and is calculated as the average duty actually levied on spirit-based mixed drink in the 6 
sample MS. For ‘borderline’ IP it is equal to €7.6 / litre and is calculated as the average duty actually levied on 
all spirit drinks (except mixed drink) in the 6 sample MS.    
The last column correspond to the scenario where the entire volume of borderline products was taxed as a 
standard basket of products, i.e. taking into account the relative distribution that exist today across categories 
(i.e. beer represents 60%, wine 33% etc.). 
(*) including the UK cider market. 
 
 Estimated effects on alcohol control policies and public health 
 
In line with the above considerations on the relationship between tax, affordability and 
consumption at systemic level, we consider of modest magnitude the overall negative 
impact on per capita consumption of alcohol possibly caused by the tax-induced 
substitution between ‘standard’ and  ‘borderline’ products. This does not evidently deny 
the existence of problems linked to the consumption of certain alcoholic beverages by 
certain socioeconomic segments of the population, which have been tackled inter alia 
through ad hoc national taxes. However, the evidence collected in countries that adopted 
ad hoc fiscal measures to tackle emerging problems like ‘alcopops’ suggest that alcohol 
consumption did not reduce but shifted to other products. In this sense, other additional 
measures restraining physical accessibility and availability, restricting 
marketing/advertising etc. seem necessary to achieve a general reduction of per capita 
consumption of alcohol.  
 
This was reflected upon by various public health stakeholders interviewed. On fiscal 
policies, their position is generally in favour of a major review of excise structure toward 
a taxation per ABV for all product (not in the scope of the current Study). Outside of it, 
minor adjustments are not seen as having a significant impact since consumers and the 
market would always find a new equilibrium. This was the case, again, with the alcopop 
tax in Germany that, according to a few studies (summarised in Box 9), did not 
eventually affected total consumption but only preferences.  
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Finally, we have compared the trends in per capita consumption of alcohol registered by 
WHO – GISAH with the trends in the excise duty rate growth, but no clear pattern could 
be identified. Actually, the results show that the strongest decline in alcohol consumption 
concerns spirits (-2.11% in seven years), which is however the category where excise 
duty increase was the lowest (+ 2.4, see Table 19), further confirming that the link 
between excise duty levels and per capita consumption is not straightforward.   
 
 
Box 9 – Excerpts from the literature review on the impact of alcopop tax on youth 
drinking 
 
Muller S, Piontek D, Pabst A, Baumeister SE, Kraus L., Changes in alcohol consumption and beverage 
preference among adolescents after the introduction of the alcopops tax in Germany. Addiction 2010; 
105:1205–13. 
 
This study aimed at assessing the contribution of the alcopops tax introduced in Germany in July 2004 to 
changes in alcohol consumption and beverage preference among adolescents. The analysis was based on 2003 
and 2007 data from the cross-sectional survey of the European School Survey Project on Alcohol and other 
Drugs (ESPAD). The impact of the new tax on the retail prices, which nearly doubled, and the ensuing 
reduction in the consumption of alcopops (from 28.4% in 2004 to 15.6% in 2005 among 12–17-year-olds) was 
evident. However, the study found that, between 2003 and 2007, adolescents’ beverage preferences changed. 
The proportion of students preferring alcopops decreased from 27.3% to 12.4%, whereas the proportion of 
students favouring beer and spirits increased by 5.8% and 7.8%, respectively. During the same period, no 
significant changes in the total alcohol volume consumption (the volume of spirits increased by 8 g of ethanol, 
while the volume of alcopops decreased by 9 g). As a result, the study concluded that ‘effective alcohol policies 
to prevent alcohol-related problems should focus upon the reduction of total alcohol consumption instead of 
regulating singular beverages’. 
 
Anderson P, Suhrcke M and Brookes C (2012), An overview of the market for alcohol beverages of potentially 
particular appeal to minors. London: HAPI. 
 
According to this study, the introduction of the alcopop tax in Germany was largely ineffective in reducing the 
consumption of ready-to-drink (RTD) beverages. Between 2005 and 2010, the total volume of spirit-based RTD 
fell by 74.2% and the tax revenue generated by this kind of alcoholic beverage collapsed from EUR 9.6 million 
to 2.4 million (-75%). However, the analysis of annual spending per capita on RTD and high-strength (HS) pre-
mixes suggests substantially different developments. After the initial decline, the per capita annual spending on 
RTD/HS has been constantly on rise in the following years, reaching some EUR 39 in 2008, nearly the same 
amount Germans were spending before the introduction of the tax (EUR 40), and remaining well above the EU 
average. This result is essentially explained by the countermoves taken by the alcohol industry players, which 
introduced new RTDs and high-strength pre-mixes, such as malt-based RTDs, that are exempt from the 
alcopop tax.  
 
  
 THE STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEIVED ISSUES WITH BORDERLINE PRODUCTS 
 
In conclusion, it is useful to complement the above analysis with the qualitative 
feedbacks collected through the OPC on the existence of market distortions determined 
by the more favourable tax treatment enjoyed by certain products, and the extent and 
frequency of ‘difficult to classify’ products.  
 
The distribution of responses and a summary of the key analytical findings are provided 
in Box 10 below.  
 
 
Box 10 – Results from the OPC: perceived need to reconsider the tax treatment of 
certain products 
 
All industry stakeholders tend to agree that there is no need to reconsider the tax treatment of RTDs, 
beer-mixes, fermented-base liqueurs and high strength fermented beverages, with the only exception of 
beer producers who – while they see no issue with beer-mixes – consider that the treatment of the other 
products may require a partial revision. To the contrary, the majority of private individuals and of 
respondents falling into the residual ‘other’ category believe the tax treatment of the products, and 
especially RTDs, needs to be reconsidered. In addition to the four products envisaged in the questionnaire, 
respondents flagged aromatised wine-based drinks, sometimes referred to as ‘new generation vermouths’, 
as products requiring greater clarity in terms of classification and taxation.  
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Question #13 - The current classification rules may create situations where certain new beverages may 
be placed on the market at a relatively affordable price, due to a favourable tax treatment. In your opinion 
is there a general need to reconsider the tax treatment of the following types of products? 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, 
public authorities, industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, 
etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
Beer and cider producers, which in many cases coincide since producers are involved in multiple markets, 
consider the classification of beer-mixes as largely straightforward, while to the contrary the classification of 
all the other ‘difficult-to-classify’ products allegedly creates somewhat frequent issues and disputes. 
Conversely, the majority of wine and spirits producers tend to experience issues of classification only rarely, 
if not at all. 
 
Question #17 - The evaluation of the Directive carried out in 2015/16 identified several ‘difficult-to-classify’ 
product groups, which are listed below. In your experience, how often do classification uncertainties and 
disputes occur with the following classes of products? 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, 
public authorities, industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, 
etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
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2.1.5.2  Unclear application of the ‘entirely fermented origins’ provision to beverages 
containing alcohol as a flavour-carrier.  
 
The Ramboll Evaluation reported the existence of different interpretations across MS of 
the meaning of the criterion ‘entirely of fermented origin’ that concurs to the definition of 
wine and OFB comprised between 10% vol (13% vol for sparkling products) laid down in 
Article 8 and Article 12 of the Directive. As discussed above, the issue at stake is the 
addition of alcohol-based aromas and whether and how it may be a cause of loss of the 
status of ‘entirely fermented origin’. The lack of a harmonised approach might lead to 
situations where the same beverage is classified as a wine or OFB in some MS and as a 
more-heavily taxed Intermediate Product in other MS, with potential adverse impacts on 
internal market functioning and tax revenues.     
 
In principle, the issue may apply also to certain flavoured beers. Article 2 of the Directive 
does not contain the above provision, and different national approaches were registered 
towards the addition of minimal amounts of alcohol to beer. Importantly, the addition of 
alcohol for flavouring purposes to beer has been allowed by Regulation 1967/2005, so it 
can be assumed that, if the maximum threshold indicated in the Regulation is respected, 
flavoured beer should not pose classification issues.  
 
Actually, field interviews with stakeholders in the six sample MS indicate that also in the 
case of wine and OFB the issue is of modest relevance. This is further confirmed by OPC 
results, with only one-fourth of wine producers admitting possible issues with products 
containing alcohol-based aromas. The perceived limited importance of this issue 
seemingly relate to the following factors:  
 
 The existence of legislation indicating that the addition of alcohol as a flavour-carrier 
(AFC) should not be considered as a fortification, if used in modest amount and not 
exceeding the strictly necessary dose. This is clearly stated in the Regulation 
251/2014 on aromatised wine products, and can be inferred from Regulation 
1967/2005 in the case of beer. National authorities seem generally inclined to uptake 
this principle when dealing with those products. 
 Some MS have adopted domestic rules that de iure or de facto exempt the alcohol 
added as a flavour-carrier in the categorisation of fermented beverages, when the 
amount added is below a specific threshold. In our sample, all MS except Romania 
have reportedly set a maximum threshold varying between 0.5% of the total ABV 
(e.g. Finland) to 1.2% ABV (e.g. Italy), with possibly different thresholds for products 
of different type.127 Thresholds were seemingly set with reference to the limit below 
which a beverage is not considered alcoholic. 
 Detecting very small quantities of distilled alcohol in a fermented beverage through 
laboratory analysis is difficult and burdensome, so a certain degree of tolerance is 
considered a cost-efficient approach, also taking into account that the market of 
flavoured beverages is small. 
 
Nonetheless, the notion ‘entirely fermented origin’ laid down in the text of the Directive 
lends itself to a restrictive interpretation and in the absence of a clear regulatory status 
for AFC the corresponding products may be subject to classification disparities. In 
particular: 
 
                                                          
127 Some countries reportedly apply the threshold only to wine and OFB, since for beer Article 2 of the Directive 
is not explicit.   
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 Aromatised wine products: under a restrictive interpretation of Article 8 
aromatised wine-product cocktails with an ABV of 7-10%, aromatised wine-based 
drinks with an ABV of 7-14.5%, and aromatised wine between 14.5% and 15% (18% 
if without enrichment) might be considered fortified and categorised as Intermediate 
Products instead of Wine.128 
 
 Flavoured OFB: the addition of alcohol is permitted up to 10%129 vol. so the issue – 
if any – may regard only products in the 10%-15% range, which could be 
categorised as Intermediate Products instead of OFB. Based on our sample of 
products from six MS, this category seems however marginal and not relevant for a 
quantitative analysis.130  
 
Based on the market estimates calculated previously (baseline assessment), Table 25 
below provides an approximate estimate of the excise duty amount that is at stake when 
applying either of the two possible approaches to AFC-containing aromatised wine 
products. Assuming, in line with our sample, that one-sixth of MS applies a strict 
interpretation, this may translate into some 13-38 mn litres of alcoholic beverages taxed 
as Intermediate Product and generating a figurative revenue between EUR 24 mn and 
EUR 71 mn. Instead, the amount of products categorised as wine may fall in the 63 – 
188 mn litres range for an overall excise yield of EUR 50 – 152 mn.  
 
The above scenarios do not take into account, due to the lack of precise data, the actual 
distribution of products across MS, which is high in countries with a low or zero tax rate 
for wine such as France. In this sense, the actual excise yield from AFC-containing AWP 
is probably closer to the low end (EUR 50 mn) rather than to the high scenario. The 
scenario on the tax revenue stemming from a strict interpretation assumes that all AFC-
containing products in a given national market pay the excise duty of Intermediate 
Product. This is evidently a hypothetical scenario, since if taxed as IP the 
competitiveness of many of these products would be seriously hampered and their 
market would likely shrink.  
 
With respect to future trends, two considerations apply: (i) an increasing number of MS 
have adopted a flexible approach to AFC, possibly in connection with the EU-level 
legislation mentioned above. This trend is likely to continue, since also MS that have not 
set explicit threshold for AFC are reportedly inclined to maintain margins of tolerance in 
the classification of these products. So disparities of treatment are progressively less 
likely; (ii) on the other hand, the market size of these products is growing, although 
moderately, so the risk of abuses may become more relevant in the future.        
 
                                                          
128 This possibility seems very unlikely since Reg. 251/2014 states: ‘the ethyl alcohol used to dilute or dissolve 
colorants, flavourings or any other authorised additives used in the preparation of aromatised wine products 
must be of agricultural origin and must be used in the dose strictly necessary and is not considered as addition 
of alcohol for the purpose of production of an aromatised wine product’. However, the last line makes reference 
to production purposes, so not necessarily ‘tax purposes’. 
129 Unless Article 17(2) is triggered, in which case still OFB in the 5.5%-15% range and sparkling OFB in the 
8.5%-15% could be affected’ 
130 Both traditional and ‘mass-market’ ciders seldom exceed 10% vol. Also, mixed drinks with a fermented base 
are typically below 10%.  
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Table 25 – Estimated amount of AFC-containing aromatised wine products and excise 
duty value at stake   
  Volume of 
products 
containing AFC 
(mn litres) 
Est. volume in 
MS adopting a 
strict 
interpretation 
(mn litres)  
Figurative 
excise duty in 
MS adopting a 
strict 
interpretation 
(in € mn) 
Est. volume 
in MS 
adopting a 
margin of 
tolerance  
(mn litres) 
Figurative 
excise duty 
in MS 
adopting a 
margin of 
tolerance (in 
€ mn) 
Aromatised 
wine 
products 
Low (25%): 75.4 
Medium (50%): 
150.7 
High (75%): 226.1 
L: 12.6 
M: 25.1 
H: 37.7 
L: €23.7 
M:  €47.4 
H: €71.1 
L: 62.8 
M: 125.6 
H: 188.4 
L: €50.6 
M: €101.28 
H: €151.9 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IWSR and EDT raw data. 
Note: The simulation assumes that in 1/6th of EU MS a strict interpretation of the ‘entirely fermented origin’ 
provision applies. The figurative excise duty yield is calculated using the average excise duty in the EU for 
intermediate products (strict interpretation) and wine (margin of tolerance). 
 
The issue of AFC does not cause relevant adverse effects of other nature. As discussed, 
the matter is reported as not problematic by authorities and operators alike and no 
present or past dispute was reported (beside cases concerning products that might have 
exceeded the AFC tolerance threshold). The adoption of a tolerance threshold certainly 
reduces the need for investigating this category of products with possible enforcement 
cost savings (unfeasible to quantify). As the amount of alcohol added is minimal, and the 
products at stake are a niche of the alcoholic beverages market, also the impact on the 
per capita consumption of alcohol are of no relevance for this IA Study.        
 
 
2.1.5.3  Indefinite excise product code for Wine and OFB 
 
The Excise Product Codes (EPC) applicable to product categories defined in the Directive 
are laid down in Annex II of Commission Regulation No 684/2009.131 Currently, ‘still 
wine’ and ‘still fermented beverages’ share the same EPC, i.e. W200, and the same 
happens with ‘sparkling wine’ and ‘sparkling fermented beverages’, both of which fall 
under W300. The Ramboll Evaluation noted that this arrangement is not ideal for MS 
that have a differential tax treatment, and concluded: ‘Where potential differences in 
national excise rates between the two categories result in different excise burdens, risks 
and associated guarantees in intra-community movements, the EMCS should distinguish 
between the two excise categories’.132 The problem, if any, regards ‘borderline’ products 
(mixed products) for which the risk of misclassification is plausible, e.g. between wine-
based and other fruit-based aromatised products and mixed drinks. The consequences of 
misclassification would be an incorrect calculation of the excise duty that has to be paid, 
as well as of the financial guarantee required.        
 
At the same time, the Ramboll Evaluation recognised that the issue is currently not 
causing any major adverse effects: ‘as there are no major, immediate and urgent 
negative consequences stemming from the current specifications, this recommendation 
may be implemented alongside other scheduled changes to the EMCS, thus minimising 
the marginal costs of the upgrade’.133  
 
For the baseline assessment it is therefore relevant in the first place to review which 
countries have a differential treatment of wine and OFB and what volume of products is 
at stake (Table 26Table 26). Overall, there are six MS applying a different tax rate to 
Wine and OFB (still and/or sparkling). Actually, in three cases the different rates concern 
                                                          
131 Commission Regulation (EC) No 684/2009 of 24 July 2009 implementing Council Directive 2008/118/EC as 
regards the computerised procedures for the movement of excise goods under suspension of excise duty, OJ L 
197, 29.7.2009. 
132 Ramboll Evaluation (2016), p. 133. 
133 Ibid. 
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only a sub-class of OFB products i.e. cider and perry (defined in national terms). In the 
case of France, the difference concerns only sparkling beverages. The total amount of 
OFB that is taxed ad hoc is estimated at 169 mn litres, which correspond to an overall 
excise duty value of EUR 237 mn, the bulk of it (98%) relates to Ireland. Overall, the 
data shows the marginality of the issue: when compared to the total OFB and the total 
Wine + OFB markets, the products with an ad hoc tax treatment account to 
approximately 13% and 1% respectively.  
 
Moreover, it should be noted that the only cases where an OFB product might have an 
incentive in being ‘misclassified’ as Wine are Hungary and Romania, since in all other 
countries Wine is taxed more heavily. In other words, the overall risk of tax losses due 
to the absence of a separate EPC (and EMCS) coding regard a tiny 0.6% (some 8 mn 
litres) of the overall OFB. The quantitative analysis is confirmed by the feedback 
collected through interviews, with the majority of stakeholders (exception made for a 
few Romanian interviewees) reporting no relevant difficulty with the current aggregate 
EPC codes.      
 
The differential tax treatment between cider and generic OFB may also require a 
separate coding for better monitoring and control, but this distinction is not currently 
supported by the Directive. In the event of a revised OFB category, with possible 
distinction between sub-classes of products, the overall picture would be different and 
the need for a separate EPC would become important. This is discussed in greater detail 
in Section 3.1.       
 
Table 26 – Overview of MS with a different tax treatment for Wine and OFB products 
MS Excise duty rate on 
wine (€/hl) 
Excise duty rate on OFB 
(€/hl) 
Volume of OFB 
products 
concerned (mn 
litres)* 
Excise duty 
revenue at 
stake (€ mn) 
FR 9.33 sparkling 3.77 sparkling 8.2 (sparkling) 0.3 
HU 
0.00 31.55 
5.6 (still) 
0.6 (sparkling) 
1.8 
IE 
424.84 (still. <=15% vol) 
849. 68 (sparkling) 
309.84 (cider and perry. still) 
619.70 (cider and perry. 
sparkling) 
61.3 (still) 
6.8 (sparkling) 
232.1 
MT 
205.00 (still & sparkling) 20.00 (still & sparkling) 
0.3 (still) 
<0.1 (sparkling) 
0.1 
PL 
37.21 22.85 (cider and perry) 
9.4 (still) 
1.5 (sparkling) 
2.4 
RO 
0.00 (still and sparkling) 
89.87 (generic OFB. still) 
10.73 (generic OFB. 
sparkling) 
<0.1 (still) 
2.0 (sparkling) 
0.2 
  TOTAL 168.6 236.8 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IWSR and EDT raw data. 
Notes: the quantities displayed relate to the share of OFB that is taxed differently than the corresponding wine 
category and for which misclassification would therefore have an impact.  
(*) The precise share of sparkling cider on the total was not available, so a qualitative conventional 10% has 
been applied. 
In the case of Romania, still OFB is practically non-existent, since nearly all cider (traditional and mass-market) 
has reportedly access to the zero tax applied also to wine.    
Countries where differences regard reduced rate provisions (such as the UK) are not displayed.   
 
 
 SUMMARY OF PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
Specific problem areas Adverse Effects Expected evolution 
Uncertain scope of the 
category ‘Other 
Fermented Beverage’ 
• Administrative burden for products 
difficult to classify. 
• Risk of legal disputes.  
• Tax-induced substitution and 
competition issues.  
• Tax revenue losses.  
• The market for OFB is stable or 
declining for mixed drinks, slightly 
growing for ’borderline’ cider.  
• Classification uncertainties and 
disputes are less frequent over the 
years. But the disparities across 
MS are going to persist. 
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Specific problem areas Adverse Effects Expected evolution 
Unclear application of 
the ‘entirely fermented 
origin’ provision to 
beverages containing 
alcohol as a flavour-
carrier 
 
• Uncertain and diverging interpretation 
may cause market distortions. 
• Related tax revenue effects are 
possible.  
• The sales volume of this type of 
products is slightly increasing. 
• More countries are adopting 
national rules and maximum 
thresholds for the use of alcohol as 
a flavour-carrier.    
Indefinite excise 
product code for wine 
and OFB 
• Obstacle to monitoring and control, 
and risk of misclassification for a 
modest amount of products. 
• In the absence of a revision of the 
OFB tax category, concrete 
problems of misclassification will 
remain negligible. 
• The issue would continue affecting 
market monitoring capacities of 
MS. 
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2.2 Exemptions for denatured alcohol 
 
2.2.1 Baseline assessment (inclusive of a market analysis) 
 
Alcohol and alcoholic beverages can be subject to high excise duties in EU MS. However, 
a significant amount of alcohol is not produced and used for human consumption, but for 
other uses. Article 27 of Directive 92/83/EEC stipulates that Member States can exempt 
alcohol produced for certain uses from excise duty – but in order to prevent tax fraud or 
evasion (i.e. to eliminate the risk that alcohol intended for other purposes is sold as 
potable alcohol), the alcohol has to be denatured before it is sold. (NB: Article 27 also 
defines certain uses, such as the production of medicines, for which alcohol can be 
exempted even if it has not been denatured, but the focus of this Section is on 
denatured alcohol for industrial uses.) Denaturation consists in the addition of certain 
chemical substances that make the alcohol unfit for human consumption. 
 
Article 27 includes two separate provisions for denatured alcohol, namely: 
 
 Article 27(1)(a) concerns alcohol that has been ‘completely’ denatured in 
accordance with the requirements of any MS, provided that these have been duly 
notified and accepted by all MS. 
 Article 27(1)(b) concerns what is often referred to as ‘partially’ denatured alcohol 
(although this term is not used in the Directive). It stipulates that alcohol 
denatured in accordance with the relevant national requirements and ‘used for 
the manufacture of any product not for human consumption’ shall also be 
exempted – but in this case there is no requirement for notification of or 
acceptance by the other MS. 
 
The difference between the denaturing procedures that are allowed under the two 
indents, and the requirements that follow from them, is important. To summarise very 
briefly (for more detail see the Section on the regulatory framework below), ‘completely’ 
denatured alcohol (CDA) is exempt from excise duty per se and can be sold freely to 
anyone; a system of mutual recognition of denaturing procedures is intended to ensure 
it can circulate without obstacles throughout the EU, and the risk of fraudulent use is 
minimised. By contrast, the so-called ‘partially’ denatured alcohol (PDA) under indent 1 
(b) can only be traded between authorised users, and the exemption is conditional on its 
use in the manufacture of another product. Its rationale lies in the fact that different 
industry sectors that use alcohol can have very different requirements, and in some 
cases, CDA is not appropriate (e.g. because its intentionally strong smell means it 
cannot be used in perfumes, tasting agents cannot be used with products such as 
toothpaste which come into contact with the mouth, etc.). Each MS applies its own 
criteria and regulations to determine which procedures and formulations for PDA are 
authorised.  
 
 
2.2.1.1 The market for denatured alcohol 
 
Eurostat Prodcom data suggests a total sold production in 2015 of a little less than 1.3 
billion litres of denatured alcohol. However, this data is not particularly useful for 
assessing the whole of the market, partly because figures for several MS (including some 
important alcohol producers such as DE and the UK) are missing.134 Even more 
importantly, it is highly unlikely that the figures even for those MS for which they exist 
                                                          
134 Eurostat Prodcom, Product code 20147500 - Denatured ethyl alcohol and other denatured spirits; of any 
strength. It should be noted that data for additional countries is available for different years (e.g. DE for 2016, 
UK for 2014), but the accuracy / comprehensiveness of this data appears questionable (i.e. likely to be too 
low). In any case, the (estimated) total for the EU28 does not change – between 1.25 and 1.28 billion litres 
per year.  
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are comprehensive, given that denaturing can happen at different stages of the 
production process, and a significant part of the alcohol that is denatured at some point 
or another may therefore never be declared as such. 
 
It is therefore necessary to rely on other sources to estimate the market size and key 
trends. According to credible industry sources, total EU-28 alcohol consumption is a little 
over 7.5 billion litres per year.135 Around 7 billion litres of this are produced within the 
EU, the rest is imported from third countries (imports into the EU have been on a 
downward trend since reaching a peak of almost 2 billion litres in 2011). The total 
consumption can be broken down into three main segments (Figure 5). Two of these 
(industrial, as well as fuel) are potentially relevant when it comes to assessing the 
market for denatured alcohol, while potable applications (which include alcohol used in 
the production of food products as well as vinegar) use exclusively undenatured alcohol, 
for obvious reasons. 
 
Figure 5 - EU alcohol consumption split by main uses (2014) 
 
Source: LMC International (2015). 
 
Around 1.2 billion litres of industrial alcohol are consumed in the EU per year. This 
market is relatively stable, and only tends to register modest growth (or decline) more 
or less in line with the trajectory of the manufacturing industry as a whole. The majority 
of the alcohol used for industrial applications is produced from renewable sources 
(fermentation alcohol), while synthetic alcohol accounts for around 30-40%, with some 
fluctuations between the two primarily based on the relative price of the underlying raw 
materials. The main industrial uses of alcohol are as a solvent (which accounts for 70-
75% of demand, and is used in the manufacture of a wide range of products including 
cosmetics, detergents, inks and coatings), and as a chemical intermediate (in order to 
produce other chemicals such as ethyl acrylates and ethylamines). 
 
Most of the industrial alcohol used in the EU has to be denatured. Among the main uses, 
the exceptions where undenatured alcohol would typically (but not necessarily always) 
be used are pharmaceuticals (based on Article 27(1)(d) of the Directive; this accounts 
for approx. 10% of the industrial alcohol market) and chemical intermediates (based on 
Article 27(2)(d) or (e); this accounts for around 25% of the market).136 
 
                                                          
135 The main source used for the ensuing analysis is LMC International, ‘The European Market for Industrial and 
Potable Alcohol’, 2015. Its main findings regarding the market size and evolution were confirmed by industry 
experts and stakeholders during interviews carried out in the context of this study. 
136 LMC International (2015). 
Industrial
16%
Potable
13%
Fuel
71%
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This means that approx. 65% (800 million litres per year) of the industrial alcohol used 
across the EU is denatured, although the formulations, methods, and stage in the 
production process at which this happens can vary significantly, depending inter alia on 
the intended end use. Due to the diversity of uses and users, exact figures are not 
available, but based on existing sources and industry expert views, we estimate these 
800 million litres are spread more or less evenly across the following key products: 
 
 Cosmetics / personal care 
 Automotive sector (anti-freeze, screenwash) 
 Detergents and other cleaners 
 Paints, coatings and inks 
 Other (incl. biocides) 
 
On the other hand, the fuel market has become the dominant use of alcohol in the EU 
in the last decade or so, especially so since the EU adopted its climate and energy 
package in 2009. There was a sharp increase in the production and use of so-called 
biofuels (which refers to mixtures of ‘traditional’ fossil-based liquid fuels – gasoline or 
diesel – with ethanol from renewable sources) until 2011, when EU fuel ethanol 
consumption had grown to around 5.5 million litres per year. It has been more or less 
constant since (partly as a result of low oil prices). The future market evolution is highly 
uncertain, and is likely to depend to a significant extent on the direction of renewable 
energy policy in Europe. The recent (2015) revision of the Renewable Energy and Fuel 
Quality Directives, which set a 7% ceiling to the contribution from conventional biofuels 
by 2020, was quoted as a concern by industry representatives. Just like industrial 
alcohol, in principle, all ethanol for use in biofuels has to be denatured, although, again, 
the formulations, methods, and stage in the production process at which this happens 
vary. In practice, the most common (but far from the only) procedure is the denaturing 
with a small amount of gasoline (or another fossil fuel) at a refinery, which then goes on 
to blend it with more of the same gasoline to produce the desired biofuel mix (e.g. ‘E10’ 
consisting of 90% gasoline and 10% ethanol).  
 
The price of alcohol depends on a number of factors, including its grade / purity (the 
required standard varies depending on the intended end use), whether or not the alcohol 
is anhydrous (i.e. its water content minimised, which is necessary for many industrial as 
well as fuel applications), and, of course, factors related to supply and demand (such as 
the cost of relevant raw materials) as well as exchange rate movements. There has been 
a relatively high amount of price volatility in Europe in recent years, with the wholesale 
price of the cheapest grade (T2 fuel ethanol) fluctuating between about 60 and 90 US 
cents per litre between 2008 and 2015, and that of the most expensive grade 
(anhydrous industrial) between about 70 and 110 US cents per litre.137 This means that 
EU denatured industrial alcohol market (approx. 800 million litres) is worth in the region 
of EUR 500-650 million per year, while the alcohol for biofuels market is estimated at 
around EUR 3-3.5 billion per year.138 Refining, transport, storage, denaturation or any 
other additional costs charged by intermediaries or distributors are not included in these 
estimates. 
 
Table 27 – Estimated size of the EU market for denatured alcohol 
Application 
Annual EU 
consumption 
(million litres) 
Of which 
denatured 
Price per litre 
(USD) 
Exchange 
rate EUR-
USD 
Est. market value 
(million EUR) 
% 
Million 
litres 
Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Industrial 1,200 65% 800 0.70 1.10 0.8 437 686 
Fuel  5,500 100% 5,500 0.60 0.90 0.8 2,640 3,960 
Total       3.077 4,646 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LMC International. 
                                                          
137 LMC International (2015). 
138 Applying an exchange rate of 0.8 EUR per USD, which is very close to the average over the last ten years. 
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The production of alcohol is distributed unevenly across the EU. Based on industry 
data, the total renewable ethanol production capacity was 8.9 billion litres per year 
(compared with an actual production of around 6.5-7 billion litres – see above).139 
France is by far the largest producer, followed by Germany and the UK (both of which 
are also important producers of synthetic alcohol, which is not included in these figures). 
Spain, Hungary, Poland, the Netherlands, and Belgium also produce significant amounts.  
 
Figure 6 – Member States shares of the total EU ethanol installed production capacity 
(2015) 
 
Source: Based on ePURE (2015). 
 
The production in certain MS (such as Spain or Hungary) is destined almost entirely for 
use in biofuels, whereas others also produce significant amounts for industrial 
applications (in particular the UK and Germany, which are currently the EU’s only 
producers of synthetic alcohol). It follows that some MS produce more alcohol than they 
use, while others need to look abroad to satisfy their demand. Looking only at industrial 
(not fuel) alcohol, the available data140 for the period 2010-2014 suggests the MS with 
the most significant surplus were the UK (158 million litres per year, on average), France 
(126 million litres) and Poland (57 million litres), while the MS with the highest deficits 
were Germany (113 million litres), Belgium (80 million litres), Spain (68 million litres) 
and Italy (49 million litres). Overall, approximately a third of the industrial alcohol 
consumed in the EU each year (around 400 million litres) crosses intra-EU borders. 
Assuming the same ratios as above (65% of all industrial alcohol is denatured), this 
means approximately 260 million litres of the industrial alcohol that is denatured is 
produced in a MS other than the one in which it is used – though it is not clear from this 
data how much of this is denatured in the country of origin, and how much is denatured 
in the destination country (feedback from interviewed stakeholders suggest the latter is 
usually the case).  
 
When considering the production, trade and consumption of non-potable alcohol, it is 
important to consider the market structure, distinguishing between two levels: 
 
 On the one hand, there is the market for ‘raw’ (unrefined) alcohol, including the 
very large biofuels segment. This has most of the essential characteristics of a 
                                                          
139 ePURE, ‘European renewable ethanol – key figures 2015’, 2016. 
140 LMC International (2015). 
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commodity, and the market is dominated by relatively few (around 100 according 
to industry experts) relatively large players who produce / deal high volumes, and 
several of whom have operations in several MS. At this level, there is a very 
significant volume of international trade, including imports from third countries to 
the EU as well as intra-EU trade, in particular movements from the production 
‘hubs’ (especially France, but also the UK, Czech Republic, and others) to other 
Member States. The vast majority of this trade involves undenatured alcohol, 
which is moved under duty suspension from one tax warehouse to another, 
refined and/or denatured (where relevant) in the MS of destination, either by the 
recipient or the eventual end user.  
 
 On the other hand, the market for industrial alcohol which has undergone varying 
degrees of rectification / purification (depending on the intended end use) is 
much more fragmented and involves a higher number (around 4,000 according to 
industry estimates) of economic operators both large and small from across a 
range of sectors, who sell or buy alcohol for specific uses, often in relatively small 
quantities and requiring specific denaturants. This market tends to be much less 
transparent, and more national or even local; while intra-EU trade does occur, it 
seems to be the exception rather than the norm, and the quantities of denatured 
alcohol that are moved from one MS to another appear to be very limited.  
 
 
2.2.1.2  The regulatory framework 
 
As briefly noted at the outset, the regulatory framework that exempts denatured alcohol 
from excise duty distinguishes between two different categories: completely denatured 
alcohol (CDA) and the so-called ‘partially’ denatured alcohol (PDA). The main EU and 
national rules and regulations applicable to both types are briefly summarised below. 
 
For completely denatured alcohol, Article 27(1)(a) stipulates that MS shall exempt 
alcohol from excise duty: 
 
‘When distributed in the form of alcohol that has been completely denatured 
in accordance with the requirements of any Member State, such requirements 
having been duly notified and accepted in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 
4 of this Article. This exemption shall be conditional on the application of the 
provisions of Directive 92/12/EEC to commercial movements of completely 
denatured alcohol.’ 
 
The process for notification referred to in the text requires each MS to communicate to 
the Commission the denaturants it wishes to employ; the Commission transmits this 
information to all other MS. The denaturing processes are then authorised by the 
Commission (provided no MS requests that the matter be raised in the Council) via a 
Commission Implementing Regulation.141 In the past, MS typically notified between one 
and three procedures (or ‘formulations’) each. In 2008, due to the view that ‘[t]he 
proliferation of denaturing procedures adds complexity to the denaturing system, 
weakens the ability for effective administration of the system, and offers more 
opportunities for fraud’142, a Fiscalis Project Group (FPG) was created to explore the 
possibility of applying common denaturing procedures for CDA. 
 
After the first phase of the project, the FPG proposed a formulation composed of 3 litres 
of methyl ethyl ketone (MEK – which serves as the ‘smelling agent’), 3 litres of isopropyl 
                                                          
141 Commission Regulation (EC) 3199/93, most recently modified by Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2017/1112. 
142 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 162/2013, recital 3. 
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alcohol (IPA – the chemical marker), and 1 gram of denatonium benzoate (the ‘tasting 
agent’) per hectolitre of ethanol. This formulation – often referred to as the ‘3-3-1’ 
formulation – was adopted on 1 July 2013 by Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
162/2013. However, most MS chose to recognise this formulation in addition to (rather 
than instead of) their national formulations, only a few of which were withdrawn at the 
same time. In these circumstances, the uptake of the 3-3-1 Eurodenaturant formulation 
has been rather limited, with many economic operators indicating that it is too costly to 
produce and that the availability of MEK in the required quantities could be a problem. 
 
In response to these criticisms, a revised version of the formulation was developed in 
the second phase of the FPG. It only contains one litre of MEK and one litre of IPA, and is 
therefore referred to as the ‘1-1-1’ formulation. This new formulation is widely supported 
by industry as well as a large majority of MS, most of whom have now also withdrawn 
their remaining national formulations. This means that, with effect from 1 August 
2017143: 
 
 23 Member States144 employ the new 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant; 
 4 Member States (BG, CZ, RO, UK145) employ the old 3-3-1 Eurodenaturant; 
 1 Member State (SE) employs a different variant of the Eurodenaturant 
ingredients, namely ‘1-2-1’; 
 additionally, 3 Member States (CZ, EL, FI146) have kept one or two national 
formulations. 
 
As noted previously, alcohol that is denatured in accordance with these procedures can 
be moved and sold freely anywhere in the EU (although there have in the past been 
issues with the interpretation of mutual recognition, which are discussed as part of the 
problem analysis below). The only condition stipulated in the Directive is the application 
of Directive 92/12/EEC (which has been repealed and replaced by Directive 
2008/118/EC, the so-called Horizontal Directive), which effectively means that when 
moved between MS, CDA must be accompanied by a Simplified Administrative Document 
(SAAD). 
 
For so called ‘partially’ denatured alcohol, Article 27(1)(b) stipulates that MS shall 
exempt alcohol:  
 
‘When both denatured in accordance with the requirements of any Member 
State and used for the manufacture of any product not for human 
consumption.’ 
 
Article 27(1)(b) essentially leaves it to MS to devise and apply rules and procedures for 
PDA that is used as an input for the manufacture of a product that is not intended for 
human consumption (rather than freely sold as a finished product in its own right). 
These provisions were originally included in the Directive primarily due to the specificities 
of the cosmetics / pharmaceutical industry (which uses alcohol in a large number of its 
products, and typically requires less drastic denaturing procedures), but they are also 
used for a number of other industrial applications. Unlike CDA, PDA is not exempt from 
excise duty per se; it has to be moved under the duty suspension regime, which implies 
storage and production in a tax warehouse, lodging of a guarantee, and the use of the 
Excise Movement Control System (EMCS), in accordance with the relevant provisions on 
the production, processing, holding and movement of excise goods in Directive 
                                                          
143 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1112. 
144 This includes Croatia, which has stipulated ‘a minimum of’ the 1-1-1 ingredients, but this clarification should 
have no effect in practice. 
145 BG and RO have recently communicated their intention to switch to 1-1-1 as soon as possible. 
146 In the case of Finland, the remaining national formulations are only authorised until the end of 2018. 
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2008/118/EC. Only when the manufacturing process is complete, the resulting product in 
which the PDA has been used is released for consumption.   
 
The rules and regulations that apply to PDA, including the authorised denaturants and 
procedures, vary considerably between MS, and there is no mechanism for mutual 
recognition. Most MS have positive lists – some longer, some shorter – of approved 
formulations (for example, ES has approved 3 formulations, PL 9, and the UK 12). In 
many MS, the formulations are tied to a specific sector or end-use, while in others, the 
denaturants are not linked to any particular purpose. Some MS (including DE and ES) 
also provide for the possibility of authorising formulations other than those included in 
their positive list for individual users, based on an assessment of their particular needs 
and the inherent risks; at least one (FR) has no positive list at all and only authorises 
formulations for individual users on a case-by-case basis. Some MS’ regulations 
(including DE, IT) explicitly state that PDA formulations that are authorised in other MS 
will usually also be authorised in their MS. In at least one MS (FR), the authorities can 
even authorise the use of ingredients of the final product itself (such as essential oils in 
the case of perfumes) as denaturants. Across the EU, it is estimated that several 
hundred formulations are authorised, though the exact number is impossible to ascertain 
due to the fact that authorisations granted to individual firms are typically not in the 
public domain. The JRC maintains a database of all formulations used across the EU, but 
this has not been systematically updated by the MS in recent years.  
 
But it is not only the approved formulations, but also the requirements with regard to 
the supervision of the production, movement and use of PDA, that vary considerably 
between MS. Each country has its own system of registrations, licenses and 
authorisations for producers and users of alcohol. While the use of EMCS is obligatory for 
all cross-border movements, some (but not all) MS allow simplified procedures for 
movements of PDA within their own territory (based on Article 30 of Directive 
2008/118/EC). There are also specific national rules regarding stock control, record 
keeping, inspections, etc. (some of which also apply to CDA). For example, ES requires 
the presence of a tax official during the denaturation process (who is to take three 
samples), and has defined a minimum of 100,000 litres per process. PL has introduced 
new legislation in 2017 which provides for a full value chain control for domestic and 
intra-EU transport of certain goods, including alcohol. Some MS (including DE, ES, FR) 
also allow for so-called ‘in situ’ denaturation, meaning users (typically cosmetics 
manufacturers) can buy undenatured alcohol and denature it on their own premises, 
sometimes as part of the production process itself. 
 
Overall, it is clear that certain approaches are stricter in some MS than in others, based 
partly on their respective assessments of the risks involved. During the interviews 
conducted as part of this study, officials and stakeholders in MS that are relatively 
flexible regarding the denaturing formulations they allow tended to emphasise the fact 
that any potential risks arising from this are mitigated by the strict controls of the 
production process.  
 
 
2.2.1.3  The uses of CDA and PDA 
 
Comprehensive data for how much CDA and PDA is produced and used across the EU 
does not exist. While there are some ‘typical’ uses (for example, the cosmetics sector 
uses primarily PDA, whereas CDA is widely used for screen wash), there are no ‘hard and 
fast’ rules. Overall, it appears that the amount of PDA produced and used across the EU 
by far exceeds that of CDA, but there are regional variations, as which of the two types 
is used for which end uses depends to some extent on the CDA and PDA formulations 
that are approved in the MS in question. It is also worth noting that the changes in the 
CDA formulations that come into effect from 1 August 2017 (see above) may lead to a 
further shift in the balance for certain products / countries. 
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
92 
 
 
Across most of Western Europe (including DE, ES, FR, UK), CDA only accounts for a 
small minority of all denatured alcohol. Apart from being sold in relatively modest 
quantities to the general public (primarily as a fuel for alcohol burners, camping stoves 
or barbecues, or as a household cleaning agent), CDA is used for the manufacture of a 
limited range of products, in particular for use in the automotive industry (anti-freeze, 
screen wash). Economic operators interviewed for this study estimated that CDA 
accounts for no more than 5-10% of all industrial alcohol in the ‘older’ (EU-15) MS. This 
is broadly in line with the responses of those EU-15 national authorities that were able to 
provide data on the volumes of CDA and PDA produced as part the 2015 evaluation. 
 
However, the situation in Eastern Europe is markedly different, and CDA plays a much 
more important role in the ‘newer’ MS (which, taken together, account for around 15% 
of the industrial alcohol consumption in the EU147). According to data compiled for the 
evaluation, the volume of CDA produced is greater than that of PDA in CZ, EE, PL, SI and 
SK, and only slightly smaller in BG (no other EU-13 MS provided this data). This is likely 
to be due to comparatively strict rules for PDA (in terms of approved formulations and/or 
supervisory regimes) which make the use of CDA relatively more attractive. For 
example, the cosmetics industry in PL uses primarily CDA in its products (some of it 
imported from other MS). Although this was described as less than ideal by the 
interviewed industry representatives (and the cosmetics industry in Western Europe uses 
almost exclusively PDA), it was reportedly preferable to the alternative of using PDA in 
PL and complying with the requisite requirements. Overall, we estimate that the market 
for industrial alcohol in the EU-13 is currently around 60-70% CDA and 30-40% PDA, 
with some significant variations between MS. This means that, for the EU as a whole, we 
estimate the market for denatured industrial alcohol is around 84% PDA, and 16% CDA 
(see Table 28 below). 
 
Biofuels are another interesting case. Most MS have specific PDA formulations for ethanol 
for use in biofuels, which usually involves denaturing with gasoline or ethyl tert-butyl 
ether (ETBE). At least one MS (DE) specifically prohibits the addition of any other ‘alien’ 
denaturants in biofuels. However, at least one MS (CZ) uses CDA for its domestic 
biofuels production, and has a specific CDA formulation for this exclusive purpose, which 
it intends to keep using in future alongside the Eurodenaturant. Nonetheless, given that 
no other MS have notified their intention to keep national CDA formulations for this 
purpose, it appears safe to assume that, from 2018, around 98% of biofuels in the EU 
will be produced using PDA. This typically means the alcohol is denatured with a small 
quantity of gasoline, before being blended with more gasoline; or denatured with a small 
quantity of ETBE before being transformed entirely into ETBE (which is an alternative 
biofuel additive). Some MS allow the two steps (denaturing / blending) to actually be 
carried out at the same time, as part of the same process, so that, effectively, 
undenatured alcohol is mixed with gasoline and the resulting product is considered an 
energy product. 
 
Table 28 – Estimated amounts of PDA and CDA consumed annually in the EU 
Application Geography 
Annual consumption 
of denatured alcohol 
(mn litres) 
% PDA 
(est.) 
% CDA 
(est.) 
Amount 
PDA (mn 
litres) 
Amount 
CDA (mn 
litres) 
Industrial 
EU-15 680 92.5% 7.5% 629 51 
EU-13 120 35% 65% 42 78 
EU-28 800 84% 16% 671 129 
Fuel  EU-28 5,500 98% 2% 5,390 110 
Total EU-28 6,300 96% 4% 6,061 239 
Source: Author’s estimates based on various sources incl. LMC International. 
 
 
                                                          
147 LMC International (2015). 
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2.2.2 Problem analysis 
 
The 2015 evaluation and subsequent analysis identified a number of problems with the 
exemptions for denatured alcohol, since both Articles 27(1)(a) and (b) ‘lack clarity 
regarding which products can be exempted under which conditions’, which can lead to 
inconsistencies, uncertainties, financial and commercial risks, and – ‘theoretically at 
least’ – competitive advantages for economic operators in certain MS over others.148 As 
part of this study, we have aimed to substantiate and collect further evidence on the 
actual problems and the extent to which they generate negative impacts in practice. 
 
2.2.2.1  Incomplete / inconsistent mutual recognition of CDA 
 
The wording of Article 27(1)(a) of the Directive is somewhat unclear: it stipulates that 
MS have to exempt alcohol that has been completely denatured in accordance with the 
requirements of any MS. Since the requirements of MS vary, this raises the question of 
whether producers in a given MS can use the CDA formulations of a MS other than their 
own, and whether other MS are required to recognise CDA produced anywhere in the EU 
(and potentially beyond) using any of the notified formulations or not. 
 
The responses by national administrations to these questions have varied. While it is 
universally accepted that MS are obliged to exempt CDA produced in another MS in 
accordance with the formulations notified by that same MS, the situation is less clear 
when the formulations of another MS are used. This has led to a significant amount of 
legal uncertainty in the past, which has sometimes had an effect on certain business 
decisions, as illustrated by the following examples reported by stakeholders consulted as 
part of this study: 
 
 Around 2008/2009, significant amounts of alcohol were denatured in DE using the 
national CDA formulation of LV, and subsequently moved to PL for use in a 
variety of industrial applications. The practice was stopped following a complaint 
by PL, which did not consider that formulations other than those notified by the 
producing MS itself qualified as CDA. 
 DE has now accepted the interpretation that only alcohol that has been 
completely denatured in a given MS in accordance with the requirements of the 
same MS are to be treated as CDA, even though this means, for example, that 
the same product – e.g. alcohol denatured according to the DE CDA formulation – 
needs to be treated differently depending on where it was denatured: if in BE or 
FR, for example, and then moved to DE, it is considered PDA, whereas if it is 
denatured in DE itself, it is treated as CDA. 
 As noted previously, cosmetics producers in PL frequently use CDA imported from 
HU, which the PL authorities have to recognise as CDA, even though the same 
product would not qualify as CDA if produced in PL itself. 
 
Questions such as these have been cause for significant concerns, especially in the 
decade from the 2004 EU enlargement round until about 2013, when the matter was 
discussed in the Excise Committee, and the Commission clarified its view that the 
national CDA formulations relate only to the MS that have notified them, respectively, 
and it is not permitted to use another MS’s method. This was broadly confirmed when, in 
2014, FR, having previously notified only the 3-3-1 Eurodenaturant,149 notified the 
Commission of its intention to also apply the national procedures notified by DE and HU. 
However, during the Excise Committee meeting where this was debated, the 
Commission as well as the majority of MS were not in favour of this proposal, insisting 
                                                          
148 Ramboll Evaluation (2016), p. 77-78. 
149 See Commission Implementing Regulation 162/2013. 
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that a situation where MS de facto allowed their economic operators to use other MS’ 
formulations, without having notified these itself, would be problematic. 
 
Since then, most MS seem to have accepted this interpretation, and in the interviews 
with stakeholders for this study, we have not found any evidence of divergent 
interpretations that cause any legal uncertainty at the present time – even though the 
MS questionnaire responses to the 2015 evaluation seem to indicate the divergent 
approaches have not yet disappeared completely. This also concerns imports from third 
countries, for which some MS allow the use of the formulation notified by any MS, 
whereas they take a more restrictive approach to CDA made in another MS. However, 
extra-EU imports are subject to an import tariff of EUR 10.2 per hl, and the value of all 
imports of denatured alcohol into the EU typically amounts to only around EUR 20 million 
per year;150 CDA is likely to only account for a fraction of this, and unfair competition 
from abroad was not raised as a concern by any stakeholders interviewed for this study. 
 
 
Box 11 – Results from the OPC: experienced issues with CDA 
 
In their responses to the open public consultation: 
 
 9 respondents (out of 58 who answered this question, including ‘don’t know’ answers not displayed 
below) indicated they, and/or a company that they had done business or were in direct contact 
with, had incurred additional costs because alcohol recognised as CDA in one EU MS was not 
recognised as such in another MS, on one or more occasions. 
 8 respondents (out of 57) indicated they or another company had experienced delays because 
alcohol recognised as CDA in one EU MS was eventually, but not immediately recognised as such in 
another MS. 
 7 respondents (out of 58) indicated they or another company had chosen not to move CDA from / 
to another EU MS because of the risk it would not be recognised as such. 
 4 respondents (out of 58) indicated they or another company had chosen to purchase CDA from a 
third (non-EU) country, rather than from an EU MS, because it was subject to less strict rules. 
 3 respondents (out of 57) indicated they or another company had experienced problems 
concerning the safety and/or robustness of one or more of the national formulations CDA that are 
currently recognised. 
 
The question on the issues related to completely denatured alcohol received a relatively low degree of 
attention, with no more than 10 responses from each of the selected respondents’ groups. Taking the low 
response rate into consideration, the various issues under consideration do not seem to occur for the 
majority of respondents. 
 
Question #46 - Have you, the company you represent, and/or a company that you have done business with 
or are in direct contact with, ever experienced any of the following issues related to completely denatured 
alcohol (as regulated by Article 27(1)(a) of the Directive)? 
                                                          
150 Eurostat trade database, CN code 2207 20 00 (Ethyl alcohol and other spirits, denatured, of any strength). 
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Source: OPC. 
Legend: IA: industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol; Ind: 
rest of the industry (not included in the previous category); Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public 
health NGOs, public authorities, etc.). 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
To sum up, in the recent past differing interpretations of what constitutes mutual 
recognition as regards CDA formulations have led to uncertainty for economic operators. 
This could have had cost implications for some who might have seen their attempts to 
move CDA from one MS to another frustrated (meaning they would have had to either 
pay excise duty or move it as PDA instead), or had to adapt their business models in 
response to changes in the interpretation of the applicable rules (such as the decision by 
DE to no longer allow its economic operators to produce CDA using formulations notified 
by other MS). The costs arising from this are impossible to quantify, as they are so 
dependent on the specific case in question, and we do not have a complete picture of all 
relevant flows of CDA between MS.  
 
But in any case, the adoption of the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant as their only CDA formulation 
by 22 MS – in all likelihood soon to be 25 (BG and RO have also now notified their 
intention to use this formulation, and FI phases out its remaining national formulation by 
end 2018) – means that any remaining problems with mutual recognition will soon be 
greatly diminished. This would leave only CZ, SE and UK requiring different 
concentrations of the Eurodenaturant ingredients, and only CZ and EL still using a 
distinct national formulation. These remaining national formulations are for very specific 
purposes (biofuels production in the case of the CZ ones), and all stakeholders who were 
consulted indicated that there was no demand for these formulations in other MS, and 
therefore no intention to move them across borders and no risk of any issues around 
mutual recognition. Concerning the MS that insist on higher concentrations of the 
Eurodenaturant ingredients for their domestic producers (CZ, SE, UK), feedback from the 
competent national authorities suggests they understand and accept that they will be 
obliged to recognise 1-1-1 CDA produced in other MS (even though this will obviously 
put their own producers at a competitive disadvantage). Movements in the other 
direction (of 3-3-1 or 1-2-1 CDA to MS that use the 1-1-1 formulation) make no 
economic sense and, even if they did happen, would cause no problems, as 
‘overdenatured’ alcohol is recognised. 
5
5
4
1
6
4
4
1 5
4
4
1
8
4
4
1 2
5
4 2
1
2
1
1
1
1 1
1
2
1
1
1
1 1 2
1
1
12
1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IA Ind Priv Oth IA Ind Priv Oth IA Ind Priv Oth IA Ind Priv Oth IA Ind Priv Oth
We / they have 
incurred additional 
costs because alcohol 
recognised as 
“completely 
denatured” in one EU 
Member State was not 
recognised as such in 
another Member State
We / they have 
experienced delays 
because alcohol 
recognised as 
“completely 
denatured” in one EU 
Member State was 
eventually, but not 
immediately 
recognised as such in 
another Member State
We / they have chosen
not to import / export
completely denatured
alcohol from / to
another EU Member
State because of the
risk it would not be
recognised as such
We / they have chosen
to purchase completely
denatured alcohol from
a third (non-EU)
country, rather than
from an EU Member
State, because it was
subject to less strict
rules
We / they have
experienced
problems
concerning the
safety and/or
robustness of one
or more of the
national
formulations for
completely
denatured alcohol
that are currently
recognised
Never Yes, once or twice Yes, on a few occasions Yes, on many occasions
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
96 
 
 
Therefore, even though the wording in the Directive continues to be somewhat 
ambiguous, it is very unlikely that mutual recognition of CDA will continue to cause 
problems in practice going forward, as national formulations have largely disappeared. In 
theory, this could change again in future, as MS are still free to notify any procedures 
they wish. But this appears very unlikely in the current circumstances, unless potential 
issues with the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant for certain uses were to come to light, for which 
there are no indications at present. Nonetheless, stakeholders interviewed for this study 
identified the following potential risks / drawbacks: 
 
 Some MS (CZ and UK) that have chosen to stick with the 3-3-1 Eurodenaturant 
have expressed concerns regarding the robustness of the reduced concentration, 
and therefore the potential for an increased fraud risk. Their main argument is 
that the lower amount of MEK means the smell is less prominent and can more 
easily be masked by the addition of other substances such as fruit flavourings. 
However, many MS disagree on that issue, and tests undertaken by the JRC 
have shown that, in any case, MEK is relatively easy to remove, and its 
concentration is therefore of limited relevance. More importantly, the presence of 
IPA as a chemical analytical marker that is very difficult / costly to remove (even 
in the reduced concentration of 1L per hl of alcohol) means the 1-1-1 
Eurodenaturant is more ‘robust’ than the CDA formulations that were most 
widely used across the EU in the recent past, in particular the German and 
Hungarian formulations (both of which also only contained 1L of MEK, and no 
IPA).151 
 
 One economic operator who produces screen wash and anti-freeze with the ‘old’ 
DE CDA formulation noted that IPA has not yet undergone long-term tests in 
these products, and that if any issues were to arise with its compatibility with 
polycarbonates, this would cause significant problems and might force producers 
to resort to explore alternative formulations. It should be noted, however, that 
tests organised within the context of the FPG and carried out by DEKRA in 2015 
revealed that a screen wash containing the 3-3-1 Eurodenaturant did not have 
any detrimental effects upon car components.152  
 
 As noted above, some of the ‘old’ national formulations were used for 
‘unorthodox’ purposes (e.g. HU CDA for PL cosmetics) for which the 
Eurodenaturant may not be appropriate. This could result in additional costs for 
economic operators having to switch to alternative PDA formulations, which 
could in theory lead to demands to bring back certain national CDA formulations. 
 
 At approx. EUR 2-5 per hl of alcohol, the price of the Eurodenaturant is higher 
than that of some of the ‘old’ national CDA formulations (for example, the old DE 
and HU formulations did not contain IPA, while the old SI formulation contained 
IPA but no MEK). While the price of the ingredients in the 1-1-1 concentration153 
is not currently viewed as a significant concern by industry (unlike the previous 
3-3-1), the increased demand for certain ingredients that will now be required 
for CDA across all MS could potentially push their price up. 
 
In summary, the introduction of the Eurodenaturant, and the elimination of almost all 
national CDA formulations, have significantly reduced the uncertainties around mutual 
                                                          
151 Eric Aries, Fernando Cordeiro, Alain Maquet, Ana Boix, Boleslaw Slowikowski, Christof Von Holst, ‘Euro-
denaturant project – Phase II’, 2016 (not published). 
152 Ibid. 
153 According to industry experts, the cost of IPA fluctuates between about EUR 1-3 per l; that of MEK between 
about EUR 1-4 per l; and that of denatonium benzoate is relatively stable, at about EUR 0.10 per g. 
Fluctuations can occur due to a range of market (supply and demand) factors. 
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recognition and concrete problems caused by this. And while the Directive in its current 
form allows MS to re-introduce national CDA formulations, this appears very unlikely at 
present.  
 
 
2.2.2.2  Proliferation of national approaches to PDA 
 
The system for PDA is essentially non-harmonised. Directive 92/83/EEC clarifies that 
alcohol that is denatured and used for the manufacture of any product not for human 
consumption shall be exempted from excise duty, but leaves it to MS to define the 
denaturation requirements. Given that (unlike with CDA) the exemption is conditional on 
its use, the ‘partially’ denatured alcohol needs to be moved under duty suspension. Once 
the manufacturing process is complete, the products containing the PDA are released for 
consumption across the EU. This means that MS do not necessarily have to recognise 
each other’s denaturing requirements, but they do need to exempt the products made 
using PDA from excise duty independently of where in the EU they were produced. 
 
As noted previously, MS’ regulatory and administrative frameworks for PDA vary 
significantly regarding the procedures and formulations they have authorised 
(sometimes just a few, sometimes hundreds); the process for obtaining authorisations 
(in some MS this is limited to the formulations on the official published list, whereas 
others can authorise formulations ‘ad hoc’ for individual economic operators); and the 
system for supervising the production, movement and use (including registration and 
record keeping requirements, samples to be taken, presence of customs officials during 
parts of the process, rules for so-called in-situ denaturation, etc.). While the need to use 
EMCS for goods moved under duty suspension is common to all MS, these are free to 
define the financial guarantees required (meaning these can vary significantly; e.g. in 
the CZ they amount to a little over EUR 10 per litre of alcohol, which is the equivalent of 
the excise duty rate for ethyl alcohol), and some have opted to use simplified procedures 
for movements within their own territory.  
 
The interviews conducted as part of this study confirmed that the vast majority of both 
national authorities and economic operators agreed that there are good reasons to allow 
MS to define their own rules for PDA. The main reasons cited for this were the flexibility 
the system affords MS to apply rules that best meet the needs of their industry (which 
vary significantly from sector to sector), while reducing the risk of fraud to a level that is 
deemed acceptable by the MS in question (noting that this risk varies from MS to MS, 
due to geographical, socioeconomic and cultural factors as well as, importantly, the 
excise duty rates applicable to alcoholic beverages – high rates obviously create greater 
incentives to commit fraud). There is therefore widespread agreement that a one-size-
fits-all approach for PDA across the EU would be difficult to agree and may create 
significant problems for certain MS and/or sectors. 
 
At the same time, it is clear that the lack of harmonisation (including the proliferation of 
national PDA formulations, as well as other elements of the supervisory regime) does 
mean that, while the single market for products containing PDA is guaranteed (so that, 
for example, perfume made in FR containing PDA in accordance with the FR 
requirements can be sold freely across the EU), the same is not entirely the case for PDA 
itself. While PDA made in a given MS in accordance with its national requirements can be 
moved to another MS using EMCS (in the same way that undenatured alcohol can be 
moved), it will not be recognised as legally denatured, and therefore cannot be 
exempted from excise duty when used for the manufacture of products, unless it also 
complies with the formulation and authorisation requirements of the receiving MS (which 
may be different). The following sub-sections discuss specific problems that may arise 
from the proliferation of national rules, including the extent to which these are due to 
the EU-level regulatory framework (as opposed to purely national rules).   
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 COMPLIANCE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER OPERATING COSTS FOR BUSINESSES 
 
The different supervisory regimes obviously result in compliance and administrative costs 
for producers and users of PDA, which can vary significantly from MS to MS. 
Stakeholders interviewed as part of this study (including economic operators with 
activities in more than one MS) pointed to a number of ways in which the regimes in 
certain MS were found to be especially burdensome, such as extensive administrative 
requirements and high financial guarantees / bonds. For example, interviewees in PL 
noted that it is common for users of PDA in PL to have a full-time member of staff 
dedicated entirely to ensuring compliance with the regulatory framework, and companies 
prefer to use CDA wherever possible to avoid the burdens that come with using PDA. 
 
In addition to the costs of complying with the supervisory regimes and providing the 
required information to national authorities, there can also be other operating costs that 
arise from what procedures can and cannot be used in different MS. For example, 
cosmetics companies in some MS have access to a much wider range of PDA 
formulations and production procedures (including in situ denaturation) than those in 
others. This can mean that the manufacture of certain products (e.g. fine fragrances) is 
possible to a higher standard and/or at lower costs in certain MS, which in turn can have 
an influence on business decisions and, ultimately, profits.  
 
Multinational companies may be able to take advantage of such differences and locate 
the production of certain goods in those MS that offer the most favourable conditions as 
regards PDA formulations and related factors. On the other hand, there are also 
instances where multinationals with operations in several MS claim to incur additional 
costs, as they need to adapt the formulations and production processes for otherwise 
identical products containing alcohol to the respective national PDA rules. 
 
The costs arising from the national regulatory frameworks vary significantly from MS to 
MS, from sector to sector, and even from company to company, and would therefore be 
very difficult to estimate comprehensively. In any case, the costs arising from these 
aspects are not attributable to the Directive, but to national implementing rules, and 
were therefore not assessed in detail as part of this study.  
 
 BARRIERS TO INTRA-EU TRADE 
 
A related but conceptually different problem, which is potentially more relevant in the 
context of the current review, is the extent to which the lack of harmonisation represents 
a barrier to intra-EU trade in PDA. The existence of different national rules and 
regulations generally represents an obstacle to trade. Economic operators who intend to 
move PDA from one MS to another need to ensure they comply with the rules that are 
applicable in all relevant jurisdictions. Since the rules are frequently complex and 
divergent, this can be a daunting task. There is also the financial risk of ‘getting it 
wrong’, which could result in having to pay excise duties. 
 
An additional factor that may make certain economic operators disinclined to source PDA 
from another EU MS is the need to comply with the requirements of Directive 
2008/118/EEC for the movement of goods under duty suspension. This includes the 
obligation for users to have a tax warehouse and to be connected to EMCS in order to be 
able to receive PDA from another EU MS. A reluctance to do so was mentioned as one of 
the main reasons why many users of denatured alcohol (especially small ones) prefer to 
either buy PDA in the domestic market, or use CDA where possible. While EMCS was 
described by those who do use it as functioning very effectively and having resulted in a 
major reduction of burdens (compared with the previous ‘manual’ procedures), smaller 
firms are reportedly often reluctant to sign up to EMCS due to the required up-front 
investment and the perceived need to ‘open up’ vis-à-vis customs to a greater extent 
than they are comfortable with. At the same time, it is important to note that, unless a 
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MS has chosen to use simplified procedures (such as DE, UK), the use of EMCS is 
obligatory even for domestic movements of PDA, which means that in many MS sourcing 
PDA abroad would not incur any additional costs related to the movement under duty 
suspension. 
 
The interviews with economic operators conducted for this study revealed a mixed 
picture as regards cross-border trade in PDA. While most interviewees acknowledged the 
fact that the different procedures and regimes in each MS can and do make cross-border 
trade more difficult, none of the interviewees felt this had affected them in a significant 
way, or were able to point to instances where they had incurred unforeseen costs. Their 
companies either were able to sell and/or buy alcohol across the EU, or felt there was no 
business need / incentive for them and/or their customers to do so. Many larger 
producers and distributors of alcohol for use in industrial applications and/or biofuels do 
move significant quantities of both partially denatured and undenatured alcohol between 
MS under duty suspension using EMCS, and reported no significant problems with this in 
the large majority of cases. The prevailing view was that such movements are generally 
possible without major difficulties, although they do require a certain level of investment 
in storage facilities (including tanks for different types of denatured alcohol, and in 
setting up and maintaining a tax warehouse) and in understanding and complying with 
the applicable rules in the different MS (which, again is more difficult and costly in some 
MS than in others). Large, specialised companies for whom alcohol is a key product often 
find it worth making this investment (but interviewees were unable to provide detailed 
cost estimates). On the other hand, smaller players with limited resources typically 
prefer to buy domestically, and let someone else deal with the complexities stemming 
from international trade in PDA.   
 
 
Box 12 - German economic operators’ cross-border trade in PDA 
 
To illustrate the above, it may be useful to consider the example of Germany. Although Germany is the 
second largest EU producer of both renewable and synthetic alcohol, it purchases significant amounts of 
alcohol abroad, mainly from neighbouring MS, to meet the needs of its industry and transport sectors. There 
are a number of producers of industrial grade alcohol in Germany who rectify alcohol produced both 
domestically and abroad (in which case it is nearly always moved to Germany undenatured), and supply it 
to customers from a range of sectors, often in denatured form. Some of these focus completely on the 
domestic market, and reported that smaller customers in particular usually prefer to buy locally, so as to 
avoid having to use EMCS (Germany allows simplified procedures for domestic movements) and eliminate 
any potential risks and uncertainties that may stem from dealing with foreign suppliers. 
 
However, other German producers do supply customers in a range of MS, including, in some cases, with 
PDA made according to the requirements of those MS. This requires the producer to obtain an authorisation 
from the German authorities to use the formulation in question, which is reportedly unproblematic as the 
German regulation explicitly states that an authorisation is granted for denaturants that are demonstrably 
authorised in another MS, unless this would conflict with fiscal or health concerns. When it comes to moving 
the PDA, it reportedly makes little difference in practice for the supplier if and how the alcohol is denatured, 
as anything that is not CDA is subject to the duty suspension regime anyway. As long as the foreign 
customer has the required licenses and authorisations from the competent authorities in their MS, has a tax 
warehouse and is connected to EMCS, the German supplier can send whatever type of alcohol the customer 
orders (provided German customs have authorised it). 
 
Nonetheless, the frequent lack of transparency regarding the formulations authorised in each MS was 
described as a challenge (as it makes demonstrating what is authorised where difficult and time-
consuming). At the same time, it was also noted that there are differences depending on the MS in 
question: the supervisory regimes in certain MS (such as CZ, FR) were reportedly especially strict towards 
foreign producers, and as a result German producers found it was not viable to supply potential customers 
there due to the burdens they faced.  
 
 
Another poignant example is that of a cosmetics firm that manufactures products in two 
different MS. For their production in FR, they buy alcohol and denature it in situ (i.e. 
within their premises as part of the manufacturing process), all within FR. But for their 
production in ES, they purchase PDA produced in FR in accordance with the 
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
100 
 
requirements of ES, and then move it to their tax warehouse in ES. Although this system 
required an initial investment in time and effort to ensure compliance, the company 
reported it now runs smoothly, and that the differences between the requirements of the 
two MS do not cause any significant problems in practice. 
 
French producers of denatured alcohol confirmed this, although the need to obtain a 
specific authorisation from the FR customs authorities results in delays of typically 
around one month before the PDA can be supplied. This further confirms that intra-EU 
trade in PDA is certainly possible and does happen, although the investment required to 
make it work is likely to prevent many smaller firms from trying. At the same time, it is 
important to distinguish between two groups of MS: 
 
 MS (including those referred to in the examples above, namely DE, ES and FR) 
that authorise specific denaturants / formulations (other than those contained in 
the positive list, if one exists) based on applications from individual firms: 
Producers as well as users in these MS generally find it relatively easy (certain 
complexities and associated costs notwithstanding) to sell or buy PDA to / from 
other MS, as their authorities are prepared to authorise foreign formulations in 
specific cases. 
 MS that only authorise denaturants / formulations that are included in a positive 
list (including CZ, PL, UK): Producers based in these countries would find it much 
more difficult to supply customers abroad with PDA (unless the authorised 
formulations in both MS happen to coincide). Users of PDA could potentially buy 
from a supplier in a MS that is part of the first group.  
 
In summary, it is clear that the existence of different national procedures and 
supervisory regimes does inhibit cross-border trade in PDA to a certain extent, which 
varies depending on the MS, sector, and types of companies involved. Operators in MS 
that follow a flexible approach to authorising formulations are far better able to do 
business across borders than those that define the requirements more strictly. In either 
case, smaller users of PDA typically prefer to source PDA domestically, which is partly 
due to the rules concerning denatured alcohol, but also partly due to other factors 
(cultural, administrative, linguistic etc.) that make some companies reluctant to 
internationalise. This in turn creates business opportunities for pan-European 
distributors, who source undenatured alcohol from across the EU, and denature it in 
accordance with the respective national requirements in their tax warehouses in the 
different MS in order to supply local customers. 
 
However, any negative economic effects on firms who choose (or feel obliged) to 
purchase PDA from domestic suppliers are likely to be minimal, as the well-functioning 
EU market for raw / undenatured alcohol (see above) means the prices are very similar 
across the EU.154 And since alcohol is a relatively inexpensive product (prices are 
typically less than EUR 1 per litre even for the most expensive types), transport costs 
are a significant factor, meaning it is rarely worth moving denatured alcohol over long 
distances anyway (except in very large quantities). Therefore, Therefore, it can be 
concluded that, although there certainly are barriers, and there may be isolated cases 
with non-negligible cost implications (especially if the requirements are not fully 
understood at the outset, and/or the authorities of the MS involved follow very different 
approaches), overall, the extent to which difficulties in trading PDA across border results 
in additional costs for users of denatured alcohol is very limited. 
 
 
Box 13 – Results from the OPC: experienced issues with PDA (direct use) 
                                                          
154 According to LMC International (2015), average regional prices in different EU regions varied by only around 
5% at most, with slightly higher prices in Southern and Eastern Europe. 
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In their responses to the open public consultation: 
 12 respondents (out of 71 who answered this question, including ‘don’t know’ answers not displayed 
below) indicated they, and/or a company that they had done business or were in direct contact 
with, had incurred additional costs to understand the legal situation as regards the applicable rules 
and procedures for PDA when moved from / to another EU MS, on one or more occasions. 
 25 respondents (out of 71) indicated they or another company had incurred additional costs / 
administrative burdens to ensure that PDA using a formulation accepted in one EU MS was also 
recognised as such in another MS (e.g. to apply for a special authorisation) – though 16 of the 25 
stated they had only experienced this on a single occasion. 
 9 respondents (out of 71) indicated they or another company had had to pay excise duty on PDA, 
because a MS did not recognise the procedure by which it was denatured in another MS. 
 11 respondents (out of 71) indicated they or another company had chosen not to move PDA from / 
to another EU MS because of the risk it would not be accepted as such. 
 
As in the previous case, the following question on the issues related to partly denatured alcohol attracted a 
limited number of responses. The only issue that received greater attention from the industry was that of the 
additional costs and administrative burdens to ensure that alcohol denatured using a formulation accepted in 
one MS is also recognised in another Member State, which was however described as quite rare, having 
happened only once or twice. 
 
Question #49 - Concerning Article 27(1)(b): Have you, the company you represent, and/or a company that 
you have done business with or are in direct contact with, ever experienced any of the following issues 
related to denatured alcohol as regulated by Article 27(1)(b) of the Directive? 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: IA: industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol; Ind: 
rest of the industry (not included in the previous category); Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public 
health NGOs, public authorities, etc.). 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
 
 COMPETITIVE DISTORTIONS 
 
Again, the fact that PDA producers and users in different MS have to comply with 
different supervisory regimes (some of which are stricter in certain areas than others), 
and have access to different PDA procedures and formulations, can have cost 
implications, as well as affect the quality of certain products (see the Section on 
compliance and other operating costs above). In theory, this distorts competition, and 
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may give economic operators in certain MS an unfair competitive advantage over those 
in other MS. For example: 
 
 Cosmetics producers in FR are able to use a range of procedures (including in situ 
denaturation with ingredients of the final product) that companies in most other 
MS cannot (provided the FR authorities consider these procedures to be 
sufficiently robust in the specific case in question, taking into account all relevant 
factors). This does mean that, for the production of fine fragrances in particular, 
the conditions in FR are more favourable than in most if not all other MS (this 
impression was confirmed by cosmetics producers with first-hand experience of 
the systems in different MS).  
 
 Alcohol producers in DE are better able to supply foreign customers with PDA 
than producers in most other MS, since the German authorities usually authorise 
the use of formulations that are demonstrably authorised in another MS on an 
individual basis. 
 
However, it is important to note that PDA regulations and the associated costs and 
opportunities are only one of a range of factors that affect business decisions and 
performance. Thus, cosmetics firms that are active in other MS (in some cases, as well 
as in FR) pointed out that aspects such as regulation in other areas, labour costs, supply 
chains, proximity to customers etc. mean that favourable PDA regimes can be balanced 
out and sometimes overridden by disadvantages in other areas. While several of the 
economic operators that were interviewed were critical of specific aspects of the national 
rules and procedures they deemed disproportionately burdensome in comparison with 
other MS, they agreed that the origin of the problem was not the Directive as such, but 
the national legal and administrative framework, which in turn reflects the way the 
authorities in different MS assess the risks arising from the production, storage, 
movement and use of denatured alcohol. 
 
 ENFORCEMENT COSTS FOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
 
Another concern arising from the proliferation of national PDA formulations is the burden 
this may cause for public authorities in the MS, in particular tax / customs laboratories 
who are tasked with analysing and trying to determine the origin of potentially 
fraudulent products. Fraud risks and their potential impacts on tax revenues and/or 
public health are discussed in a separate Section further below; here, we focus 
exclusively on enforcement costs stemming from the current PDA regime. 
 
In their questionnaire responses to the 2016 evaluation, a minority of MS indicated they 
felt that the existence of various denaturing methods across the EU made it ‘particularly 
difficult’ for their administration to monitor and control of the production and/or 
movement of denatured alcohol. The most frequent reason cited for this response was a 
lack of knowledge of the different denaturing methods used by other MS, resulting in a 
burden on the time and resources available for analysis in the laboratories. During the 
interviews conducted as part of this study, the tax / customs authorities in the Western 
European MS where fieldwork took place (DE, ES, FR, UK) reported no problems with 
this – their laboratories routinely carry out analysis in the context of applications for new 
PDA formulations and/or samples from denaturing processes carried out within their 
respective MS, but in all of these cases the denaturants used are known so the analysis 
is not particularly difficult or burdensome. It was noted that analyses of PDA arriving 
from other MS are not necessary, as from a fiscal point of view it does not matter how 
the alcohol was denatured: if the formulation is not compliant with the procedures 
authorised by the receiving MS, the product is not recognised as PDA and therefore not 
eligible for an exemption. 
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The responses from MS in Central / Eastern Europe (CZ, PL) helped clarify the situation. 
Even though fraud with denatured alcohol is a much more significant concern in these 
countries, they agreed with their Western counterparts that tests on PDA moved from 
another MS (or imported from a third country) are not usually required. However, when 
suspicious products (i.e. illicit alcoholic beverages that may have been produced using 
denatured alcohol) are found, the laboratories need to try to ascertain their origin. Thus, 
the number of tests that are required is directly linked to the fraud risk, which is 
reportedly close to zero in some MS (whose laboratories therefore report no burdens – 
see above), but significant in others (for details see the Section on fraud below). And the 
fact that the list of possible legal denaturants across all EU MS is so long means these 
tests can be more difficult and costly than if the laboratories only had to check for a 
limited number of ingredients to determine where and for what purpose the alcohol may 
have been denatured. 
 
According to data provided by the authorities of the two afore-mentioned MS, alcohol 
can account for up to 25-50% of the workload of their customs laboratories, though this 
includes routine tests on samples of alcohol denatured in the MS itself with known 
denaturants. In recent years their laboratories have typically analysed several hundred 
samples of denatured alcohol;155 however, only a small minority of these would be of the 
‘difficult’ variety related to suspicious alcoholic beverages that may contain (cleaned up) 
denatured alcohol of unknown origin. In extreme cases, when nothing is known about 
the possible origin and denaturants, the tests can reportedly be very time and labour 
intensive (i.e. take several days, and cost up to EUR 1,000 in staff time and materials), 
and do not always lead to a conclusive result. If we assume around 500 tests of alcohol 
samples per year, and that around 5% of these are ‘difficult’ in the sense outlined above, 
the total annual cost for a given national customs authority would be in the region of 
EUR 25,000.  
 
 
2.2.2.3  Divergent interpretation of the terms of Article 27(1)(b) 
 
Another matter that is causing certain problems is the lack of clarity around exactly how 
the terms ‘used for the manufacture of any product not for human consumption’ are to 
be interpreted. While the term ‘not for human consumption’ tends to be unambiguous 
(essentially including anything except food and beverages, which are addressed 
separately in indents (e) and (f)), two other terms can cause difficulties. Firstly, there 
are some disagreements as to what constitutes a (finished) product, including whether 
or not it needs to be in the packaging in which it is sold to the public, or can be moved in 
bulk. A second issue relates to the term ‘used for the manufacture of’, and if this means 
the denatured alcohol has to be used as an ingredient of the final product, or can also be 
used in a wider sense, e.g. for cleaning the manufacturing equipment. 
 
 LACK OF CLARITY REGARDING WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRODUCT 
 
As noted previously, PDA itself has to be moved under the duty suspension regime, 
whereas finished products containing PDA are released for consumption. Thus, the 
question of when alcohol ceases to be classified as PDA, and becomes a finished product, 
has important practical consequences. Doubts can arise in particular regarding products 
with a very high alcohol content, such as screen wash or other cleaning products. 
Several MS reported being aware of cases where shipments in bulk of large quantities of 
alcohol with only minimal quantities of other ingredients (such as detergent and/or 
colour) were declared as CN codes other than 2207 – such as 3820 or 3824 – and 
therefore moved without any controls. National authorities admitted that they could not 
                                                          
155 The numbers provided range from 514 to 968 per year for PL (2012-2016), and 118 to 697 for CZ (2014-
2016).  
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be certain of the scale of the problem, since such movements are not registered under 
EMCS, and detection therefore relies on more or less random checks. Some thought 
there were only a few isolated cases, but others (especially CZ, PL) believed it could be 
significant and provide a route for fraudulent activity. In essence, in the absence of a 
formal definition of what constitutes a finished product, the question is whether and how 
the national authorities can and are willing to challenge the classification of certain goods 
they believe are essentially (denatured) alcohol.  
 
The ITEG adopted an opinion in 2014 to clarify that the finished product in which 
denatured alcohol has been used must be ‘a recognisable finished product’, and that the 
products have to be ‘held out for sale in their recognisable finished form’156 (which would 
include, for example, perfume in a small flacon or screen-wash in a 5 litre retail 
container, clearly labelled and marketed/sold as such, but not larger volumes of the 
same products packaged in bulk). The majority of MS voted in favour of this opinion, but 
a significant minority were opposed, and the different national practices seem to 
continue. During the interviews, some MS have argued that the packaging does not play 
an important role in their decision making, but that it is the character of the goods, and 
the extent to which they have been processed, that should be the determining factor. 
However, it was also widely recognised that it is very difficult to define clear rules for 
products as diverse as perfume and screen wash, for example, and that an element of 
subjectivity remains.  
 
The consequences of this are essentially two-fold. On the one hand, the different 
interpretations by different MS (and, reportedly, sometimes even different customs 
offices within a given MS) of what does and does not constitute a finished product leads 
to legal uncertainty for economic operators, which can have cost implications (in cases 
where the classification is challenged). A few of the economic operators consulted as 
part of this study reported having first-hand experience of such situations, but were not 
able to specify costs, and stated the issue was eventually resolved to their satisfaction 
(in one case via a BTI). The other potentially negative consequence is an increased risk 
of fraud from uncontrolled movements of large volumes of ‘weakly’ denatured alcohol 
(sometimes mixed with small quantities of other products) declared as something other 
than PDA. This was raised as a concern by several interviewees, some of whom were 
able to point to isolated cases of suspicious shipments. For a more in-depth discussion of 
fraud-related aspects, see the separate Section below.  
 
 INDIRECT USES OF PDA (SUCH AS CLEANING) 
 
MS diverge on whether or not the term ‘used for the manufacture of’ means the PDA has 
to be an ingredient of the finished product, or whether indirect uses, such as cleaning of 
manufacturing equipment, also qualifies for the exemption. The Commission has 
previously expressed the view that the use of alcohol for cleaning, disinfection or other 
adjacent activities does not entitle for application of the exemption, and the ITEG opinion 
referred to above states that the denatured alcohol must have been ‘directly’ used for 
the manufacture of that product. However, it seems unlikely that this means the rules 
are now consistently applied across all MS, and in their responses to the 2015 evaluation 
questionnaire, the majority of MS expressed the view that PDA used in the production 
chain, in particular for cleaning, should be exempted. However, others insist that 
economic operators who want to use alcohol for such purposes should use CDA. Even 
where PDA is exempted, how this is handled in practice varies – some MS have PDA 
formulations that are authorised specifically for cleaning purposes (e.g. the UK, where 
‘any industrial or commercially operated cleaning process’ is one of the previously 
approved uses for one specific PDA formulation called ‘industrial denatured alcohol’), 
others allow companies that have been authorised to use a certain type of PDA as an 
                                                          
156 ITEG Opinion 1/2014. 
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ingredient in a given product to also use the same PDA for cleaning, for example. At 
least one MS (PL) has revised and clarified its position in recent years, and now 
consistently exempts PDA for cleaning machinery and similar uses. However, this was 
only following a court case that ruled cleaning machinery was not to be considered part 
of the production process as such, and thereby called into question this interpretation. In 
a broadly similar case – albeit concerning Article 27(1)(d) not (b) – the CJEU also ruled 
that alcohol used for the cleaning and disinfection of equipment and facilities is to be 
exempted, ‘in so far as that disinfection is inherent in the production process for 
medicines’.157 
 
Again, the main negative effect of the current situation was described as being legal 
uncertainty, although none of the interviewees felt the current rules applicable in their 
respective MS (all of which allowed for an exemption of PDA for indirect uses in some 
form or other) generated any undue costs or burdens for them. However, where PDA for 
indirect uses is not exempted, users of denatured alcohol may have to incur additional 
costs for purchasing and storing CDA in addition to PDA.  
 
 
Box 14 – Results from the OPC: experienced issues with PDA (indirect use) 
 
In their responses to the open public consultation: 
 
 9 respondents (out of 71 who answered this question, including ‘don’t know’ answers not displayed 
below) indicated they, and/or a company that they had done business or were in direct contact with, 
had encountered different interpretations in practice among MS regarding what constitutes a final 
product that can be exempted, e.g. whether it needs to be in its final packaging or can be moved in 
bulk, on one or more occasions 
 29 respondents (out of 71) indicated they or another company had encountered different 
interpretations in practice among MS regarding what constitutes ‘used for the manufacture of’, e.g. 
whether denatured alcohol used for cleaning or disinfection can be exempted 
 7 respondents (out of 71) indicated they or another company had encountered different 
interpretations among MS regarding the correct tax treatment and/or denaturing process for alcohol 
to be used as an ingredient for transport and/or heating fuel 
 
Given the low number of responses to the OPC question on the different possible interpretations of Article 
27(1)(b), the majority of stakeholders involved in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol stated that 
they have encountered issues with different interpretations only once or twice.  
 
Question #49 - Concerning Article 27(1)(b): Have you, the company you represent, and/or a company that 
you have done business with or are in direct contact with, ever experienced any of the following issues related 
to denatured alcohol as regulated by Article 27(1)(b) of the Directive? 
                                                          
157 CJEU judgment: Bulgarian Customs Agency Director v. Biovet AD (Case C-306/14) 
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Source: OPC. 
Legend: IA: industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol; Ind: rest 
of the industry (not included in the previous category); Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health 
NGOs, public authorities, etc.). 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
 
 
 
2.2.2.4  Fraud risk 
 
Ultimately, the regulatory frameworks for denatured alcohol exist primarily to minimise 
the risk of fraud, i.e. the diversion of alcohol intended for industrial uses into the potable 
alcohol market. As such, one of the key considerations is the extent to which this 
objective is met. Although comprehensive and reliable evidence does not exist, there are 
strong indications that, in some MS at least, fraud with denatured alcohol is significant. 
 
The WHO has published estimates that around 17% of all alcohol consumed in Europe in 
2010 (or about 1.9 litres of pure alcohol per person) was unrecorded – that is, alcohol 
which is not taxed and is outside the usual system of government control, including 
surrogate alcohol (not intended for human consumption), but also home or informally 
produced alcohol, smuggled alcohol, or alcohol obtained through cross-border shopping 
(which is recorded in a different jurisdiction). Among EU MS, the estimated proportion of 
unrecorded alcohol ranges from as little as 3% (FR, IT) to over 20% (RO, SE).158 The 
role of surrogate (i.e. denatured) alcohol159 within this is also likely to vary significantly. 
In many MS (including DE, ES, FR), the interviewed stakeholders unanimously agreed 
that the consumption of surrogate alcohol is almost unheard of, due to a combination of 
cultural and socioeconomic factors (among them the comparatively low levels of excise 
duty for alcoholic beverages, including the zero rate on wine, which mean legal alcohol is 
available cheaply, reducing the incentives for fraud and making the purification of 
denatured alcohol unattractive economically).  
                                                          
158 WHO, ‘Global status report on alcohol and health’, 2014. 
159 Please note that, throughout this report, the term ‘surrogate alcohol’ is used as a subcategory of unrecorded 
and illicit alcohol, to refer to the drinking of alcohol that is not intended for human consumption (and therefore 
exempt from excise duty and usually denatured). This includes both alcoholic beverages (usually fake spirits) 
that are illegally produced with alcohol from which (some of) the denaturants have been removed or 
neutralised, and (less commonly) certain products containing alcohol (such as mouthwash, aftershave etc.) 
that are drunk ‘as is’ even though they are not (officially) intended or sold for this purpose. 
2
6
1 1
1
6
1 1
1
6
1 1
2
1
20
1
1
2
1
2
1 1 1 2
1
1 1
1
2
1
2
1
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IA Ind Priv Oth IA Ind Priv Oth IA Ind Priv Oth
We / they have encountered different 
interpretations in practice among 
Member States regarding what 
constitutes a final “product” that can be 
exempted, e.g. whether it needs to be 
in its final packaging or can be moved in 
bulk 
We / they have encountered different 
interpretations in practice among 
Member States regarding what 
constitutes “used for the manufacture 
of”, e.g. whether denatured alcohol 
used for cleaning or disinfection can be 
exempted
We / they have encountered
different interpretations among
Member States regarding the
correct tax treatment and/or
denaturing process for alcohol
to be used as an ingredient for
transport and/or heating fuel
Never Yes, once or twice Yes, on a few occasions Yes, on many occasions
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
107 
 
 
However, stakeholders in other, predominantly Eastern European MS (including CZ, PL) 
reported that fraud involving surrogate / denatured / industrial alcohol is a significant 
concern, although they were unable to provide data on the share of surrogate alcohol 
within the consumption of unrecorded alcohol. In the responses to the 2015 evaluation 
questionnaire, the highest estimates (from a small minority of MS) were that abuses of 
the exemptions for denatured alcohol were responsible for 40-80% of the loss of spirits 
duty from fraud. 
 
 
Box 15 - Estimating fraud with surrogate alcohol in Poland 
 
The WHO estimates the consumption of illicit alcohol in Poland to be about 1.6 litres of pure ethanol, or 13% 
of total consumption. According to interviewees, the illicit alcohol is predominantly spirits (ethyl alcohol), the 
total legal consumption of which is about 120 million litres of pure ethanol per year.160 A project carried out 
in 2012 by the Polish Spirits Industry in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance found that, between 2009 
and 2011, the majority of illicit spirits (7 out of a total of 12 million litres of pure alcohol per year) 
consumed in Poland were derived from decontaminated / purified industrial alcohol.161 Based on the current 
excise duty and exchange rates, this would be equivalent to just under EUR 95 million of excise duty lost per 
year (or a little under 6% of the total excise duty receipts from ethyl alcohol in Poland).162 Whether this is 
considered a realistic estimate depends on who is asked: while the authorities in Poland estimate that the 
consumption of illicit alcohol has fallen to around 5% of the total in recent years (which, assuming the 
relative importance of surrogate within illicit alcohol has remained stable, would mean this type of fraud is 
responsible for around EUR 50 million of lost revenue per year), some industry representatives consider 
these figures to be too conservative, and reckon the market share of illicit spirits in Poland is closer to 20% 
(which would bring the total for fraud with surrogate alcohol to almost EUR 200 million per year). 
 
 
If one applies the ‘mid-range’ estimates from PL (fraudulent surrogate alcohol 
consumption of around 6% of the legal spirits consumption; see the box above) to the 
remaining EU-13 MS, the estimated total excise duty revenue loss is approx. EUR 170 
million per year (the largest parts of which correspond to PL, CZ, SK and LT, in this 
order). This number needs to be taken with a great degree of caution, as it is based on 
extrapolations from a single study. Nonetheless, it may provide a sense for the likely 
order of magnitude (rather than the exact size) of the problem in Eastern Europe. 
 
At the same time, one should not assume that the problem does not exist at all in the 
EU-15. Certain MS (e.g. EL) share some of the same characteristics that favour the 
occurrence of tax fraud involving industrial alcohol. The high excise duty rates on 
alcoholic beverages in certain Western and Northern MS also create incentives for this 
kind of behaviour. Although the main concern in relation to illicit alcohol in these 
countries is bootlegging and, to a lesser extent, smuggling, there is at least one known 
recent case in the UK where anti-freeze containing denatured alcohol seems to have 
been used to manufacture illicit vodka.163 
 
The manifestations of the problem are varied. They include purified denatured alcohol 
(typically from solvents, thinners, barbecue fire-lighters, screen-wash or anti-freeze) 
from which the smelling and/or tasting agents have been chemically removed, and which 
is then used for the manufacture of illicit drinks (usually spirits), such as in the examples 
mentioned above. But there are also reports of cosmetics or personal care products, 
such as mouth wash or after shave, that can be drunk ‘as is’ (i.e. without removing the 
denaturants), and are sometimes sold and bought with this purpose in mind. 
 
                                                          
160 Based on total excise duty revenues and rates for 2015 taken from the Commission’s excise duty tables. 
161 Cited based on OECD, ‘Illicit Trade: Converging Criminal Network. The size, impacts and drivers of illicit 
trade in alcohol’, 2016. 
162 Calculations based on data from the Commission’s excise duty tables (2016). 
163 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leicestershire-15888342 
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Potential ways in which the Directive and/or the way it is implemented at national level 
may facilitate, or fail to effectively minimise the risk of, this type of fraud, include the 
following: 
 
 ‘Weak’ CDA formulations: The fact that CDA can be sold and bought freely 
without any controls means it is particularly important the denaturing method 
used is as robust as possible. There is now broad agreement a robust denaturant 
should contain three elements – a smelling agent and a tasting agent to make it 
unpalatable for human consumption, and a chemical analytical marker that is 
very difficult to remove and thereby allows laboratories to detect fraud. 
However, some of the national CDA formulations that were in use before 1 
August 2017 did not contain all three of these elements. Polish stakeholders 
reported that in the past, CDA formulations from other MS were used in the 
majority of fraud cases, in particular those of DE and HU (which lacked a 
chemical analytical marker such as IPA) and SI (which included IPA and 
denatonium benzoate but no MEK). 
 
 A combination of ‘weak’ PDA formulations and insufficient controls: As 
noted previously, in principle the use of less robust formulations for PDA is 
counterbalanced by the tighter controls regarding its production, movement and 
use. Nonetheless, in theory at least, shipments of PDA could be diverted to 
illegal uses during the production process. However, in practice this seems to be 
very rare, as the authorisation processes, controls, recordkeeping requirements 
etc. are reportedly strict enough to effectively minimise the risk of this type of 
fraud in all MS consulted for this study. 
 
 Finished products containing PDA: A different matter is that of fraud with 
finished products that contain PDA and have been released for consumption, 
especially if the denaturants used are relatively easy to remove. Where these 
have a high alcohol content, there may be incentives to recover and ‘clean up’ 
the alcohol for use in potable products. Certain products can even be drunk 
directly (see above). The risks are obviously proportionate to the cost of the 
products in question – for example, many stakeholders tend to agree that the 
high retail cost of fine fragrances justifies the use of ‘weak’ denaturants (such as 
essential oils), as there is no risk of such products being purchased with the 
intention of drinking them. Others, however, insist on the importance of 
including at least a chemical marker in all PDA formulations as a matter of 
principle. In practice, the fraudulent use of products containing ‘weak’ PDA is 
reportedly a problem in some MS, albeit not involving high-end products such as 
fine fragrances.  
 
 Purposeful misclassification: A variant of the problem described previously 
involves alcohol (whether denatured or not) that is classified and shipped as 
something else (usually under CN codes 3820 or 3824). As with the other types, 
the exact scale of this is impossible to ascertain due to the lack of data, but 
anecdotal evidence points to instances where fraudsters may have tried to avoid 
the controls that usually apply to PDA by claiming they are sending a finished 
product. 
 
Trying to anticipate future trends regarding fraud with denatured alcohol is inherently 
difficult. The problem with particularly ‘weak’ CDA formulations should disappear as the 
Eurodenaturant replaces the old national formulations in almost all MS; the few 
remaining national CDA formulations (CZ, EL, FI) are very unlikely to be used 
fraudulently according to interviewed stakeholders. However, the authorities in some MS 
(CZ, UK) have expressed concerns the reduced concentrations of MEK and IPA in the 1-
1-1 Eurodenaturant are insufficient to effectively minimise the risk of fraudulent use, 
although analyses coordinated by the JRC and involving all MS’ customs laboratories 
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would seem to suggest otherwise.164 In any case, if one considers that a system is only 
as strong as its weakest link (as CDA can circulate freely across the EU, and fraudsters 
would tend to use the ‘weakest’ formulation available), then the fact that many MS have 
replaced their national formulations with the Eurodenaturant would reduce the risk of 
fraud with CDA overall. Whether this will result in a reduction of fraudulent activity, or in 
a displacement of fraud towards PDA, is impossible to predict at this stage. 
 
Apart from the lost tax revenue and other negative effects of criminal activity on society, 
the other main concern in relation to the effects of this kind of fraud is public health. 
Certain denaturants (in particular methanol, which is widely considered the greatest 
hazard) are toxic, and can lead to illness and even death when consumed – as in the 
case of the 2012 methanol poisonings in CZ and PL, although, like most cases of 
methanol poisoning in the last decades, these stemmed from the illegal admixture of 
methanol rather than from the use of methanol-denatured alcohol.165 In fact, methanol 
is no longer widely used as a denaturant in the EU: all CDA formulations containing 
methanol except one (EL) have been eliminated, and many MS have also acted on the 
ITEG recommendation that methanol should no longer be used as a denaturant for 
cosmetics and perfumes.166 Therefore, the national authorities and stakeholders 
interviewed for this study were generally not concerned about adverse health effects 
from ingesting toxic denaturants as such. Nonetheless, it was pointed out that there can 
nonetheless be significant health risks from drinking certain types of surrogate alcohol: 
for example, screenwash and anti-freeze often contains glycol (as an ingredient rather 
than a denaturant), which is moderately toxic. Data from the Polish National Health Fund 
shows an average of around 200 hospital admissions, and around 50 deaths due to 
glycol poisoning per year in Poland. Another concern are the substances that are 
sometimes used to remove certain denaturants: for example, chloroform has been found 
in a significant number of samples of illicit samples of alcohol in Poland, apparently as a 
result of the removal of denatonium benzoate. In addition to these issues, another public 
health concern is simply the availability of cheap illicit (surrogate) ethanol and the 
possible effects on consumption. 
 
In this context, it is also worth mentioning Article 27(5) of the Directive, which 
provides a mechanism for MS to raise concerns with CDA or PDA methods that give rise 
to tax evasion, avoidance or abuse with the Commission, which shall transmit the matter 
to the other MS and consult the Excise Committee; if the latter disagrees with the 
measures proposed by the Commission, the matter is to be submitted to the Council. 
However, the procedure has only been invoked in a handful of cases (most recently in 
2016 by LT concerning a PDA formulation authorised in PL, and by PL concerning a CDA 
formulation notified by HU, respectively). Interviewees noted that the process tends to 
be cumbersome and time-consuming, and can only be invoked when the origin of the 
products in question and the denaturants that were used are known.  
 
 SUMMARY OF PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
Problem drivers Adverse Effects Expected evolution 
Incomplete / 
inconsistent mutual 
recognition of CDA 
• Uncertainty over recognition of 
national formulations notified by other 
MS 
• Operating costs for economic 
operators in specific circumstances 
• The adverse effects are expected to 
largely disappear when Regulation 
2017/1112 applies 
• A return to non-harmonised national 
CDA formulations in the foreseeable 
future is very unlikely, but cannot be 
ruled out in the longer term under the 
current rules 
                                                          
164 Aries et al., (2016). 
165 Downey, G., ‘Advances in Food Authenticity Testing’, 2016, p. 577. 
166 ITEG Recommendation 2/2014 
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Problem drivers Adverse Effects Expected evolution 
Proliferation of 
national approaches 
to PDA 
• Compliance, administrative and other 
operating costs for businesses from 
national rules (not linked to the 
Directive) 
• Barriers to intra-EU trade of PDA due 
to number and complexity of national 
rules 
• Competitive advantages for certain 
sectors in certain MS 
• Enforcement costs for authorities in 
certain MS 
• No major changes expected 
• Differences between national 
approaches will continue to represent 
challenges for economic operators 
• Imminent harmonisation of CDA 
formulations is expected to lead 
certain sectors in certain MS to switch 
to PDA 
Divergent 
interpretation of the 
terms of Article 
27(1)(b) 
• Uncertainty as to what constitutes a 
finished product and permitted uses 
of PDA 
• Costs for business and authorities 
from disputes 
• Fraud risks from intentional 
misclassification to avoid controls 
• No major changes expected 
 
Fraud risk from 
ineffective CDA 
and/or PDA rules 
• Opportunities for organised crime 
• Lost tax revenues for MS 
• Health effects from consumption of 
surrogate alcohol 
• No major changes expected – though 
wide-spread adoption of the 
Eurodenaturant is likely to make fraud 
with CDA more difficult 
• Fraudsters may therefore shift their 
attention to PDA 
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2.3 Reduced rates for small producers 
 
In this Section, the problem definition concerning the provisions on reduced rates for 
small producers is presented. In Section 2.3.1, first the legal and administrative 
elements are discussed: the Directive provisions for small breweries and distilleries and 
their implementation by MS, additional national schemes for small producers, and other 
forms of excise-related simplifications included in the EU acquis. Then, the market 
analysis for the various relevant products is presented. In Section 2.3.2, the problem 
analysis is carried out, and the nature and magnitude of the issue at stake, including its 
likely development, are described. The analysis focuses on the six MS in which fieldwork 
activities were carried out for this issue: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Poland, and the 
United Kingdom.  
 
 
2.3.1 Baseline assessment 
 
2.3.1.1 The provisions for small breweries and distilleries 
 
Directive 92/83/EEC allows MS to grant reduced excise rates to small producers of beer167 
and ethyl alcohol.168 Such an exemption cannot be granted to small producers of wine, 
other fermented beverages, and intermediate products.  
 
MS can reduce rates for small producers of beer and ethyl alcohol up to 50% of the 
standard rate, subject to two conditions: 
 
• Yearly output. The Directive defines what a small producer is in terms of 
yearly output: up to 200,000 hl of beer for small breweries, and up to 10 
hectolitres of pure alcohol (hlpa) for small distilleries. MS are free to set lower 
output thresholds or output brackets corresponding to different rates of 
reduction. 
 
• Independence. A small brewery shall: (i) be legally and economically 
independent of any other brewery; (ii) use premises physically apart from 
those of any other brewery; and (iii) not operate under license. A small 
distillery shall: (i) be legally and economically independent of any other 
distillery; and (ii) not operate under license. 
 
MS shall apply the reduction to beer or ethyl alcohol manufactured by small producers 
located within their borders, as well as to the beverages manufactured by small 
producers located in another MS, on an equivalent basis. Small distilleries, but not small 
breweries, can also be exempted from tax warehousing arrangements. 
 
 IMPLEMENTATION ACROSS MS  
 
The majority of MS – 23 out of 28 – have opted in to the reduced rates for small 
breweries. Thirteen out of these 23 MS have adopted the maximum threshold allowed 
by the Directive, the remaining 10 a lower one, from as low as 6,000 hl/year in Estonia, 
up to 150,000 hl/year in Finland. Eleven MS have established a bracket system, with two 
to five brackets, i.e. they provide a larger discount for very small breweries compared to 
the one granted to those whose output is close to the threshold. While most of the MS 
provide for a fixed discount rate (for each bracket where applied) expressed in EUR per 
hectolitres / degree Plato or EUR per hectolitres / ABV, three MS – Denmark, Poland, and 
the United Kingdom – have a slightly more complex system where the discount 
                                                          
167 Article 4 of the Directive. 
168 Article 22 of the Directive. 
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decreases proportionately as the output increases. Not all MS provide the maximum 
allowed discount – i.e. 50% of the normal rate – or they provide the full discount only 
for the smallest output bracket. Information is summarised in Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7 – MS implementation of the reduced rates for small breweries (2017) 
 
Source: EDT. 
Legend: In blue: MS without reduced rates for small brewers; in white: MS with reduced rates for small 
brewers and maximum threshold; in grey: non-EU countries. Numbers indicate the threshold applied.   
Note: (*): degressive system. 
 
Analysing how MS have implemented this provision, the following considerations 
emerge: 
 
 There does not appear to be an inverse relation between the excise rate level 
and the decision to grant reduced rates. For instance, Spain and Sweden are 
among the MS with a higher rate on beer, but they did not opt in to the 
provision, while low-excise MS such as Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, or Latvia 
did opt in. 
 Smaller MS tend to have lower maximum thresholds, but this is not always 
the case. For example, small-to-medium MS, such as Belgium, Denmark, 
Malta, Portugal, or Luxembourg, did adopt the 200,000 hl per year limit, while 
large MS such as Germany or the UK grant no reduction above 40,000 and 
60,000 hl per year, respectively. This results in a very different market share 
potentially covered by a small brewery, from as low as 0.05% in Germany to 
as high as 67% in Luxembourg or 92% in Malta. 
 A microbrewery producing 1,000 hl per year receives the maximum possible 
reduction (50%) in 14 MS out of the 23 opting in to the provision, while in 3 
MS it receives a limited reduction (less than 15% of the standard rate). 
 A small brewery producing 10,000 hl per year is granted the maximum 
possible reduction (50%) in 10 MS out of the 23 opting in to the provision, 
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while in 5 MS it enjoys no or limited reduction (less than 15% of the standard 
rate). 
 
 A medium brewery producing 100,000 hl per year is granted the maximum 
reduction (50%) in only 5 MS out of the 23 opting in to the provision, while in 
12 MS it enjoys no or limited reduction (less than 15% of the standard rate). 
 
Reduced rates for small distilleries have a much lower implementation rate, as only 7 
MS have decided to apply it: Austria, Germany, Spain, Croatia, Portugal, Romania, and 
Slovenia. In Slovenia, the yearly output is set at 1.5 hl of spirits per year; in Austria, the 
yearly output threshold is 4 hlpa per year, while, in the other 5 MS, the output threshold 
corresponds to the maximum allowed by the Directive (10 hlpa). All MS provide for the 
maximum possible discount (50%), except for Austria and Germany, which come close 
to it (46% and 44% respectively), while in Spain the discount amounts to 12% of the 
standard rate. There are no output brackets or decreasing reductions. Details are 
provided in Figure 8 below.  
 
Figure 8 – MS implementation of the reduced rates for small distilleries (2017) 
 
Source: EDT 
Legend: In blue: MS without reduced rates for small distilleries; in white: MS with reduced rates for small 
distilleries and maximum threshold; in grey: non-EU countries. Numbers indicate the threshold applied. 
Note: (*): threshold expressed as hl of spirits. 
 
 NATIONAL SCHEMES FOR SMALL PRODUCERS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 
 
In the six MS visited for this policy issue, two additional schemes providing reduced rates 
or full exemption to small producers have been identified: the Abfindung for small 
distilleries in Austria and the exemption for small cider makers in the UK. 
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 The Abfindung scheme for small distilleries in Austria.169 In Austria, farmers 
traditionally distil their own fruit production, for their own consumption as well as 
for sale. Though its economic importance in terms of farmers’ income is 
considered to be marginal, distillation is regarded as part of the Austrian rural 
culture. Rules for farmers’ distilleries have been in place for more than 250 years. 
In Austria, two kinds of distilleries may be set up: 
 
o Verschlussbrennerei (sealed distillery), in which the duty to pay is calculated 
on the exact amount of alcohol produced.  
o Abfindungsbrennerei (small-scale flat-rate distillery), in which the excise duty 
is calculated on an estimated output. 
 
The Abfindung regime is defined in Article §55 of the Austrian alcohol tax law170 
An Abfindungsbrennerei can produce up to 2 hlpa per year; on the first hlpa, a 
reduced rate equal to 54% of the standard rate is applied; on the second hlpa, a 
reduced rate equal to 90% of the standard rate is applied (§65). Products from an 
Abfindungsbrennerei can be put up for sale under certain restrictions, but cannot 
be sold in other EU MS (§57). Any individual can apply to carry out distillation 
activities under the Abfindung regime, by registering as a producer and 
communicating to the customs authority his/her distilling equipment, the raw 
materials that will be used, and the timing and duration of the distillation. 
According to the raw materials used and the duration of the distillation, an output 
is estimated, and the excise duties are calculated. Only own fruit or other 
agricultural products can be distilled in an Abfindungsbrennerei. 
 
 The small cider maker exemption in the UK. The United Kingdom has an 
exemption from excise taxes for small cider makers producing less than 70 hl per 
year. The exemption dates back to 1976, and was contextual to the introduction 
of excise duties on cider. The UK government announced in July 2015 that it 
would retain the exemption ‘until and unless a replacement scheme is 
established’. 
 
To be eligible for the exemption, small cider makers must apply for an 
authorisation from the customs authority. Once the authorisation is obtained, 
small cider makers are exempt from the various excise obligations (e.g. 
recordkeeping, auditing, excise payments, setting up of a tax warehouse). The 
customs authority performs occasional checks, and further investigates if 
anything appears suspicious.  
 
 OTHER PROVISIONS FOR SMALL PRODUCERS 
 
Though reduced rates are not granted to small producers of wine and other fermented 
beverages, these may be granted an exemption from most of the administrative 
requirements provided by the excise legal framework. Article 40 of the Horizontal 
Directive provides for MS the possibility to exempt small wine producers from the 
requirements on (i) production, processing and holding (including the setting up of a tax 
warehouse);171 (ii) movement of excise goods under suspension;172 and (iii) any other 
requirement relating to movement and holding. Small wine producers are defined as 
those with an output of less than 1,000 hl of wine per year. Based on Article 15 of 
                                                          
169 A similar scheme exists in Germany as well, as detailed in §114 of BrennO 1998.  
170 ‘Bundesgesetz über eine Verbrauchsteuer auf Alkohol und alkoholhaltige Waren (Alkoholsteuergesetz)’, 
consolidated version of 21.04.2017. 
171 Chapter III of the Horizontal Directive. 
172 Chapter IV of the Horizontal Directive. 
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Directive 92/83/EEC, this provision can also be applied to other fermented beverages.173 
According to the fieldwork carried out and to the recent evaluation of the Horizontal 
Directive, Austria174 and Italy175 apply the exemption; on the contrary, France does not, 
but it exempts small winegrowers from lodging an excise guarantee.176  
 
 
2.3.1.2  Industry analysis  
 
In the following sub-sections, data on the various beverage industries are presented, in 
order to estimate the number of small players and their market share. For each tax 
category included in the Directive, the most representative product is analysed: beer, 
still wine, cider for the other fermented beverages, distilled spirits for ethyl alcohol, and 
fortified wine for intermediate products. These industries produce the most common 
products in their category in the six sample MS.177 Indeed, the supply and market share 
analysis presented below needs to rely on a relevant market, defined along geographical 
boundaries (i.e. for each sample MS) and product boundaries. For the definition of the 
policy options and the impact analysis (in Section 3.3 below), consideration will be given 
to the extension of reduced rates to the whole tax category. 
 
 THE BEER INDUSTRY 
 
Five of the six sample MS apply reduced rates for small brewers. France, Belgium and 
Poland grant them up to an output of 200,000 hl per year, while Austria and the United 
Kingdom limit it respectively to 50,000 and 60,000 hl All MS but France provide for a 
bracket system, the discount being higher for smaller entities. A reduction up to 50% of 
the standard rate is granted only by France and the UK, while all other countries provide 
for a lower discount.178 Importantly, when breweries get close to the threshold, the 
reduced rate gets closer to the standard one, at 90% or more of the latter, hence the tax 
advantage becomes smaller. Full information is reported in Table 29 below. 
 
Table 29 – Implementation of reduced rates for small brewers in the sample MS  
MS Standard Rate 
Output upper limit 
(hl) 
Brackets 
(hl) 
Reduced rate 
(% of standard) 
AT 2.00 €/hl/° Plato 50,000 
0-12,500 60% 
12,500-25,000 70% 
25,000-37,500 80% 
37,500-50,000 90% 
BE 2.00 €/hl/° Plato 200,000 
0-12,500 87% 
12,500-25,000 90% 
25,000-50,000 93% 
50,000-75,000 96% 
75,000-200,000 99% 
FR 
7.41  
€/hl/% vol 
200,000 No as of 2013 50% 
PL 1.81 €/hl/° Plato 200,000 
0-20,000 68%* 
20,000-70,000 84%* 
70,000-150,000 87%* 
150,000-200,000 90%* 
                                                          
173 As done e.g. by Italy, see Article 8 of ‘Decreto 27 marzo 2001, n. 153, Regolamento recante disposizioni per 
il controllo della fabbricazione, trasformazione, circolazione e deposito dell'alcole etilico e delle bevande 
alcoliche, sottoposti al regime delle accise, nonché' per l'effettuazione della vigilanza fiscale sugli alcoli metilico, 
propilico ed isopropilico e sulle materie prime alcoligene’, consolidated version of 4.7.2017. 
174 ‘Schaumweinsteuergesetz 1995’, Part 3, §44 (3). 
175 See Article 37.1 of ‘Decreto Legislativo 26 ottobre 1995, n. 504, Testo unico delle disposizioni legislative 
concernenti le imposte sulla produzione e sui consumi e relative sanzioni penali e amministrative’, consolidated 
version of 4.7.2017. Hereinafter: ‘Italian Excise Law’. 
176 Code général des impôts, art. 110-D. 
177 Based on ISWR sales data for 2016 and total excise revenues per fiscal category from EDT. 
178 In Poland, the reduced rate is granted per hl of production, while the excise is calculated per hl/° Plato. 
Hence, the ratio of the reduced rate over the standard one is not fixed. 
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MS Standard Rate 
Output upper limit 
(hl) 
Brackets 
(hl) 
Reduced rate 
(% of standard) 
UK** 
21.04  
€/hl/% vol 
60,000 
0-5,000 50% 
5,000-30,000 86%*** 
30,000-60,000 97%*** 
Source: EDT. 
Notes: * calculated on 12° Plato beer; ** with reference to beer with 2.8-7.5% vol; *** calculated on the mid-
point of the bracket. 
 
Table 30 below provides a summary of the information retrieved on the production 
structure of the beer industry in the six MS. These best estimates result from the 
consolidation of public data provided by tax authorities and trade associations, as well as 
from quantitative and qualitative information collected during the fieldwork and used to 
complement missing data. The definition of the various size classes varies from country to 
country, as there is neither a shared industry consensus, nor a standard data collection 
format. In most countries, the definition of what a micro or small brewer is depends on the 
national brackets used to administer the reduced rate scheme. The definition of a medium 
brewer is largely influenced by the country market structure. 
 
Table 30 – Number of small brewers and supply structure 
 AT BE FR IT PL UK EU* 
% of brewers covered by 
the reduced rate 90% 97% 99% 
0% 
(98% below 
1000 hl) 
87% 99% 97% 
% of output covered by 
reduced rate 
6% 10% 4%. 0% 3% 5% 5% 
Market Share  
Micro Brewers 
(up to 1,000/5,000 hl) 
1.5% 
3% 1.5% 2.5% 2% 5% 
n/a 
Small Brewers 
(up to 10,000/20,000 hl) 
8.5% 
Medium Brewers 
(up to 100,000/200,000 
hl) 
15% 7% 2.5% 6.5% 8% 20% 
Large Brewers 
(over 200,000 hl) 
75% 90% 96% 92% 90% 75% 
Source: Brewers of Europe: interviews with national trade federations, tax and customs authorities. 
Note: market segment covered by the reduced rates; market segment partly covered by the reduced rates. 
(*): data refer only to MS implementing the reduced rates; based on values from sample MS (AT, BE, FR, PL, and 
UK). Size classes are only indicative and vary across the sample MS, depending on the thresholds adopted for 
reduced rates and industry practice.  
 
Findings show that the vast majority of active brewers, 97% in the overall sample, and 
about or more than 90% in each country, is covered by the reduced rates. However, their 
production represents a small share of output, 5% in the overall sample, and not higher 
than 10% in any MS. In the UK and Austria, where the output threshold is lower than the 
maximum allowance and where the market features a significant group of so-called 
regional brewers in the area of 100,000 to 500,000 hl, reduced rates cover 5-6% of the 
market. In Belgium, a country with a longstanding tradition of local and small brewing and 
where the maximum threshold is set at 200,000 hl, reduced rates cover 10% of the 
market, the highest share among the MS analysed. In Poland, there is a significant 
presence of mid-size breweries, with an output of about 100,000-500,000 hl per year; 
however, since only a part of these regional players falls below the threshold, the market 
share covered by reduced rates is about 3%. In France, the importance of small players is 
limited: even though the number of small brewers increased four-fold over the last 
decade, their population has grown from a very small base;179 as a consequence, small 
                                                          
179 In France, the brewing tradition almost disappeared in the 1980’s, when only 30 brewers were active; this was 
due to changes in consumer taste and the industry consolidation process. This trend has reversed and, nowadays 
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brewers represent only about 4% of the market. Finally, in Italy, where reduced rates do 
not exist, microbreweries up to 1,000/1,500 hl represent 98% of the active players and 
about 2.5% of the market.180  
 
 THE DISTILLED SPIRIT INDUSTRY 
 
The quality of the information on the number, size, and market share of players active in 
the supply of distilled spirits is much poorer compared to what is available for beer and 
wine.181 This is also due to the fact that only 7 MS opted in for the reduced rates for small 
distilleries – while 23 opted in for beer – and to the fact that there is no definition of ‘small 
spirit producer’ in other parts of the EU legislative framework, either for tax or agricultural 
policies. However, several trends emerged from the fieldwork, which can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
1. The number of active distilleries is in the order of magnitude of 100 units in four 
out of the six MS visited: in particular, 120 distillers are licensed in Poland, 
between 75 and 90 of which are considered active; about 150 are active in Italy, 
and 230 in the UK. In Belgium, it is estimated that about 40-45 active distilleries 
are present in the market. In France, the number of operators is estimated at 
about 5,000-10,000. Austria is an exception: therein, it is estimated that about 
30,000-40,000 companies or individuals, mostly farmers, distil spirits – the vast 
majority under and because of the simplified flat-rate Abfindung regime. 
 
2. Data on the size of distilleries are scant. In Poland about 45 distilleries produce 
less than 100 hlpa per year and their market share is estimated to fall below 
0.4%. In France, 50 to 60 distilleries are estimated to fall below 10 hlpa, and they 
would represent, at maximum, 0.04% of the spirit market. To the contrary, 
estimates show that about 2,000 French distillers produce less than 10,000 hl of 
spirits per year (equivalent to 4,000 hlpa at 40% vol). In the UK and Italy, 
stakeholders and the authorities estimated that the presence of small distilleries 
with a scale of 10 hlpa is nihil or negligible, and that they could be active only in 
very premium segments, or as ancillary activities to farming, with a strict local 
dimension. In Austria on the contrary, most of active distillers fall within the 
Abfindung, and hence produce only up to 1 or 2 hlpa per year. 
 
3. There are growth trends in the small distillery segment, but they are not 
widespread across the MS. Growth was reported both in the UK, also thanks to a 
spur of small gin distilleries, and in Belgium, based on data on the applications for 
a tax warehouse. Growth of small distillation is not driven by fiscal incentives, but 
rather by consumers’ demand. However, in other countries such as Poland, the 
number of distillers, and especially of small agricultural distilleries, is rapidly 
shrinking; in Italy, there is no indication of a growth of small-scale distillation.  
 
 THE CIDER INDUSTRY 
 
The consumption of cider is largely concentrated in a handful of MS. The UK has, by far, 
the largest market, representing about 50-55% of the EU market, followed by Spain, 
France, Germany, and Ireland.182 Cider markets are larger in countries where there is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
about 1,000 active operators exist. E. Gillard, ‘Bières et brasseries françaises du 21ème siècle’, Projet Amertume, 
2016. 
180 These findings are in line with those described in the Ramboll Evaluation, where the share of production 
covered by reduced rates in the three countries for which data are estimated is around or above 90%, and 
where the 5 big producers control 50% to 70% of the market. MS covered: DE, FR, IT, and UK. 
181 As also acknowledged by trade associations. See Vinum & Spiritus Association Belgium, ‘La réalité 
économique derrière notre secteur’, Available at: http://fr.vinumetspiritus.be/sector/economics/de-
economische-realiteit-achter-onze-sector/, last accessed on July 2017.   
182 AICV, ‘European Cider Trends’, 2016 Update. 
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traditional production. The most important cider-producing countries or regions are indeed 
the British Islands – both Ireland and the UK – France, especially Normandy and Brittany, 
Spain, especially the Asturias, and Germany. To better collect information on cider, the 
sample of MS thus includes Ireland, while Austria and Belgium have been dropped. In this 
way, the sample consists of three of the largest cider markets (France, Ireland, and the 
UK) and two marginal producers (Italy and Poland). 
 
Table 31 below provides a summary of the information retrieved on the production 
structure of the cider industry in these five MS. The estimates below are based on data 
provided by customs, tax, and agricultural authorities and trade associations. Additional 
quantitative and qualitative information collected during the fieldwork was used to 
complement missing data. The definition of the various size classes varies from country to 
country, as there is neither a shared industry consensus, nor a standard data collection 
format. In general, micro-cider makers are considered to be those whose yearly 
production is below 100 hl (e.g. 70 hl in the UK). For these players, cider production 
remains an ancillary activity, e.g. for farmers or farmhouses. The definition of small cider 
makers usually encompasses those whose production is below 10,000/15,000 hl. 
 
Table 31 – Estimated market share of small and micro cider makers and their output 
 FR IE IT PL UK EU 
% of small cider makers  10% 20% 
100% 
n/a 32% 15% 
% of micro-cider makers 89% 73% 11% 64% 82% 
Production share of small 
cider makers 
17.5% 3% 
100% 
n/a 3% 
4.6% 
Production share of micro-
cider makers 
2.5% 0.1% 2% 0.1% 
Source: interviews with national trade federations, tax and customs authorities, ministries of agriculture. 
Note: EU estimates based on the five sample MS. 
 
The distribution of the firm population and production of cider is similar to that of the beer 
industry. Micro- and small cider makers represent about 97% of the number of active 
companies, and between 93% and 99% in the MS considered. Their production share is 
estimated at 4.6% in the MS considered, and is below 5% in all countries except for 
France, where small independent companies are estimated to represent between 15% and 
20% of the production. The production of micro-cider makers is negligible in the UK and 
Ireland, where the market is dominated by very large companies, and does not reach 
more than 3% in Poland and France, confirming the ‘ancillary’ nature of this market 
segment. 
 
 THE STILL WINE INDUSTRY 
 
The still wine value chain features different actors that play different roles in terms of 
scope of the activity. There are at least four kinds of wine producers: 
 
1. ‘Classical’ wine makers: companies that are both wine growers and wine makers; 
they produce and bottle their own wines. A wine maker may also buy grape, juice 
or bulk wine from other producers, in a variable percentage.  
2. Independent wine makers: as the classical wine maker, they are both wine growers 
and wine makers. However, independent wine makers process only their own 
grape. They usually have a smaller scale than classical wine makers. 
3. Cooperatives of wine growers: a cooperative collects grape, juice or bulk wine from 
its members, which in turn usually are co-owners, who then receive monetary or 
in-kind compensation as a share of profits or finished production. Cooperatives are 
thus wine makers, but not necessarily wine growers. Very small wine growers, who 
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have no interest or no means to produce, bottle, and trade wine, usually confer 
their production to cooperatives. 
4. Negociants en vin, or wine shippers: a wine shipper buys grape, juice, or bulk wine 
from wine growers, and then produces, bottles and sells wine under its own name. 
Hybrid companies exist, which are wine makers and also produce wine as shippers. 
 
As a consequence, there could be at least two kinds of small players in the still wine value 
chain: the small wine grower – regardless of whether it confers his/her production to a 
large player or not – and the small wine producer. As the focus of the reduced rate 
provisions is on operators producing alcoholic beverages (i.e. breweries and distilleries), 
rather than on other operators along the value chain, the analysis below focuses on small 
wine producers. However, it should be remembered that large wine makers often work in 
cooperation with a constellation of small players. 
 
Table 32 below provides information on the share of players below 1,000 hl in the six 
sample MS, and on their share of national production. Data on firm distribution have been 
collected from public authorities, trade associations, and sectoral literature.183 In countries 
where the production of wine is marginal (Belgium, Poland, and the UK), all producers are 
considered to fall below this threshold. In Austria and Italy, the vast majority of producers 
has an output lower than 1,000 hl; however, in Austria, where production is very much 
atomised and there are very few large winemakers, small producers represent about 57% 
of the national production; in Italy, where large producers do exist, small producers only 
represent about 15% of national production. The only country where the number of small 
producers is lower than 90% is France, with 69% of wine producers estimated to be small; 
in terms of production, their share is in line with that of Italy (17%). 
 
Table 32 – Estimated market share of small still wine producers and their output 
 AT BE FR IT PL UK EU 
% of wine producers 
below 1,000 hl 
97% 100% 69% 92% 100% 100% 85% 
% of production 57% 100% 17% 15% 100% 100% 17% 
Total wine production 
2015-16 (‘000 hl) 
2,300 10 47,900 51,500 4.5 40 165,600 
Source: DG AGRI, AGRIMER; interviews with national trade associations, CEVI, ministries of agriculture, tax and 
customs authorities. 
Note: EU estimates based on the six sample MS. 
 
 THE FORTIFIED WINE INDUSTRY 
 
Intermediate products are a residual category – hence, ‘intermediate’ between fermented 
beverages and ethyl alcohol, which includes products ‘typically based on a naturally 
fermented beverage to which alcohol and, in some cases, other ingredients have been 
added’.184 Its residual character is confirmed by the fact that it represents the least 
significant category in terms of tax revenues: at EU level,185 revenues from intermediate 
products amount to 2.3% of total excise revenues, with the maximum share in Portugal – 
home of Port wines – where it reaches 6.3%.  
 
                                                          
183 For France, data refer to wine producers below EUR 10 mn of annual revenues. A company of this size 
would produce less than 1,000 hl, with the exception of players producing the cheapest category of wine, i.e. 
without any geographical indication. Even in this case, considering 2015 prices, a company would produce 
about 1,250 hl. Hence, this revenue threshold is considered a good approximation of the 1,000 hl output 
threshold. For the UK, the share of producers below 1,000 hl is estimated based on qualitative information. 
184 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties 
on alcoholic beverages and on the alcohol contained in other products, COM(90)432, 7.11.1990, at p.8. 
185 Excluding 5 MS for which disaggregated revenues from intermediate products are not available: EL, HR, IT, 
MT, and PL. 
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This category includes several products, such as fortified wines, vin doux naturel, 
vermouth, aromatised wine aperitifs, as well as certain mixed drinks with a fermented 
base. As a homogeneous analysis of such a diversified range of products is not possible, 
the focus will be on fortified wines, the most representative product in this category.186 
 
Fortified wines are produced by adding alcohol – usually by means of a neutral strong 
spirit – during fermentation to increase the alcoholic strength of the product. As a result, 
fermentation is stopped, so that a part of the sugar content of the must is not converted 
into alcohol, and the resulting product has a sweeter taste.187 Port, Sherry, Madeira, 
Marsala, Samos and Pineau des Charentes are among the most common types of fortified 
wines. All these products have geographically protected indications. The quantity of 
fortified wines is limited when confronted to wine. As an example, the production of Port 
amounts to about 650,000 hl,188 the volume of Sherry is about 900,000 hl,189 in Italy 
about 25,000 hl of Marsala and 30,000 hl of other fortified wines are produced,190 and 
finally about 33,000 hl of Madeira are produced each year.191 
 
The value chain for fortified wines include growers, producers of the base wine, and 
‘fortifiers’. Grapes and base wine can be produced by a large number of wine growers: for 
example, 30,000 for Port,192 and 1,050 for Madeira. However, the vast majority of them 
does not produce the end product: fortification and ageing (where necessary) are done by 
shippers (also Bodegas for Sherry). For instance, 90% of the Port trade is concentrated on 
15 shipping houses,193 while there are 7 producers of Madeira,194 and about 60 shippers / 
stockists / Bodegas for Sherry.195 The estimated average production for these producers is 
39,000 hl for Port, 47,000 hl for Madeira, and 15,000 hl for Sherry. For this reason, 
although many small wine growers or wine makers work within the value chain, the 
number of small producers and their market share is residual. 
 
 
2.3.2 Problem analysis 
 
The Commission Report considers that the existing rules on reduced rates are working well 
and the Council shares this view.196 However, a baseline analysis concerning the 
application of the reduced rates to small breweries and small distilleries needs to be 
carried out, in order to verify whether a problem exists, and, where appropriate, to 
quantify its magnitude. Indeed, the OPC and the stakeholders suggested that in some 
areas problems with the application of current norms occur; these problems are discussed 
in Sections 2.3.2.1 for small brewers, and 2.3.2.2 for small distillers. 
 
                                                          
186 The share of revenues from fortified wines over the total revenues from intermediate products at EU level is 
of 61% (sales data retrieved from IWSR, excise duty rates and revenues from EDT). The analysis excludes MT, 
EL, IT, PL, HR, IE and UK, because revenue data on intermediate products are not homogeneous. Outliers (NL, 
ES) adjusted based on EU average. 
187 Court of Master Sommeliers, ‘Port – Port Trade’, Available at: 
www.courtofmastersommeliers.org/pdfresources/portnotes.pdf, last accessed on July 2017.  
188 Correia L., Rebelo J., Caldas J., ‘Production and Trade of Port Wine: Temporal Dynamics and Pricing’, Page 
16 (2012 data), 2015. 
189 Great Wines from Spain, ‘The Wines – Sherry’, Available at: 
 http://www.greatwinesfromspain.com/the-wines/sherry, 2014 Data, last accessed on July 2017. 
190 Corriere Vinicolo, 2016 data. 
191 Wijnstudio, ‘Madeira Wine’, Available at: http://www.madeirawine.nl/madeira-wine/, last accessed on July 
2017.  
192 Brito C, ‘A network perspective of the port wine sector’, International Journal of Wine, Vol. 18 No. 2, 2006.  
193 The 15 members (shippers) of AEVP represent 90% of the total Port trade, Available at: 
http://www.aevp.pt/Members, last accessed on July 2017. 
194 Discovering Madeira, ‘Who produces Madeira Wine’, Available at: http://www.discoveringmadeira.com/who-
produces-madeira-wine, last accessed on July 2017.  
195 Consejo Regulador de los Vinos de Jerez y Manzanilla, ‘Bodega Types’, Available at:  
http://www.sherry.wine/wines/bodegas, last accessed on July 2017.  
196 Council Conclusions (2016), at §8. 
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The IIA identifies a specific problem at stake for this policy issue: the risk of unequal 
treatment in so far as reduced rates are available for beer and ethyl alcohol, but not for 
wine, other fermented beverages, and intermediate products.197 Accordingly, the Council 
has invited the Commission ‘to investigate the impacts of extending those rules to other 
categories of products.’198 This issue is dealt with in Section 2.3.2.3 below. 
 
2.3.2.1  Functioning of the reduced rates for small breweries  
 
 DOMESTIC FUNCTIONING 
 
The analysis reported below considers three aspects of the application of the provisions for 
small brewers: (i) whether the output threshold (200,000 hl per year) is appropriate; (ii) 
whether the system generates unnecessary administrative burdens for economic operators 
or enforcement costs for public authorities; (iii) whether the provision, and in particular 
the conditions defining an independent brewer, scores well in terms of legal certainty. 
 
With respect to the current threshold, it is considered appropriate because it allows MS 
to support SME in overcoming diseconomies of scale and the costs of market access 
barriers in a sector where most of the market is concentrated on a limited number of very 
big players.199 The threshold is sufficiently high to allow MS to include micro and small 
breweries, as well as medium and regional players (at least the smallest among them).  
 
MS authorities were keen on retaining the current limit and its flexibility,200 and did use a 
lower threshold (e.g. in Austria and the UK) to tailor the effects of the reduction according 
to their national market structure. Few economic operators expressed discontent with the 
current threshold, and this is also confirmed by the OPC results, where 61% of 
respondents from the beer industry consider it appropriate. Negative reactions were 
collected during the fieldwork, because of the specificities of national market structures. In 
some countries, such as the UK, the 200,000 hl threshold would artificially dichotomise the 
population of regional breweries in the area of 100,000 hl to 500,000 hl, and this might 
create market distortions. Mid-size players are also present in Austria (where stakeholders 
insist that the government should raise the national limit), Belgium, and Poland. The 
problem is, however, largely theoretical: in Austria and the UK, the governments set the 
limit much below, at 50,000 hl and 60,000 hl respectively; in Poland and Belgium, where 
the maximum threshold is adopted, the discount is lower the larger the firm output, and 
gets quickly close to 0%.201 This further demonstrates that the current provision, including 
the threshold, allows MS to tailor this provision to national specificities. 
 
During the fieldwork, a group of economic operators complained that the threshold, by its 
nature, discourages the growth of small brewers. Indeed, when a small brewer has a 
yearly production very close to the national threshold, increasing its scale could be 
unprofitable because of the loss of access to the reduced rates. In practice, this problem 
affects only MS which (i) do not have any brackets or a degressive system; and (ii) 
provide for a significant discount. This is e.g. the case of France, where a 50% discount is 
granted up to 200,000 hl. However, in France the number of breweries in the 10,000-
200,000 hl is very limited (about 10), hence the risk appears theoretical. To the contrary, 
in Belgium, Austria, Poland, and the UK, the brackets or degressive systems in place 
reduce the disincentive to grow, because brewers ‘at the edge’ of the threshold already 
                                                          
197 IIA (2017), at p.2. 
198 Council Conclusions (2016), at §8. 
199 See Section 2.3.1.2 above. 
200 In line with the findings of the Commission Evaluation, where it is reported that only two Member States 
expressed discontent with the available limit. 
201 In PL, the discount amounts to 13% of the standard rate for breweries above 70,000 hl, and to 10% for 
those above 150,000 hl (assuming a beer with 12° Plato). In BE, the discount is of 4% above 50,000 hl, and of 
1% above 75,000 hl.  
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receive a small advantage. In theory, one could consider providing the reduced rates on 
the first 200,000 hl brewed by any player, regardless of its size. This mechanism would 
remove any disincentive to grow. However, the implementation of this system would prove 
difficult for at least two reasons: (i) beer is taxed based on hl per ABV or degree Plato, 
hence it would be necessary to determine the strength of the first 200,000 hl, and 
companies could abuse this provision by brewing strong beer first; (ii) excises are paid not 
only directly by breweries, but also by domestic or international distributors, and 
reconstructing where the first 200,000 hl of production has ended up would be complex. 
 
In terms of administrative burden for economic operators and enforcement costs for 
public authorities, the fieldwork confirmed that the reduced rates for small brewers do not 
require unnecessary efforts, from neither companies nor customs. Enforcement costs with 
respect to domestic producers were considered to be minimal by all tax and customs 
authorities interviewed. In the word of one customs officer, ‘costs or burdens for public 
authorities are not an issue for the scheme’. 
 
Economic operators across the 6 MS visited largely concurred on the very limited 
administrative costs generated by the reduced rate schemes. The Fiscalis discussion 
document on reduced rates202 also confirms that burdens and formalities for small 
breweries often arise from the compliance with the overall excise provisions, and in 
particular the requirement to set up a tax warehouse and provide a guarantee, rather than 
from the reduced rate schemes.203  
 
To estimate administrative burdens, a deep dive survey of small economic operators was 
carried out with the support of national trade associations in 3 MS implementing reduced 
rates. Five operators were surveyed by means of a written questionnaire in the UK, and 
four operators were interviewed in France and Poland to this purpose. In these countries, 
procedures to obtain or demonstrate the status of small producer are quite similar.204 The 
information obligations to which the small brewer is subject can be described as follows: 
 
 Submit a declaration on the quantity produced during the previous year (in Poland 
and France) or on forecasted production for the current year (UK). For declarations 
concerning previous year production, the necessary information can be extracted 
from the records already kept under the excise legislation, so that the cost is 
minimal (filing an additional form). For declarations concerning the current year, a 
forecast needs to be prepared by the small brewer. However, UK operators 
consider this obligation requires a negligible amount of time. 
 Prove the status of ‘independent brewery’. In the UK, this is done by means of a 
self-declaration; in France, this consists in a one-off submission of a set of 
company documents (e.g. copy of the company register, information on 
shareholding, company charter). 
 Specify the status of ‘produced by an independent small brewery’ in the ECMS 
movements.205 This can be done by flagging the appropriate parameter in the 
system, and comes at negligible costs. 
                                                          
202 Fiscalis discussion document, at p.5. 
203 MS can already allow small brewers to release for consumption their products upon production, and 
therefore exempt many of the formalities related to the tax warehouse. This is the case of e.g. Italy, where 
small brewers up to 10,000 hl can opt for a simplified regime for duty payment. See Agenzia delle Dogane e 
dei Monopoli, ‘Circolare 5/C, Determinazione direttoriale prot.140839 del 4 dicembre 2013, concernente 
l’assetto del deposito fiscale e le modalità di accertamento, contabilizzazione e controllo della produzione per i 
microbirrifici’, 06.05.2014. 
204 See HM Revenues and Customs, ‘Excise Notice 226: Beer Duty’, at §8; Bulletin officiel des douanes, 
‘Contributions Indirectes, Régime Fiscal Des Boissons Alcooliques, Droit Spécifique Sur Les Bières Taux Réduits 
Pour Les Bières Produites Par Les Petites Brasseries Indépendantes for France’. 
205 See Annex I to the Commission Regulation (EC) No 684/2009 implementing Council Directive 2008/118/EC 
as regards the computerised procedures for the movement of excise goods under suspension of excise duty. 
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 Negligible additional costs related to inspection and controls are reported, as 
records of the quantity produced by each brewer are already kept and verified 
under normal customs procedures. 
 
Based on the replies from small operators, a typical firm is assumed to spend about 1 hour 
clerk’s work per month to comply with the requirements described above, i.e. 12 hours per 
year. The Business-As-Usual factor is estimated at 25%, given that keeping track of past, 
current, and future production levels is a part of ‘typical company’ activity.206 Annual 
burdens207 per company – monetised based on the salary of a clerk, including 
overheads208 – in the 5 MS applying reduced rates for the beer sector vary from about EUR 
60 in Poland to EUR 280 in Austria, with a sample average of EUR 178. Total burdens in 
the 5 MS amount to EUR 600,000. Given the volumes of production subject to reduced 
rates,209 administrative burdens amount to about EUR 0.09/hl of beer. Extrapolating the 
analysis to the whole EU – namely, to the 23 countries adopting the reduced rates for 
small brewers – based on national production, total burdens amount to about EUR 1.5 mn. 
Administrative costs and burdens are summarised in Table 33 below. 
 
Table 33 – Administrative costs and burdens due to the reduced rates for small brewers 
MS 
Unit admin costs 
Unit admin 
burdens 
Total admin 
burdens Admin burdens  
Euro € ‘000 €/hl 
AT 372 279 55 0.10 
BE 352 264 52 0.03 
FR 258 194 196 0.24 
PL 78 59 8 0.01 
UK 211 158 290 0.13 
Sample MS - - 601 
0.09 
EU28 - - 1,517 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on a survey of small operators. 
 
With respect to legal certainty, the main issue is the definition of the conditions at which 
a brewer is given the status of ‘independence’. The granting of reduced rates to small 
producers is conditional upon their independence in legal and economic terms. However, 
independence in legal and economic terms is not further defined in the Directive, and, as 
confirmed by stakeholders, the exact implementation of this legal concept may lead to 
uncertainty in some MS. 
 
In most cases, the condition of legal and economic independence does not generate legal 
uncertainty, as other areas of the EU law can be resorted to. For example, the Commission 
Recommendation on the definition of SME210 provides an explanation of when two 
companies shall be considered as partners or linked, based on capital or voting rights, or 
on sharing people having a decisive influence over company key decisions (e.g. 
appointment of the board).211 However, two grey areas may remain: when the small 
producer is the licensee of another producer, and when the small producer outsources part 
of its production to another brewer.  
 
                                                          
206 The Business-As-Usual factor measures the share of administrative costs that a company would incur even 
though there was no regulation in place. In a nutshell, it captures the activities which are part of the normal 
business administration (in this case, keeping track of production levels). Administrative burdens – i.e. those 
strictly generated by a norm – are defined as the difference between administrative costs and Business-As-
Usual costs. 
207 The BAU factor is assumed at 0%. 
208 Source: Eurostat Earning Structure. 
209 See Section 2.3.1.2 above. 
210 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, C(2003)1422, 6.5.2003. 
211 The matter was also clarified by the CJEU in 2009. See Judgment of the Court of 2.04.2009, ‘Glückauf 
Brauerei GmbH v Hauptzollamt Erfurt’, C-83/08. 
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With respect to beer brewed under license, i.e. beer produced by a small producer on 
behalf of another brewer and under the trademark of the latter, the issue has largely been 
settled by existing guidelines and clarifications. Though details are not provided by the 
Directive, the Minute Statements from the ECOFIN Council meeting adopting the Directive 
express the following rules: 
 
• beer produced under license is not eligible for the reduced rate; 
• a small brewer can brew under license without losing his/her right to the reduced 
rate on the rest of his/her production, provided that (i) beer under license 
represents ‘a minority’ of the total production; (ii) total production, including beer 
under license, remains within the maximum threshold.212 
 
In the context of a Fiscalis group, issues have been reported by MS with the identification 
of a license contract, as opposed to any contract (e.g. purchase or outsourcing) providing 
for Company A to brew beer for Company B. The key factor is considered to be the 
transfer of the right to use the trademark of another company.213 The condition of 
‘brewing under license’ was also recently interpreted by the CJEU, which confirmed that 
the transfer of trademark and know-how identifies a license contract.214 Stakeholders have 
not reported significant problems with the implementation of the ‘brewing under license’ 
condition, and national frameworks and interpretations largely conform to the rules 
detailed above.215   
 
The second grey area concerns ‘contract brewing’. In this case, a small producer 
outsources, possibly under license, the production of beer to another brewer. This business 
relation is less common than that of a small producer brewing under license, but it may 
arise, e.g. when the small brewer has exhausted its production capacity. The first question 
is whether contract brewing is likely to be used to circumvent the output threshold, either 
because of the associated legal uncertainty or the lack of appropriate verification by 
customs authorities. The second question is whether contracted beer can be taxed at a 
reduced rate or should be treated like beer brewed under license, and thus excluded from 
the reduced rate. The third question is whether this contract breaches the independence of 
each counterpart or not and, if not, whether each of the two operators individually or the 
two operators jointly should remain below the output threshold in order to continue 
benefiting from reduced rates.216 Such a problem was mentioned by UK operators, and it 
was confirmed that this area may still have a certain degree of subjectivity. French 
stakeholders reported that this issue should have been settled by a Customs 
Memorandum, but that, despite the intentions, this has led to different interpretations by 
local customs offices. In Austria, the law provides that when two breweries are ‘dependent 
from each other’, such under certain types of cooperation, their total production should be 
considered in order to verify whether they meet the threshold for reduced rates.217 
 
In conclusion, the baseline assessment of the clarity of the current provision is positive, so 
that, in most cases, its implementation does not engender legal uncertainty or costs. 
However, grey areas remain, which, although not concerning the vast majority of small 
brewers, affect the legal certainty for economic operators having entered into certain 
cooperation agreements, in particular contract brewing. In these areas, the uncertainty 
has given rise to disputes, and thus to litigation costs, as well as to other costs related to 
the determination of the status of economic independence. This is also confirmed by the 
                                                          
212 See ‘Fiscalis Discussion document’, at p.5. 
213 Ibid., p.6. 
214 Judgement of the Court of 4.6.2015, ‘Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects and Directeur 
régional des douanes et droits indirects d’Auvergne v Brasserie Bouquet SA’, C-285/14. 
215 See the UK and FR guidance documents mentioned above (HMRC, ‘Excise Notice 226: Beer Duty’; Bulletin 
officiel des douanes, ‘Contributions Indirectes, Régime Fiscal Des Boissons Alcooliques, Droit Spécifique Sur Les 
Bières Taux Réduits Pour Les Bières Produites Par Les Petites Brasseries Indépendantes for France’). 
216 A legal case is undergoing before a French court (interviews with economic operators). 
217 See ‘Biersteuergesetz 1995’, at §3.6. 
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replies to the OPC: whereas only one third of respondents from the beer industry 
considered the application of reduced rates to operators from other EU MS or third 
countries a moderate or major issue, the share increased to 81% with respect to the 
definition of independent operator. 
 
 CROSS-BORDER FUNCTIONING 
 
As reduced rates for small brewers are optional, companies in different MS may be put in a 
different competitive position. To prevent unfair treatment of non-national producers, and 
since excises are paid based on the rates and conditions of the MS in which goods are 
released for consumption, the Directive mandates that imported beer manufactured by 
small producers established in another MS shall also be granted the exemption, on an 
equal footing (thus complying with Article 110 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)).218 In addition, the WTO principle of national treatment – i.e. that 
the same tax rate should be applied equally to domestic and third-country producers – 
should also be complied with. As a consequence, the reduced rate should be extended to 
any small brewer, be it domestic, from another MS, or from a third-country.219  
 
Although no issue of legal uncertainty and clarity arises, there can be implementation 
problems, as customs authorities in the country where the product is released for 
consumption need to check the status of the brewer. The information collected from tax 
authorities and economic operators is mixed in this sense. Tax and customs authorities 
agree that the framework is clear and that foreign operators, both from other MS and 
third-countries, should be granted the same treatment; however, they disagree on how to 
prove the status of small producer. Certain authorities consider this to be a ‘self-
declaration’ scheme, so that controls on intra-EU traders claiming the status of ‘small 
producer’ are done only in case something suspicious is detected. In this case, the 
customs authority in the MS of destination may submit a request for information to the 
customs authority in the MS of origin in order to verify the status.220 However, most of the 
customs authorities interviewed do require a certificate from the brewers or their 
distributors, issued or stamped by the home country customs authorities. Economic 
operators interviewed confirmed that, when moving products to another MS, the local 
distributor may ask for such a certificate, but this does not happen in every MS of 
destination. A problem arises when (i) a small brewer established in a MS not requiring the 
certificate and not issuing the certificate to domestic manufacturers intends to enter the 
market of a MS requiring such a certificate; (ii) or when the MS of destination does not 
automatically recognise the status granted by the MS of origin.221 Hence, there appear to 
be only minor disturbances to the functioning of the Single Market for small brewers, 
mostly connected to specific trade flows, or to international trade. The limited scale of the 
phenomenon is also confirmed by the OPC, where only one third of the respondents from 
the beer industry considered cross-border aspects of reduced rates to be a moderate or 
major issue. 
 
                                                          
218 In Article 4.3. 
219 The uneven treatment of domestic and third-country producers of alcoholic beverage was the subject of a 
WTO dispute between EU and Canada. The case was settled by mutual agreement so that Canadian import 
tariffs on alcoholic beverages were reduced in order to offset the tax advantage for domestic producers. See 
WTO, ‘DS354: Canada — Tax Exemptions and Reductions for Wine and Beer’. 
220 Checking the status of operators based in a third country may be more difficult. However, no problems were 
reported with major trade partners, such as Canada and the US. Importantly, the number of small brewers 
originating from non-EU MS is very limited, given the investment necessary to enter a distant market. 
221 Only in two MS this problem is mentioned as affecting a significant number of operators; it relates to sales 
of beer produced by Belgian small producers in France. France allegedly does not accept self-certification and 
does not always recognise checks performed by the Belgian customs authority. 
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 OTHER ASPECTS 
 
To complete the analysis of the baseline situation, the following categories of effects are to 
be analysed: 
 
• SME competitiveness. The issue of SME competitiveness can be analysed from 
two perspectives: static, i.e. whether current players enjoy benefits because of the 
reduced rates, and dynamic, i.e. whether reduced rates favour the entry of new 
micro and small companies in the beer industry. 
 
o Static competitiveness. During the fieldwork, economic operators were asked 
whether reduced rates supported SME competitiveness, e.g. by increasing 
profits or investments, or whether they were largely appropriated by 
distributors or passed-on to consumers. Economic operators consider that the 
provision supports the competitiveness of small brewers, and that the tax 
discount does benefit small operators, rather than being passed through the 
value chain. Hence, the provision is effective in counterbalancing lower costs 
enjoyed by large companies, in particular because of economies of scale and 
market access barriers. The limited pass-on is also consistent with the fact that 
small brewers are most likely to produce craft beer, as opposed to the mass 
products mostly marketed by large companies. As a consequence, price levels 
are different, and this reduces the incentive to pass-on the tax discount in order 
to remain competitive vis-à-vis larger players. Further empirical evidence is 
provided by an industry study on British small brewers, where most of the 
respondents indicated that the excise reduction was kept within the firm (e.g. 
for investment), and only 12% indicated that it led to a price reduction.222 In 
line with the findings from the fieldwork, all small brewers taking part to the 
OPC expressed a very positive assessment of the reduced rates provisions. 
 
o Dynamic competitiveness. While reduced rates have a clear positive impact 
on SME competitiveness, their effect on the entry rates in the beer industry is 
not univocal. There seems to be a trend towards the growth of the micro and 
small brewery segment, which is, however, according to economic operators’ 
view, largely driven by market demand. This trend is even across countries, 
regardless of whether they have implemented the reduced rates or not. In 
France and the UK, where the discount for microbreweries is also significant 
(50% of the standard rate), their number has more than doubled over the 
2010-2015 period (annual growth rate of respectively 16% and 19%). In 
Austria, the number of microbreweries remained stable (+13% over 5 years); 
however, the discount for microbreweries in this country is significant (40% of 
the standard rate). In a different context, in Italy, where there are no reduced 
rates, the number of microbreweries almost doubled in the 2010-2015 period223 
(annual growth rate of 13%).224 While operators consider that reduced rates 
support the entry of new players, these data suggest that the provision of 
reduced rates is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, and that other 
national factors are also at play (such as consumer demand, as well as industry 
structure, market stability, type of beer consumed by the population, 
competition from other beverages).  
 
• Foregone excise duty revenues. All customs authorities interviewed considered 
that the reduced rate schemes did not generate large costs for the public budget. 
                                                          
222 SIBA, ‘British Beer: The Report on the 2017 Members’ Survey of the Society of Independent Brewers’, 2017. 
223 The operationalisation of the simplified excise regime for microbreweries in 2014 did not increase the trend. 
224 The same is valid for another MS out of the sample, Spain, which does not have reduced rates for small 
brewers. Therein, albeit from a very small base (46 microbrewers in 2010), the number of microbreweries 
increased nine-fold over the 2010-2015 period. 
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As shown in Table 34 below, in the visited MS, the costs of these schemes are 
between 0.5% and 1.5% of excise revenues from beer. The amount of foregone 
revenues depends on multiple factors, namely (i) the market share covered by 
reduced rate; (ii) the size of the discount; (iii) the absolute level of the excise for 
beer; (iv) the average beer strength.225 Estimated costs vary from about 1 million 
EUR in Belgium, where the discount granted to small breweries is limited to 1-13% 
of the standard rate, to more than EUR 60 mn in the UK, mostly because of the 
relatively high standard rate (Table 34).  
 
Table 34 – Amount of foregone excise duty revenues due to reduced rates 
MS 
Foregone revenues 
As a % of tax revenues from beer 
€ '000 
AT 2,000* 1.1% 
BE 1,000** 0.5% 
FR 15,000** 1.8% 
PL 4,000** 0.5% 
UK 60,354* 1.4% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of information provided by tax authorities and trade associations. 
Note: * for AT and the UK, data were provided by the Ministries of Finance; ** for BE, FR, and PL 
estimates are based on the market share covered by the reduced rates (rounded to the nearest 
mn). 
 
• Market effects: intra-market distortions. The Commission Report states that 
‘[b]ased on the analysis of competition, it seems unlikely that the presence of 
reduced rates for small brewers […] have caused any negative competitive 
distortions within their markets[.]’226 This finding is substantiated in the Ramboll 
Evaluation, where it is observed that the market share of breweries below the 
reduced rate threshold in FR, DE, and the UK is limited, and that the concentration 
in these markets is stable. In this study, the market data estimated for the MS 
where fieldwork was carried out confirm this assessment, as the market share of 
producers covered by the reduced rate varies from 3% to 10%, while the market 
share of large brewers is estimated between 75% and 96%. Large beer producers 
confirmed this view during the fieldwork and expressed no or limited concerns with 
respect to reduced rates. In a nutshell, they do not perceive this provision as 
empowering small producers to undercut prices on the beer market, mainly for two 
reasons. First, diseconomies of scale and barriers to market access are indeed a 
factor reducing the competitiveness of SME, and the reduced rates are perceived as 
partially counterbalancing such a disadvantage, rather than putting SME in a 
privileged competitive position. Secondly, product segmentation on the beer 
market matters as well, so that small companies mostly focus on craft beer, and 
large companies on mass products.227 
 
• Per capita alcohol consumption. No or negligible changes to per capita alcohol 
consumption, and thus negative health impacts, can be attributed to the provision 
for reduced rates. This is due to the combination of (i) a limited impact on price, as 
the tax discount is mostly appropriated by the SME; (ii) a limited impact on 
consumption, as the market affected represents a small share of the overall beer 
market, and since there is no indication that the consumption of ‘reduced rate beer’ 
results in additional consumption in terms of pure alcohol. Also, craft beer, which 
represents the bulk of production for small brewers, has not been associated with 
                                                          
225 As in other parts of the reports, it is assumed an average strength of 5% vol or 12° Plato. 
226 COM(2016) 676 Final, p. 14. 
227 The distinction is obviously not neat. All large producers are active in the premium or craft segments, even 
though these segments represent a lower share of output compared to small breweries. At the same time, 
breweries under the reduced rate, especially medium breweries in the 50,000 hl to 200,000 hl output range, 
also manufacture mass products. 
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hazardous consumption patterns.228 Views collected from health institutions and 
NGOs interviewed during the fieldwork confirm these conclusions.   
 
 
2.3.2.2  Functioning of the reduced rates for small distilleries 
 
Albeit providing for a similar mechanism – an excise reduction, a maximum output 
threshold, and a set of conditions defining ‘independent’ distilleries – the rationale and 
the functioning of the reduced rates for small distillers are quite different from that for 
brewers. When discussing this issue with a tax authority implementing the provision, it 
was clearly stated that the rationale of the reduced rates for small distilleries is to 
protect and preserve the traditional distilling culture, rather than to promote the 
competitiveness of SME in the spirits sector. Accordingly, the threshold is set at a much 
lower level, of about 1/8,000 compared to the one allowed to small brewers.229 
 
The commercial viability of such a scale of production is very limited. Though 
considerations vary depending on the type of spirits and the % vol, this scale could be 
viable only for distilleries of ultra-premium products. As such, this provision currently 
serves to protect ancillary ‘traditional’ production, such as that of fruit farmers in Austria 
and Germany, or wine makers in Southern Europe (Portugal).230 Those distilleries are 
more likely to work on an occasional basis, e.g. after fruit harvesting or grape pressing. 
They can sell their products, but their market is very local.  
 
Having such rationale in mind, a straightforward comparison of the threshold for small 
distillers with that for brewers would be a comparison of provisions with different 
objectives; as such, it may be appropriate that these provisions cause different impacts 
in the market. However, it is also possible that the provisions for small distilleries suffer 
for poor regulatory design, i.e. that the level of the threshold is too low to be fit for 
purpose. Noteworthy, in the OPC, most of the producers in the ethyl alcohol industry 
expressed a negative opinion on the current threshold, but while a quarter considered it, 
expectedly, too low, more than half of them considered it too high – probably expressing 
a general discontent with the granting of reduced rates to small distilleries. SME in the 
ethyl alcohol sector also expressed the view that the threshold is too high. 
 
Under these circumstances, the provision has very limited impacts on the distillery 
sector. Only 7 MS have implemented it (and Slovenia only did so as of this year). 
Moreover, in some of these countries – Germany and Austria231 - other simplified 
regimes for ancillary distillers exist, which not only provide for a reduced rate, but also 
for a simpler administration. To provide an idea of how small impacts in the baseline 
scenario are, in France, which did not implement the reduction, distilleries of about 10 
hlpa of capacities are estimated to represent 0.04% of the spirit market; in Poland, 
distilleries up to 100 hlpa – 10 times the current threshold – would represent at best 
0.4% of the production. As a consequence, the impact on spirit markets is negligible,232 
the volume of products subject to reduced rates being tiny and sold only locally, usually 
‘at farm’s gate’. The very limited volume of spirits concerned make any change in per 
capita alcohol consumption or foregone revenue immaterial. Any cross-border dimension 
is lacking, given that hardly any distillery of this size could find entering a foreign market 
profitable. Administrative burdens or enforcement costs that can be linked to this 
provision are also minimal, considering that the regime would not cost companies more 
than their equivalent small brewer scheme and that the costs of the latter are minimal, 
                                                          
228 Interview with health authorities.  
229 Assuming a spirit at 40% vol, the threshold for small distillers, expressed in hl of products, amounts to 25 
hl. 
230 Ibid.  
231 See Section 2.3.1 above. 
232 As stated in the COM(2016) 676 Final, at p. 12. 
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and considering that customs authorities would not deploy significant resources on 
ancillary activities, where the tax risk is negligible. These findings were confirmed by 
stakeholders both in MS where the reduced rates were introduced and, from a 
counterfactual perspective, in MS where this is not the case. 
 
 
2.3.2.3  Treatment of small producers of other alcoholic beverages 
 
The Directive does not allow MS to grant a reduced rate to small producers of beverages 
other than beer and ethyl alcohol. This different treatment may result in a distortion of 
competition between different beverages. However, focusing only on the possibility to 
access reduce rates as the force determining competitive conditions would represent a too 
narrow problem definition.  
 
First, the strength of the competition across alcoholic beverages, or in other words 
whether they fall in the same relevant market, should be considered. When considering 
the established practice in EU competition cases, markets for alcoholic beverages are 
largely defined along product lines, so that beer,233 wine,234 other fermented beverages, or 
spirits235 belong to different relevant markets.236 In the economic analysis, cross-price 
elasticities for alcoholic drinks, measuring the consequences on the consumption of 
beverage A when the price of beverage B changes, are considered mostly non-significant 
or very small.237 As such, the different treatment granted to small brewers and distillers 
might not represent a competitive distortion, because of the very limited degree of inter-
market competition.  
 
Also, reduced rates are only one of the elements determining the competitive conditions 
for small producers of different alcoholic beverages. At least two other regulatory drivers 
need to be taken into account: 
 
1. Minimum and actual duty rates. While small producers of wine and other 
fermented beverages may not be granted reduced rates, they are subject to a zero 
rate in a number of MS. Where the excise duty is zero (or very low as in France), 
reduced rates would not be a policy lever to promote their competitiveness; to the 
contrary, most of stakeholders and part of the public authorities interviewed 
perceive that the introduction of reduced rates for small producers risks leading to 
the subsequent removal of the zero rate for wine. More in detail:  
 
a) still wine is subject to a zero rate in 14 MS, representing respectively 72%238 of 
the production and 58%239 of the consumption. Furthermore, in France, the 
excise duty on wine is positive, but very low, at 3.77 €/hl;240 including France, 
the 15 MS with a zero or near-zero rate represent 98% of production and 78% 
of consumption.  
                                                          
233 For beer, the market could be further segmented into on-trade and off-trade, and possibly, along types of 
beer. See European Commission (DG COMP), ‘Case M.7887 – AB Inbev / SAB Miller’, May 2016. 
234 For wines, the market usually includes still wine, sparkling wine, wine aperitifs, and fortified wine. The 
market for still wine can be further segmented based on the colour and on denominations, but the Commission 
practice is not established in this area. See European Commission (DG COMP). ‘Case No Comp/M.5114 – 
Pernod Ricard / V & S’, 2008. 
235 For spirits, the markets are defined as ‘no wider than those for each of the internationally recognised main 
spirits types (whiskey, gin, vodka, rum, etc.) and for each liqueur. See European Commission (DG COMP), 
‘Case No Comp/M.2269 – Pernod Ricard / Diageo / Seagram Spirits’, May 2001, at §14. 
236 See European Commission (DG COMP), ‘Case M.7887 – AB Inbev / SAB Miller’, May 2016. 
237 See HM Revenue and Customs, ‘Estimation of price elasticities of demand for alcohol in the United 
Kingdom’; HMRC Working Paper 16, 2014. 
238 European Commission (DG AGRI), ‘2016-2017 Harvest Forecast’, 2016. 
239 IWSR Data. 
240 As a comparison, the unweighted average of the positive excise duty rates in the EU is 139.81 €/hl. 
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b) Sparkling wine is subject to a zero rate in 8 MS, representing respectively 41% 
of the production241 and 31% of the consumption.242 Considering France, zero 
and near-zero rate MS represent 69% of the production and 49% of the 
consumption. 
c) Still or sparkling cider and perry are subject to a zero rate in 9 MS, representing 
9% of the consumption. Considering still cider and perry only, it is subject to a 
zero rate in 13 MS, representing 14% of consumption.243 
 
2. Access to simplified regime. Small wine producers – and consequently 
producers of other fermented beverages244 – may be exempted from the duty to 
set up a tax warehouse and from most of the requirements concerning holding and 
movements of excisable goods.245 These requirements generate significant costs for 
small producers. For example, in the UK, the cost of setting up a tax warehouse for 
small cider makers have been estimated at about EUR 2,300 by economic 
operators. When discussing with an Italian producer about the costs that he was 
about to incur because of exceeding the output threshold of 1,000 hl, he estimated 
that the setting up of a tax warehouse generated one-off expenses for about EUR 
5,000, the bulk of it linked to the calibration of his production equipment, on top of 
recurring annual costs linked to recordkeeping (which he was unable to estimate, 
as they did not yet materialise).  
 
However, even though inter-market competition is not at risk, intra-market effects may be 
at play. In particular, MS have limited power to correct potential market imbalances in 
wine, other fermented beverage, or intermediate product markets,246 be they the 
diseconomies of scale or market access barriers, or the protection of traditional 
productions. This limitation in MS flexibility could be a case of poor regulatory design. As a 
consequence, the Council has invited the Commission to investigate the impact of 
extending the rules to small producers of other beverages.247 
 
 
2.3.2.4  Dynamic baseline scenario 
 
With respect to the impacts of reduced rates for small brewers, in most of the countries 
analysed in-depth the number of microbreweries is growing at a very fast pace. Even 
though the rate of growth is likely to diminish in the future as the market achieves a 
higher level of maturity, there is no indication at this stage that the phenomenon is 
halting.248 As a consequence, the market share of small brewers could increase, but, so 
far, the growth in the number of players was not matched by a parallel increase in their 
market share, nor in the overall size of the beer market. As such, there is a limited 
expectation that market effects (i.e. competitive distortions), costs to the public budget, or 
negative health impacts would become more prominent in the future. On the other hand, 
administrative burdens and enforcement costs are more likely to increase linearly or quasi-
linearly as the number of players increases, but they would probably be as limited as in 
the baseline situation, in both absolute and relative terms. At the same time, as the sector 
of small brewers achieves maturity and some players grow in size, it is likely that (i) cross-
border trade flow augments, so that the not always smooth functioning of the scheme in 
MS other than that of establishment becomes a more significant problem; and (ii) the 
                                                          
241 International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV), ‘OIV’s Focus – The sparkling wine market’, 2014.  
242 IWSR Data. 
243 AICV, ‘European Cider Trends 2016 – Update’, 2015 (national association for PL).  
244 Based on Article 15 of the Directive. 
245 Based on Article 40 of the Horizontal Directive. See Section 2.3.1 above. 
246 IIA, at p.5. 
247 Council Conclusions (2016), at §8.  
248 British Beer & Pub Association, ‘Small Brewer Relief and the impact on future market structure – Discussion 
paper’, 2016. 
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
131 
 
commercial relationships become more complex, and more forms of cooperation could be 
part of the grey areas identified above. 
 
With respect to the other two sub-problems discussed above, the situation is not likely to 
change in the near future. The uptake of the provision for small distilleries across MS is not 
expected to increase, according to the tax authorities interviewed, and only in the UK and 
Belgium – out of the 6 countries visited – there seem to be an upward trend in the very 
small distillery market. The number of operators concerned by the provision is thus 
unlikely to grow significantly. With respect to small producers of other alcoholic beverages, 
the current imbalances within the markets will remain unaffected should no change to the 
current situation be introduced. 
 
 
 SUMMARY OF PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
Problem drivers Adverse effects Expected evolution 
Issues with the 
application of reduced 
rates to small brewers 
• Lack of clarity concerning the 
application of the reduction to certain 
forms of cooperation between small 
brewers may create legal uncertainty 
and litigation costs 
• Application of the reduction to 
operators located in other MS is 
hampered in a limited number of 
cases because of administrative 
requirements 
• The growth in the micro and small 
brewery segment is likely to increase 
the complexity of the market and the 
weight of cross-border trade, so that 
the magnitude of the problem is likely 
to increase (albeit from a small level) 
Issues with the 
application of reduced 
rates to small 
distilleries 
• Though the threshold is appropriate 
for ancillary producers, the limited 
take up of the provision may be due 
to the fact that the maximum output 
is hardly fit for operators at a 
commercial scale 
• No additional MS likely to opt in to the 
provision; the number of commercial 
operators falling below the threshold 
will remain marginal 
Uneven treatment of 
small producers of 
other alcoholic 
beverages 
• The Directive provisions prevent MS 
from correcting potential market 
imbalances 
• Market imbalances would remain 
unaddressed, but stable 
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2.4 Reduced rates for low-strength alcohol 
 
Articles 5, 9, 13, 18, and 22 of the Directive allow MS to apply reduced rates on low-
strength alcoholic beverages for all categories of products, i.e. beer, wine, other 
fermented beverages (OFB), intermediate products, and ethyl alcohol. This Section first 
provides a baseline assessment detailing, for each category of product: i) the EU and 
national definitions of low-strength alcoholic beverages; ii) the market features of low-
strength alcohol; iii) the national structure and level of excise duty; and iv) the current 
tax impact of reduced rates on low-strength alcoholic beverages at MS level. Then, we 
discuss the main problems stemming from the current EU legal framework and its 
national implementation, with a view to identify issues for revision of the current policy 
framework. Country level analysis focuses on six MS covered via fieldwork, i.e. Belgium, 
Finland, Italy, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom (UK). 
 
 
2.4.1 Baseline assessment 
 
The analysis of low-strength alcohol have to be conducted at the level of the five product 
categories defined in the Directive since, as shown below, major differences exist when it 
comes to product definition, alcohol content thresholds, market features, excise duty, 
tax revenues, etc. Before moving to the analysis by category of product, however, it is 
worth providing some background information, which is relevant to all categories: 
 
 For each category, the Directive defines the thresholds in terms of actual alcoholic 
strength by volume under which MS may apply reduced rates: 2.8% vol for beer; 
8.5% vol for wine and OFB; 15% vol for intermediate products; and 10% vol for 
ethyl alcohol. 
 In all product categories, beverages with an alcohol content not exceeding 1.2% 
vol are considered as ‘alcohol-free’ by the Directive; therefore, they are not 
subject to excise duty. The only exception is represented by beer, where the 
Directive sets a lower threshold (0.5% vol) to apply the definition of ‘alcohol-free’ 
product. 
 Depending on the category of products, excise duty (and hence reduced rates) is 
either applied as: i) per hectolitre of product (wine, OFB and intermediate 
products); or ii) per hectolitre / ABV (ethyl alcohol and beer in some MS), or per 
hectolitre / Plato degree (beer, in some MS). This difference implies that excise 
duty on beer and ethyl alcohol is somehow proportional to their actual alcoholic 
strength, whereas the excise duty on wine, OFB, and intermediate products is 
proportional to the overall volume (in litres) of product, irrespectively of its 
alcoholic strength.  
 Directive 92/84/EEC establishes positive, minimum excise duty for beer, 
intermediate products and ethyl alcohol. Conversely, there is no positive 
minimum excise duty for wine and OFB. Consequently, wine and OFB in several 
MS are exempted from excise duty, irrespective of their alcohol content (but 
below the thresholds established in Directive 92/83/EEC).  
 Reduced rates for low-strength beer, wine, OFB, and ethyl alcohol can be below 
the minimum rates of Directive 92/84/EEC. It is not entirely clear, if reduced 
rates can be even set at zero or needs to be positive. By contrast, the Directive 
specifies that the reduced rate for intermediate products shall be neither less 
than 40% of the standard national rate, nor lower than the standard national rate 
on still wine and other still fermented beverages.249  
 Finally, the Directive enables MS to apply different reduced rates to different 
alcoholic strength ‘brackets’ (below the maximum threshold) for beer, wine, OFB, 
                                                          
249 Different thresholds apply to some specific Intermediate Products such as those covered by Regulation 
4252/88 or sparkling intermediate products. 
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and ethyl alcohol. In this respect, bearing in mind that the minimum excise duty 
on wine and OFB is set at zero by Directive 92/84/EEC, for these two categories 
MS have enough flexibility to introduce different rates for different segments both 
below and above the 8.5% vol threshold, without any constraint on the level of 
such rates. By contrast, only a single reduced rate can be applied to intermediate 
products below 15% vol. 
 
 
2.4.1.1  Beer 
 
 DEFINITION OF LOW-STRENGTH BEER  
 
Beer is not defined in the EU legislation and national definitions vary across MS. In the 
same vein, the definition of low-strength beer varies between MS. For instance, while for 
tax purposes some MS, such as Finland, define low-strength beer as any beer with an 
actual alcoholic strength by volume between 0.6% vol and 2.8 % vol,250 in the UK beer 
qualifies as low-strength if its actual alcoholic strength by volume ranges between 1.3 % 
vol and 2.8% vol.251  
 
Also in those countries where reduced rates are not applied to low-strength beer, 
diverging definitions of such product exist. By way of example, in Belgium beer is 
considered as low-strength if its actual alcoholic strength by volume is between 0.6% vol 
and 1.2% vol.252 By contrast, in Italy, whereas low-strength beer has alcohol content 
between 1.2% vol and 3.5% vol, beer below 1.2% vol is considered as alcohol-free.253 
 
 MARKET FOR LOW-STRENGTH BEER  
 
Based on IWSR data and definitions, in 2015 the market for low-strength and alcohol-
free beer represented about 4% of the beer market’s total value in Europe; this estimate 
comprises also alcohol-free beer (below 0.5% vol), which is outside of the scope of the 
Directive.254 Focusing on EU consumption of low-strength beer (containing between 
0.6% vol and 2.8% vol), the IWSR database points at a share of some 1.4% of total 
beer consumption in 2015 (Figure 9).255 This number grew by 70% since 2010, when 
low-strength beer had a market share of about 0.8% at the EU level (Figure 9). Results 
from the OPC conducted on the topic confirm this increasing trend. Indeed, about 60% 
of participants who responded to this question believe that the consumption of low-
strength beer is increasing moderately and about 15% believe that the consumption of 
low-strength beer is increasing significantly.  
 
In all MS covered by the fieldwork, the market for low-strength beer grew between 2010 
and 2015. More specifically, in Italy and the UK there was basically no market for low-
strength beer in 2010, while in 2015 the market share was above 1% and 0.5% 
respectively. In Belgium, the market grew by five times, in Romania by a factor of 13, 
albeit from a very small base. Interestingly, although market shares for low-alcohol beer 
have been increasing since 2010, they remain marginal in all selected MS. 
 
                                                          
250 See Excise Duty Tables (2017). 
251 For further details, see HMRC (2017), Alcohol Duty Rates from 13 March 2017, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rates-and-allowance-excise-duty-alcohol-duty/alcohol-duty-
rates-from-24-march-2014#beer (last accessed on 21 June 2017).  
252 For further details, see 31 Mars 1993 - Arrêté royal concernant la bière (MB 1993 06 04).  
253 For further details, see Legge 16 agosto 1962, n.1354 and following amendments.  
254 The estimate includes two beer categories identified by IWSR: i) ‘low-alcohol beer’; and ii) ‘radler’. 
255 The estimate includes only the ‘radler’ category as defined by IWSR. In fact, the ‘low-alcohol’ category 
appears to cover mostly alcohol-free beer. This conclusion is based on the identification of the alcohol content 
of a sample of 13 products comprised in the ‘low-alcohol’ category and 14 products comprised in the ‘radler’ 
category in five MS: Belgium, Italy, Poland, Romania and the UK. 
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Figure 9 – Market share for low-strength beer (>0.5% and <=2.8% vol) out of total 
market for beer (volume) in selected MS 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR database and Panimoliitto statistics (for Finland). 
 
Beer producers interviewed for this Study have stressed that several factors may explain 
the limited market share for low-strength beer in all MS: i) in many national markets 
low-strength beer (both radler and low-strength standard beer) is a rather innovative 
product, which has still to gain market confidence compared to standard beer; ii) 
producing low-strength beer costs more than producing standard beer, therefore only 
(certain) large beer producers can absorb the greater production costs, (and the product 
is usually sold at a premium price); and iii) low strength beer may taste differently and, 
reportedly, might not appeal standard beer consumers, while at the same time 
consumers highly sensitive to health and well-being might still prefer alcohol-free 
beer.256 
 
 REDUCED RATE ON LOW-STRENGTH BEER AND ESTIMATED TAX IMPACT  
 
Among the six MS covered via fieldwork, only Finland and the UK introduced reduced 
rates for low-strength beer (Table 35). Finland applies reduced rates to beer with an 
actual alcoholic strength by volume comprised between 0.6% vol and 2.8% vol; the 
reduced rate is about one-quarter of the standard rate. The UK applies reduced rate for 
beer with an actual alcoholic strength by volume comprised between 1.3% vol and 2.8% 
vol;257 the reduced rate is about half the standard rate. 
 
Table 35 – Excise duty and reduced rates for low-strength beer in selected MS (as of 
January 2017) 
MS Standard rate Reduced rate 
Belgium €2.00/hl/° Plato n/a 
Finland €32.05/hl/% vol 
€8.00/hl/% vol  
(between 0.6% vol and 2.8% vol) 
Italy €3.02/hl/° Plato n/a 
Poland €1.81/hl/° Plato n/a 
Romania €0.74/hl/° Plato n/a 
                                                          
256 In Italy and Poland, large producers are in the process of launching low-strength standard beer with alcohol 
content at around 3.5% vol, which is expected to be more appealing for wellness-oriented consumers in search 
for low-alcohol, low-calories alcoholic beverages. 
257 In the UK whereas beer below 1.3% vol is exempted from excise duty, beer above 7.5% vol is subject to a 
rate higher than the standard. 
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MS Standard rate Reduced rate 
UK 
€18.37/hl/% vol  
(between 2.9% vol and 7.5% vol) 
 
€23.85/hl/% vol  
(above 7.5% vol) 
€9.28/hl/% vol  
(between 1.3% vol and 2.8% vol) 
Source: Excise Duty Tables (2017). 
 
In the UK, a reduced rate on low-strength beer was first introduced in the second half of 
2011. National beer producers argued that foregone tax revenues linked to reduced 
rates are very small; this is confirmed by available evidence. By focusing on 2015 figures 
by HRMC, which are largely aligned with IWSR data, the foregone tax revenues (excise 
duty) linked to reduced rates on low-strength beer were in the region of EUR 6.6 million, 
i.e. less than 0.2% of the total tax revenues from excise duty on beer in the UK. Two 
estimates of foregone revenues were constructed. First, a lower bound estimate 
assuming low-strength beer sold contained 1.3% vol. Then, an upper bound estimate 
assuming low-strength beer sold contained 2.8% vol. A point estimate was finally 
computed as the simple average of these two scenarios. Such analysis most likely 
overestimates foregone revenues, if one considers that any increase in rates on low-
strength beer might reduce this market also in favour of alcohol-free products, which are 
not subject to excise duty. 
 
In a similar fashion, foregone tax revenues in Finland appear to be quite limited, i.e. in 
the region of 0.4% of total tax revenues from excise duty on beer in 2015 (including VAT 
on excise duty). This share is slightly bigger than the one estimated for the UK for two 
main reasons: i) the difference between the standard rate and reduced rate is larger in 
Finland; ii) the definition of alcohol-free beer is stricter in Finland (alcohol content lower 
than 0.6% vol) than in the UK (alcohol content lower than 1.3% vol). At any rate, 
Finnish authorities confirmed that forgone revenues linked to reduced rates are very 
limited and almost negligible when accounting for the share of consumers that would go 
for alcohol-free options in the absence of reduced rates. It is worth stressing that Finland 
currently applies the highest excise duty to beer in the EU. 
 
 
2.4.1.2  Wine 
 
 DEFINITION OF LOW-STRENGTH WINE 
 
Article 9.2 of the Directive enables MS to apply reduced rates to both still and sparkling 
wine with an actual alcoholic strength by volume not exceeding 8.5% vol. It is worth 
underlining that this threshold is not aligned with the EU and international definition of 
(standard) wine. According to the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV), the 
actual alcoholic strength by volume of wine should not be below 8.5% vol.258 In a similar 
fashion, Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013259 establishes a minimum actual alcoholic 
strength by volume of 8.5% vol for both still260 and sparkling wine261.  
                                                          
258 For further details see OIV, ‘International Standards for the Labelling of Wines’, 2015; special legislation at 
the regional level can reduce this minimum actual alcoholic strength by volume to 7% vol, depending on 
‘climatic conditions, soil or grape variety, special qualitative factors or individual traditions specific to certain 
vineyards’. 
259 See Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations 
(EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (hereinafter: ‘Regulation 
1308/2013’); the minimum alcohol strength is 9% vol, if wine is derived from grapes harvested in some 
specific wine-growing zones. 
260 Wine with a protected designation of origin or a protected geographical indication may have an actual 
strength of not less than 4.5%. Reportedly, this type of wine represents a niche product.  
261 Some special sparkling wine such as ‘quality aromatic sparkling wine’ may have minimum alcohol strength 
of 6% vol; in the same vein, some ‘semi-sparkling wine’ and ‘aerated semi-sparkling wine’ may have an actual 
alcoholic strength by volume of not less than 7% vol These also appear to be niche products. 
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When it comes to tax purposes, Finland and the UK apply different rates to different 
brackets of alcohol content. In Finland, low-strength wine has an alcohol content not-
exceeding 8.0% vol; in the UK, low-strength still wine must have less than 5.6% vol.262 
Belgium applies one single reduced rate on wine below 8.5% vol. 
 
 MARKET FOR LOW-STRENGTH WINE 
 
As mentioned, wine must have actual alcoholic strength by volume above 8.5 % vol, 
with few exceptions (e.g. PDO/PGI wines such as Moscato d’Asti)263 that are niche 
products. In this context, the 8.5% vol threshold appears to be relevant only to some 
special wine and products derived from wine;264 ‘wine-based’ drinks, however, are not 
necessarily classified as ‘wine’ for tax purposes.265 Consequently, the market share for 
low-strength wine (below 8.5% vol) is limited in all MS. 
 
The IWSR database allows identifying the following types of wine/wine-based drinks that 
most likely include some products below 8.5% vol: i) fruit-flavoured still wine; ii) Asti, 
Lambrusco and fruit-flavoured sparkling wine; iii) sangria, gluehwein, and possibly other 
aromatised wine products.266 By allotting a share of total consumption of these products 
to the low-strength segment,267 it is possible to provide a rough estimate of the market 
share for low-strength wine in selected MS and in the EU as a whole (Figure 10). Low-
strength wine would represent about 1.2% of the overall market for wine at the EU level. 
A growing trend was registered between 2010 and 2015 in all surveyed MS.268 In Italy, 
the market share was about 2% in 2015; this was mainly due to some consumption of 
low-strength Lambrusco, which is less common in other MS.  
                                                          
262 See Excise Duty Tables (2017). 
263 Moscato D’Asti has an actual alcohol content between 4.5% vol and 6.5% vol. 
264 Below 8.5% the following categories of special wines and products derived from wines can be identified: i) 
sweet wines with residual sugar derived from grapes (alcohol content not lower than 4.5%); ii) ‘icewine' 
(alcohol content not lower than 5.5%); iii) wine-based beverages (alcohol content not lower 4.5% for wine-
based drinks and 1.2% for wine-based cocktails; Regulation 251/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of 
geographical indications of aromatised wine products and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1601/91, OJ L 
84, 20.3.2014, p. 14–34); iv) beverages obtained by dealcoholisation of wine (alcohol content below 0.5%); v) 
beverages obtained by partial dealcoholisation of wine (alcohol content not lower than 0.5% and below 
thresholds for wine and special wine). For further details, see OIV, ‘Definition of the vitivinicultural products by 
code sheet’, 2016, available at: http://www.oiv.int/public/medias/3996/products-definition-en.pdf (last 
accessed on 4 July 2017). 
265 Reportedly, for tax purposes, aromatised wine-based drinks and wine-product cocktails below 7% vol are 
classified as either OFB or intermediate products. They are included in the wine category only if they are above 
7% vol and without addition of alcohol. 
266 Sangria and gluehwein are aromatised wine-based drinks, which can be classified in the ‘wine’ category 
when above 7% vol. 
267 The alcohol content of Asti sparkling wine generally varies between 6% vol and 9.5% vol; therefore, under 
the assumption of a homogenous distribution across alcohol strength segments, it is estimated that about 70% 
of the consumption fall within the low-strength segment. In the same vein, Lambrusco’s alcohol content usually 
varies between 7.5% vol and 12% vol; hence, some 20% of the consumption can be allotted to the low-
strength segment. As for flavoured sparkling wines and fruit flavoured wines, it is more difficult to establish an 
exact range for alcohol content due to the large variety of products covered; at any rate, most of the products 
sold online range between 7.5% vol and 9.5% vol and it is reasonable to assume that 50% of such products 
can be considered low-strength wine. Finally, all products included in the sangria and gluehwein segment are 
assumed not to exceed 8.5% vol; this assumption could lead to an upper bound estimate of the market share 
for low-strength wine. 
268 Although around two-third of participants in the OPC who responded to this question reported that, to their 
knowledge, consumption of low-strength wine is stable.  
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Figure 10 – Market share for low-strength wine (<8.5% vol) out of total market for wine 
(volume) in selected MS 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR database. 
 
 REDUCED RATE ON LOW-STRENGTH WINE AND ESTIMATED TAX IMPACT  
 
Among the six MS covered via fieldwork, Belgium, Finland and the UK apply reduced 
rates to low-strength wine (Table 36). It goes without saying that MS applying a zero 
rate to wine (such as Italy and Romania for still wine) did not opt for reduced rates. 
 
Table 36 – Excise duty and reduced rates for low-strength wine in selected MS (as of 
January 2017) 
MS 
Standard rates 
(still wine) 
Standard rates 
(sparkling wine) 
Reduced rates 
Belgium €74.91/hl €256.32/hl€ €23.91/hl (between 1.3% vol and 8.5% vol) 
Finland €339.00/hl €339.00/hl 
€22.00/hl (between 1.3% vol and 2.8% vol) 
€169.00/hl (between 2.9% vol and 5.5% vol) 
€241.00/hl (between 5.6% vol and 8.0% vol) 
Italy €0/hl €0/hl n/a 
Poland €36.80/hl €36.80/hl n/a 
Romania €0/hl €10.65/hl n/a 
UK €318.19/hl €407.56/hl 
€98.03/hl (still wine between 1.3% vol and 4.0% vol) 
€134.82/hl (still wine between 4.1% vol and 5.5% 
vol) 
€308.06/hl (sparkling wine between 5.6% vol and 
8.5% vol) 
Source: Excise Duty Tables (2017). 
 
In surveyed MS applying reduced rates on low-strength wine, the foregone tax revenues 
linked to the reduction represent a marginal share of the maximum tax revenues from 
excise duty on wine in 2015.269 More specifically, foregone revenues are: i) less than 
0.2% of total revenues in Belgium, where the reduction is significant (reduced rate is 
one-third of the standard rate on still wine and one-tenth of the reduced rate on 
sparkling wine) and applies to all wine not exceeding 8.5% vol; ii) about 0.3% in 
Finland, where the reduction applies to wine not exceeding 8.0% vol and consumption of 
low-strength wine is above 1% of total consumption; iii) less than 0.1% in the UK, 
where the reduction basically applies only to sparkling wine up to 8.5% vol, as the 
consumption of still wine with alcohol content up to 5.6% vol is most likely negligible. 
 
 
                                                          
269 As the Excise Duty Tables (Tax Receipts) provide aggregate tax revenues for both wine and OFB in most 
MS, the Consultants estimated the maximum revenues from excise duty on wine by applying the standard rate 
for still/sparkling wine to the entire national consumption of still/sparkling wine (IWSR data).  
0,00%
0,50%
1,00%
1,50%
2,00%
2,50%
BE FI IT PL RO UK EU
2010 2015
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
138 
 
2.4.1.3  Other Fermented Beverages  
 
 DEFINITION OF LOW-STRENGTH OFB 
 
Traditional OFB mainly include cider, perry, mead, and fruit wines. Most of cider and 
perry have an alcohol content between 1.2% and 8.5% vol. Fruit wines instead can 
range from 6% vol to 14% vol.270 These products are not defined by Union law. 
According to the Code of Practice drafted by AICV271: i) cider and perry contain alcohol 
within the range of 1.2% vol to 8.5% vol and should maintain the character of 
fermented apple/pear juice;272 ii) fruit wine instead has an alcohol content above 1.2% 
vol, with no upper limit; iii) low-alcohol cider, perry and fruit wine contain more than 
0.5% vol and less than 1.2% vol; iv) alcohol-free cider, perry and fruit wine contain less 
than 0.5% vol. Cider, perry and fruit wine may be carbonated by fermentation or by 
injection of carbon dioxide or uncarbonated.  
 
National definitions of such beverages vary across MS. For instance, in Belgium and Italy 
there is no specific definition besides the one provided by the Directive for tax purposes. 
In Finland, cider and perry are produced by fermentation from apples or pears and have 
an alcohol content comprised between 2.8% vol and 8.5% vol.273 In the UK, cider is 
defined as ‘cider or perry of a strength exceeding 1.2% alcohol by volume (ABV) but less 
than 8.5% ABV obtained from the fermentation of apple or pear juice without the 
addition at any time of any alcoholic liquor or of any liquor or substance which 
communicates colour or flavour other than such as the Commissioners may allow as 
appearing to them to be necessary to make cider or perry’.274 In Poland, cider and perry 
have an actual alcoholic strength by volume between 1.2% vol and 8.5% vol; by 
contrast, fruit wine contains alcohol for no less than 8.5% vol, whereas low-alcohol fruit 
wine has an alcohol content between 0.5% vol and 8.5% vol.275 
 
Fragmentation is apparent also when looking at MS applying reduced rates. Belgium, for 
tax purposes, relies on the definition spelled out in the Directive; hence, low-strength 
OFB contain no more than 8.5% vol. In Finland, reduced rates are applied to a menu of 
brackets, with the upper threshold equal to 8.0% vol. In Poland, cider and perry with 
alcohol content of no more than 5.0% vol benefit from a reduced excise duty. In the UK, 
low-strength OFB do not exceed 8.5% vol; yet, when it comes to reduced rates there are 
different brackets for still cider and perry, sparkling cider and perry and still/sparkling 
OFB other than cider and perry. 
 
 MARKET FOR LOW-STRENGTH OFB 
 
As previously mentioned, based on product definitions, most of the market for OFB does 
not exceed 8.5% vol.276 Interviews with cider, perry and fruit wine producers in different 
MS confirmed this situation. Consumption of OFB appears to be concentrated in few MS. 
                                                          
270 This includes also fortified fruit wine. Jarvis B., ‘Cider, perry, fruit wines and other alcoholic fruit beverages’ 
in Fruit Processing edited by Arthey D. and Ashurst P.R. 
271 AICV, ‘Code of Practice’, 2015. 
272 An exception is represented by ‘cidre de glace’, a beverage made from the fermentation of frozen 
apples/pears with an alcohol content above 7% vol. In addition, in countries where there is no tradition for 
cider/perry, it is common to use the term ‘apple wine’ and ‘peer wine’ for a high gravity apple cider base and 
peer cider base with an alcohol content between 9% vol and 12% vol, which is usually used as a primary 
ingredient in the production of cider and perry.   
273 See ‘Alcohol Act 1143/1994’, ‘Alcohol Beverage Decree 1344/1994’, ‘Excise Act 182/2010’, ‘Alcohol Tax Act 
1471/1994’ as referred to in the Code of Practice AICV. 
274 See ‘Alcoholic Liquor Duties Act 1979’, paragraph 5.5, Section 25.  
275 See ‘Dz.U. 2011 no 120 poz. 690, Ustawa z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. o wyrobie i rozlewie wyrobów winiarskich, 
obrocie tymi wyrobami i organizacji rynku win’. 
276 It is worth mentioning that, in some MS, the category OFB may also include aromatised fortified wine-based 
drinks and cocktails with an ABV lower than 7% vol, as well as with an ABV comprised between 7% and 10% 
vol, where addition of alcohol is authorised. 
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Focusing on surveyed MS, IWSR data suggest that in 2015 cider, perry and fruit wine 
were responsible for less than 0.5% of the total volume of alcoholic beverages consumed 
in Belgium, Italy, Poland and Romania. By contrast, this share reaches almost 5.5% in 
Finland and 12% in the UK. In 2015, the UK market for cider, perry and fruit wine 
represented more than half of the entire EU market. The overall European market for 
cider, perry and fruit wine recorded a moderate growth between 2010 and 2015; such 
result is in line with responses to the OPC (46% of participants who responded to this 
question argued that the market is stable, about 40% that it is moderately growing). 
 
Figure 11 – Market share for cider, perry and fruit wine out of total market for alcoholic 
beverages (volume) in selected MS 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR database. 
Note: Data for Romania refers only to 2016, as data for previous years are not available. 
 
With regard to fruit wine, the alcohol content tends to be higher (usually above 5.5%) 
than cider and perry, but still below 8.5% vol, with the exception of fortified fruit wine 
that generally has an alcohol content above 8.5% vol. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning that, based on IWSR data, while in 2015 the market for fortified fruit wine 
was about 30% of the total market for fruit wine (in volume), the latter was less than 
1% of the total market for cider, perry and fruit wine. In the same vein, the actual 
alcoholic strength by volume of mead may vary by producer and may exceed 8.5% vol; 
nonetheless, this appears to be a niche product and consumption statistics are not 
currently available. Against this background, in what follows the analysis will focus only 
on cider and perry.  
 
 REDUCED RATE ON LOW-STRENGTH OFB AND ESTIMATED TAX IMPACT  
 
Belgium and Finland apply reduced rates to low-strength OFB (Table 37); these are the 
same reduced rates applied to wine (see Table 36 above). The UK allows for reduction 
on excise duty on consumption of still and sparkling cider and perry. Poland applies two 
different standard rates: one to cider and perry not exceeding 5.0% vol, and another 
rate to OFB. In the same vein, Romania applies a zero rate to still cider, perry and mead 
as well as to sparkling cider and perry; a positive rate is applied to OFB. Finally, Italy 
applies zero excise duty on all OFB (in the same way as for wine).  
 
Table 37 –Excise duty and reduced rates for low-strength OFB in selected MS (as of 
January 2017) 
MS 
Standard rates 
(still OFB) 
Standard rates 
(sparkling OFB) 
Reduced rates 
Belgium €74.91/hl €256.32/hl€ €23.91/hl (between 1.3% vol and 8.5% vol) 
Finland €339.00/hl €339.00/hl 
€22.00/hl (between 1.3% vol and 2.8% vol) 
€169.00/hl (between 2.9% vol and 5.5% vol) 
€241.00/hl (between 5.6% vol and 8.0% vol) 
Italy €0/hl €0/hl n/a 
Poland €36.80hl €36.80/hl 
€22.59/hl (cider and perry between 1.3% vol 
and 5.0% vol) 
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
8,0%
10,0%
12,0%
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Romania 
€89.17/hl 
€0/hl (still cider, perry 
and mead) 
€10.65/hl 
€0/hl (sparkling cider 
and perry) 
n/a 
UK - - 
€44.52/hl (still cider and perry between 
1.3% vol and 7.5% vol) 
€67.28/hl (still cider and perry between 
7.6% vol and 8.5% vol) 
€44.52/hl (sparkling cider and perry between 
1.3% vol and 5.5% vol) 
€308.0579/hl (sparkling cider and perry 
between 5.6% vol and 8.5% vol) 
Source: Excise Duty Tables (2017). 
 
To estimate the foregone tax revenues generated by the current reduced rates, the 
following assumptions are required to cope with missing data. First, it is assumed that 
consumption of cider and perry is equally distributed between the ‘still’ and the 
‘sparkling’ segments. Second, the distribution of consumption by alcohol content 
available for the UK is considered relevant also to Belgium, Finland and Poland. Against 
this background, it is estimated that reduced rates currently generate foregone tax 
revenues (excise duty) as a share of the maximum tax revenues on cider and perry277 in 
the region of 30% in Poland, 45% in Finland, 80% in the UK and 85% in Belgium. 
Considering the limited size of the market for cider and perry vis-à-vis total market for 
alcoholic beverages, foregone tax revenues are less than 0.5% of total revenues from 
excise duty on alcohol in Belgium and Poland, about 3% in Finland and some 18% in the 
UK (the largest EU market for cider and perry).  
 
Finally, it is worth reiterating that almost the entire market for cider and perry is below 
8.5% vol and that the application of standard rates to all quantity consumed would lead 
to a substantial increase in the average price in most MS (from +5% in Poland to +90% 
in the UK)278, thus reducing consumption. Therefore, the analysis above most likely 
overestimates foregone revenues, if one considers that the decrease in consumption 
would reduce the revenues generated by excise duty on cider and perry. 
 
 
2.4.1.4 Intermediate products 
 
 DEFINITION OF LOW-STRENGTH INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS 
 
Article 17(1) of the Directive defines ‘Intermediate Products’ as all those products falling 
within CN codes 2204, 2205, and 2206 with an actual alcoholic strength by volume 
comprised between 1.2% vol and 22% vol, not covered by Articles 2, 8 and 12 of the 
Directive. Furthermore, the term ‘Intermediate Products’ may comprise any OFB279 with 
an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 5.5% vol and 8.5% vol for still and 
sparkling beverages respectively, which are not entirely of fermented origin (optional 
provision). Therefore, this appears to be a residual and variegated category. Examples of 
intermediate products include some aromatised and fortified wines (e.g. vermouth, 
Sherry, and Port wine). MS can only apply a single reduced duty rate to intermediate 
products with an alcoholic content not exceeding 15% vol. Among surveyed MS, this 
specific threshold has been adopted in all countries opting for reduced excise duty on 
intermediate products, i.e. Belgium, Finland and the UK. 
 
                                                          
277 As the Excise Duty Tables (Tax Receipts) provide aggregate tax revenues for both wine and OFB in most 
MS, the Consultants estimated the maximum revenues from excise duty on cider and perry by applying the 
standard rate for still/sparkling cider and perry to the entire national consumption of still/sparkling cider and 
perry (IWSR data).  
278 Author’s elaboration of IWSR data. 
279 As defined by Article 12 of the Directive.  
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Regulation (EU) 1308/2013280 establishes alcohol content of wine fortified for distillation, 
such as Sherry and Port wine; the actual alcoholic strength by volume of such products 
is comprised between 18% vol and 24% vol. According to Regulation (EU) No. 
251/2014,281 aromatised wine, such as vermouth, must have an actual alcoholic strength 
by volume comprised between 14.5% vol and 22% vol; yet, aromatised wine up to 15% 
vol (and up to 18% vol without enrichment) can be included in the ‘wine’ category. 
Aromatised wine-based drinks may have an actual alcoholic strength by volume between 
4.5% vol and 14.5% vol; yet, they tend to be classified as intermediate products only 
when above 10% vol and including an addition of alcohol. Finally, aromatised wine-
product cocktails may have an actual alcoholic strength by volume higher than 1.2% vol 
and lower than 10% vol; yet, they are generally classified as OFB up to 7% vol and as a 
‘wine’ when between 7% vol and 10% vol. 
 
 MARKET FOR LOW-STRENGTH INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS 
 
Identifying the size and features of the market for intermediate products is not an easy 
task, as this is a residual category comprising both traditional products and some new 
products (e.g. mixed drinks).282 Based on the IWSR database, the market for traditional 
intermediate products may include: i) fortified wine, i.e. Sherry (and Sherry-style 
beverages), Port (and Port-style beverages) and other fortified beverages (e.g. Marsala, 
Muscat, Pineau des Charentes etc.); ii) aperitifs such as vermouth, ‘americano’ etc.; and 
iii) certain aromatised wines like ginger wine and tonic wine. The vast majority of the 
abovementioned products have an alcoholic content above 15% vol. Therefore, they are 
not considered low-strength intermediate products. By contrast, certain ‘flavoured 
alcoholic beverages’ (FAB) may have an alcohol content lower than 15% vol and be 
categorised as intermediate products, depending on their alcohol base.283 Therefore, 
they may benefit from reduced rates on low-strength intermediate products. Among 
sampled countries, IWSR data show that in Finland and in the UK, consumption of FAB 
outnumbers consumption of traditional intermediate products.  
 
 REDUCED RATE ON LOW-STRENGTH INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS AND ESTIMATED TAX 
IMPACT  
 
Among the selected MS, Belgium, Finland, and the UK opted for reduced rates on low-
strength intermediate products (Table 38). More specifically, in Belgium, the reduced 
rate applies only to still intermediate products with an actual alcoholic strength by 
volume below 15% vol; in Finland and the UK, it applies to all intermediate products with 
an actual alcoholic strength by volume ranging from 1.2% vol to 15% vol.  
 
Table 38 – Excise duty and reduced rates for low-strength intermediate products in 
selected MS (as of January 2017) 
MS 
Standard rates 
(still intermediate 
products) 
Standard rates 
(sparkling 
intermediate 
products) 
Reduced rates 
Belgium €157.78/hl €256.09/hl 
€118.59/hl (still intermediate products between 
1.3% and 15% vol) 
Finland €670.00/hl €670.00/hl €411.00/hl (between 1.3% vol and 15% vol) 
Italy €88.67/hl €88.67/hl n/a 
                                                          
280 Regulation 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a 
common organisations of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 
922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671–854 
281 Regulation 251/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the definition, 
description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products 
and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1601/91, OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, p. 14–34. 
282 According to participants in the OPC who responded to this question, the market for low-strength 
intermediate product is rather stable (60% of respondents). 
283 FAB below 10% vol may be classified as OFB; FAB above 10% may be classified as ethyl alcohol. 
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MS 
Standard rates 
(still intermediate 
products) 
Standard rates 
(sparkling 
intermediate 
products) 
Reduced rates 
Poland €74.07hl €74.07/hl n/a 
Romania €89.17/hl €89.17/hl n/a 
UK €424.21/hl €424.21/hl €318.19/hl (between 1.3% vol and 15% vol) 
Source: Excise Duty Table (2017). 
 
It is estimated that reduced rates on intermediate products currently generate foregone 
tax revenues ranging from 25% of the maximum tax revenues on FAB in Belgium and 
the UK to 39% in Finland. Foregone tax revenues are less than 1% of total revenues 
from excise duty on alcohol in Belgium and the UK and about 7% in Finland.284 In 
addition, the analysis above most likely overestimates foregone tax revenues for two 
reasons: i) as most of the market for FAB is expected to be below 15% vol, the 
application of standard rates to all quantity consumed would lead to a substantial 
increase in the average price in all surveyed MS (from +17% in the UK to +42% in 
Finland); ii) depending on their alcohol base, FAB may also be classified as OFB or ethyl 
alcohol. 
 
 
2.4.1.5  Ethyl alcohol 
 
 DEFINITION OF LOW-STRENGTH ETHYL ALCOHOL 
 
Article 22.5 of the Directive allows MS to apply a reduced rate on ethyl alcohol with an 
actual alcoholic strength by volume not exceeding 10% vol. However, under the EU spirit 
drinks regulation285, any spirit must have a minimum actual alcoholic strength by volume 
of 15% vol. Therefore, only special products and mixes between spirits and other non-
alcoholic beverages may be below 10%. Only Finland applies reduced rates to low-
strength ethyl alcohol and sets the threshold at 2.8% vol. 
 
 MARKET FOR LOW-STRENGTH ETHYL ALCOHOL 
 
In light with the spirit drinks regulation, the market for low-strength ethyl alcohol does 
not include any traditional spirits. By contrast, it may include mixed drinks, which can be 
grouped in three main segments: i) long drinks, i.e. alcoholic beverages mixing a 
brand/spirit category and non-alcoholic beverages; ii) pre-mixed cocktails, i.e. alcoholic 
beverages reflecting well-known cocktails containing spirits; and iii) FAB. Long drinks 
and FAB usually have an actual alcoholic strength by volume of less than 10% vol; 
therefore, they can be considered low-strength ethyl alcohol. FAB, however, may be also 
classified as OFB, intermediate products or ethyl alcohol, depending on their alcohol 
base. In what follows, it is assumed that 100% of FAB is ethyl alcohol, thus providing an 
upper bound estimate of the market for low-strength ethyl alcohol. Pre-mixed cocktails 
include both products below 10% vol and products above 10% vol. Therefore, it is 
assumed that only 50% of the consumption of pre-mixed cocktails can be allotted to the 
market for low-strength ethyl alcohol.  
 
Based on IWSR data, the estimated market share (in volume) of low-strength pre-mixed 
cocktails and long drinks grew between 2010 and 2015 at the EU level and represented 
2.4% of the total EU consumption of ethyl alcohol in 2015. By contrast, the market share 
                                                          
284 Foregone tax revenues are computed under the assumption that all FAB have a fermented alcohol base and 
are classified as intermediate products. This provides an upper bound estimate of foregone tax revenues from 
reduced rates on intermediate products. 
285 Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the 
definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks and 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89, OJ L39, 13.2.2008, p. 16-54.  
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of FAB decreased, going from 8.7% in 2010 to 6% in 2015. Interestingly, in Poland and 
Romania, the market for low-strength ethyl alcohol is very limited. In Belgium and Italy, 
it was in the region of 10% of total consumption of ethyl alcohol in 2015 and mainly 
included long drinks; in the UK and most importantly in Finland, FAB represented a 
substantial, but declining share of the market. Participants in the OPC provided a blurred 
picture: more than half of participants who responded to this question consider this 
market rather stable, one-quarter believe it is decreasing, one-fifth point at a growing 
trend.  
 
 REDUCED RATE ON LOW-STRENGTH ETHYL ALCOHOL AND ESTIMATED TAX IMPACT  
 
Among surveyed MS, only Finland opted for a reduced rate on low-strength ethyl alcohol 
(Table 39). This rate equals EUR 800/hlpa and is only applied to ethyl alcohol with an 
actual alcoholic strength by volume ranging from 1.2% vol to 2.8% vol. The reduced 
rate applied in Finland on ethyl alcohol is almost six times lower than the standard rate. 
Nonetheless, ethyl alcohol containing between 1.2% and 2.8% alcohol by volume 
represents a negligible share of the market for ethyl alcohol. Therefore, the impact of 
applying reduced rates to low-strength ethyl alcohol on tax revenues in Finland is 
marginal. This conclusion was confirmed by Finnish stakeholders. 
 
Table 39 – Excise duty and reduced rates for low-strength ethyl alcohol in selected MS 
(as of January 2017) 
MS Standard rates Reduced rates 
Belgium €2,992.79/hlpa n/a 
Finland €4,555/hlpa 
€800/hlpa  
(between 1.2% vol and 2.8% vol) 
Italy €1,035.53/hlpa n/a 
Poland €1,328.58/hlpa n/a 
Romania €743.06/hlpa n/a 
UK €3,167.73/hlpa n/a 
Source: Excise Duty Table (2017). 
 
 
2.4.1.6  Rationale for applying reduced rates on low-strength alcoholic beverages 
 
Overall, MS have used the provisions on reduced rates for low-strength alcohol with 
flexibility in order to accommodate their own priorities and reflect national specificities, 
which explains the diverse adoption of reduced rates by different MS (Table 40). 
 
Table 40 – Reduced rates on low-strength alcoholic beverages in selected MS  
MS Beer Wine OFB 
Intermediate 
products 
Ethyl alcohol 
Belgium x √ √ √ x 
Finland √ √ √ √ √ 
Italy x x x x x 
Poland x x √ x x 
Romania x x x* x x 
The UK √ √ √ √ x 
Source: Excise Duty Tables (2017). 
Note: *Exemption for sparkling still cider, perry and mead and for sparkling cider and perry; √= Reduced 
rates available; x= Reduced rates not available. 
 
Some countries, such as Finland and the UK, reportedly apply reduced rates based, inter 
alia, on health policy considerations; in fact, reduced rates are expected to encourage 
the consumption of low-strength products thus decreasing the overall intake of alcohol. 
Some stakeholders explained that reduced rates may in particular encourage producers 
to develop innovative low-strength products and enhance the variety of the offer, so as 
to attract a larger segment of consumers. Conversely, other MS, such as Italy and 
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Romania, do not to apply reduced rates, and reportedly pursue their health policy 
objectives via different tools such as awareness-raising and responsible drinking 
campaigns.286 In Poland, reduced rates on cider and perry do not (primarily) respond to 
public health policy concerns but to agricultural/industrial policy needs; in particular, it 
helped tackling the negative economic effects of the Russian embargo on domestic apple 
and other fruit growers, offering them new business opportunities. Belgium does not 
apply reduced rates to low-strength beer and ethyl alcohol, but it does to low-strength 
wine, OFB, and intermediate products. This is mainly due to the fact that while excise 
duty on beer and ethyl alcohol are proportionate to the alcohol strength, reduced rates 
allow introducing elements of proportionality also for the other categories of alcoholic 
beverages. 
 
The results of the OPC provide an overview of the expected benefits that are, in the 
participants’ view, likely to stem from a greater adoption of reduced excise duty rates for 
low-strength alcoholic beverages. The overall picture confirms the existence of 
heterogeneous rationales and perspectives beyond reduced rates to low-strength 
alcoholic beverages. In particular (see Annexes for details):  
 
 Most of respondents (especially individual and beer industry stakeholders) believe 
that the application of reduced rates to low-strength alcohol may lead to more 
choice for consumers and create incentives for product innovation.  
 Participants expressed similar views on the utility for SME and large players: 
reduced rates may help small producers (because they are best positioned to 
target specific niche markets), as well as large producers, because they tend to 
have wider product portfolios and may more easily cope with the extra production 
costs. Among industry stakeholders, these benefits are especially perceived in the 
beer sector and, to a smaller extent, in the other fermented beverages sector.  
 With respect to per capita consumption of alcohol and public health effects, the 
majority of respondents  (58%) believe that the ‘net effect’ would be positive, 
since consumers would be encouraged to substitute higher-strength alcoholic 
beverages with lower-strength ones. On the other hand, some 18% argue that 
reduced rates may eventually increase alcohol consumption because more 
affordable products would encourage consumers to drink more.287  
 
 
2.4.1.7  Reduced rates on low-strength alcohol and public health policy  
 
As confirmed by all the surveyed health institutions and NGOs, there is poor systematic 
evidence on the public health impact generated by the existing reduced rates for low-
strength alcohol in the EU. The main difficulty is the lack of empirical data on the 
consumption of low-strength alcohol and drinking patterns vis-à-vis the consumption of 
‘standard’ products. Various theoretical hypotheses exists but not supported by robust 
evidence on consumers behaviour.  
 
Overall, the relevant literature confirms there is an inverse relationship between the 
price and the consumption of alcoholic beverages;288 additional studies have also 
demonstrated the significant positive relationship between alcohol consumption and 
health-related issues;289 both relationships have been confirmed for young consumers.290 
                                                          
286 Information and education campaigns are normally carried out in all MS, so they should not be considered 
alternative but rather complementary measures of tax-related measures.   
287 The latter view is relative more widespread among ethyl alcohol industry and non-industry respondents. 
288 See, for instance, Babor, T et al., ‘Alcohol Policy and the Public Good’, 1994. 
289 See Osterberg, E., ‘Effects of price and taxation’, 2001, in Heather, N., Peters, T.J. and Stockwell, T. (Eds) 
International Handbook of Alcohol Dependence and Problems, 685-698; Chaloupka, F.J., Grossman, M. and 
Saffer, H., ‘The effects of price on alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems’, Alcohol Research & 
Health. 26(1):22-34, 2002; Babor, T. et al., ‘Alcohol: No ordinary commodity – research and public policy’, 
2003. 
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Although this literature is crucial in understanding the link between prices of alcoholic 
beverages and per capita alcohol consumption, it does not allow to draw direct 
conclusions with regard to the public health impact of incentives for low-strength alcohol. 
In fact, the application of reduced rates to low-strength alcoholic beverages could 
influence consumers’ behaviour in opposite ways, as follows:291 
 
 First, consumers could switch to drinking low-strength alcohol without increasing 
their overall consumption (in litres) of alcoholic beverages. In this case, reduced 
rates could lead to a less harmful use of alcohol, as defined by the WHO.292 This 
possible impact is also supported by considerations on the limited amount of 
liquid that can be ingested in one session, suggesting that low-strength products 
would likely be consumed in greater quantities.293   
 Second, lower prices for low-strength alcohol may provide incentives to former 
abstainers (including adolescents) to start consuming alcoholic beverages. In a 
nutshell, if prices of low-strength alcoholic beverages decrease due to the 
application of reduced rates, consumers may substitute alcohol-free beverages 
for low-strength alcoholic drinks. Only few empirical studies provide data on 
drinking initiation patterns. For example, in a country with a high prevalence of 
abstainers, an increase in the taxation of alcoholic beverages may prevent 
drinking initiation among youth and decrease harm associated with the 
consumption of alcohol.294 If such correlation appears to be true, its inverse may 
as well be: a decrease in the taxation of alcoholic beverages (whether of regular 
or low-strength) may result in higher drinking initiation.  
 Finally, consumers opting for low-strength alcoholic beverages may increase their 
consumption of such products, with a neutral or negative impact on the pure 
alcohol intake. In practice, consumers may allow themselves to drink larger 
quantities of alcoholic beverages because of their lower ABV content. This 
evidently implies that consumers are aware of and pay attention to the alcohol 
content of their drinks, which is quite obvious in the case of products of different 
nature (e.g. between beer and spirits), but more difficult between drinks of the 
same category and for small ABV differences (e.g. beer of 3.5% vol versus beer 
of 5% vol), especially in the  ‘on-trade’ consumption.295  
 
The analysis of a literature case-study concerning the implementation of reduced rates 
for low-strength alcohol in Australia (see Box 16) shows that beneficial public health 
effects can be observed when incentives to switch to low-strength alcohol are combined 
with other education and alcohol control policies. Needless to say, the results achieved in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
290 Cook, P.J., Moore, M.J., ‘The economics of alcohol abuse and alcohol-control policies’, Health Affairs, 
21(2):120-33, 2002; Chaloupka, F.J., et al. (2002); Markowitz, S., Chatterji, P., and Kaestner, R., ‘Estimating 
the impact of alcohol policies on youth suicides’, Journal of Mental Health, Policy and Economics, 6(1):37-46, 
2003. 
291 These effects are registered in case reduced rates lead to lower prices for low-strength alcoholic beverages. 
Shemilt, I. et al., ‘What do we know about the effects of exposure to ‘Low alcohol’ and equivalent product 
labelling on the amounts of alcohol, food and tobacco people select and consume? A systematic review’, BMC 
Public Health, 2017; Rehm, J. et al., ‘Evidence of reducing ethanol content in beverages to reduce harmful use 
of alcohol’, The Lancet Gastroenterology and Hepatology, 1(1):78-83, 2016.  
292 The WHO offers both a broad and an operational definition of ‘harmful use of alcohol’. The broad definition 
encompasses all drinking behaviours resulting in detrimental health and social consequences, not only for the 
consumer, but also for people surrounding the consumer, and society as a whole (WHO, ‘Global strategy to 
reduce the harmful use of alcohol’, 2010). The operational definition provides concrete indicators such as total 
alcohol consumption per capita within a calendar year in litres of pure alcohol, age-standardised prevalence of 
heavy episodic drinking among adolescents and adults, and alcohol-related morbidity and mortality among 
adolescents and adults (WHO, ‘Global action plan for the prevention and control of NCDs 2013–2020’, 2013). 
293 Shemilt, I. et al. (2017). 
294 Sornpaisarn B., et al., ‘Can pricing deter adolescents and young adults from starting to drink: an analysis of 
the effect of alcohol taxation on drinking initiation among Thai adolescents and young adults’, J Epidemiol Glob 
Health, 5: S45–57, 2015. 
295 Geller E.S., Kalsher M.J., Clarke S.W., ‘Beer versus mixed-drink consumption at fraternity parties: a time 
and place for low-alcohol alternatives’, J Stud Alcohol, 52: 197–204, 1991. 
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a specific context cannot be immediately generalised, since other factors - like cultural 
settings, consumption habits, price sensitivity, traditions, etc. – may play a role. In any 
case, as various stakeholders underline, public health effects relate to the pure alcohol 
intake and not so much to the ABV of specific beverages, so prevention campaigns and 
programmes unanimously play a more prominent role. However, policies aimed at 
reducing per capita consumptions could benefit from reduced rates, as a complementary 
measure, especially when standard taxation is not proportionate to the alcohol content.  
 
 
Box 16 – The impact of reduced rates for low-strength alcohol in Australia 
 
A case study on the health effects of low-strength alcoholic beverages could be based upon an example from 
Australia. In the Northern Territories of Australia, a reduction in the tax levied on low-strength alcoholic 
beverages led to an increase in the consumption of such products, which further led to a decrease in acute and 
chronic mortality.296 This result reveals a positive relationship between reduced rates on low-strength alcohol 
and health benefits. Nevertheless, the observed positive public health effects may not only be attributed to the 
increased consumption of low-strength drinks. Indeed, the accommodating taxation policy implemented for 
low-strength alcoholic beverages was complemented by increased controls on alcohol availability, expanded 
treatment and rehabilitation services, as well as by changes in education.297 In conclusion, beneficial health 
effects may only be observed when reduced rates are combined with other policies aiming to combat harmful 
use of alcohol. At national level, in 2000, Australia reduced duty rates by almost 50% for on-trade beer 
containing between 3.0% and 3.5% vol. This policy resulted in an increase in the market share for this 
segment by nearly 7% (up to 18%) in an overall declining market.298  
 
 
To sum up, the net impact on public health of reduced rates applied to low-strength 
alcoholic beverages remains unclear, due to lack of detailed data on the drinking 
patterns for such products (sometimes also due to the novelty of such products). There 
is however general consensus across stakeholders of different MS that reduced rates, 
and taxation policy at large, is not sufficient to achieve public health policy targets; 
additional tools like information and education campaigns, limitations on advertising and 
selling options, etc. are also necessary. 
 
 
2.4.2 Problem analysis  
 
The Directive includes provisions allowing for reduced rates on low-strength alcoholic 
beverages in all product categories, but it does not define targets and objectives for such 
provisions. This option has been used by a few MS for a mix of reasons: (i) tailor 
national taxation policies (e.g. introduce a certain proportionality with ABV strength for 
certain products); (ii) pursue objectives of industrial and agricultural policy; (iii) achieve 
health policy objectives, etc. The different rationale is deemed to be one of the main 
drivers behind the diverse implementation at MS level of such provisions. This issue has 
been highlighted also in the Ramboll Evaluation.299  
 
The ultimate policy goal of these provisions remains unclear, but this is generally not 
perceived as an obstacle to its uptake in MS (as confirmed by in-depth interviews). On 
the opposite, the lack of a stated policy objective contributes to its adaptation and 
flexible use across MS in line with domestic needs and priorities.300  
 
                                                          
296  Stockwell T et al., ‘Consumption of different alcoholic beverages as predictors of local rates of night-time 
assault and acute alcohol-related morbidity’, Aust N Z J Public Health, 22: 237–42, 1998; Chikritzhs T., 
Stockwell T., Pascal R., ‘The impact of the Northern Territory’s Living With Alcohol program, 1992–2002: 
revisiting the evaluation’, Addiction, 100: 1625–36, 2005. 
297 Knai C et al., ‘Are the public health responsibility deal alcohol pledges likely to improve public health? An 
evidence synthesis’, Addiction, 110: 1232–46, 2015. 
298 Data collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
299 Ramboll Evaluation (2016). 
300 In addition, the diverse implementation at MS level has no impact on the functioning of the Internal Market 
as excise duty is charged where the product is released for consumption. 
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On the other hand, the Directive sets the alcoholic strength thresholds to apply reduced 
rates at levels that are largely irrelevant for some product categories. In this sense, the 
current thresholds may hinder the uptake of these provisions by certain MS and ilimit the 
magnitude of the effects possibly pursued. This raises the question of whether different 
thresholds would be more effective: 
 
 With regard to beer the current threshold apparently applies only to radler and 
very few other products. In this sense, it does not provide a tangible incentive to 
produce/consume low-strength beer. Brewers from all sample MS would generally 
welcome an increase in the threshold for low-strength beer from 2.8% vol to 
3.5% vol in order to capture a larger share of the demand and enhance the 
distinction with alcohol-free beer. In a similar fashion, there is a niche market for 
ale just below 3.5% vol.301 
 
 In the same vein, the current thresholds for wine (8.5% vol), intermediate 
products (15% vol) and ethyl alcohol (10% vol), are generally much below the 
typical strength of these products, so only a few are currently covered. In many 
cases, to comply with product definitions spelled out by Union law, such products 
must have an alcohol content above the maximum thresholds set by the 
Directive. Therefore, in the current conditions, ‘standard’ products have generally 
no access to reduced rates, while ‘special’ products like mixed drinks and some 
flavoured/aromatised drinks do have. Whereas a revision of thresholds for these 
product categories may provide a more balanced access to the facility, there is no 
agreement among stakeholders on the need to change and the benefits (or 
drawbacks) that can be expected, as well as on alternate, more appropriate 
thresholds. 
 
 Conversely, the threshold set for OFB (8.5% vol) covers almost the entire market 
for cider and perry and a portion of the market for fruit wine, so it can be flexibly 
used by MS to purse their different policy priorities. While some stakeholders may 
argue that this threshold is even too high, it is worth recalling that MS are free to 
set the national threshold below the one spelled out in the Directive (e.g. 5.0% 
vol). Therefore, no policy problem is detected when it comes to OFB.  
 
To sum up, the policy problem that is worth examining in this Study concerns the 
possible adoption of alternative, higher thresholds for low-strength products in order to 
allow a greater coverage of the market (expect for OFB, where the threshold is 
sufficiently high).  In the analysis, we maintain beer separated from other category of 
products, due to the different level of demand (and agreements) among stakeholders for 
redressing solutions. 
                                                          
301 For instance, sessions real ales.  
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 SUMMARY OF PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
Problem drivers Adverse effects Expected evolution 
Too low ABV threshold 
for low-strength beer, 
only covering a small 
share of the market 
• The current threshold is not relevant as 
there is no true market for low-strength 
beer with the exception of radler and 
few other products 
• No real incentive to produce/consume 
low-strength beer 
• Large beer producers are 
currently launching new beer with 
alcohol strength of 3.5% vol. 
• The uptake by MS of the 
provisions on reduced rates for 
low-strength beer may remain 
limited 
Too low ABV thresholds 
for low-strength wine, 
intermediate products 
and ethyl alcohol, only 
covering a small share 
of the market 
• The current thresholds are not relevant 
as most of wine, intermediate products 
and spirits must have an actual alcoholic 
strength by volume higher than the 
thresholds set by the Directive  
• The provision may eventually incentivise 
‘special’ products against ‘traditional’ 
ones.   
• The uptake by MS of the 
provisions on reduced rates for 
low-strength wine, intermediate 
products and especially spirits 
may remain limited 
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2.5 Exemptions for private production 
 
In this Section, the problem definition concerning the exemption for private production 
for own consumption is presented. The analysis focuses on the six MS in which fieldwork 
activities were carried out for this issue (the sample MS): Austria, Finland, Italy, Poland, 
Romania and the United Kingdom. In Section 2.5.1, the baseline assessment is reported, 
analysing the national legal frameworks first, and then estimating the amount of home 
distillation in each of the sample MS. Then, in Section 2.5.2, the problem analysis is 
carried out, describing the nature and magnitude of the issue at stake, including its likely 
development.  
 
 
2.5.1 Baseline assessment 
 
Directive 92/83/EEC gives MS the option of exempting private production of fermented 
beverages for own consumption from excise duties, provided that no sale is involved. 
The exemption can be applied to beer,302 wine,303 and other fermented beverages.304 
Conversely, an exemption to private production for own consumption is not provided for 
the remaining categories, namely ethyl alcohol and intermediate products.305 
 
The rationale why private production of ethyl alcohol is not granted a duty exemption in 
the Directive can be traced back to both health and tax reasons. The category of ethyl 
alcohol consists mostly of distilled products.306 Distillation is, from a health perspective, 
more dangerous than fermentation, due to the possibility of mistakenly producing 
beverages with an excessive level of methanol.307 Moreover, given the higher EU 
minimum and national excise duty rates imposed on ethyl alcohol, the risk of tax fraud is 
higher than for the other beverages. The higher health risks linked with private 
distillation would also explain the concomitant exclusion from the scope of the exemption 
of intermediate products: indeed, this category includes beverages which can contain 
distilled alcohol (e.g. fortified wine).308 Given the reconstructed rationale, the analysis in 
this Section will distinguish between fermented beverages, on one side, and distilled 
alcohol on the other. 
 
The regulatory framework for private production for own consumption in the sample MS 
is largely homogeneous. The private production of fermented beverages for own 
consumption, including beer, wine, fruit-wine, cider, and other fermented beverages is 
allowed and exempted from duties in all these MS.309 On the contrary, private distillation 
is not allowed in four out of the six countries – Finland, Italy, Poland, and the UK – but it 
                                                          
302 Article 6. 
303 Article 10. 
304 Article 14. 
305 Based on Article 22.6 and 22.7 the production of ethyl alcohol can be subject to lower excise duties when 
distilled in fruit growers’ distilleries from fruit supplied by fruit growers’ households. This option is granted to 
BG, CZ, HU, RO, and SK. 
306 Namely, spirits, liqueurs, and other spirituous beverages. Hereinafter, ‘spirits’. Fermented beverages with 
an ABV strength higher than 22% are also classified as ethyl alcohol.  
307 See Stakeholder interviews; Huckenbeck W., Freudenstein P., Jeszenszky E. and H.G. Scheil, ‘Congeners in 
spirits produced by moonshine distillers’, Blutalkohol Vol. 40, pp. 294-301, 2003; Rehm, J., Kailasapillai, S., 
Larsen, E., Rehm, M.X., Samokhvalov, A.V., Shield, K.D., Roerecke, M. and D.W. Lachenmeier, ‘A systematic 
review of the epidemiology of unrecorded alcohol consumption and the chemical composition of unrecorded 
alcohol’, in Addiction, 109, pp. 880-893, 2014. 
308 The intermediate product category also includes beverages whose alcohol is entirely of fermented origin.  
309 Small differences exist in the applicable regime: for example, in Austria the excise legislation only applies to 
commercial producers, thus completely exempting private producers from any requirement spelled out therein. 
In the UK, commercial licensed producers of wine and other fermented beverages are allowed an exemption for 
private production, but licensed breweries do not enjoy the same exemption. In Italy, there is no explicit 
exemption for the private production of wine, but it results from the joint application of a zero rate and of the 
simplification for production, warehousing, movement, and controls granted to small producers. 
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is possible in Austria and Romania. In the former country, private distillation can be duty 
free, while in the latter it is taxed at a reduced rate (see Box 17 below). Though not 
explicitly allowed, these provisions reportedly find their justification in the minute 
statements of the Ecofin Council that adopted the Directive, stating that MS were 
allowed to maintain ‘traditional exemptions’ for the private production of any alcoholic 
beverage.310 
 
 
Box 17 - Private distillation in Austria and Romania 
 
In Austria, duty-free production of spirits is allowed under the Hausbrand unter Abfindung regime.311 When 
a farmer is running an Abfindung (flat-rate) distillery, that is a small agricultural distillery, he/she is allowed 
not to pay excises on up to 15 litres of pure alcohol (lpa) per year, a quantity which is considered for private 
consumption of the family. The exemption can reach up to 27 lpa alcohol per household, depending on the 
number of family members, and up to 51 lpa in Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Only farmers – meaning those (i) 
running an agricultural or forestry business; (ii) living on the premises of this business; and (iii) earning a 
significant amount of his/her living from this business – running an Abfindung distillery can obtain the 
Hausbrand exemption. Other individuals running an Abfindung distillery cannot apply for it. Exempted 
production needs to be declared to the customs authorities and can be sold, in line with the rules of the 
Abfindung regime. This exemption dates back to 1830s and both public authorities and economic operators 
consider it to be necessary to protect the production of traditional spirits. The Commission opened an 
infringement procedure on this exemption on February 2017, by sending the Austrian government a letter of 
formal notice (ex Article 258 TFEU), which could eventually lead to challenging the Hausbrand regime before 
the CJEU.312 The Austrian government formally replied in July, rejecting the claims.313  
 
In Romania, private production of tuica (plum brandy) and rachiurile de fructe (fruit brandy) up to 0.5 hlpa 
per year per household is allowed, but it is not duty free. It is taxed at a reduced rate, fixed at 50% of the 
standard rate. This exception seems to be similar to what is granted by Article 22.7; however, any citizen, 
and not only fruit growers, could be granted the reduction, and distillation needs not to take place in fruit 
growers’ distilleries. Private producers need to notify customs of their distillery equipment (one-off 
notification), and of the quantity produced every year.  
 
 
Private production of fermented beverages is largely a non-regulated activity. In most of 
the sample MS, private producers of e.g. beer or wine need not to register or undergo 
any administrative procedure,314 and they are subject to no monitoring or controls. 
Judicial cases concerning illicit private production of fermented beverages, for example 
duty-free products for own consumption that were eventually put up for sale, were 
hardly reported by public authorities, as this issue is considered to be a very low 
enforcement priority.315 Indeed, customs authorities have neither the means to 
extensively control a myriad of private producers of fermented beverages, nor the 
interest to recover potential foregone revenues which, in their opinion, are not 
substantial enough.  
 
In line with the unregulated nature of this activity, the number of private producers and 
the quantity produced are not tracked, and no official data could be retrieved. A 
qualitative assessment was thus sought. Based on authorities’ and economic operators’ 
feedback, private production of wine appears to be common in wine-producing countries, 
such as Italy and Romania. Home brewing is becoming more popular, sometimes 
                                                          
310 This emerged from the interviews and the consultation of secondary sources, namely: Fiscalis Project 
Group, ‘Discussion document on the provisions regarding small and medium sized enterprises (SME) involved 
in the production of alcohol and alcoholic beverages for excise duty purposes’, Fiscalis seminar in Sopot, 
Poland, 14–16.10.2008, at p. 17. A copy of the minutes of the Ecofin Council could not be retrieved from public 
archives. 
311 See Section 2.3.2. 
312 European Commission, Infringement Decision Database, accessed on September 2017. 
313 News.at, ‘EU hat Österreichs Schnapsbrenner im Visier’, 25.08.2017, available at: 
https://www.news.at/a/wirtschaft-eu-oesterreichs-schnapsbrenner-visier-8278290 (last accessed on 
September 2017). 
314 An exception is Romania, where home-winemakers need to register. 
315 Cases of sales of home-produced beer were reported to have happened in the last decade by a stakeholder 
in Poland. 
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extensively so, in all the countries visited, both in MS in which this was a longstanding 
tradition, such as the UK, and in MS where this phenomenon emerged in the last decade, 
such as Poland and Italy. Home-production of other fermented beverages, such as cider 
or fruit-wine, exists and is linked to local demand and production traditions, but it is less 
common than wine and beer production.316 
 
With respect to home distillation, its spread varies from MS to MS: 
 
 In the UK and Finland, public authorities, economic operators, and health 
stakeholders consider it to be a minor to negligible phenomenon. Even though 
instances of illicit home distillation were reported, they are occasional and mostly 
limited to rural areas, where private individuals may have access to their own 
agricultural raw materials. 
 In several regions of Italy and Poland, home distillation is part of the local 
agricultural tradition. In Italy, home distillation is not considered to pose 
significant problems and it is not among the enforcement priorities for customs 
authorities. Though hard data on producers and production are not available, in 
Poland stakeholders estimate that home distillation may represent less than 10% 
of the illicit alcohol market, which largely consists of surrogate products obtained 
from denatured alcohol. Hence, even though episodes of illicit home production 
are reported by Polish authorities, the focus of the fight against illicit alcohol 
remains largely on purification rather than home distillation.  
 In Austria and Romania, where private distillation is allowed, the situation is quite 
different. In the former MS, it is widespread (the number of private distillers is 
gauged to be in the order of 30,000-40,000 individuals). The very large part of 
private distillation takes place under the Hausbrand exemption, and it is therefore 
legal. In the latter MS, private distillation is authorised and taxed, although at a 
reduced rate. However, part of the private production falls outside the excise 
system, and is thus to be considered illegal. Industry estimates317 indicate that 
illicit home distillation represents a small portion of the illicit spirit market, at 
about 10%. 
 
Given the lack of direct sources, an indirect methodology is resorted to estimate illicit 
home distillation. This methodology combines available information on unrecorded 
alcohol, collected by the WHO,318 and the qualitative and quantitative assessment 
collected from public authorities, health and economic operators in the countries visited, 
as well as from the health literature on alcohol control.  
 
Unrecorded alcohol is defined as ‘alcohol which is not taxed and is outside the usual 
system of governmental control’.319 It includes both licit and illicit alcohol, and namely 
the following categories: 
 
 Home production, both licit and illicit; 
 Small- or large-scale clandestine production; 
 Cross-border shopping (alcohol ‘recorded’ in another jurisdiction);320 
 Smuggling, i.e. illegal trade of alcoholic beverages; 
                                                          
316 In the UK, home production of made-wine, i.e. from fruits, traditionally exists, and is exempted from the 
excise duty. In Finland, private production of fruit wine became popular in the 90s, but this trend has largely 
disappeared. 
317 Confidential data, on file with the authors. 
318 WHO, ‘Global status report on alcohol and health’, 2014. Latest available data refer to 2010. 
319 Ibid, p.364. 
320 ‘Cross-border shopping’ is licit for small amount of products for personal use (regulated by Article 32 of 
Directive 2008/118/EC. However, the disparities in price levels between bordering countries may also provide 
incentives for more frequent and sizeable cross-border flows of ‘recorded’ alcohol operated by individual 
citizens, for private consumption or small-scale informal business (also known as ‘bootlegging’).     
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 Surrogate alcohol, that is alcoholic beverages obtained from the purification of 
denatured alcohol. 
 
The various components of unrecorded alcohol are shown in Figure 12; licit components 
are identified in light blue, and illicit ones in white. Estimates of unrecorded alcohol in 
the six countries visited are reported in Table 41. 
 
Figure 12 - Components of unrecorded alcohol production and consumption 
 
Legend: in light blue, licit components, in white, illicit components.  
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on WHO (2014).  
 
Table 41 - Unrecorded alcohol consumption in sample MS 
 Unrecorded alcohol Total alcohol consumption Share of unrecorded alcohol 
lpa per capita % 
Austria 0.6 10.3 6% 
Finland 2.3 12.3 19% 
Italy 0.2 6.7 3% 
Poland 1.6 12.5 13% 
Romania 4 14.4 28% 
United Kingdom 1.2 11.6 10% 
Note: lpa: litres of pure alcohol. 
Source: WHO (2014).  
 
 
Box 18 - Data on unrecorded alcohol consumption 
 
Though unrecorded alcohol represents an important share of alcohol consumption, the quality of data 
concerning this phenomenon is far from being excellent. An estimation of unrecorded alcohol consumption is 
done by WHO based on different sources and methodologies. Among possible sources, preference is given to 
national government statistics (including survey-based); then, to industry statistics and databases; finally, 
to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations' statistical database. With respect to the 
validity of surveys on alcohol consumption, they can suffer from underreporting, due to social stigma, and 
their results tend not to be unequivocal. Furthermore, in some cases, even though indicators on alcohol 
consumption are designed to test the correlation with alcohol-related diseases, data on unrecorded alcohol 
are estimated based on the health impacts of alcohol consumption, which may create problems of reverse 
inference.321   
 
 
                                                          
321 See also Rehm J., Kanteres F, and D.W. Lachenemeieri, ‘Unrecorded consumption, quality of alcohol and 
health consequences’, in Drug and Alcoholic Review, Vol. 29, pp. 426-436, 2010. 
Unrecorded 
Alcohol 
Home Production 
Licit 
Illicit 
Cross-border 
Legal Shopping 
Smuggling 
Clandestine 
Production 
Surrogate  
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Based on the data on unrecorded alcohol presented above, it is then necessary to 
identify the following parameters: 
 
1. the share of home production over unrecorded alcohol; and  
2. the share of illicit home distillation over home production.  
 
Quantitative estimates of these parameters are available for Romania, based on an 
industry evaluation.322 For the other 5 sample MS, the two parameters are estimated 
based on a five-ladder qualitative scale as described in Table 42 below.323 
 
Table 42 - Parameters for the estimation of illicit home distillation in the sample MS  
MS Relevance of home production over 
unrecorded alcohol 
Relevance of illicit home distillation over 
home production 
Austria Medium-
low 
As in other north-western European 
countries, a large part of unrecorded 
alcohol is estimated to consist of cross-
border shopping (Leifman, 2001). 
However, compared to FI and UK, AT is a 
wine-producing country and has a 
significant legal home-production of 
spirits.  
Low Most of home distillation is licit 
under Hausbrand. 
Finland Low High-price country compared to 
neighbours. Cross-border shopping, 
possibly including ‘bootlegging’, 
represents the largest single component 
(Rehm et al., 2010, Lachenmeier et al., 
2011), at about 62% of the unrecorded 
alcohol consumption (2015 data from 
WHO and National Institute for Health 
and Welfare). Even among the other 
components, home production is 
considered of limited importance. 
Low Home distillation is very sporadic. 
Only 4% of Finnish consumers 
reported to have consumed illicit 
spirits over the last year (source: 
industry survey). 
Italy Medium Substantial volume of unrecorded alcohol 
from home production is typical for 
Mediterranean countries (Leifman, 
2001). 
Medium-
low 
Home production of wine 
predominant. Traditional 
production of spirits exists in 
certain regions. Share of Italian 
citizens having drunk home-
distilled spirits estimated at 26% 
(Leifman, 2001). 
Poland Low Stakeholders estimate that home 
production represents less than 10% of 
the market for illicit alcohol. This is in 
line with the health literature, which 
considers surrogate alcohol more 
prominent (Rehm et al., 2010, 
Lachenmeier et al., 2011). 
Medium-
high 
Private distillation likely to 
represent a significant part of 
home production (Lachenmeier et 
al., 2009), because (i) negligible 
wine production; (ii) high share of 
spirit consumption over total 
alcohol consumption (RAHRA, 
2017) 
United 
Kingdom 
Low High-price country compared to 
neighbours. Most of unrecorded alcohol 
likely to be cross-border shopping. 
(Leifman, 2001, Rehm et al., 2014). The 
only significant home production is home 
brewing – limited private production of 
wine, cider, made-wine and spirits. 
Low Home distillation is very sporadic, 
according to public authorities 
and economic operators. Share of 
British citizen having drunk 
home-distilled spirits estimated at 
5% (Leifman, 2001). 
Source: Author’s analysis, based on various sources.324 
                                                          
322 Confidential data, on file with the author. 
323 The qualitative assessment is transformed into the following quantitative factors: low: 10%; medium-low: 
25%; medium; 50%; medium-high: 75%; high: 90%. 
324 Sources quoted in the table: Rehm J., Kanteres F, and D.W. Lachenemeieri, ‘Unrecorded consumption, 
quality of alcohol and health consequences’, in Drug and Alcoholic Review, Vol. 29, pp. 426-436, 2010; Leifan 
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Based on the assessment described above, the amount of illicit distillation estimated for 
the sample MS is reported in the Table 43 below. The main finding is that, in most MS, 
illicit home distillation represents a negligible part of the spirit market: below or around 
1% in Austria, Finland and the United Kingdom, and slightly higher (about 2.5%) in the 
case of Italy, where a local tradition exists. The share is higher in Poland, where it 
reaches 3.5% of the market, and, most notably, in Romania. This finding is in line with 
the qualitative evidence provided by local stakeholders (Box 15). Extrapolating results at 
EU level, home distillation is estimated at about 210,000 hlpa, or 2.3% of the spirit 
market (based on the share of unrecorded alcohol of the sample MS over the EU total, 
that is 40%). These results are also in consonance with those provided by OPC 
respondents, where 41% of the respondents considered that the spread of private 
distillation is ‘nihil’ or ‘small’, and 43% that it is ‘modest’; only 15% considered it as 
significant. 
 
Table 43 - Estimated illicit home distillation in the sample MS  
  
Home distillation Spirit Market Share of the spirit market 
hlpa % 
Austria 1,103 111,627 1.0% 
Finland 1,052 94,626 1.1% 
Italy 13,103 502,901 2.6% 
Poland 38,749 1,098,450 3.5% 
Romania 25,119 424,188 5.9% 
United Kingdom 6,409 1,153,897 0.6% 
Total 85,535 3,385,689 2.5% 
EU 213,838 9,361,724 2.3% 
Source: Author’s analysis; IWSR data.325  
 
 
2.5.2 Problem analysis 
 
2.5.2.1 The nature of the problem: fermented beverages 
 
All stakeholders consulted and available sources analysed suggest that the private 
production of fermented beverages does not create any significant problem, either 
economic or regulatory,326 over the various categories of impacts relevant to the 
analysis. This is in line with the findings provided in the Commission Evaluation: 
 
 With respect to market effects and tax revenues, impacts of home production of 
fermented beverages proved to be minimum. More in detail: 
 
o Although private production of wine is common in producing countries, market 
operators and public authorities do not see any concern, especially given that, 
in the MS representing 98% of the EU production, wine is taxed at zero or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
H., ‘Estimations of unrecorded alcohol consumption levels and trends in 14 European countries’, in Nordisk 
Alkohol- & Narkotikatidskrift, Vol. 18, 2001; Lachenmeier, D.W., Ganss, S., Rychlak, B., Rehm, J., Sulkowska, 
U., Skiba, M. and W. Zatons, ‘Association Between Quality of Cheap and Unrecorded Alcohol Products and 
Public Health Consequences in Poland’, in Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research Vol. 33, No. 10, 
2009; Lachenmeier, D.W., Schoeberl, K., Kanteres, F., Kuballa, T., Sohnius, E.M. and Rehm, J., ‘Is 
contaminated unrecorded alcohol a health problem in the European Union? A review of existing and 
methodological outline for future studies’, in Addiction, Vol. 106, 2011; RAHRA, ‘Comparative monitoring of 
alcohol epidemiology across the EU’, 2017; Rehm, J. Kailasapillai, S., Larsen, E., Rehm, M.X., Samokhvalov, 
A.V., Shield, K.D., Roerecke, M. and D.W. Lachenmeier, ‘A systematic review of the epidemiology of 
unrecorded alcohol consumption and the chemical composition of unrecorded alcohol’, in Addiction, 109, pp. 
880-893, 2014. 
325 The conversion between hl of products and hlpa is done assuming 40% vol. 
326 At p 15. See also Ramboll Evaluation, at p. 42. 
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near-zero327 rate. Hence, even if a certain quantity of home-produced wine 
was put up for sale, it would enjoy (almost) no excise advantage and would 
then create no competition threats to legal operators; moreover, foregone 
excise revenues would be negligible. 
 
o Public authorities reported no cases in which home brewing was linked to tax 
frauds. In addition, the beer industry, in all sample MS, considers that home 
brewing poses no competitive constrains. There are no indications of an unfair 
competition arising from duty-free home beer put up for sale. In particular, 
this threat is considered implausible, as it would be extremely difficult for 
home producers to brew beer in sufficient quantity and, most importantly, of 
a sufficient and stable quality, to regularly supply even an informal market. To 
the contrary, the growth of home brewing is considered conducive to the beer 
culture, resulting in a higher popularity of beer on the beverage market. A 
fortiori, no cross-border impact could be identified. 
 
 Administrative costs related to private production of fermented beverages are 
negligible. Such activity is largely unregulated and unmonitored in the sample MS, 
and only a few exceptions could be identified.328 The bulk of private producers 
undergo no administrative procedures at all. 
 
 Enforcement costs for public authorities are also negligible. Systematic controls and 
monitoring systems are not put in place, given that private production of fermented 
beverages remains a low priority for customs authorities. Moreover, instances of 
illegality in this area were reported as sporadic. Hence, no dedicated or additional 
enforcement resources are spent by customs authorities in this area. 
 
 With respect to health consequences, private production of fermented beverages has 
not been associated to risks in terms of (i) quality of the product; or (i) hazardous 
alcohol consumption patterns. With respect to per capita alcohol consumption, the 
primary harm from unrecorded alcohol, including home production, arises from the 
fact that it is typically much more accessible than recorded alcohol.329 
 
 Public authorities also report that home production is not connected to criminal 
activities, which mostly focus on clandestine distillation and production of surrogate 
beverages from denatured alcohol. 
 
 
2.5.2.2  The nature and magnitude of the problem: private distillation 
 
In its Conclusions, the Council ‘invites the Commission to investigate further the 
potential impact of allowing Member States to exempt from excise duties the production 
of ethyl alcohol and intermediate product for own consumption’, while at the same 
recalling ‘the particular importance of striking the right balance between revenue, the 
costs of tax administration, other aspects relating to consumption and the impact on 
cross-border trade.’330 Accordingly, the problem at stake is framed in terms of unequal 
treatment of the fermented and distilled beverages, subject to verification of whether 
                                                          
327 This is the case of France, where the excise duty on wine is set at 3.77 €/hl; as a comparison, the 
unweighted average of the positive excise duty rates in the EU is 139.81 €/hl. 
328 E.g. the duty of registration for home-winemakers in Romania, or the limited information to be provided in 
the context of filling excise tax return to use the allowance for private production of wine and cider by licensed 
producers in the UK. 
329 Rehm, J. Kailasapillai, S., Larsen, E., Rehm, M.X., Samokhvalov, A.V., Shield, K.D., Roerecke, M. and D.W. 
Lachenmeier, ‘A systematic review of the epidemiology of unrecorded alcohol consumption and the chemical 
composition of unrecorded alcohol’, in Addiction, 109, pp. 880-893, 2014. 
330 Council Conclusions, at §9. 
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such an equal treatment could create excessive negative impacts. Here below, the 
assessment of the baseline situation along this mandate follows. 
 
 The estimated level of private distillation results in the loss of tax revenues, the 
magnitude of which is quantified in Table 44.331 Tax losses depend on both (i) the 
amount of illicit home production identified; and (ii) the applicable tax rate. In the 
6 countries considered, lost excises reach about EUR 100 mn in total, or 1.4% of 
the excise revenues from ethyl alcohol. In 5 out of the 6 sample MS – except 
Romania – foregone revenues remain below 5% of the current revenues from 
ethyl alcohol. Only in Romania, where the issue has a higher magnitude, excise 
revenue losses are at almost 10% of the current revenues. Extrapolating results 
at EU level (based on the share of unrecorded alcohol in the sample MS), lost 
excises are estimated at about EUR 250 mn, or 1.6% of the excise revenues from 
ethyl alcohol. 
 
Table 44 – Estimated foregone excise duty revenue due to illicit home distillation 
 
Home 
Distillation 
Excise Duty 
Rate* 
Foregone 
Revenues 
Excise Duty 
from Ethyl 
Alcohol 
% of Foregone 
Revenues  
hlpa €/hlpa € '000 € '000 % 
Austria 1,103 648 715 120,400 0.6% 
Finland 1,052 4,555 4,793 413,580 1.2% 
Italy 13,103 1,036 13,569 634,860 2.1% 
Poland 38,749 1,343 51,481 1,658,640 3.1% 
Romania 25,119 374 9,332 101,720 9.2% 
United Kingdom 6,409 3,755 20,303 4,225,710 0.5% 
Total 85,535 - 100,193 7,154,910 1.4% 
EU 212,264 - 248,638 15,478,502 1.6% 
Source: EDT and Author’s analysis on WHO, IWSR, findings from the interviews and desk research. 
Note: (*) fore AT and RO the reduced rates for small producers are considered; data refer to 2015.  
 
 The intensity of negative market effects is proportional to the magnitude of the 
phenomenon, and, thus, is uneven across countries. Stakeholders operating 
where illicit home distillation has a negligible or limited occurrence, such as in 
Austria, Finland, Italy and the United Kingdom, report no problems in terms of 
unfair competition. In these countries, the views of economic operators and those 
of trade associations are therefore aligned with that of public authorities in 
considering private distillation a low enforcement priority. With respect to Poland, 
stakeholders do have concerns with competition threats from illicit alcohol; 
however, home distillation is considered a significantly smaller threat than 
surrogate alcohol, also because the latter is cheaper to produce, and can thus 
more seriously undercut the price of licit products. Market impacts become 
relevant in Romania, given that illicit home distillation is estimated to represent 
6% of the spirit market.  
 
 Though market effects are not negligible in certain MS, in none of the visited 
countries problems with respect to cross-border flows of home-distilled alcohol 
could be identified. Home-distilled products were considered as having a very 
local circulation. Problems deriving from cross-border unrecorded alcohol, 
including licit (or ‘bordeline’) forms such as cross-border shopping,332 and illicit 
ones, such as purification of PDA or CDA moved from another MS,333 were 
                                                          
331 Quantification is based on the assumption that private distillation is used to produce spirits, rather than 
intermediate products, and taxed accordingly. This is in line with the information collected from stakeholders 
on the types of beverages most commonly distilled at home. When reduced rates for small producers are 
available in a country, these are used for quantification, as private distillation is assumed to remain below the 
allowed maximum output. 
332 As in FI and the UK. 
333 As in PL. 
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discussed with public authorities and stakeholders; reportedly, cross-border 
home-distilled products do not represent a significant threat. 
 
 Currently, there is no evidence from the fieldwork that private distillation is 
absorbing significant enforcement resources from public authorities, for various 
reasons. First, as discussed above, private distillation, even in countries where it 
is significant, is considered to be a limited threat to public revenues, both in 
absolute value and in comparison with other tax frauds and types of illicit alcohol. 
Secondly, given the dispersed nature of private distillation, the enforcement of 
this prohibition would require chasing a large number of individuals, each of them 
producing a limited quantity, so that the magnitude of the risk does not justify 
the commitment of significant resources. 
 
 Home distillers potentially face large administrative burdens. Indeed, in the 
countries where home distillation is prohibited, distillation can only take place in a 
licensed distillery. This requires, at a minimum, (i) obtaining an authorisation 
from the (local) customs authority; and (ii) setting up and managing a tax 
warehouse.334 For this reason, it has been underlined by public authorities and 
stakeholders that all private distillers do not attempt to comply with the 
applicable regulatory framework, and thus that no administrative costs or 
burdens arise.335 The situation is different in Austria and Romania, where private 
distillers need to comply with a tailored set of administrative obligations, 
described in Box 19. 
 
 
Box 19 - Administrative costs and burdens for private distillation in Romania 
and Austria 
 
In Austria, licit private distillation takes place under the Hausbrand unter Abfindung regime. The 
private distiller needs (i) to prove that he/she is a farmer, and this is done in the context of the 
access to the common agricultural policy support, thus creating no additional burdens; and (ii) to 
deduct the excises due on the first 15 to 51 hlpa produced, depending on the size of his/her 
household and on his/her region of residence, from the duty payment. As such, accessing the 
Hausbrand exemption triggers no or negligible additional burdens for the private distiller. 
 
In Romania, each person intending to distil spirits at home must notify the customs of the 
equipment at his/her disposal (one-off notification) and of the quantity of alcohol produced (yearly 
registration). The procedures are mostly carried out in paper and by visiting local customs office. 
Compliance with the framework thus generates modest administrative burdens for individuals. 
 
 
Negative impacts from home distillation are considered to be limited, when 
singled out of the general health impacts linked to the consumption of distilled 
products. In particular, home distillation is not associated with hazardous 
consumption patterns. The main additional health risk of private distillation, 
compared to the consumption of commercial spirits, is methanol intoxication. In a 
proper distillation process, most of the methanol is removed from the final 
product; however, if distillation is done incorrectly, excessive amounts of 
methanol may end up in the spirit. That said, most of the clusters of methanol 
intoxications reported in Europe are linked to surrogate alcohol or adulterated 
beverages.336 Italy reported one death due to methanol intoxication from private 
                                                          
334 In the UK, a stakeholder reported that ‘legal home distillation is possible, but the individual would need to 
get a license, set up a tax warehouse, demonstrate to be a ‘fit and proper person’, prepare a viable business 
plan, comply with recordkeeping duties, and calculate and pay the excise. Hence, even though there is not an 
explicit prohibition, in practice there is none to very little legal home distillation’. 
335 See Ramboll Evaluation, at p. 75. 
336 Even in countries such as Poland and Romania, where the magnitude of the phenomenon is larger (based 
on interviews with health institutions or NGOs in these countries). 
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distillation in 2014, while Finland reported none over the recent years.337 With 
respect to per capita alcohol consumption, as in the case of fermented beverages, 
the primary harm from unrecorded alcohol, including home production, arises 
from the fact that it is typically much more accessible than recorded alcohol.338  
 
 Finally, home distillation is not considered to be connected to criminal activities. 
Based on primary information retrieved from public authorities and economic 
operators, criminal activities in the field of illicit alcohol production mostly resort 
to larger scale processes, such as production of surrogate alcohol via purification 
techniques or larger-scale clandestine distillation. 
 
The assessment of the magnitude of the problem, in quantitative terms where possible, 
and of its impacts across the various dimensions considered, is summarised in Table 45. 
 
Table 45 - Baseline assessment of the impacts linked to home distillation 
 Baseline Assessment 
Magnitude of the 
problem 
Negligible to limited in AT, FI, IT and the UK, at 1-3% of the licit spirit market. Modest in 
PL (39,000 hlpa, or about 3.5% of the licit spirit market); more significant in RO (25,000 
hlpa, or about 6% of the licit spirit market) 
 Impacts on the baseline scenario 
Tax revenues The magnitude of impact ranges between a few millions and some tens of millions EUR in 
each of the sample MS. In Romania, the estimated tax losses may amount to ca. 10% of 
the total revenues from ethyl alcohol. 
Market effects 
(including cross-
border) 
No or very limited market effects were reported in AT, FI, IT and the UK; modest in PL, 
and less important than those linked to surrogate alcohol. On the contrary, in RO illicit 
home production is a competitive threat for legal operators. No cross-border impacts due 
to private-distilled beverages could be identified in the sample MS. 
Enforcement 
costs 
Private distillation currently does not absorb significant resources from customs 
authorities, which consider it either a negligible issue (in AT, FI, IT or the UK), and/or a 
lower priority compared to other challenges. 
Administrative 
burdens 
In MS where home distillation is prohibited (AT, FI, IT and PL), the burdens for private 
distillers are theoretically very high, so that in practice no private distiller complies with 
the administrative requirements. In AT and RO, the burdens are negligible to low. 
Health impacts Possibly higher per capita alcohol consumption and related harm due to increased 
accessibility. Higher risk of methanol intoxication from privately-distilled products 
compared to commercial beverages, but very limited adverse events in the sample MS. 
Crime Private distillation has not been associated to criminal activities. This impact category 
appears irrelevant and will not be further considered in the analysis. 
 
 
2.5.2.3  Dynamic baseline scenario 
 
Two main trends will determine the likely evolution of home production in general and of 
private distillation in particular. 
 
(i) General trends in alcohol consumption. WHO data include projections up to 
2025 for total alcohol consumption, which, in the 6 sample MS, is estimated to 
decline by 5% in total, the only two countries on the rise being Finland and the 
UK. 
                                                          
337 Interviews with stakeholders. 
338 See Rehm J., et al. (2010). 
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(ii) Specific trends in home production of the different beverages. Home brewing is 
on the rise in all sample MS and, based on the stakeholders views, at the 
moment there is no sign of deterioration of this tendency. Production of wine 
for own consumption is considered stable over the last decades.339 Private 
distillation is judged to be in decline in most of the sample MS (with the 
possible exception of Romania), due to a combination of factors, such as (i) 
the lower number of people living in rural areas where raw materials are 
available, (ii) changes in the consumers’ lifestyle and preferences, (iii) increase 
in the disposable income (allowing consumers to access more expensive and 
better quality licit alcohol); and (iv) loss of traditional production methods and 
techniques because of the existing prohibition. 
 
The combination of the decline in total alcohol consumption and of the downward drivers 
examined above is likely to determine a reduction of the diffusion of home distillation, 
both in terms of the number of private distillers and the quantity produced.  
 
As far as the political stance of MS authorities is concerned, policy changes are not 
foreseeable at national level. MS in which private distillation is not allowed maintain that 
the situation should not change for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the health 
risks associated with methanol poisoning and the possible increase in the consumption of 
spirits due to the liberalisation of private distillation (even from a symbolic point of 
view). Secondly, even though private distillation is not, in most MS, a risk per se to the 
integrity of public budgets, ethyl alcohol products present a higher risk of tax frauds, and 
hence their production should be more strictly controlled, as it is the case with the 
current regime. MS in which private distillation is allowed consider the current regimes 
as fundamental to preserve their rural traditions, and also that any prohibition would be 
unlikely to alter current practices (i.e. that it would be very difficult to enforce). 
 
 SUMMARY OF PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
Problem drivers Adverse Effects Expected evolution 
Unequal treatment of 
private production of 
alcoholic beverages  
• While home production of fermented 
beverages is possible, duty-free, and 
does not create significant adverse 
effects, home distillation is currently 
prohibited in most of MS. 
• Decline of private distillation, because 
of reduction of total alcohol 
consumption and disappearance of 
traditional productions. 
• No changes in MS’ attitude. 
 
 
  
                                                          
339 See Leifan H., (2001). 
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2.6 Measurement of Plato degree for sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
Article 2 of the Directive defines ‘beer’ as ‘any product falling within CN code 2203340 or 
any product containing a mixture of beer with non-alcoholic drinks falling within CN code 
2206, in either case with an actual alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 0.5% vol’. 
Article 3(1) of the Directive allows for levying excise duty on beer with reference either 
to the Plato degree or actual alcoholic strength by volume (ABV) of the ‘finished 
product’. This Article results in different interpretations when it comes to measuring the 
Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer, i.e. mixture of beer with non-alcoholic 
additives or drinks. Different interpretations may lead to substantial differences in the 
excise duty applied and, in turn, in retail prices and consumption of such product.  
 
This Section provides a baseline assessment of the issue by analysing the concerned 
product, assessing the features and size of the relevant market, discussing the existing 
approaches to measuring the Plato degree and estimating tax revenues generated by 
this type of product. Finally, we review the main policy problems stemming from the 
different approaches in force in EU MS. The analysis covers six sample MS covered by 
fieldwork - i.e. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland and Romania – which account 
for almost 90% of the total consumption of sweetened/flavoured beer in the 14 MS that 
have opted for fixing excise duty with reference to the Plato degree.341 
 
 
2.6.1 Baseline assessment 
 
‘Sweetened/flavoured beer’ refers to a range of products essentially consisting of a 
mixture of standard beer with non-alcoholic additives and/or drinks. In a nutshell, there 
are two main types of sweetened/flavoured beer: 
 
 First, beer mixed with lemonade (or other non-alcoholic beverages and juices like 
ginger ale, apple, grapefruit, or orange juice) typically in a 50:50 ratio, which is 
called ‘radler’ or ‘shandy’ - hereinafter ‘radler’.342 The lemonade is added to the 
‘base beer’, after fermentation. A standard radler contains only 2-2.5% vol of 
alcohol, and even less in some cases.343  
 Second, beer to which a small amount of fruit, juice, sugar and/or fruit or non-
fruit concentrated flavours344 are added - hereinafter ‘other 
sweetened/flavoured beer’). The additive usually makes up only a small part 
of the weight and volume of the final beer; it can be added to the wort, before 
fermentation (e.g. ‘kriek’345), or to the ‘base beer’, after fermentation.346 
 
 
2.6.1.1  The EU market for sweetened/flavoured beer  
 
The EU market for sweetened/flavoured beer is relatively small, but growing. This has 
been confirmed by all relevant stakeholders interviewed during the fieldwork phase. 
Compared to the overall EU beer market, the market share of these products is about 
                                                          
340 This code includes beer made from malt.  
341 The following EU MS apply has opted for the Plato degree approach: AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, EL, ES, IT, LU, MT, 
NL, PL, PT, and RO. 
342 Radler, the German notion for shandy, has become the dominant term. Other words for radler are panaché 
(French) and clara (Spanish). Sometimes the term radler only refers to beer with citrusy additions, 
whereas shandy encompasses also other tastes. In this study, though, radler denotes any roughly 
50:50 mixture of beer and a non-alcoholic beverage like lemonade, juice, ginger ale etc.  
343 Based on the review of a sample of 14 radler products in six MS: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
and Romania. 
344 Certain tequila-flavoured beer is classified as beer under CN code 2203, according to Regulation 1967/2005. 
345 Some types of kriek may also include sugar added after fermentation. 
346 This distinction has been confirmed by economic operators interviewed for this Assignment.  
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2.7% (2015), up from 1.2% in 2010 (see Figure 13).347 Almost half of the EU 
consumption seemingly concentrates in Germany and Poland, which account for three-
quarter of the overall consumption in MS applying the Plato method (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 13 – Market share for sweetened/flavoured beer out of the total market for beer, 
in selected MS 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on IWSR database. 
Note: Belgium includes also Luxembourg. 
 
Figure 14 – Total consumption of sweetened/flavoured beer (2015, hectolitre) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on IWSR database. 
Note: Belgium includes also Luxembourg. 
 
Radler makes up a large portion of sweetened/flavoured beer in Europe, but its relative 
share has recently decreased from 63% in 2010 to 48% in 2015 (see Figure 15), due to 
the more prominent growth of other sweetened/flavoured beer. The market structure 
varies significantly across MS: radler seemingly account for 100% of all 
sweetened/flavoured beers in Austria and Italy,348 75% in Germany, and only 24% in 
Belgium (2015). In some countries like Belgium and Romania, consumption of radler 
increased considerably over the past years in absolute terms.  
                                                          
347 Similar shares are registered in MS applying the Plato method. 
348 Whereas this information has been confirmed by Austrian stakeholders, in Italy there is a small, but 
declining market for flavoured beer, which appears not to be recorded by IWSR data. Nonetheless, the Italian 
market for flavoured beer other than radler is dominated by beer with addition of flavour in the wort produced 
by craft brewers; the Plato degree of such beer is not affected by different measurement approaches (see 
below). Hence, IWSR data allows capturing the entire market relevant to the policy problem discussed in this 
Section of the Study (see below).  
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Figure 15 – Market share of radler and other flavoured beer (2015) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on IWSR database. 
Note: Belgium includes also Luxembourg. 
 
The IWSR database reports a market growth by 6% between 2015 and 2016 for 
sweetened/flavoured beer, and projects a market growth by 8.5% in 2017, to reach total 
consumption of almost 11 million hectolitres. A Technavio study349 forecasts steady 
growth for sweetened/flavoured beer in Europe through 2020, while the demand for 
standard beer is assumed to keep decreasing, due inter alia to increased competition 
from other alcoholic beverages like cider and wine.350 In this context, 
sweetened/flavoured beer is part of a strategy of brewers to innovate and regain market 
shares. This trend involves both mainstream beer brands – many of which have 
introduced sweetened/flavoured beer, and especially radler, in recent years – as well as 
the craft beer industry. In fact, as confirmed by various interviewees, craft brewers 
usually produce speciality beer, which is more often flavoured compared to standard beer 
made by large-scale producers.351  
 
Based on IWSR data, the average price of sweetened/flavoured beer is higher than that 
of standard beer (i.e. 247 €/hl against 215 €/hl). More specifically, radler seems on 
average cheaper (170 €/hl) while other sweetened/flavoured beer seems much more 
expensive (318 €/hl) than standard beer. Indeed, other sweetened/flavoured beer are 
generally marketed as premium product.352 A recent Technavio study predicts that 70% 
of sweetened/flavoured lager will be in the premium lager category in the period 2016-
2020. These considerations have been confirmed by most of beer producers interviewed 
for this Study, who explained that production costs for other sweetened/flavoured beer 
tend to be higher than production costs for standard beer. 
 
 
2.6.1.2  Application of the Plato method to sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
                                                          
349 For further details see DBR, ‘Study says increasing demand for craft beer will boost Europe's beer market 
through 2020’, 2017 http://beer.drinks-business-review.com/news/demand-for-low-or-non-alcoholic-beer-to-
grow-in-europe-through-2020-030117-5708450 (last accessed on 10 July 2017).  
350 For further details, see Datamonitor, ‘New Developments in Radlers, Shandies, and Pre-Mixed Beer Drinks’, 
2013, executive summary available at https://www.slideshare.net/cteahan/new-developments-in-radlers-
shandies-and-premixed-beer-drinks (last accessed on 10 July 2017) (2013) and DBR (2017) 
351 See, for instance, ‘US beer market is bursting with flavour: 80% increase in flavoured beer launches 2010-
15’ at http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/food-and-drink/us-beer-market-is-bursting-with-flavor-80-
increase-in-flavored-beer-launches-2010-15 (last accessed on 10 July 2017); and ‘Celebrating the small, 
independent and traditional craft brewers’ https://www.brewersassociation.org/communicating-craft/celebrating-
small-independent-traditional-craft-brewers/ (last accessed on 10 July 2017). 
352 For further details see Datamonitor (2013). 
100%
24%
75%
100%
29%
78%
48%
76%
25%
71%
22%
52%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Austria Belgium Germany Italy Poland Romania EU28
Radler Other flavoured beer
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
163 
 
As seen, Article 3(1) of the Directive allows MS to levy excise duty on beer by reference 
either to the number of hectolitre/degrees Plato, or the number of hectolitre/degrees of 
actual ABV. A succinct review of the two measurement methods is provided in Box 20. 
 
 
Box 20 – Overview of ABV v. Plato degree measurement methods 
 
Table 46 provides a summary of the main differences between the ABV and Plato methods. 
 
Table 46 – Key differences between ABV and degree Plato 
ABV Degree Plato 
Global standard Only used in 14 EU countries 
Used as indicator for consumers and often also for 
taxation 
Used for taxation in some countries 
Used in production process to estimate 
fermentability of the wort 
Measures percentage of ethanol by volume Measures percentage of extract by weight 
Measured with hydrometer Measured with refractometer or hydrometer 
No linear conversion is possible, but approximately 0.4 ABV = 1° Plato 
 Source: Author’s elaboration of interviews with stakeholders and desk research. 
 
ABV is the standard measure of alcohol content in fluids. It is used globally by producers and serves as a 
universal indicator for consumers. As for beer, ABV is estimated by measuring the density of the beer. At 
20°C, it measures the number of millilitres of pure ethanol present in 100ml of a solution. In fermentation, 
yeast produces alcohol from sugar. Sugar density in water is larger than alcohol density. Hence, by 
comparing the beer density before and after fermentation, the volume of alcohol can be estimated. Density 
is usually derived from specific gravity, which is measured with a hydrometer. The specific gravity is the 
ratio of the density of the liquid to the density of water. Consequently, the following formula measures 
alcohol by volume: 
  
ABV = 131.25(OG – FG),353 where OG denotes the original gravity (before fermentation) and FG the final 
gravity (after fermentation) of the beer. 
 
The Plato method differs from ABV in that it seeks to estimate the concentration of extract in a fluid as a 
percentage by weight. For example, in a 12° Plato beer the extract makes up 12g per 100g of wort. The 
extract contains mainly sugar derived from malt, but can also include other soluble material in the wort. 
For a brewer, the Plato approach exhibits the advantage of measuring the beer in terms of the amount of 
fermentable materials (sugars) in the wort. The Plato method focuses on the real weight of the extract, 
rather than a relative density compared to the density of water (like ABV). Plato is a method traditionally 
applied in central Europe. It is used in 14 EU countries to report alcohol content for taxation purposes (see 
below). 
 
Reportedly, it is not possible to create an exact conversion table between Plato degree and ABV. Therefore, 
measuring Plato and ABV strength require different tests. The approximate conversion is not linear, but 
roughly 1 Plato degree equals 0.4% vol.354 
 
 
Figure 16 shows that half of the MS apply excise duty on beer by relying on the Plato 
method (white) and the other half base their excise duty on ABV measurement (dark 
blue).355 
 
                                                          
353 Sometimes 133 is used instead of 131.25 as the constant, depending on the °C at which ABV is measured.  
354 See European Commission, ‘EU rules for the taxation of alcohol’, 2016; and London Economics (2010). 
355 For further details, see the Ramboll Evaluation (2016). 
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Figure 16 – Application of the Plato or ABV method to establish the excise duty on beer 
across MS. 
 
Source: Ramboll Evaluation (2016). 
 
 
2.6.1.3  Production process for sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
To understand the options of measuring the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer, it 
is useful to consider the production process, which consists of three main steps (see 
Figure 17): 
 
(i) First, the wort is created from the blending of crushed malted barley and hot 
water. For instance, as shown in Figure 17, 100kg of unfermented wort contain 
88kg of water, 8.85kg of ‘fermentable extract’, and 3.15kg of ‘non-fermentable 
(or real) extract’. 
(ii) Second, fermentation converts part of the ‘fermentable extract’ into alcohol. The 
wort turns into the ‘base beer’. However, not all ‘fermentable extract’ is 
transformed into alcohol. In 1843, the Bohemian scientist Karl Balling found that 
2.066g of ‘fermentable extract’ created 1.000g of alcohol and 1.066g of by-
products (e.g. brewers’ yeast and CO2). This ratio is fixed and is hence used to 
calculate the Plato degree of beer. The by-product is usually removed from the 
base beer, which in the example below after fermentation only weighs 95.44kg. 
(iii) Finally, to obtain sweetened/flavoured beer, additional unfermented sugar/flavour 
is added to the ‘base beer’ (e.g. 3kg in the example below, which reflects the 
brewing process for sweetened/flavoured beer other than radler). Consequently, 
the sweetened/flavoured beer is heavier than the base beer (98.44kg in Figure 
17). ‘Present extract’ is calculated as the sum of the ‘real extract’ and the added 
sugar/flavour in the sweetened/flavoured beer (6.15kg in the example). 
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Figure 17 – The production process for sweetened/flavoured beer and determination of 
extract 
 
Source: Brewers of Europe.356 
Note: This example describes the production process of sweetened/flavoured beer other to which 
sugar/flavour is added after fermentation. 
 
Before discussing the different approaches to measure the strength of 
sweetened/flavoured beer via the Plato method, two caveats are required: 
 
 The brewing process in Figure 17 is relevant only for sweetened/flavoured beer 
to which sugar/flavour is added after fermentation. Flavoured beer with additives 
included in the wort usually do not undergo the subsequent sweetening process. 
Additives included in the wort are either transformed into alcohol or part of non-
fermented (real) extract. 
 The example in Figure 17 corresponds to the production of sweetened/flavoured 
beer other than radler as a relatively small amount of sugar/flavour is added. For 
a typical radler, the base beer is mixed with a larger quantity of lemonade 
(typically 50:50 proportion), so both water and sugar are added to prepare the 
final product. For instance, 100 kg of lemonade (90 kg of water plus 10kg sugar 
and lemon flavour) may be added to the base beer instead of the 3kg of sugar in 
the example above. In this case, the final beer would weigh 195.44kg and the 
present extract would weigh 13.15kg. 
 
 
2.6.1.4  Approaches to measuring the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer  
 
Article 3(1) of the Directive requires MS to calculate the Plato degree of ‘finished 
products’, yet the Directive does neither clarify what is a ‘finished product’ in the case of 
a sweetened/flavoured beer nor provide guidance on the correct method to measure its 
Plato degree. So, three different interpretations and measurement methods exist to 
                                                          
356 Brewers of Europe (18 May 2016), ‘European approach to calculation of Plato’, presentation. 
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determine the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer.357 The first takes into account 
only the ingredients of the base beer, whereas the second and third approach consider 
also the ingredients added later in the process. A technical review is provided in the 
following sub-sections.  
 
 APPROACH A: MEASURING THE PLATO DEGREE BEFORE ADDING SUGAR/FLAVOURS 
 
This approach aims to calculate the Plato degree of the base beer, prior to the addition 
of sugar/flavours. This is similar to calculating the Plato degree of non-sweetened or 
non-flavoured beer. In this case, one calculates the Plato degree based on the Balling 
formula using the real extract and mass of the base beer (Figure 17). The alcohol 
strength of the base beer in Plato degree is measured as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 =
(2.066𝑥𝐴𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙) + 𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕
𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟 + (1.066𝑥𝐴𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙)
∗ 100 
 
Therefore, following the example provided in Figure 17, the base beer is brewed at 12° 
Plato: 
 
(2.066 ∗ 4.29𝑘𝑔) + 3.15𝑘𝑔
95.44𝑘𝑔 + (1.066 ∗ 4.29𝑘𝑔)
∗ 100 = 𝟏𝟐 ° 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒐 
 
This approach, which is reportedly applied by Romanian authorities, focuses entirely on 
the features of the base beer. In fact, the quantity of water/sugar added to obtain the 
sweetened/flavoured beer has no impact on the Plato degree of the base beer. For tax 
purposes, approach A requires to apply the excise duty only to the quantity of base beer 
contained in the sweetened/flavoured beer. For instance, a consumer of radler including 
50% of beer at 12° Plato and 50% of lemonade, would pay excise duty only on 50% of 
the content of the purchased bottle/can. 
 
There is no difference between approach A and the two other approaches (B1, B2) 
described below with regard to sweetened/flavoured beer to which additives are included 
already in the wort; in such a case, the base beer corresponds to the bottled product and 
the real extract corresponds to the present extract. 
 
 APPROACH B1: MEASURING THE PLATO DEGREE AFTER ADDING SUGAR/FLAVOURS, ON 
THE REAL EXTRACT 
 
This approach aims to calculate the Plato degree of the sweetened/flavoured product 
after the addition of sugar/flavours, by taking into account the ‘non-fermented (real) 
extract’, i.e. the extract of the base beer without considering sugar/flavours added to the 
sweetened/flavoured beer after fermentation, and the total mass of the 
sweetened/flavoured beer. The approach best reflects the actual alcohol content of the 
product, and is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 =
(2.066𝑥𝐴𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙) + 𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕
𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟 + (1.066𝑥𝐴𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙)
∗ 100 
 
In our example, this approach yields 11.7° Plato for the sweetened/flavoured beer. 
 
(2.066 ∗ 4.29𝑘𝑔) + 3.15𝑘𝑔
98.44𝑘𝑔 + (1.066 ∗ 4.29𝑘𝑔)
∗ 100 = 𝟏𝟏. 𝟕° 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒐 
                                                          
357 Approaches to measure the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer that are assessed in this Study have 
been selected because they either are currently applied by EU MS or will be potentially adopted in coming 
years.  
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According to some stakeholders this approach might be introduced by Italian authorities, 
which currently use the approach B2, below.358  
 
 APPROACH B2: MEASURING THE PLATO DEGREE AFTER ADDING SUGAR/FLAVOURS, ON 
THE PRESENT EXTRACT 
 
This approach aims to calculate the Plato degree of the sweetened/flavoured product 
after the addition of sugar/flavours, by taking into account the ‘present extract’, i.e. the 
extract of the sweetened/flavoured beer also considering the sugar/flavours included in 
the sweetened/flavoured product, and the total mass of the sweetened/flavoured beer. It 
is calculated by applying this formula: 
 
(2.066xAlcohol) + 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐞𝐱𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭
Mass of beer + (1.066xAlcohol)
∗ 100 = 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜 
 
In our example, this approach leads to 14.57° Plato: 
 
(2.066x4.29kg) + 6.15kg
98.44kg + (1.066x4.29kg)
∗ 100 = 𝟏𝟒. 𝟓𝟕 𝒅𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒐 
 
Reportedly, this is the most used approach by tax authorities in Plato countries. Among 
surveyed countries, it is applied in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Poland (Table 47). 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that this approach may overestimate the Plato degree of 
the sweetened/flavoured beer (see below); for this reason, the beer industry claims this 
method is technically incorrect. Reportedly, there is virtually no difference between 
method B1 and method B2 in case of artificial sweeteners (e.g. aspartame), as such 
sweeteners can be identified by customs lab and excluded from the calculation of the 
present extract.359 
 
Table 47 – Approaches adopted by sample MS to measuring the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
Approach A Approach B1 Approach B2 
Romania 
Italy(?) (possible transition from 
current approach B2)* 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Poland. 
Source: Author’s elaboration of interviews with stakeholders. 
 
 
2.6.1.5  Tax revenues from sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
To estimate tax revenues from consumption of sweetened/flavoured beer, it is necessary 
to rely on some assumptions regarding their average Plato degree (Table 48). In this 
respect, a distinction between radler and other sweetened/flavoured beer has to be 
made. Based on interviews with stakeholders and expert assessment, it is reasonable to 
assume that a ‘typical’ radler contains 50% of low gravity base beer (at about 11° Plato) 
and 50% of lemonade. By applying the formulas above, this would lead to a Plato degree 
between 5.5° (approach A) to 10° (approach B2). By contrast, a ‘typical’ 
sweetened/flavoured beer with concentrate additive added after fermentation would 
                                                          
358 See Article 35 of ‘Decreto Legislativo 504/1995’ as recently amended by Decreto Legge 193/2016 converted 
into law with amendments by Legge 225/2016. The provision requires secondary rules for its implementation 
(e.g. establishing the point of measurement, approved equipment etc.) However, it is unlikely that these rules 
will be adopted prior to the CJEU pending ruling on case C-30/17. 
359 Tax authorities interviewed for this Study argued that few brewers actually use sweeteners instead of sugar, 
which shows the extra excise duty is not a high burden for them. By contrast, brewers explained that the 
choice to use sugar rather than artificial sweetener is driven by marketing considerations, e.g. using only 
natural ingredients, rather than by cost considerations, e.g. tax savings. 
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reflect the example in Figure 17 above and have a Plato degree ranging from 11.7° to 
14.6°. 
 
Table 48 – Composition and typical strength of sweetened/flavoured beer 
 Radler (50% lemonade) 
Other sweetened/flavoured beer 
(Additive added after fermentation) 
Alcohol 4.495 kg 4.495 kg 
Real extract 2.200 kg 3.301 kg 
Mass of the base beer 100 kg 100 kg 
Sugar added 9 kg 3.143 kg 
Water added 91 kg 0 kg 
Mass of the sweetened beer 200 kg 103.143 kg 
Plato degree (approach A) 5.5° (base beer at 11.0°) 12.0° 
Plato degree (approach B1) 5.6° 11.7° 
Plato degree (approach B2) 10.0° 14.6° 
Source: Author’s elaboration of interviews with stakeholders and expert assessment. 
 
By relying on the average Plato degree in Table 48, the market data presented above, 
and based on the approaches adopted by MS authorities, the tax revenues from excise 
duty on sweetened/flavoured beer would range from EUR 2.3 million in Romania to EUR 
58.6 million in Poland, leading to a total of about EUR 106 million in the six surveyed 
countries (2015 data). To put these numbers in context, this is equal to ca. 1% of the 
total excise duty revenues from beer in Italy and Romania, and to almost 7% in Belgium 
and Poland (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 18 – Excise duty revenues from sweetened/flavoured beer (2015, € ‘000) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series.  
Note: Estimate on typical radler and other sweetened/flavoured beer (see Table 48). Approach A adopted in 
Romania. Approach B2 applied in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Poland. 
 
Figure 19 – Excise duty revenues from sweetened/flavoured beer out of total tax 
revenues on beer (2015) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series (2015 and 2016 for tax receipts). 
Note: Estimate on typical radler and other sweetened/flavoured beer (see Table 48). Approach A adopted in 
Romania. Approach B2 applied in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Poland. 
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The estimates above are based on the assumption that all sweetened/flavoured beer 
consumed in the six sampled MS is prepared by including some sugar/flavour added 
after fermentation. In fact, data available (IWSR) does not allow identifying beer to 
which flavour is only added in the wort. As each of the approaches presented above (A, 
B1 and B2) results in the same Plato degree for beer flavoured in the wort, this 
assumption leads to an upper bound estimate of the market affected by the policy 
problem discussed below. 
 
 
2.6.2 Problem analysis 
 
Since there are no harmonised rules on how to measure the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer, MS may either define the ‘finished product’ as the quantity of 
base beer in the mixture and apply approach A; or they may define the ‘finished product’ 
as the entire quantity of sweetened/flavoured beer and opt for either approach B1 or B2 
above.360 As discussed, whereas the different approaches have no impact on measuring 
the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer with additives included in the wort, they 
have a significant impact on measuring the Plato degree of radler and other 
sweetened/flavoured beer with additives added after fermentation. Against this 
background, the adoption by MS of approach A, B1, or B2 affects the level of excise duty 
applied, the price paid by consumers and the tax revenues generated by such products. 
Depending on which approach is chosen, the result can be that a different excise duty is  
applied to products with the same alcoholic content (Table 49). Based on that, some 
beer producers claims that an incorrect method of measuring the Plato degree may 
ultimately lead to distortions of competition.361 
 
Table 49 – Estimated excise duty for sweetened/flavoured beer under the different 
approaches (per hl of product) 
  
Excise duty on 
beer 
Approach A Approach B1 Approach B2 
  
(EUR/hl/° 
Plato) 
Excise duty 
per hl (EUR) 
Excise duty 
per hl (EUR) 
Excise duty 
per hl (EUR) 
Austria 
Radler 
2.00 
10.96 11.22 20.01 
Other sweetened/ 
flavoured beer 
24.02 23.32 29.15 
Belgium 
Radler 
1.85 
10.12 10.36 18.48 
Other sweetened/ 
flavoured beer 
22.19 21.54 26.92 
Germany 
Radler 
0.79 
4.31 4.41 7.87 
Other sweetened/ 
flavoured beer 
9.45 9.18 11.47 
Italy 
Radler 
3.04 
16.66 17.05 30.41 
Other sweetened/ 
flavoured beer 
36.52 35.45 44.30 
Poland 
Radler 
1.86 
10.19 10.43 18.61 
Other sweetened/ 
flavoured beer 
22.34 21.69 27.11 
Romania 
Radler 
0.88 
4.84 4.96 8.84 
Other sweetened/ 
flavoured beer 
10.62 10.31 12.88 
Source: Author’s elaboration of EDT series (2015). 
Note: Estimate on typical radler and other sweetened/flavoured beer (see Table 48).  
 
The issue has already caused a few disputes between brewers and tax authorities, and 
generated judicial costs and other unduly burdens. For instance, in Germany, a brewer 
went to court in 1997 seeking to have its radler taxed based on method B1 rather than 
                                                          
360 It is worth remarking that approaches to measure the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer that are 
assessed in this Study have been selected because they either are currently applied by some EU MS (A and B2) 
or will be potentially adopted in coming years (B1).  
361 See also Ramboll Evaluation (2016). 
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B2.362 The national court finally decided against the brewer’s plead in 2004, and since 
then there have not been further complaints against the use of method B2 in Germany. 
More recently a similar case has been brought to court by a Polish brewer (see Box 21); 
this case has been referred to the CJEU (C-30/17 - Kompania Piwowarska). 
 
 
Box 21 - The Court of Justice case C-30/17: Kompania Piwowarska (Poland) 
 
As mentioned, the Directive does not provide a definition of ‘finished product’ to measure beer strength. 
This may lead to litigation between beer producers and tax authorities, especially when it comes to the 
application of the Plato method to sweetened/flavoured beer. A case in point is the recent lawsuit that has 
been referred by the Director of the Customs Chamber in Poznan to the CJEU. The case opposes a Polish 
beer company producing sweetened/flavoured beer and the Polish tax authority. The different views of the 
brewer and the Polish tax authority can be summarised as follows. 
 
The brewer argues that the strength of the sweetened/flavoured beer in Plato degree should be measured 
accounting for the ‘real extract’ (method B1) rather than ‘present extract’ (method B2) of the final product. 
Including the sugar added after fermentation in the extract figure would be a technically wrong 
measurement, because this sugar does not add to alcohol formation. By contrast, the Polish tax authority 
requires method B2, i.e. measuring the Plato degree on the basis of the present extract, including the 
sugar added after fermentation.  
 
The Polish case clearly demonstrates the importance of the problem for both beer producers and tax 
authorities. By adopting the brewer’s approach, the beer producer (tax authorities) must pay (receive) PLN 
87.8, whereas by adopting the tax authority’s approach it must pay (receive) PLN 109.8 (figures 
correspond to the example in Figure 17) per hectolitre of beer. Different interpretation of the way of 
applying the Plato method to sweetened/flavoured beer can lead to differences in excise duty for the same 
product. This case is further complicated by the fact that the brewer is asking to retroactively apply method 
B1 in order to recover excise duty paid in excess in past years. 
 
The CJEU is called to rule on whether the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer should be measured by 
considering either the ‘real extract’ or the ‘present extract’. It is worth noting that the Court is not asked to 
decide whether the calculation of the Plato degree should be done before adding sugar (i.e. on the ‘base 
beer’) or after adding sugar (i.e. on sweetened beer). In this respect, both the brewer and the tax 
authority agree that sweetened beer is the ‘finished product’ for excise duty purposes. 
 
 
Approaches A and B1 generate some problems when it comes to enforcement, since 
national authorities are reportedly not able to measure the Plato degree of the base beer 
by analysing the content of the bottled product. The customs laboratories interviewed for 
this Study have explained that, currently, there is no method to distinguish the base 
beer and lemonade or other additives after mixing. Therefore, any check should be done 
on the production site by measuring both the Plato degree of the base beer and the 
quantity of base beer included in the end-product. In the same vein, with few exceptions 
(e.g. when the beer is sweetened/flavoured by artificial sweeteners, which are 
unambiguously different from sugar in real extract), it is not possible to distinguish 
between the real extract and the present extract by analysing the bottled product. 
Again, checks need to be performed on the production site by measuring the real extract 
used to produce the base beer. In this context, enforcement problems become more 
prominent when it comes to applying excise duty on sweetened/flavoured beer moved 
from another MS, as tax authorities could hardly perform checks in plants based in a 
different country. 
 
Finally, any change in excise duty would be likely reflected in a change in price and, in 
turn, in consumption of sweetened/flavoured beer. Distortions in prices and consumption 
may also engender, to a minor extent, public health policy issues.363 For instance, 
sweetened/flavoured beer is thought to be more attractive for women and young 
consumers and both are not established beer drinking groups, which is confirmed by the 
                                                          
362 For further details, see https://www.jurion.de/urteile/bfh/2006-03-28/vii-r-39_04/ last accessed 
31.07.2017. 
363 See also IIA (2017). 
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fact that 40% of radler drinkers are new to the beer category.364 However, research has 
shown that marketing plays a greater role in attracting these consumer groups than the 
actual content/taste of a beer.365 On the other hand, radler contains less alcohol (2-2.5% 
vol) than standard beer, so it may eventually reduce the overall alcohol intake and - as 
discussed in Section 2.4 - have positive public health impacts. 
 
 SUMMARY OF PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
Problem drivers Adverse Effects Expected evolution 
Unclear definition of 
finished product and lack 
of guidance on the most 
correct approach to 
measure the Plato 
degree when it comes to 
sweetened/flavoured 
beer  
 
 
• Beer products with the same alcohol 
content may be taxed differently, 
thus leading to unfair competition 
• Beer producers and tax authorities 
disagree on measurement of the 
Plato degree, thus leading to legal 
proceedings  
• Approaches A and B1 do not allow 
customs lab to perform checks on 
bottled product, thus generating 
enforcement problems and costs  
• Tax on sweetened/flavoured beer is 
computed differently in different MS, 
possibly affecting competitiveness 
and demand.  
• The CJEU is called to decide whether 
the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer should be 
measured by adopting approach B1 
or B2 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
364 For further details, see Datamonitor (2013). 
365 For further details, see WHO, ‘Global status report: alcohol and young people’, 2001; and: ‘Beer and Health: 
Moderate consumption as part of a healthy lifestyle’, at http://beerandhealth.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/beer-and-health-web.pdf (last accessed on 10 July 2017). Stakeholders have also 
confirmed this statement.  
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3 DEFINITION AND IMPACT ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS 
 
3.1 Classification of alcoholic beverages 
 
3.1.1 Overview 
 
 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS 
 
The purpose of this Section is to develop a set of policy options to address the three 
problem areas extensively analysed in the previous Section 2.1 (‘classification issues’) 
and estimate the nature and the magnitude of their impact if they were adopted. The 
policy options retained for the analysis were preliminarily identified during the Inception 
Phase, in the light of the recommendations of the Ramboll Evaluation and the following 
DG TAXUD’s Report and Inception Impact Assessment. Based on the evidence collected 
from the fieldwork and the results of the baseline assessment, they have been refined 
and further developed. We have discarded at an early stage the options that appeared 
clearly unfeasible or ineffective or manifestly inferior to similar solutions, and we focus in 
this Section on more realistic ones.  
 
For each of the problems identified we provide (i) a definition of the policy options 
considered (and an explanation for those not considered); (ii) the identification of the 
relevant impact areas, including both intended and unintended effects; and (iii) a 
measurement of the magnitude of the impact expected, based on a triangulation of 
quantitative methods – when feasible and relevant – and qualitative evidence (interviews 
and OPC results). 
 
Certain problems may have more than one possible solution, either alternative or 
complementary. When certain solutions appear as variants of the same approach they 
have been discussed jointly, otherwise they have been presented separately. This is the 
case with the broad issue concerning the scope of the OFB category for which three main 
approaches have been identified (Figure 20). The analysis of impact is instead organised 
by impact area and covers jointly the different solutions and variants proposed so as to 
highlight the differences in the expected results.                
 
Figure 20 – Correspondence between classification problem areas and selected policy 
options   
 
 
 
        
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 THE OVERALL STAKEHOLDERS’ FEEDBACK ON A POSSIBLE REVISION OF THE DIRECTIVE  
 
Before delving into a systematic assessment of the options for change it is useful to 
highlight that the evidence collected from stakeholders’ consultation suggests there is a 
quite low appetite for major changes of the Directive. According to OPC results, there is 
Uncertain scope of the 
OFB category   
Unclear application of 
the ‘entirely fermented 
origin’ provision   
Indefinite EPC for wine 
and OFB   
I – Clarify the excise duty structure for ‘borderline’ products     
II - Introduce a differentiation in the OFB tax category       
III – ‘Soft’ policy approaches and measures outside of the 
scope of the Directive        
IV - Clarify the treatment of alcohol added as a flavour-carrier       
V - Create separate EPC for OFB     
PROBLEM AREAS         SELECTED APPROACHES ANALYSED 
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limited need to reconsider the classification of certain ‘borderline’ products in order to 
achieve a more equitable tax treatment. As shown in Figure 21, only the beer industry 
would be in favour of reviewing the way certain fermented beverages are treated (RTDs 
and medium/high strength beverages with a fermented base). 
 
The feedbacks collected through in-depth interviews concur on the fact that the origin of 
classification problems lies outside of Directive 92/83/EEC, and should be rather sought 
in the CN classification rules and/or in the disparities in national sectoral legislation. In 
particular, economic operators generally admit that the current rules are complex but do 
not hamper  the functioning of the Single market, whereas a revision of the Directive 
would only modestly address existing problems but might translate into new problems 
and distortions. National administrations have more mixed views than the industry, and 
some concede there would be added value in establishing clearer and common criteria 
for distinguishing between CN 2206 and CN 2208, as well as in a few other ‘surgical’ 
interventions on the text of the Directive (e.g. on the notion ‘entirely fermented origin’). 
The limited economic importance of ‘borderline’ products (as compared to beer, wine and 
spirits) may play a role in it, and some public authorities questioned the proportionality 
of a regulatory change motivated by such a small issue. 
 
For completeness, it is worth summarising the main points of a recently issued REFIT 
Platform Opinion that addressed some of the present issues.366 In particular, it emerged 
that while various Member States support more accurate definitions and greater clarity 
in legislation in order to reduce legal uncertainty, views are divided on whether this 
should be achieved by establishing common thresholds on the amount of fermented 
alcohol used in mixtures. More generally, the debate showed also the persistence of 
divided views on the structure of excise duty, with some MS that would be in favour of 
taxation per alcohol content, while for other MS the current rules should not be touched, 
since are the result  of  a  compromise aiming  at  safeguarding  the  specific interests  
of  the  Member  States  while permitting a minimum harmonisation of excise duties. As 
discussed in the Introduction, the revision of excise duty structures adopting a ‘per 
alcohol content’ approach – which is supported inter alia by various public health 
stakeholders and some segments of the industry – is outside of the scope of this 
regulatory revision process, hence is not covered in this IA Study. It is nonetheless 
worth mentioning that at ITEG level, there seems to be interest by certain MS to 
promote a mixed approach on this issue, and revise the Directive in a way that each MS 
may decide whether to tax wine, OFB and IP per volume of finished product (as it is 
today) or per degree of actual alcoholic strength.367         
  
                                                          
366 REFIT  Platform  Opinion  on  the  submission  by the Scottish  Council  for  Development  and  Industry  
and a Member   of   the   REFIT   Platform   Stakeholder group  on  the  common  interpretation of  EU  laws  
on Wine and Spirits Date of Adoption: 07/06/2017. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/xviii12abinterpretationeulawswine.pdf 
367 Reported by DG TAXUD on 02.10.2017. 
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Figure 21 – OPC results for Question #13 
Q13: The current classification rules may create situations where certain new beverages may be 
placed on the market at a relatively affordable price, due to a favourable tax treatment. In your 
opinion is there a general need to reconsider the tax treatment of the following types of products? 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an interest 
in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry stakeholders with 
an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, public authorities, 
industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
 
To conclude, it is also interesting to briefly review the stakeholders’ position with respect 
to the basic principles that should guide any possible revision of the tax classification 
rules, as emerged from the OPC (Figure 22). A clear majority of the industry disagrees 
with establishing a different tax treatment for new mixed drinks, whereas private 
individuals tend to agree with it. Similarly, the industry opposes any special treatment of 
products intended for the young persons, while private individuals and some other types 
of respondent are in favour. Mixed views exist with respect to ‘cleaned-up’ fermented 
bases: individual respondents, the beer industry and part of the cider industry believe a 
fiscal distinction is needed, while the wine and spirit industries are against it. 
Unsurprisingly, the taxation of products that are equivalent for consumers but based on 
fermented or distilled alcohol divides the industry, with producers of fermented 
beverages (beer, wine and OFB) in favour of different levels of taxation depending on 
the base (fermented or distilled), and spirits producers advocating for an equal 
treatment, regardless of the base. At the moment, the consumers have limited 
information on the alcohol base (and blends) used in certain beverages, and nearly all 
respondents agree that consumers’ awareness is a fundamental principle. Finally, all 
respondent groups agree that wines and beers using alcohol as flavour-carrier should not 
be taxed more heavily because of it. 
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Figure 22 – OPC results for Question #16 
Q16: In your opinion, which principles should guide a possible revision of the tax classification of 
alcoholic beverages? Please express your agreement / disagreement with the following 
statements. 
 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an interest 
in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry stakeholders with 
an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, public authorities, 
industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
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3.1.2 Review the scope of the tax category for ‘other fermented beverage’ 
 
3.1.2.1 Definition of policy options 
 
 CLARIFY THE EXCISE DUTY STRUCTURE FOR ‘BORDERLINE’ PRODUCTS (OPTION I)     
 
The first approach considered consists of refining the current definition of certain excise 
duty categories so as to reduce the risk of disparities of treatment and/or unduly 
favourable treatment of ‘borderline’ products, but without changing the five-category 
fundamental structure of the Directive. As discussed at length in the previous Section, 
the classification issues examined here regard the distinction between CN 2206 and CN 
2208 and the ‘subjective’ criteria introduced by the CJEU jurisprudence and adopted in 
CNEN note 2206 00, which opened the CN 2208 heading also to beverages that are not 
based on alcohol from distillation. In particular, ‘borderline’ products include beverages 
based on ‘cleaned-up’ fermented alcohol and mixtures of alcohol of different sources and 
other substances, for which the essential character of a certain fermented beverage is 
possibly lost. In the absence of clear and harmonised criteria for establishing under 
which conditions this essential character (i.e. taste, smell, and appearance) is 
maintained or lost, each MS adopts different approaches and methods, thus resulting in 
disparities of treatment. 
 
Under the current system the customs classification determines the excise duty 
category. Once a beverage is classified as CN 2208 it can be taxed only under Article 20 
(Ethyl alcohol), while if classified as CN 2206 it may fall under Article 12 (OFB) or Article 
17 (Intermediate Products) depending on its strength, but not under Article 20.368 In 
other words, since the excise duty classification comes after the CN classification, tax 
administrations have limited room for manoeuvre in applying the category that they 
consider appropriate for products that come with a CN code they disagree with. In 
principle, tax administrations might challenge questionable CN coding decisions, but 
when these are covered by a BTI issued in another MS they generally opt for avoiding 
disputes. The consequence is that similar products may end up being excised differently 
depending on the country of origin. The problem is possibly made more acute by the fact 
that - according to some anecdotal evidence from interviews – products intended for 
cross-border trade might be subject to less controls and/or to a more flexible 
classification than products for the domestic market. 
 
To redress this situation, a first possible option is to make the tax classification of these 
products not so strictly determined by the customs classification. The excise definition of 
products should evidently remain linked to the CN heading, but the criteria that today 
determine if a borderline product should fall under Article 20 or not could be established 
explicitly in the tax regulation rather than derived from the prior CN code. This approach 
would be inter alia consistent with the principle that CN codes are for ‘tarification’ 
purposes and may be inappropriate to determine the excise duty treatment of products 
that were not on the market when Directive 92/83/EEC was adopted.  
 
In practice, this would translate into introducing in the Directive the same CJEU principle 
that currently inform CN classification, which establish that a fermented-base beverage 
that has lost its essential character (taste, smell, and appearance) can be assimilated to 
a distilled-base beverage, and excised in accordance with Article 20. This approach 
would require to amend the text of the Directive: 
 
 excluding from the scope of Article 12 and Article 17 products that have lost their 
essential fermented character; and 
                                                          
368 Actually, it may fall under Article 20 if its ABV exceeds 22% vol, but this is mostly a theoretical case with no 
correspondences in the market. 
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 allowing under Article 20 products coming under CN 2206 of any ABV strength 
(the denomination of the category might be revised accordingly). 
 
Under this approach, MS may consistently tax under Article 20 any ‘borderline’ product 
that is considered as having lost its essential fermented character, regardless of the fact 
that it comes under CN 2206, with or without a BTI. Incidentally, it has to be noted that 
the correspondence between the CN and the excise duty system is already ‘many-to-
many’, so this amendment would not particularly disrupt the concordance mechanism. 
Ideally, this policy change may lead to:  
 
 full coherence in the way similar products are excised in each geographical 
market (the tax category is no longer determined by prior CN classification 
decisions issued in other countries) and, by consequence, equal treatment of 
domestic and foreign products with similar characteristics; 
 reduced need for BTIs, and possibly reduced recourse to the CN 2208 heading for 
non-distilled beverages – which is at present the only instrument that authorities 
have to pursue restrictive excise duty policies - hence more consistency in the 
application of this code to spirits and liqueurs. 
 
On the other hand, this approach seems less robust in ensuring a coherent treatment of 
the same products across different MS. This will essentially depend on the common rules 
and criteria that will be established to determine when a product has actually lost its 
essential fermented character. The more these criteria are unambiguous, objectively-
measurable and agreed among MS authorities, the lower the risk of disparities of 
treatment. Such criteria should not be laid down in the text of the Directive but defined 
in detailed operational terms in guidelines or recommendations developed by a joint 
technical working group and adopted at ITEG level (non-regulatory measure). This 
approach would have the advantages of allowing some flexibility in the concrete 
implementation of criteria at MS-level – in line with the specificities of national markets – 
and of facilitating its periodical updating. Based on the feedbacks collected these 
guidelines should, among other things: 
 
 Set the maximum amount of distilled alcohol that can be added to a fermented 
beverage before it becomes prevalent for categorisation purposes, and this both 
in terms of contribution to the total ABV and/or overall volume of the end-
product. 
 Establish if, and to what extent, the addition of other substances like water, 
sugar, cream etc. may per se affect the fermented character of a beverage or 
not, and the criteria thereof. 
 Establish common methods and analytical parameters to deal with ‘cleaned-up’ 
alcohol, both as an end-product or a base for other beverages. Ideally, the 
approach should be oriented to the final product and not to the production 
processes. The risks of making reference to specific procedures like reverse 
osmosis, cryoextraction etc. include: (i) technology evolves, and any rule linked 
to it may become rapidly obsolete; (ii) under certain circumstances, these 
processes are admitted oenological practices, and it might be considered 
discriminatory if they concur to categorise OFB but not wine.  
 
The proposed guidelines would not be binding so a certain disparity of treatment across 
MS might still be possible, with adverse effects ranging from mere ineffectiveness 
against the problem targeted, to the risk of fuelling more disputes, including at 
international level (WTO), since the Harmonised System is broadly used to determine 
the tax category of alcoholic beverages also in third countries. As the BTI tool would no 
longer ensure the same tax treatment of a product across the EU (including imported 
products) any non-robust and agreed mechanism may have far-reaching negative 
consequence on the market.            
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Secondly, there is the risk that non-target products are also caught in this re-
classification process. As shown in Section 2.1 certain aromatised wine products with an 
ABV lower than 10% that come under CN 2206 or CN 2205 are excised under Article 
12.369 The characteristics of some of these products may comply with the above criteria 
for the identification of ‘borderline’ products (addition of alcohol and other substances, 
neutral base etc.), and may therefore end up being re-directed to Article 20. Beside the 
evident market effect, there would be also a legal problem with those that come under 
CN 2205 since the proposed revision would regard extending Article 20 to CN 2206 but 
not to CN 2205. Moreover, unlike CN 2206 products, there is no CNEN note or CJEU 
judgement that would support their reclassification as CN 2208. In this Study, we 
consider impact on aromatised-wine products as ‘unintended’, meaning that these 
products are not in the scope of this possible regulatory revision and any expected 
impact would be a collateral undesired effect. However, according to various 
stakeholders interviewed, the advantageous tax treatment extended to certain wine-
based product would not be justified since these products are in many respects 
equivalent to other RTDs with a fermented base.      
 
With the exception of the case of CN 2205 ‘borderline’ products, the risk that a product 
is classified inconsistently for CN and excise purposes seems negligible. In fact, if the 
proposed option implies more freedom in the choice of the applicable tax category, de 
facto in most countries there is no separate processes for CN and excise classification. 
We can assumed this would not change under the option considered, and the same staff 
would continue assigning the appropriate tax and customs codes in a coherent manner.  
 
Table 50 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed option I for classification issues 
Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Impact Areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Clarify the excise duty 
structure for 
‘borderline’ products, 
expanding the scope of 
Article 20.  
 
 Legal certainty     Reduced risk for disparities of treatment of 
similar products in the same market. 
 Unclear status of CN 2205 borderline 
products. 
 More uncertainty at EU level, if the 
classification criteria retained are not 
robust.  
 Related risk of disputes at international 
level.   
 Competition and market 
effects  
 Borderline products would become 
excisable under Article 20, with negative 
impact on demand and possible 
substitution. 
 Non-target products might be caught 
unintendedly.  
 Risk of severe impact on trade, if the 
classification criteria retained are not 
robust.   
 Tax revenues   The demand of ‘borderline’ products may 
reduce significantly so the effects on the 
tax revenues could be mild. 
 
 
 INTRODUCING A DIFFERENTIATION IN THE OFB TAX CATEGORY (OPTION II)      
 
The OFB excise duty category defined under Article 12 encompasses a broad range of 
products, in particular: (i) cider, perry and fruit wines of various kind, with or without a 
regulated denomination; (ii) low-strength mixed drinks, with or without the addition of 
alcohol, below 10% vol; (iii) other medium-strength entirely fermented beverages below 
15% vol (very rare); (iv) aromatised wine products of the CN 2206 type and, in a few 
                                                          
369 Some MS may tax them under Article 17(2) when aromatised wine products with an authorised addition of 
alcohol and an ABV of 7-10% vol.   
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cases, of the CN 2205 type, below 7% vol. The OFB category was primarily designed for 
cider, perry and fruit wines issued of agriculture, while the other products have emerged 
more recently as a result of innovative production processes, evolving consumers’ 
preferences, and market opportunities. The favourable tax regime extended to OFB 
clearly had a role in it, although perhaps not always prominent (see Section 2.1.4). In 
order to restore the original principles and market equilibrium and/or to respond to 
social demand of higher protection against the risk of alcohol consumption among young 
people, various MS have then introduced differentiations within this category. In a 
nutshell, two different approaches exist:  
 
(i) to distinguish for tax purposes traditional cider and other products defined in 
country-level sectoral legislation, from all other generic OFB, including ‘mass-
market’ cider and the like (e.g. Ireland, Romania, Poland, UK, France); 
 
(ii) to apply additional consumption taxes on specific categories of mixed drinks 
to deter their consumption (e.g. pre-mix tax in France, alcopop tax in 
Germany370, Luxembourg and Denmark).           
 
A third approach, with similar intent and effects, selected by other countries (e.g. Italy), 
does not imply additional national measures but consists in the adoption of the optional 
provision of Article 17(2) that allows to categorise as Intermediate Products (IP) also 
OFBs with an ABV in excess of 5.5% vol (8.5% vol for sparkling OFB) that are not 
entirely of fermented origin. In some respect, this is tantamount to a differential tax 
regime for certain mixed drink with an ABV of 5.5% - 10% vol.     
 
These approaches evidently respond to specificities of national markets and needs, and 
the actual tax differential ranges from relatively modest differences (e.g. Poland, and to 
some extent Ireland) to major ones (Denmark, Luxembourg, Romania). A review of 
relevant examples is provided in Table 51 below.  
 
Table 51 – Differential tax treatment of certain type of OFB across selected MS (end 
2016) 
Member 
State 
Standard excise 
duty (€/hl)  
Differential regime 
(€/hl)  
Difference (in %) 
France €3.77 (still OFB) €1.33 (cider, perry, hydromel, 
slightly fermented grapes juice) 
+ €110 per litre of pure 
alcohol (pre-mixes) 
-64% (cider, perry, hydromel, 
slightly fermented grapes juice) 
+304% (pre-mixes – 
estimated on a drink of 7% vol) 
Denmark  €71.58 (still OFB <= 
6%) 
€115.62 (still OFB > 
6%) 
 
+ €96.00 (mixture with non-
alcoholic drink <=10%) 
+ €154.00 (mixture with non-
alcoholic drink >10%) 
+ 134% (mixture with non-
alcoholic drink <=6%) 
+ 83% (mixture with non-
alcoholic drink 6-10%) 
+ 133% (mixture with non-
alcoholic drink > 10%) 
Luxembourg €0.00 + €600 (mixture with non-
alcoholic drink) 
N/A (denominator is nil) 
Romania €89.87 (still OFB) 
€10.73 (sparkling 
OFB) 
€0.00 (cider, perry, hydromel) N/A (denominator is nil) 
Poland €37.21 (OFB) €22.85 (cider, perry) -39% (cider, perry) 
Ireland €141.57 (OFB <= 
5.5%) 
€424.84 (OFB still > 
5.5%) 
 
 
€47.23 (cider and perry <= 
2.8%) 
€94.46 (cider and perry 2.8%-
6%) 
€218.44 (cider and perry 6-
8.5%) 
€309.84 (cider and perry > 8.5% 
From:  
-67% (cider and perry <= 
2.8%) 
To 
-27% (cider and perry > 8.5% 
still) 
                                                          
370 Actually, the German alcopop tax regards products that can be classified as ‘ethyl alcohol’ i.e. spirit-based 
mixed drink. The distinction with OFB-bases mixed drink is often blurred, however, for the analysis carried out 
in this Section the German case is not relevant.   
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still) 
Italy €0.00 (OFB <= 5.5%) €88.67 (OFB 5.5%-10% with 
alcohol added – ex Article 17(2))  
N/A (denominator is nil) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of EDT. 
Notes: for a better readability of the table some further differentiations within sub-types of product are not 
displayed. Also the UK has a very articulated tax rate differentiation, entirely developed in the area of the 
reduced rates, i.e. unlike IE, PL, RO etc. there is only one standard rate for all OFB, but there are different 
reduced rates for products < 8.5% vol whether ‘cider and perry’ or ‘other’.       
      
The policy option for a revision of the Directive that is developed here consists in a 
possible extension of these national approaches to the EU-level, with a view to 
differentiate the OFB products that arguably correspond to the original definition and 
intention of the legislator from the ‘novel’ products that have been opportunistically 
designed to fit into it or simply that do not fit elsewhere. In fact, the two existing 
approaches have the same objective and the same result. The only difference between 
them regards which ‘sub-category’ is separately defined and excerpted from the 
standard one – i.e. the ‘mixed drinks’ (intended as ‘pre-mixes, alcopops etc.) or the 
‘cider and perry’. In visual terms, the two approaches can be represented as in Figure 23 
below, where their difference concerns where the demarcation line is drawn, namely: 
   
 Line A: cider and perry (and specific OFB like mead, hydromel, certain fruit-wine 
etc.) v. Other OFB (including mixed drinks and possibly certain ’borderline’ cider 
drinks). 
 Line B: mixed drinks (pre-mixes, alcopops and the like) versus cider, perry and 
any other non-mixed OFB of any kind (‘traditional’ or not).    
 
Figure 23 – The two possible approaches for differentiating the OFB category     
 
         
 
 
 
 
With the only exception of France - where both differentiation lines are in place - all 
other MS have opted for either of the two distinctions. This is also the approach chosen 
in this Report, since introducing two differentiations at the same time would excessively 
fragment a category that is currently the smallest. The two approaches are in many 
respects equivalent and since a priori there is no strong element to select one, both 
solutions are examined here – i.e. ‘Line A’ and ‘Line B’. To combine the two approaches 
in one model and standardise the analysis, it is assumed that on the left side of the 
demarcation line (with reference to Figure 23) stands the OFB that would remain under 
the standard treatment envisaged by Article 12, while on the right side stand the 
products that would qualify for a separate tax treatment. As concerns the regulatory 
changes required: 
 
 The demarcation Line A would require to adopt at EU level a harmonised 
definition of cider, perry and the other OFB that correspond to the original scope 
of this category, matching as much as possible with the existing national 
definitions for these products. As discussed in Section 2.1.4 this is far from being 
straightforward: national definitions may vary significantly; the industry calls for 
a permissive approach e.g. establishing no minimum amount of fresh juice, no 
limits to added sugar and water etc. – which is probably tantamount to shifting 
Line A rightward to overlap with Line B; whereas certain consumers organisations 
consider most of the mass-market products not to be ‘real’ cider. The Directive is 
clearly not the appropriate vehicle for product definition, which should instead be 
developed as sectoral legislation. 
 
 The demarcation Line B would require to define what a mixed drink is and the 
relevant criteria to allow for such a categorisation. Also in this case various 
B A 
Other OFB Mixed drinks Premixes, 
alcopops etc. 
Cider, perry etc. 
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approaches exist and an agreement should be reached among MS at the expert 
group level. The French definition seems more all-catching than other mixed 
drinks definitions in that it applies either to mixture of different beverages or to 
beverages with a certain amount of added sugar/sweeteners. In this respect, it 
may encompass also various ’borderline’ ciders371 - which means Line B would 
shift leftward to nearly coincide with Line A. In this respect, it is worth reminding 
that a previous attempt to define ‘alcopop’ at EU-level was dropped.372 
 
In both cases, the two demarcation lines may shift to the point of overlapping. In 
analytical terms, this means that the market impact of the two approaches differs 
primarily with respect to the treatment of ’borderline’ cider, i.e.: (i) on the left side of 
the demarcation line - approach B, but also ‘permissive definition’ under approach A; or 
(ii) on its right side – ‘restrictive’ approach A or extensive (France-like) approach B.  
 
Developing detailed product definitions and establishing their appropriate tax treatment 
is not in the scope of this work, however for the further development of the impact 
analysis it is necessary to formulate assumptions on the possible tax level that would 
apply to the new category that has been imagined. In fact, the differentiation would 
have tangible effects only if a tax differential is introduced, as it is currently the case in 
the MS listed in Table 51 above. In this Study, we have hypothesised that the new 
category would be treated tax-wise the same way Intermediate Products are treated. 
This assumption seems consistent with the fact that Article 17(2) already envisaged the 
possibility to treat as Intermediate Products certain mixed drink with added alcohol with 
a strength of 5.5%-10% vol. This approach is also less disruptive, in principle, than 
certain national mixed drinks taxes (e.g. FR and LU) which de facto make certain 
products commercially non-viable. In this sense, a ‘variant’ of the policy option described 
here could be to simply subsume the newly defined category of product under 
Intermediate Products (Article 17). This would certainly simplify technical and 
administrative arrangements. However, it is not our preferred choice because: 
 
(i) It would excessively tie the hands of national administrations to a certain 
regime, limiting their ability to customise the treatment of these products to 
their needs and market conditions. It is useful to remind that only a minority 
of MS have adopted these differentiation, so it is possible that some of them 
are not interested in different tax levels. The assimilation to the IP category, 
would impose to these products at least the minimum rate envisaged in the 
Directive (EUR 45 per hl). Other MS have instead adopted much higher tax 
levels than the IP, and would probably oppose lower rates. 
 
(ii) Assimilating these OFB products to IP may have adverse consequences also 
for the non-target IP products like fortified wines, certain vermouths etc. In 
the attempt to modulate an appropriate treatment of mixed products MS may 
eventually establish IP rates that are higher than the rates they would have 
applied if the IP category contained only fortified wine and vermouths. 
 
(iii) The IP excise duty structure is a flat rate per hl of finished products, 
regardless of alcoholic strength. In practice, the near totality of IP’s are 
comprised between 10%-22% vol and often closer to the high-end. Applying 
this structure to mixed drinks would mean to extend it to products of lower 
strength, even below 5.5%. As described previously, below 10% vol the IP 
excise duty is generally the highest, often much greater than the Ethyl Alcohol 
duty.  
        
                                                          
371 This might explain also why their market is so small in France as compared to other MS.    
372 COM(2017) 58 final. 
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The last point raises a more general question on how to establish this tax avoiding 
distortions or creating unintended incentives, especially as regards very low-strength 
products. The issue may be circumvented by allowing the application of reduced rates for 
products below a certain threshold (or falling into different ABV bands).  
 
The products considered here are typically low-strength. As shown previously (see Table 
14), an estimated 88% of mixed drinks have an ABV lower than 10%, and also 
‘borderline’ ciders are typically below this level. Similarly, pre-mix and alcopop national 
taxes target products below 10-12% vol, so on the one hand it would be logical to fix the 
scope of the new category to this ABV band. However, this could create again distortions 
and unintended incentives vis-à-vis products with a higher ABV, in the event MS fix the 
rate applicable to the new category above the IP level. Taxing the new category per pure 
alcohol would easily solve all risks of distortion, but it would contradict the current 
structure of OFB that is – as wine - per volume of finished product, and any revision of it 
is beyond the scope of the present exercise. To sum up, in our scenario analysis we have 
considered the new category applicable to products up to 22% vol, although in practice a 
tangible market effect can be registered only for products below 10%.             
 
In terms of market effects, this approach may have a few unintended effects to be 
considered. First of all, as seen, the OFB category includes also certain aromatised wine 
products (both of CN 2206 and CN 2205 types) that might be caught in the definition of 
the new category. Secondly, the status of mixed beer would remain uncertain. At the 
moment they are classified as CN 2206 but taxed under Article 2 (beer). The French pre-
mix tax applies to beer mixes as well (but not to product of CN 2205 category), but at 
EU level this would require a revision of Article 2 that is not in order. The results could 
be a significantly more favourable treatment for e.g. a flavoured beer-mix than for a 
flavoured-cider-mix. Similarly, the status of spirit-based mixed drinks would have to be 
considered: at the moment they may suffer from the more favourable treatment granted 
to OFB-based mixed drinks, but if they remain outside of the new category, there would 
be a reverse tax incentive to produce low-strength spirit-based drinks (taxed by pure 
alcohol) than fermented-based drinks (taxed by volume of finished product). If the Line 
B approach is taken, this could be easily solved by including CN 2208 products in the 
new category (in line with French model); in the case of Line A it would be more 
complex, since there would be no explicit definition of what falls right of the demarcation 
line.         
 
The risk that inappropriate or weak definitions create incentives to develop new 
‘borderline’ products or to fuel tax-induced substitution cannot be excluded, and is 
roughly proportional to the tax differential applied between the two sub-categories 
established and the difficulty to enforce the classification criteria retained. Too 
permissive criteria, may have the opposite effect of prompting the development of 
‘borderline’ OFB beverages that are today kept at bay by the subjectivity of criteria. In 
other words, the uncertainty of classification induces a cautious attitude among 
producers towards stretching the criteria beyond a certain limit. If a permissive definition 
of OFB (or cider, perry and other specific OFB) is adopted, this may possibly encourage 
economic operators, including those who currently produce ‘genuine’ OFB to adjust their 
standard to the minimum legal requirements. Of course, it is possible to elaborate robust 
definitions that prevent this risk. Some of the national taxes examined (e.g. the French 
pre-mix tax) do not reportedly present problems of this kind.373 The considerations made 
previously on the need to develop agreed definitions involving all MS administrations (in 
consultation with industry representatives) also apply here.374       
                                                          
373 Instead, the Romanian differentiation between ‘legal’ cider and other OFB resulted difficult to enforce, since 
‘mass-market’ products are imported under the ‘cider’ heading and are therefore placed on the market as if 
they were ‘traditional’ cider (at zero rate). This problem would not be relevant in case the definition of cider is 
adopted EU-wide.   
374 This is especially important for the definition of cider, for which various diverging national definitions exist.  
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Finally, it has to be considered that establishing a new category would inevitably imply 
some administrative burden, primarily related to the update of all national systems, both 
on the administrations and economic operators’ sides. It would also become important to 
reconsider the current structures of EPC with a view to separate wine from the revised 
OFB categories (see Section 3.1.4 below). 
 
Table 52 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed option II for classification issues 
Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83) 
Impact Areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Introducing a 
Differentiation in the 
OFB Excise Duty 
Category, by defining 
separately: 
a) cider, perry and 
other specific OFB, 
or 
b) mixed drinks.   
 
 Legal certainty     Reduced risk for disparities of treatment of 
similar products across the EU. 
 More uncertainty, if the elaborated 
definitions are not robust.  
 Administrative burden  Need to legally and technically review the 
excise duty system in place.    
 Competition and market 
effects  
 Increased harmonisation (reduced need for 
MS-level measures). 
 A share of OFB (mixed drinks and possibly 
some ‘mass-market’ cider) would be taxed 
differently, with negative impact on 
demand and possible substitution. 
 Non-target products might be caught 
unintendedly.  
 Risk of unintended incentives to 
substitutes.  
 Possible distortions due to the per volume 
nature of the tax envisaged.   
 Tax revenues   The demand of certain OFB may reduce, 
with effects on the tax revenue.  
 The demand of less-taxed substitute 
products may increase.   
 
 NON-REGULATORY OPTIONS (OPTION III)      
 
In addition to the regulatory changes described above, there are various measures to 
address the identified problems, which do not require a revision of the Directive. For 
these options we have not carried out a fully-fledged impact assessment, since they go 
beyond the scope of the current revision process and the level of uncertainty due to 
external factors is significant. However, it is important to take them into account in the 
analysis, since they represent alternative courses of action that policy-makers may 
consider to tackle classification issues. These measures are not strictly alternative to the 
regulatory options, but rather complementary. Actually, some of them seem a pre-
requisite for a successful implementation of the proposed Directive amendments.  
 
The four measures presented below would require the engagement of other 
Commission’s services and therefore need to be examined and refined at the inter-
service level. Their development would ideally require an active involvement of the 
indirect tax service, since they would have major impacts on the functioning of Directive 
92/83.  
 
a. Review of CN / CNEN (option III.a). First and foremost, a significant share of 
stakeholders met during the fieldwork, tax authorities in particular, would be in 
favour of clearer common criteria for the identification of products that have lost 
their essential fermented character, than those laid down in CNEN note 2206 00, 
which reportedly leave a margin for subjective interpretation too ample. In fact, a 
proper clarification of the CN classification rules is a pre-requisite for the success of 
any intervention on excise duty structures. Furthermore, CNEN note 2206 00 is not 
binding, and this further increase the risk of disparities of interpretation. The first 
policy option analysed in this Section envisages to ‘by-pass’ this problem by partly 
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de-linking the two systems. But introducing in the Directive the principles of the CJEU 
jurisprudence still requires to address the current ambiguities of the CN codes, since 
the CJEU criteria were established in the framework of customs and not excise duty 
classification disputes. In this sense, it would be easier and more effective for 
harmonisation that such clarifications are adopted at the level of CN or CN 
explanatory notes. A robust distinction between fermented alcoholic products that 
may fall under CN 2206 and those that should be considered CN 2208 would mostly 
pre-empt the need for any revision of the Directive. Needless to say, the matter is 
outside the remit of excise duty authorities, and should be addressed at the level of 
Customs Code Committee, and in the relevant international fora. It has been 
reported that the relevant Commission service is already working on a draft text that 
would revise the CN code in this sense and establish binding classification rules for 
the products currently covered by CNEN note 2206 00.  
 
b. Adoption of guidelines (option III.b). The need for detailed guidelines to 
precisely define and categorise certain ‘borderline’ products is common to all 
solutions proposed. In fact, the regulatory option (I) discussed above requires that 
the CJEU ‘subjective’ criteria are translated in clear operational terms through a non-
binding document accompanying the Directive revision; the regulatory option (II) 
also requires that clear, measurable and agreed criteria are adopted (through 
guidelines) to distinguish the ‘special OFB’ category from the rest of OFB; also non-
regulatory option (III.a) may benefit from detailed guidelines for the practical 
implementation of the rules laid out in the CN notes. Nonetheless, the adoption of 
guidelines may be also beneficial ‘per se’, and in the absence of any other regulatory 
or non-regulatory measures. As discussed above, guidelines should, among other 
things: 
 
o Establish the criteria to differentiate between a ‘genuine’ fermented beverage 
and a beverage that has lost its essential character and should be therefore 
classified otherwise.  
o This may include setting a threshold for the amount of distilled alcohol that 
can be added to a fermented beverage both in terms of contribution to the 
total ABV and/or overall volume of the end-product, as well as other 
parameters related to the appearance and taste of the product.  
o Since various criteria and parameters concur to determine the classification of 
‘borderline’ beverages, guidelines should also indicate how to weigh and 
balance the different aspects.    
o Establish if, and to what extent, the addition of other substances like water, 
sugar, cream etc. may per se affect the fermented character of a beverage or 
not, and the criteria thereof. 
o Establish analytical parameters to deal with ‘cleaned-up’ alcohol, both as an 
end-product or a base for other beverages. 
o Define common analytical methods to assess the composition of products in 
order to improve detection capacity and reduce uncertainties in laboratories’ 
outcome.  
 
The development of guidelines requires a collaborative process involving tax and 
customs authorities of the MS (in most MS there is no separate process for customs 
and excise duty classification) and the relevant Commission services. The process 
could be supported through funding programmes like Fiscalis 2020 or Customs 2020, 
and involve exchanging views and experiences on the existing national measures, 
with a view to identify appropriate common criteria and practices that can be adopted 
and promoted at EU-level, also in the absence of a revision of the Directive. 
 
c. Sectoral regulation for cider and other specific OFB (option III.c). Another 
option to consider envisages adopting at the EU-level a harmonised definition of 
cider, perry and other specific OFB to distinguish them from other generic OFB like 
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mixed drink, which are arguably taking advantages of the blurred boundaries of the 
current excise duty definition. This measure would be essential in the case of 
regulatory option (II) above, but it would be also useful as an alternative to a formal 
amendment of the Directive, in particular to complement the measures described in 
point (III.a) and (III.b) above.    
 
The Directive on excise duty structure is evidently not the appropriate vehicle for 
introducing a product definition and establishing the permitted ingredients and 
production processes. Conversely, this should be done ideally within sectoral 
legislation – although the participation of tax authorities is recommended, since the 
matter have evident fiscal implications. In an initial stage, the adoption of a pan-EU 
industry code of practice may offer a useful, initial starting point to move from a non-
binding to a properly regulated framework.375 However, attention should be paid to 
how permissive or restrictive the adopted definitions are with respect to the current 
market situation and the future perspective. An excessively permissive definition 
might de facto open the Article 12 to any kind of OFB and make difficult to 
distinguish for tax purposes genuine and ‘borderline’ products. This is mutatis 
mutandis the case with Regulation 251/2014, based on which there is limited room 
to distinguish for tax purposes certain traditional aromatised wines from so called 
‘wine coolers’ and the like. Conversely, restrictive definitions would end up covering 
only a small share of the current OFB market and the bulk of ‘mass-market’ would 
fall outside of it, so the utility for tax classification purposes would be limited.                
 
d. Enhance monitoring and control (option III.d). The findings of the fieldwork 
conducted in a sample of MS showed that tax authorities have often a limited market 
intelligence of novel ‘borderline’ products. Disaggregated data per sub-category of 
products are generally unavailable and when products fall in a non-taxed category 
(such as OFB and wine in various MS) many tax administrations reported to have no 
data at all on sales and consumption levels. Customs may in principle have access to 
more detailed market statistics by 6-digits HS subheadings or 8-digits CN sub-
headings, but these are seldom systematised and analysed. In theory, with the 
exception of zero-tax products entirely outside of the excise system, it would be 
technically possible to reconcile the volume and value of the various sub-categories 
of products in a granular way, but it is not currently done, so public authorities (and 
other stakeholders) lack the essential monitoring data to address problems 
effectively and consistently.  
 
In essence, this measure would require to introduce for statistical purposes a 
collection of data on excise goods volumes more granular than the current one that is 
articulated only on EPC, and does not cover zero-rate products. However, since 
procedures and administrative arrangements vary across MS a one-size-fits-all 
approach is not in order, and concrete solutions should be discussed at first at the 
level of ITEG group.                 
 
 
3.1.2.2  Impact analysis 
 
 LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
The fundamental rationale for the policy options analysed here is the need to reduce the 
existing legal uncertainties and disparities of interpretations with certain products that 
we have labelled as ‘borderline’ since their classification as CN 2206 or CN 2208 is not 
straightforward and/or coherent across countries. The baseline assessment showed that 
the legal uncertainty problem was particularly acute in the aftermath of the CJEU 
                                                          
375 The industry association AICV has reportedly initiated such a process.  
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landmark rulings, due to the introduction of subjective classification criteria of difficult 
interpretation, but overtime the extent and the frequency of concrete issues have 
diminished since (some) national customs have adopted rules and procedures to 
effectively operationalise these criteria. These include for instance the adoption of 
thresholds for the amount of alcohol of distilled origin that can be added to a fermented 
base (both in volumetric and ABV terms), as well as methods and parameters to assess 
organoleptic characteristics and intended use. Nonetheless, as the national approaches 
are non-harmonised at EU-level there remains the risk of different / incoherent legal 
interpretations and ensuing disputes, as well as incentives to continue to develop 
products exploiting these classification uncertainties.     
 
All the policy options described in the previous Section 3.1.2.1 are intended to reduce 
legal uncertainties and increase the alignment of MS approaches towards ‘borderline’ 
products. The effectiveness of the measures proposed in tackling the diverse risk and 
adverse effects of classification uncertainties appears however uneven, as briefly 
summarised in Table 53 below. In particular:  
 
 A clarification of the excise duty structure (option I) by introducing the CJEU 
criteria in the definition of certain alcoholic products may reduce the cases of similar 
products that are taxed differently because of different underlying CN codes 
attributed by different MS (with / without a BTI decision). This benefit would 
materialise only if the introduction of these criteria is supported by robust and agreed 
guidelines for their operationalisation, otherwise the current CN code uncertainties 
would simply be replicated to the excise duty level, and the risk of more severe legal 
disputes may increase.  
 
Since guidelines would necessarily leave a certain room of interpretation to MS 
authorities, this option would be comparatively less effective in ensuring a 
harmonised treatment of the same products across different MS. The BTIs would no 
longer determine the applicable tax category, so their use would likely reduce. But 
the absence of this practical instrument may eventually trigger among economic 
operators the perception of a higher degree of classification uncertainty and 
unpredictability.  
 
Furthermore, the possibility of mismatches between CN and excise duty 
classifications and in particular the fact that a product coming under CN 2206 can be 
taxed under Article 20 (Ethyl Alcohol) – although quite unlikely - may have 
unpredictable negative implications for international trade. These could be avoided if 
clear and coherent rules for the operationalisation of CJEU criteria are simultaneously 
implemented for both customs and excise duty classifications. 
 
 The introduction of a differentiation in the OFB category (option II) to separate 
either cider etc. or mixed drinks from the rest of OFB, may ensure a more consistent 
treatment of certain products across MS since it would make unnecessary the current 
national-level distinctions and ad hoc taxes. Needless to say, the benefit would 
materialise only in the presence of a robust and agreed definition for the new 
category.  
 
This may be particularly complex to achieve in the case of a separate new category 
for cider and other specific OFB (the ‘Line A’ approach described in Section 3.1.2.1), 
since there are (i) relevant disparities in the legal definitions that already exist at MS-
level, which should be aligned; and (ii) diverging views between producers of ‘mass-
market’ products and their trade associations, and small ‘traditional’ producers and 
certain consumers’ organisations. Furthermore, with some exceptions (e.g. IE, UK) 
these products are typically regulated in national food & agriculture legislation, so the 
excise duty Directive seems not the most appropriate vehicle for establishing a 
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common product definition. But at the same time, there might be limited rationale to 
pursue an EU-level definition of cider etc. outside of its fiscal treatment.  
 
In the case of mixed products (the ‘Line B’ approach described in Section 3.1.2.1), 
the main challenge would consist in adopting a definition that does not simply create 
tax incentives to develop substitute products, as it happened for instance with the 
‘alcopop’ tax in Germany. On the scope of this category, MS may have different 
views related to the specificities of the national industry and market and might want 
to include or not malt-based mixed beverages and so called ‘wine-coolers’.  
 
Overall, the policy option would not affect the frequency of cases where similar 
products have different tax treatment in the same MS, due to prior diverging 
customs classification, and no relevant impact on disputes is anticipated. 
  
 Measures not involving a regulatory revision of the Directive, and in particular 
the review of CN / CNEN and the adoption of guidelines for the interpretation of CJEU 
criteria (options III.a and III.b) would be generally welcome by competent 
authorities and part of stakeholders, since they may improve both the coherence in 
the way a single product is taxed in different countries and the consistency in the 
categorisation of products with similar characteristics. The incentive to pursue tax 
optimisation strategies by developing ‘borderline’ products would be reduced, and the 
same would likely happen with classification disputes. On the negative side, the risk 
of non-robust definitions or non-compliance (given the voluntary nature of 
guidelines) may constrain the effectiveness of this approach. The tax categorisation 
would remain determined by the CN code, and non-harmonised national measures 
for special products may persist or even accelerate.  
 
Introducing an EU-wide regulation of cider and other specific OFB (option III.c), if not 
accompanied by corresponding fiscal measures would evidently have limited effects 
on the issue at stake, since compliant and non-compliant products would continue be 
taxed likewise. 
 
As discussed, the implementation of these measures fall outside of the remit of the 
excise duty system, and would ideally require a larger consensus at the international 
level, in order to avoid any hurdles and uncertainty affecting the international trade.        
 
Table 53 – Summary of the expected impact of the proposed policy option on legal 
certainty  
Type of impact I - Clarification of the 
excise duty structure for 
borderline products 
II – Introduction of a 
differentiation in the 
OFB category 
III – Non-regulatory 
revision options  
Availability of 
clear rules and 
criteria to 
properly 
categorise 
borderline 
products.  
 A precondition is the 
adoption of robust and 
agreed guidelines.  
 The impact is minimal 
for MS that have already 
adopted standard 
operating procedures 
(SOPs) and the like.    
 Agreement on 
common definitions 
seems complex, 
especially for cider. 
 Linking tax structure 
to external sectoral 
legislation may have 
legal implications.  
 Intervention at the 
level of the CNEN 
would be more 
relevant and effective 
since uncertainties 
relates to customs 
classification.  
 Guidelines may be 
useful even in the 
absence of a Directive 
review.   
Frequency of 
cases where the 
same product is 
treated 
differently tax-
wise in different 
MS. 
 There remains the 
possibility of disparities 
in the application of 
agreed criteria 
(subjective dimensions 
would persist). 
 BTIs would count less 
for tax categorization, 
so there is a high risk of 
perceived uncertainty on 
 Major positive impact, 
since it is assumed 
that current existing 
ad hoc measures 
would be no longer 
necessary. 
 A certain risk of 
disparities of 
classification would 
remain. 
 Clarification of the CN 
classification rules 
may reduce these 
cases.  
 Similar positive impact 
of guidelines, if robust 
and agreed.  
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the side of the industry. 
Frequency of 
cases where 
similar products 
have different 
tax treatment in 
the same MS, 
due to the prior 
custom 
classification. 
 Major positive impact 
since MS have more 
freedom to apply the 
proper tax category 
regardless of the prior 
CN code.  
 Modest impact, since 
the current rules to 
distinguish between 
CN 2206 and 2208 still 
apply. However, the 
new category may 
attract products that 
would otherwise be 
candidate for CN 2208 
(under CNEN 2206 
00). 
 Positive impact, since 
ideally disparities in 
the attribution of CN 
codes would be 
reduced significantly.  
 Limited effects of non-
binding guidelines.  
Overall number 
of difficult to 
classify cases. 
 Limited incentive to 
develop new borderline 
product (for tax 
purposes).  
 Modest but present 
risk of creating new 
opportunities for 
borderline products 
(depending on the tax 
differential incentives). 
 Significantly reduced 
number, since they 
relate mostly to the 
application of customs 
classification.   
Frequency of 
disputes with 
economic 
operators. 
 Less cases, but possibly 
more frequently of 
judicial nature (tax law 
instead of customs 
procedures).   
 Not relevant in this 
respect.  
 Reduced, in line with a 
possible greater 
clarity. 
Trade issues at 
the international 
level.  
 Depending on the 
concrete application, the 
risk of trade issues at 
international level 
exists.  
 No significant positive 
or adverse effects 
envisaged.  
 Not relevant. A certain 
alignment at WCO 
level can be expected.  
 
 COMPETITION AND MARKET EFFECTS     
 
The re-classification of certain products under a different tax category with a different 
excise duty rate would clearly have an impact on the market size and trends. This impact 
has been assessed triangulating the results of a quantitative market analysis376 
econometric model with other evidence collected through interviews with stakeholders 
and a desk review of literature and relevant documentary sources. The various steps of 
the assessment and the findings are described in the following paragraphs and 
summarised in Table 54, Table 55, and Table 56 below.  
 
(i) Step 1 – estimating the market size of potentially affected products. This 
part of the exercise was conducted as part of the baseline assessment and led to 
the quantification of the market size of both ‘borderline’ products (mixed drinks 
and other fermented beverages that might have lost their essential fermented 
character) and other sub-categories of products that might be unintendedly 
affected since currently covered by the same Directive provisions at stake (Article 
12 or Article 17). This part of the work required a detailed one-by-one analysis of 
a vast range of specific brand-products listed in the IWSR database. The tax 
treatment of these products is not disclosed so it had to be inferred from e.g. 
alcoholic strength, estimated alcoholic base and, in some cases, market price.  
 
The sales volume of products with similar characteristics and falling in the same 
(estimated) tax category were then aggregated into homogeneous sub-categories 
considered relevant for the assessment. The target products include non-spirit 
mixed-drinks with ABV lower than 5.5% vol or lower than 10% vol, and other 
medium/high strength fermented beverages with an ABV up to 22% vol. Non-
target products consist of certain aromatised-wine products that are possibly 
taxed under Article 12, including both CN 2206 and certain CN 2205 products. In 
practice, non-target products include product like sangria, gluehwein (mulled 
                                                          
376 The market analysis is largely based on the results of an econometric modelling exercise conducted on the 
market data published by IWSR.   
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wine), and other aromatised-wine cocktails. We have also estimated the market 
of ‘borderline’ cider, in case it would be included in the scope of the re-
classification, in line with the approach outlined in Section 2.1. Overall, it is 
estimated that ‘target products’ sales in the EU amount to approximately 154 mn 
litres (305 mn litres if ‘borderline’ cider is included377); and non-target products 
potentially affected to some 106 mn litres. As compared to the total volume of 
alcoholic beverages consumed in the EU per year, the products at stake are only 
a tiny minority, i.e. 0.8% of the total.      
 
The sub-categories are defined assuming that all the encompassed products 
would change of tax category following the adoption of one of the policy options 
considered. Since the attribution of products to a certain sub-category, as well as 
the very market dimension of these products are subject to a certain margin of 
error, the baseline data used in the analysis should be taken with caution.    
             
Step 2 - market trends in the absence of policy changes. This step 
consisted in estimating the projected value of the market after one year in the 
‘business as usual’ scenario (i.e. dynamic baseline). Projections are based on the 
average growth rate observed over the past five years. We have limited the 
market projections assuming that growth trend is linear, and would remain 
similar also in the following years. The trend varies across sub-categories of 
product: ‘borderline’ OFB and IP, as well as AWP - CN 2206 are substantially 
stable, AWP – CN 2205 seems declining, while ‘borderline’ cider is growing.  
 
The overall market change is positive, although very modest in scale. The 
aggregated annual variation for these sub-categories amount to less than 1.0 mn 
litres, which is some +0.2% per year. Needless to say, growth trends differ 
across the MS that have been examined and used to extrapolate general EU-level 
trends.        
   
(ii) Step 3 - revised tax rate due to re-classification. Option I may entail in 
practice that a certain amount of products with a questionable essential 
fermented character are taxed in accordance to Article 20. These may regard 
both certain Article 12 products (mixed drinks) and, more likely, certain Article 17 
products – i.e. medium/high strength OFB currently considered as Intermediate 
Products. It is unlikely that any cider including ‘borderline’ ones could be affected. 
Also CN 2205 products would not be affected, since this option concerns only CN 
2206 products. Instead, some AWP classified as CN 2206 may in theory (but not 
very likely) be affected. Similar outcomes could be obtained through non-
regulatory options III.a and III.b.   
 
For Option II we have not envisaged any specific tax rate, since this is outside of 
the scope of this exercise. However, for illustrative purposes, we have simulated 
that of the two categories created by splitting the current OFB category, one 
would retain the current Article 12 tax rate, while the other would be taxed with 
the same rate of IP. The simulation was conducted at the level of each of the six 
sample MS taking into account the different rates currently applied to OFB and IP 
and the existence of national non-harmonised measures (e.g. pre-mix tax, 
separate excise duty for cider, application of Article 17(2) etc.).             
 
                                                          
377 Where not explicitly mentioned, the figures ‘borderline’ cider does not include the UK market. The rationale 
is that since the UK market accounts alone to two-thirds of the EU cider, and is also much greater than the 
total market of mixed drinks, it may ultimately determine the results of the for impact assessment exercise.   
Secondly, in the current situation it is very unlikely that the UK would follow the EU in a re-classification 
process that would affect primarily the competitiveness of its domestic cider industry.  
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(iii) Step 4 - tax-induced variation of the current price levels. An important 
variable of the econometric model applied is the extent to which a possible 
variation in the excise duty rate may translate into a variation of the average 
price level for a certain sub-category. This variable – denominated ‘pass-through’ 
factor – has been calculated for all the categories of products potentially 
concerned by re-classification (intended and unintended ones) based on a large 
matrix of historical correlation between tax (including excise duty and the VAT on 
the excise duty) and price levels in the six sample MS. In practice, the ‘pass-
through’ factor expresses by how much the selling price of a product would 
change following a variation of the tax levied. It is important to remind that the 
tax level is only one of the possible explanatory factors behind the price level. As 
most of the interviewees highlighted, prices are only limitedly influenced by taxes 
and more importantly by marketing strategies, production costs, retail mark-ups, 
etc.     
 
Fermented mixed drinks below 10% vol is the only case where no statistically-
relevant correlation could be found. More than for other beverages, the price of 
mixed drinks seems therefore determined by factors other than the tax level. 
While this is the case for ordinary and modest variations of rates, in the case of 
special taxes (pre-mix or alcopop taxes) explicitly conceived to deter 
consumption, major market impacts were indeed observed, consisting in the 
massive withdrawal of affected products from the market. So, in the model, we 
have assumed for these products a conventional pass-through of 100%.378         
 
(iv) Step 5 - overall variation in the demand. The main outcome of the exercise 
consisted in estimating the variation of consumers’ demand of products possibly 
caused by the application of a different tax rate - taking into account the above 
effects on prices. This required in the first place to calculate the elasticity of the 
demand for the various sub-categories of products to re-classify. We have used 
for this purpose the same large dataset of Step 4. Combining the estimated 
variation in price levels (Step 4) and the elasticity coefficient, it was eventually 
possible to estimate the variation in the volumes of product demanded potentially 
caused by the two regulatory options at stake.379 For a more accurate estimation, 
two different econometric models have been applied to data, which returned 
partly different results (but coherent in terms of general trends). As shown in 
Tables 56 and 57, the two models produced a minimum and a maximum impact 
scenario. The ‘mean’ value between the two endpoints can be taken as a valid 
approximation.   
 
The assessment of impact has been conducted on the six sample MS, and the 
outcomes were extrapolated at EU level by applying appropriate conversion 
factors linked to market size. These are smaller in the case of mixed drinks, IP 
and AWP – where our sample accounts for some 47% of the EU market, and 
bigger for cider – where they represent only 14%. The principle behind 
                                                          
378 Applying a different ‘pass through’ factor to mixed drinks, the model would evidently return different 
estimates. In the interim stage of the work, we had calculated the impact applying a greater pass-through 
coefficient (1.5 - prices increase in a greater proportion than the tax increase) and a smaller one (0.5). In the 
first case, the impact on mixed drinks were magnified, while in the second case they were mitigated. The two 
alternative coefficient used were arbitrary, so the results had little analytical significance. In the final version of 
the Study, we have approached the issue of sensitivity of results by using two different econometric models, 
and calculating an upper and a lower threshold to the estimates provided. Therefore, the less-sophisticated 
simulations by different values of the pass-through coefficient have been dropped.    
379 The ‘arc elasticity’ formula has been used in this exercise, in consideration of the fact a big variation is 
expected on a category of products with varying starting prices and sales quantity, and given the absence of a 
specific demand function for these products. In practice, as compared to basic ‘point elasticity’, the arc 
elasticity defines the mid-point elasticity between the two selected points and may mitigate somehow the 
overall effects.  
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extrapolation is that the sample is sufficiently representative of the entire EU 
market, not only in quantitative terms but also qualitatively, and in particular that 
the variety of preferences and trends observed in the sample sufficiently reflects 
the diversity of EU countries. There are a couple of limitations in this method that 
are worth mentioning: (i) the outcomes of the exercise aim at representing the 
expected EU-aggregated impacts, but do not support conclusions on impact on 
individual MS; (ii) the ratio between our sample and EU-level data changes if 
instead of volume of products (in litres) we consider the value of market (in EUR) 
or the amount of excise duty collected. The extrapolation of results for these 
other variables using the volume of consumption as conversion factor inevitably 
leads to minor calculation distortions that could not be entirely corrected.           
              
The results presented in Table 54 below show that Option I would affect primarily 
‘borderline’ IP, with a possible reduced volume of sales of ca. -36% (average 
value between ‘min’ and ‘max’ scenarios).380 Mixed drinks of lower strength would 
also be affected, but at a smaller degree, since the structure of Article 20 is by 
pure alcoholic degree. Overall, the consumption of target products would reduce 
by some 42 mn litres in one year (average scenario). The collapse is mostly due 
to the abrupt introduction of a relatively high excise duty on products that in 
various markets currently enjoy a zero or very low excise duty. It is also due to 
the fact that the demand of these products is quite elastic, so the consumers 
would likely respond to a price increase turning massively to other products.  
 
The impact of Option II would be borne in particular by very low-strength mixed 
drinks and – if included in the re-classification – by ‘borderline’ cider. The model 
predicts a sales drop of respectively 46% (for very low-strength mixed drink – 
average scenario) and 64% (for ‘borderline’ cider – average scenario). More 
moderate is the expected impact on mixed drink between 5.5% and 10% vol, 
which in some MS are already taxed as Intermediate Products. The aggregated 
market loss would be greater than under Option I, i.e. – ca. 91 mn litres, 
primarily due to the ‘flat’ nature of the excise duty that would applied, whose 
burden is inversely proportional to the ABV strength.  
 
It is important to highlight the estimated effects on non-target products. Under 
Option I some aromatised wine products classified as CN 2206 may unintendedly 
fall in the scope of re-classification. In this case, applying their corresponding 
pass-through factors and elasticity coefficient, we can expect a reduction of sales 
from ca. 36 mn litres to nearly zero. The variation would be much greater than 
for target products. Under Option II, the impact on non-target products would be 
equally profound. Adverse market effects may be registered also by some CN 
2205 products currently in the remit of Article 12. Overall, the AWP segment may 
register a drop of -74 mn litres (average scenario), i.e. some -70% against the 
‘no change’ scenario.  
 
As discussed, a quantitative assessment of the impact of non-regulatory options 
(in particular options III.a and III.b) would be highly speculative, since these 
options fall outside of the remit of excise duty system and/or are non-binding in 
nature. Nonetheless, since these options would essentially clarify the conditions 
under which certain fermented beverages should be treated like spirits, it can be 
assumed that their impact is conceptually similar to regulatory Option I. This is 
even more so, since Option I de facto requires that operational guidelines are 
adopted in support to the regulatory amendment.        
   
                                                          
380 Where not specified all figures in this section refer to the average value between the minimum and maximum scenarios 
provided in Table 54.  
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Table 54 – Estimated impacts of the proposed options on market sales volume  
Product  
categories 
Baseline 
2016 
Baseline  
+ 1 year Range Option I Diff. Option II Diff. 
 (mn litres) (mn litres) (*) 
(mn 
litres) 
(mn 
litres) 
(mn 
litres) 
(mn 
litres) 
‘Borderline’ OFB  
Mixed Drinks      
(<= 5,5% vol) 
73.64 74.34 
max 54.62 -19.73 27.92 -46.42 
min 65.87 -8.47 51.81 -22.53 
Mixed Drinks         
(5,5%-10% vol) 
4.76 5.04 
max 4.45 -0.59 4.54 -0.50 
min 4.79 -0.25 4.82 -0.22 
‘Borderline’ cider (OFB)  
w/ the UK 435.27 459.44 
max 459.44 0.00 97.14 -362.30 
min 459.44 0.00 221.52 -237.91 
w/out the UK 151.80 153.62 
max 153.62 0.00 33.80 -119.82 
min 153.62 0.00 77.08 -76.54 
‘Borderline’ IP  
MHS Ferm. 
(10% - 22% vol) 
75.49 75.48 
max 40.99 -34.50 75.48 0.00 
min 54.50 -20.98 75.48 0.00 
Non-target products**  
AWP 2205 70.12 68.15 
max 68.15 0.00 29.28 -38.87 
min 68.15 0.00 24.73 -43.42 
AWP 2206 36.43 36.43 
max 0.50 -35.93 0,00 -36.43 
min 0.61 -35.82 5.59 -30.85 
TOTAL 412.23 413.07 
max 322.32 -90.75 171.03 -242.04 
min 347.54 -65.53 239.52 -173.56 
mean 334.93 -78.14 205.27 -207.80 
(w/ UK cider)*** (695.70) (718.88) 
 
(640.75) (-78.14) (309.16) (-409.72) 
Source: Author’s estimates, based on a quantitative analysis of IWSR data.  
Notes: The ‘baseline + 1 year’ is estimated on the basis of 2016 data and the average growth rate registered 
in the past five years. 
(*) For each data point a maximum and a minimum impact is provided, based on the results of the two 
econometric models used in the Study.  
(**) Non-target products that might be affected by the policy options include aromatised-wine products (AWP) 
falling under CN 2206 or, in some circumstances, under CN 2205. 
(***) Since the UK cider market account for the bulk of EU cider, the impact on this market might determine 
alone the overall results of the exercise. For this reason, the aggregated figures containing the UK cider are 
provided separately.    
 
(v) Step 6 - overall effects on market value. The reduction in sales have 
eventually been combined with the tax-induced expected increase in prices in 
order to estimate the scale of the impact in terms of market value (Table 55). 
These are evidently negative due to the expected market decline. In both ‘change 
scenarios’ considered, the estimate loss would be around EUR 300-400 mn.  
 
These figures have to be considered in the light of an overall EU28 market that 
according to IWSR amounts to EUR 207.2 bn. In this respect, the products at 
stake (target and non-target) represent altogether a small 1%, and the possible 
value loss would be of 0.2%. Also, it has to be considered that the consumption 
would likely shift to other products, so at systemic level the variation would be 
hardly noticeable.            
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Table 55 – Estimated impacts of the proposed options on market economic value  
Product  
categories 
Baseline 
2016 
Baseline  
+ 1 year Range Option I Diff. Option II Diff. 
 (€ mn) (€ mn) (*) (€ mn) (€ mn) (€ mn) (€ mn) 
‘Borderline’ OFB 
Mixed Drinks      
(<= 5,5% vol) 
513.45 510.30 
max 387.11 -123.19 236.05 -274.25 
min 459.61 -50.69 443.94 -66.36 
Mixed Drinks         
(5,5%-10% vol) 
43.74 46.13 
max 38.38 -7.76 39.02 -7.12 
min 41.63 -4.51 41.68 -4.46 
‘Borderline’ cider (OFB) 
w/ the UK 2,644.07 2,790.87 
max 2,790.87 0.00 732.70 -2,058.17 
min 2,790.87 0.00 1,663.81 -1,127.06 
w/out the UK 473.16 478.84 
max 478.84 0.00 254.95 -223.89 
min 478.84 0.00 578.95 100.11 
‘Borderline’ IP 
MHS Ferm. 
(10% - 22% vol) 
868.43 867.17 
max 533.81 -333.35 867.17 0.00 
min 689.96 -177.21 867.17 0.00 
Non-target products** 
AWP 2205 210.37 200.89 
max 200.89 0.00 107.52 -93.37 
min 200.89 0.00 92.24 -108.65 
AWP 2206 12.45 12.46 
max 3.40 -9.05 2.85 -9.60 
min 4.19 -8.27 28.69 16.24 
TOTAL 2,121.61 2,115.79 
max 1,642.43 -473.36 1,507.56 -608.23 
min 1,875.10 -240.69 2,052.67 -63.12 
mean 1,758.77 -357.02 1,780.11 -335.67 
(w/ UK cider)*** (4,292.52) (4,427.82) 
 
(4,070.80) (-357.02) (2,561.42) (-1,866.40) 
Source: Author’s estimates, based on a quantitative analysis of IWSR data.  
Notes: The ‘baseline + 1 year’ is estimated on the basis of 2016 data and the average growth rate registered 
in the past five years. 
(*) For each data point a maximum and a minimum impact is provided, based on the results of the two 
econometric models used in the Study.  
(**) Non-target products that might be affected by the policy options include aromatised-wine products (AWP) 
falling under CN 2206 or, in some circumstances, under CN 2205. 
(***) Since the UK cider market account for the bulk of EU cider, the impact on this market might determine 
alone the overall results of the exercise. For this reason, the aggregated figures containing the UK cider are 
provided separately. 
 
 
Box 22 – Results from the OPC: expected consumer reaction to price increases 
 
The majority of respondents believe that a price increase would generate a small decrease in consumption of 
all products under consideration. Rather differently from the other respondents’ categories, beer industry 
stakeholders consider beer-mix consumers as very price-sensitive and, to the contrary, spirit-based RTDs 
consumers as much less influenced by price. 
 
Question #24 - In the event a revised taxation would increase the consumer price of the following alcoholic 
beverages, in your opinion what would the likely reaction of consumers be? 
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Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Ind: rest of the industry (not included in the previous 
category); Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, public authorities, etc.). 
Note: industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol have been 
included in the ‘Oth’ category (sub-questions in RTD), or ‘Ind’ category (sub-questions on beer mixes and 
liqueurs with a fermented base). 
Producers and trade associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
 
 
 TAX REVENUES      
 
The re-classification of certain products determined by the policy options analysed would 
have direct repercussions on the tax revenue generated. The magnitude obviously 
depends on the actual rates applied and the combination of two opposite effects: 
 
 the tax yield per unit of product evidently increases when the rate increases (as 
a consequence of re-classification in a more heavily-taxed category); 
 but the number of units sold declines, due to the negative impact of price 
increase on the demand.  
 
We have further developed the scenarios described in the previous paragraphs with a 
view to estimate the likely net effect of policy options on tax revenues. Table 56 below 
compares the ‘no change’ scenario (baseline) with the two ‘change’ scenarios for the 
various sub-categories of products at stake, including again target and non-target 
products. It has to be noted that the variation of excise duty revenue is magnified by the 
VAT applied on it, so both estimates - with and without the VAT component effect - are 
provided.381 The findings indicate that: 
 
 taxing ‘borderline’ products under Article 20 (Option I) would result in a revenue 
loss of ca. EUR 126 mn / year as compared to the baseline value. The negative 
impact is due to the fact that the reduction in consumption would be more than 
proportional than the tax increase, thus offsetting any revenue benefit. Losses 
would be registered in particular from target products, since they currently 
generate much more revenue than non-target products. 
 
 Option II may lead to even deeper losses, amounting to nearly EUR 250 mn as 
compared to the baseline value. However, in the event ‘borderline’ cider is kept 
out of the re-classification process, the tax gap would be ‘only’ EUR 35 mn. The 
tax gap would be particularly acute for target products, especially very low-
strength mixed drinks and ‘borderline’ cider, due to the market collapse showed 
in Table 56. The loss would be partly mitigated by some extra tax revenue 
expected from certain non-target products.  
 
 When compared to the EUR 35.6 bn of excise duty collected in the EU from 
alcoholic beverage (plus some EUR 7.0 bn of VAT on excise duty), the impact is 
modest, i.e. 0.3%-0.5%.    
 
In a nutshell, in terms of tax revenue the changes analysed would likely not lead to 
beneficial effects. Furthermore, the only benefits would come from certain products 
unintendedly affected. These findings are inter alia consistent with the effects observed 
after the introduction of relatively heavy alcopop/pre-mix taxes in France and Germany: 
the market quickly collapsed, and in a short time period the revenue yielded from these 
                                                          
381 The estimates including VAT refers only to the VAT applied to the excise duty and not the entire VAT paid by 
the product.      
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ad hoc taxes dropped to very modest amounts. Economic operators largely withdrew 
from the market the concerned products, since they had become too expensive for the 
consumers, and invested in other new products. This was for instance the case with 
spirits-based alcopops, which after the introduction of the alcopop tax were massively 
replaced with malt- and wine-based mixed drinks. 
 
We can expect a similar process also with the two regulatory options at stake. A major 
tax leap would eventually result in the substitution of the target products with other 
products from less-taxed categories.  
 
As discussed, the substitution effects could not be measured quantitatively, but there is 
evidence that consumers’ preferences would largely shift to other alcoholic beverages, so 
the net tax loss would be mitigated. In other words, the expected reduced consumption 
of target and non-target products would be replaced with the consumption of products 
falling into other tax categories. So the ultimate effect on excise duty revenues would 
depend primarily on which other products would be consumed and their level of taxation. 
As described in the baseline assessment, in the event this substitution would follow the 
current consumption patterns, a minor tax loss can be expected, since the main 
alternatives to ‘borderline’ products are more lightly taxed.      
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Table 56 – Estimated impacts of the proposed options on tax revenues (excise duty and the VAT applied to it) 
Product  
categories 
Baseline 
2016 
Baseline  
+ 1 year Range Option I 
Diff. (w/ 
VAT) 
Diff. (only 
ED)  Option II 
Diff. (w/ VAT) Diff. (only ED) 
 (€ mn) (€ mn) (*) (€ mn) (€ mn) (€ mn) (€ mn) (€ mn) (€ mn) 
‘Borderline’ OFB 
MD very low 214.97 213.65 
max 137.21 -76.44 -62.92 100.73 -112.91 -92.93 
min 170.86 -42.78 -35.21 213.94 0.29 0.24 
MD low 7.62 8.04 
max 6.48 -1.56 -1.28 5.99 -2.05 -1.69 
min 7.30 -0.74 -0.61 6.79 -1.25 -1.03 
‘Borderline’ cider (OFB) 
w/UK 825.28 871.10 
max 871.10 0.00 0.00 212.06 -659.04 -542.42 
min 871.10 0.00 0.00 542.48 -328.62 -270.47 
W/out UK 344.24 348.37 
max 348.37 0.00 0.00 73.79 -274.58 -225.99 
min 348.37 0.00 0.00 188.76 -159.61 -131.36 
‘Borderline’ IP 
MHS Ferm. 224.43 225.03 
max 137.17 -87.87 -72.32 225.03 0.00 0.00 
min 189.51 -35.52 -29.24 225.03 0.00 0.00 
Non-target products** 
AWP 2205 8.15 7.67 
max 7.67 0.00 0.00 37.03 29.36 24.16 
min 7.67 0.00 0.00 31.42 23.75 19.55 
AWP 2206 2.61 3.78 
max 0.32 -3.47 -2.85 0.00 -3.78 -3.11 
min 0.39 -3.39 -2.79 11.23 7.45 6.13 
TOTAL 802.01 806.54 
max 637.21 -169.34 -139.37 442.57 -363.97 -299.57 
min 724.10 -82.44 -67.86 677.17 -129.37 -106.48 
mean 680.65 -125.89 -103.61 559.87 -246.67 -203.02 
(w/ UK cider)*** (1,283.05) (1,329.27) 
 
(1,203.38) (-125.89) (-103.61) (805.87) (-523.41) (-430.79) 
Source: Author’s estimates based on a quantitative analysis of IWSR data.  
Notes: ED: Excise duty (revenue); w/ VAT: excise duty augmented with the applicable VAT. The average EU28 VAT rate is conventionally applied (21.5%).       
The ‘baseline + 1 year’ is estimated on the basis of 2016 data and the average growth rate registered in the past five years.  
(*) For each data point a maximum and a minimum impact is provided, based on the results of the two econometric models used in the Study.  
(**) Non-target products that might be affected by the policy options include aromatised-wine products (AWP) falling under CN 2206 or, in some circumstances, under CN 
2205. 
(***) Since the UK cider market account for the bulk of EU cider, the impact on this market might determine alone the overall results of the exercise. For this reason, the 
aggregated figures containing the UK cider are provided separately. 
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 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN  
 
The policy options at stake can have an ambivalent impact on administrative burden for 
economic operators and competent authorities. On the one hand, they are intended to 
cut the current unnecessary burden caused by classification issues and uncertainties, on 
the other hand they might result into additional costs for adapting the system and 
implementing the new rules. As discussed in the baseline assessment, the quantification 
of administrative burden is possible only on the basis of hypothetical scenarios, since 
there is no sufficient and reliable data to calculate real monetary costs. The simulation 
developed here relates to the two options requiring a regulatory amendment of the 
Directive, i.e. (i) the clarification of the excise duty structure for borderline products, and 
(ii) the introduction of a differentiation in the OFB category.  
 
The two options are compared in Table 57 below taking into account both the beneficial 
impact of a possible reduction of the current unnecessary burden and the extra costs 
possibly required to update the existing system in line with the proposed change. It is 
important to consider that while the reduction of unnecessary burden is a recurrent 
saving, the costs to update the system are one-off, i.e. they happen only once. So the 
balance of costs and benefits would shift overtime. In particular, under option (I) the 
aggregated benefits would possibly offset costs within a 5-6 years period, while under 
option (II) it would likely take much longer (some 10 years or more). The distribution of 
impacts would be uneven: the net gains for competent authorities are much more 
evident than for economic operators. Finally, these estimates do not take into account 
the costs potentially incurred by economic operators to review their production 
processes, product portfolio, and market strategies in order to offset the downsides of 
re-classification. These are not regulatory costs in strict sense, since they do not stem 
from new legal requirements. However, from the perspective of economic operators they 
could be much greater than the sheer administrative obligations.   
       
Table 57 – Summary of expected impacts on administrative burden from the proposed 
policy options  
 I - Clarification of the excise duty 
structure for borderline products 
II – Introducing a differentiation in the 
OFB categories 
Impact on 
baseline scenario 
The policy option envisages the 
development of agreed and common 
guidelines for a more straightforward 
classification of borderline products.  
 
Depending on the clarity and 
robustness of the criteria and methods 
developed, the existing burden may be 
eliminated moderately or nearly 
entirely.     
This policy option is less oriented toward 
‘difficult-to-classify’ products, and the burden 
due to the difficult distinction between CN 
2206 and CN 2208 would persist. However, it 
nonetheless envisages a better definition of 
certain OFB that might eventually reduce 
classification complexity.  
 
At the same time, every new distinction may 
create new ‘borderline’ products (in this case 
within the new OFB sub-categories). 
Estimated 
quantitative 
effects (based on 
simulated 
scenarios) 
Assuming the measure may reduce the 
number of complex dossiers by ca. 
50%, the estimated costs savings may 
amount to some EUR 0.5 – 0.8 mn per 
year, for competent authorities.  
 
Non-quantifiable benefits for economic 
operators in the same proportion can 
be assumed.    
All in all, the benefits of a clearer definition of 
certain products can be neutralised by the 
risk of new borderline products.  
 
It can therefore be assumed that the overall 
present burden would not change significantly 
(EUR 1.0 – 1.5 mn).     
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 I - Clarification of the excise duty 
structure for borderline products 
II – Introducing a differentiation in the 
OFB categories 
New 
administrative 
costs  
This option would not impose new 
administrative costs beside the ‘one-
off’ need to familiarise with the new 
rules and guidelines, adopt it in the 
standard procedures and training staff 
accordingly.  
 
Competent authorities and economic 
operators (in the segments touched by 
the revision) would be equally 
affected.     
 
   
The introduction of a new tax category would 
require various administrative actions, 
namely: 
 Familiarisation with the new rules and 
guidelines. 
 Amendment of the legal and 
administrative framework. 
 Updating of the IT system, templates and 
other operational tools. 
 Training of staff. 
 Updating of the licenses and 
authorisation of the concerned economic 
operators.  
 
With the exception of the second point, the 
above costs would affect both authorities and 
the concerned economic operators.  
All the required action would be ‘one-off’, no 
relevant recurrent cost is envisaged.     
Estimated 
quantitative 
effects (based on 
simulated 
scenarios) 
The staff efforts required to familiarise 
and implement the new rules may vary 
by enterprise size. In this simulation 
we assumed one staff / month overall 
will be needed, amounting to 
approximately EUR 4,000 per 
enterprise (including overheads). 
 
The affected population encompasses 
in principle all those who produce 
‘borderline’ CN 2206 products, these 
can be found primarily among OFB 
producers, but also among certain 
breweries and wine/liqueurs producers. 
Their precise number is unknown but 
assuming for analytical purposes that 
they are some 1,000 (cider-makers, 
especially ‘traditional’ producers would 
not be affected), the aggregated costs 
would amount to EUR 4.0 mn.  
 
The impact on competent authorities 
cannot be quantified. In terms of unit 
costs it is certainly higher than for 
economic operators, but the affected 
population is limited so in aggregated 
terms it may be modest.     
As regards the staff efforts to familiarise and 
implement the new rules we estimated the 
same scale of impact assumed for option I.   
 
For the other direct costs connected to 
updating IT systems and tools (and the 
specialised expertise required), the estimates 
elaborated in Table 60 below for the change 
of the EPC seems applicable, i.e. approx. EUR 
600 - 1200 per enterprise (weighted by 
enterprise size).      
 
The affected population includes primarily 
OFB producers (including cider-makers).  
However, also some producers of aromatised 
wine products falling in this category may be 
affected. Assuming an affected population of 
2,000 – 3,000 enterprises, the aggregated 
costs would range between EUR 9.2 and EUR 
15.6 mn. 
 
Also in this case the impact on competent 
authorities cannot be quantified. In terms of 
unit costs it is certainly higher than for 
economic operators, but the affected 
population is limited so in aggregated terms it 
may be modest. 
 
With respect to non-regulatory options (III), it is self-evident that they would not impose 
regulatory costs on operators and authorities directly attributable to Directive 92/83.  
However, the proposed measures and processes would clearly require efforts and 
resources in all phases of their development and implementation cycle. Since these 
measure fall outside of the scope of this Study precise estimates have not been 
developed, but some qualitative considerations are possible:  
 
 The direct costs of the review of CN / CNEN (option III.a) are part of the 
ordinary activities of the appointed experts and would not represent an extra 
cost. On the side of economic operators and national customs offices some one-
off costs to familiarise and adapt procedures to the new rules can be expected. 
Their magnitude would be broad in line with the expected extra costs imposed 
by Option I. The expected benefits are also comparable with those generated 
by Option I, or somehow smaller in the event CN revisions do not remove 
completely the uncertainties on the application of excise duty categories. 
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 The costs of development of guidelines to operationalise CJEU criteria (option 
III.b) are also an integral part of Option I scenario. They would mostly 
comprise the expenses for the functioning of the working group. Then, in the 
implementation phase, some familiarisation costs can be envisaged (but no 
formal act is foreseen). Also in this case, the burden reduction would be in line 
with Option I estimates, somehow diminished by the fact that some MS may 
decide not to adopt them.  
 
 The costs of developing a sectoral regulation for cider, perry and other specific 
OFB (Option III.c) are difficult to estimate, since they ultimately require a fully-
fledged regulatory process. In any case, these would be one-off costs, so they 
essentially require an initial investment to update the excise duty system and 
procedures. In principle, they might also increase the recurrent enforcement 
costs for national authorities, based on the principle that any new tax category 
envisages an extra monitoring and administration effort. The burden savings 
would be limited, since in the absence of a regulatory intervention (Option II) 
most of ‘borderline’ products would remain unaffected.  
 
 Option III.d (enhancing monitoring and control) would have no direct effects on 
administrative burden, but it may be conducive to better interventions against 
‘borderline’ products. At this stage, however, the outcome of a collaborative 
process on this issue is highly uncertain, so concrete benefits are unclear. On 
the other hand, the collaborative process would require a modest effort to the 
authorities concerned, which could also be funded through the relevant DG 
TAXUD programmes.                           
 
 THE PUBLIC VIEW ON THE PROPOSED POLICY OPTIONS  
 
The following Box 23 illustrates the OPC participants’ feedback on the proposed policy 
options to address the various classification issues identified, as well as the perceived 
benefits and risks. Views are evidently mixed and can be easily related to the 
perspective of specific segments of the industry and/or interests of other nature. To 
highlight these differences, the responses are reported separately. It is also interesting 
to note that, while respondents often concede there can be added value in a general 
clarification of the current picture, the perceived risks of a legislative change tend to 
outweigh the perceived benefits across most of respondent groups (except private 
individuals).              
 
 
Box 23 – Results from the OPC: stakeholder views on the policy options to address 
classification issues  
 
Views on the proposed policy options. As shown in the figure below, various different policy options were 
assessed in the OPC. While private individuals were in general in favour of all the options proposed, industry 
stakeholders had more varied views, namely: 
 
 Add one or more new product categories, such as a separate category for cider, perry and fruit wine. 
While this option was positively received by the beer and cider industries, wine and spirits producers 
strongly opposed it. 
 Clarify the ‘correct’ criteria for classifying products, for example by incorporating relevant parts of Court 
of Justice judgments (in particular on the essential / organoleptic characteristics of products, and their 
intended use) into the Directive. Exception made for the spirits industry, the majority of producers 
agreed, if not strongly agreed, with the option. 
 Amend Article 20, so that also products falling under CN code 2206 may be taxed as ethyl alcohol, 
where relevant. Wine, cider and spirits producers strongly opposed this option, while to the contrary 
over 60% of brewers expressed an at least partial agreement with it. 
 Encourage a revision of the scope and definition of CN code 2206. As in the previous case, this option 
attracted major criticism from the wine and spirits industry. Beer and cider producers were instead 
mainly neutral. 
 No change to the Directive, but possible recommendations based on the views of the Indirect Tax 
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Experts Group (ITEG) on the correct classification of specific products. In this case, industry 
stakeholders expressed rather mixed views, with for instance the majority of brewers strongly in favour 
and over 60% of wine producers taking a neutral stance. 
 
Question #19 - Please express your opinion on the following possible approaches to address the problems 
of the definition and classification of alcoholic beverages at the EU level. 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, 
public authorities, industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, 
etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
 
Perceived risks and potential benefits. A clear majority of all industry respondents believe that a revision 
of the OFB tax category would generate negative effects on all fronts, including adverse effects on 
international trade, classification uncertainties and disputes, market distortions, etc. Private individuals and 
the residual ‘other’ category of respondents had to the contrary more mixed views. 
 
Question #20 - In your opinion, what are the risks of a possible revision of the tax category of ‘other 
fermented beverages’? 
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Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, 
public authorities, industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, 
etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
 
In line with the previous question, the industry judged the benefits of a revision of the OFB tax category 
(e.g. reduced classification uncertainties and disputes, reduced tax-induced substitution across products) as 
rather low. Private individuals and the residual respondents were somewhat more optimistic. 
 
Question #22 - In your opinion, what are the benefits of a possible revision of the tax category of ‘other 
fermented beverages’? 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, 
public authorities, industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, 
etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
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3.1.3 Clarify the terms ‘entirely fermented origin’  
 
3.1.3.1 Definition of policy options 
 
As shown in the problem analysis, there is an issue with the interpretation of the notion 
‘entirely fermented origin’ used in Articles 8, 12.1 and 17 of the Directive, with respect 
to certain products that contain alcohol as a flavour-carrier (AFC), i.e. aromas diluted in 
ethyl alcohol. The amount of alcohol used for this purpose is minimal and various 
Member States apply a margin of tolerance for its use in certain flavoured beverages, 
also in line with the provisions of Regulation 1967/2005 on the use of alcohol aromas in 
beer, and Regulation 251/2014 on aromatised wine products. Nonetheless, a strict 
interpretation of the notion ‘entirely fermented origin’, as it is presently laid down in the 
Directive, would lead to a reclassification of certain AFC-containing beverages under 
other different tax categories.  
 
The baseline assessment showed that the problem – if any – concerns primarily 
aromatised wine products, since in the case of OFB, the addition of alcohol is anyway 
permitted for products up to 10% vol, while the excise duty definition of beer does not 
contain the provision on the ‘entirely fermented origin’ of the products, so it is not 
covered by this regulatory clarification. With respect to beer, it is worth mentioning 
again Regulation 1967/2005, which allowed flavoured beer containing a minimal addition 
of alcohol to be taxed under Article 2. Analogously, according to some of the national 
authorities interviewed, the absence of the above provision in Article 2, can be 
legitimately interpreted as the possibility to tax as standard beer also the beer 
containing AFC.   
 
The policy option examined here (Option IV) consists in adopting a flexible approach 
toward AFC, allowing the addition of ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin to products of 
‘entirely fermented origin’ (wine and OFB), for technical purposes (to dilute or dissolve 
colorants, flavourings or any other authorised additives) and not exceeding the dose 
strictly necessary. The principle can be established in the Directive in generic terms, as 
in Regulation 251/2014, or setting an upper limit to the maximum contribution of AFC to 
the total ABV of the final products. Some MS have set it to 1.2% ABV, which is the 
threshold below which the excise duty on alcohol does not apply. Reportedly, other MS 
have used the same approach to establish a 0.5% ABV threshold to the AFC used in 
certain flavoured beer. The most effective approach seems a combination of the two 
principles, i.e. establishing that ABV should not exceed the dose strictly necessary and in 
any case cannot amount to more than 1.2% vol. 
 
Although derived from the AWP regulation, the same principle should cover also OFB 
under Article 12 with an ABV between 10% and 15% vol, to avoid disparities of 
treatment. The extension of this principle to beer (Article 2) may become useful in all 
cases where the threshold identified in Regulation 1967/2005 is too strict (0.04% vol) 
and/or to harmonise MS approach to it, but since the notion ‘entirely fermented origin’ 
does not apply to the definition of beer, this revision is not strictly related to the issue at 
stake here. 
 
This policy option would primarily have an impact on the certainty and consistency of 
rules across MS, but only limited market effects since the addition of AFC is de iure or de 
facto already accepted. It may be interesting however to see what is the dimension of 
the market (and tax revenues) at stake. The downside is evidently the risk of abuse that 
a permissive interpretation of ‘entirely fermented origin’ may encourage.                 
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Table 58 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on the application of 
the ‘entirely fermented origin’ provision 
Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83) 
Impact Areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Introducing a margin of 
tolerance in the notion 
‘entirely fermented 
origin’ for alcohol as a 
flavour carrier, with or 
without establishing a 
fixed threshold.   
 
 
 Legal certainty   Reduced risk of disparities of 
treatment across MS. 
 More certainty for economic 
operators on accepted practices.    
 Market effects  Only for products currently or 
potentially excluded from this 
tax-break. 
 Tax revenues   Risk of abuse, and difficult 
enforcement.    
 
 
3.1.3.2 Impact analysis 
 
 LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
The evidence from the fieldwork interviews and the stakeholders consultation suggest 
that there are limited concrete cases of classification uncertainties or disputes related to 
the addition of minimal amounts of alcohol as a flavour carrier (or for similar technical 
purposes) to fermented alcoholic beverages.  
 
With respect to aromatised wine products, the Regulation 251/2014 clearly states the 
condition for its use: ‘the ethyl alcohol used to dilute or dissolve colorants, flavourings or 
any other authorised additives used in the preparation of aromatised wine products must 
be of agricultural origin and must be used in the dose strictly necessary and is not 
considered as addition of alcohol for the purpose of production of an aromatised wine 
product’.382 A beverage complying with these criteria can be considered an aromatised 
wine product in accordance to sectoral legislation, but this does not automatically imply 
that it is in line with the provisions of Article 8 and Article 12 requiring that products are 
‘entirely of fermented origin’. If strictly intended, this provision may require that 
products containing a single drop of alcohol of distilled origin are classified as 
Intermediate Products.383 As discussed in the ‘baseline assessment’ the risk of 
inconsistencies have been addressed by various MS by either (i) adopting a flexible 
approach to functional alcohol added, i.e. adopting de iure or de facto the same 
principles of Reg. 251/2014 also for tax purposes, or (ii) setting specific maximum limits 
(in ABV terms) to the amount of AFC that can be added to a fermented beverage before 
the tax category changes (typically 1.2% vol). These measures are evidently not 
harmonised and vary across MS. In some of the MS examined there is no such measure 
in place and, in theory, the addition of any amount of AFC would trigger the IP tax 
treatment, but in practice a certain degree of tolerance is generally granted. So, it can 
be assumed that in the EU only a small fraction (not possible to quantify) of aromatised 
wine products containing minimal amounts of AFC are possibly taxed under Article 17.  
 
Still, the OPC results show that a minority of economic operators from the wine sector is 
aware of somehow frequent issues with the classification of these products – further 
confirmed by the widespread support that a harmonised solution to this issue has 
received (see Box 24 below). In our understanding, this is not motivated by major legal 
disputes, severe market distortions or the like, but primarily by the degree of uncertainty 
that the current ‘patchwork’ of national solutions inevitably cause, which may create 
                                                          
382 Regulation 251/2014, Annex I, point 3, page 28. 
383 Except products eligible for Article 12(1) first indent and Article 12(2) first indent (OFB below 10% and 13% 
vol, respectively).   
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unnecessary hurdles and delays in operations and eventually constrain the full 
deployment of the market potential. The matter seems of limited relevance for MS 
authorities that have adopted an explicit approach to deal with these products, and 
perhaps just slightly more relevant for those who have not. But, again, this is more 
related to the need to confirm that the national approach is consistent with EU legislation 
and established practices, than to concrete problems or cases difficult to handle.  
 
Aromatised wine products is the most relevant category in this analysis, but it is useful 
to note that similar issues may apply to beer and to a very limited extent OFB. The case 
of beer with added alcoholic flavours lies almost entirely outside of Directive 92/83/EEC, 
since it was the subject of the Commission Regulation 1967/2005, which established that 
a product with an addition of alcohol via aromatic components resulting in only 0.04% 
ABV cannot be excluded from position 2203 and classified in heading 2208.384 The 
Regulation on one side establishes the principle that a small addition of alcohol for aroma 
purposes does not imply a change of CN code, on the other hand relates to a specific 
product where the addition of alcohol was negligible and classified as beer according to 
CN 2203. Conversely, the status of mixed beers that come under CN 2206385 and with an 
AFC exceeding 0.04% vol cannot be straightforwardly inferred from this Regulation. As 
for aromatised wine products, various MS reported the adoption of specific thresholds for 
the addition of AFC to flavoured beer, which are generally lower than for wine (typically 
0.5% vol), but much higher than 0.04%. Since these are, again, national-level 
approaches, there remains a substantial uncertainty with the treatment of these 
products under the Directive. Unlike wine and OFB, the Directive is silent with respect to 
the ‘entire fermented origin’ of beer, so this issue does not fall in the scope of this 
option. However, if the Directive is amended to clarify the status of products containing 
AFC, it would be useful, for legal clarity, to cover also the relevant beer mixes.  
 
The case of OFB is of limited relevance since products with an ABV lower than 10% may 
explicitly contain distilled alcohol, so the addition of AFC would not make any difference. 
Above this threshold the matter may have some relevance, but besides pre-mix 
cocktails, and a few special OFB, there are very few products in this ABV band. The 
matter may have some MS-level relevance where there are specific regulations for cider, 
establishing when and how much flavourings may be added. The addition of alcohol per 
se is generally banned in the national definition of ‘traditional’ cider, so AFC may cause 
its re-classification among generic OFB. This has fiscal consequences e.g. in France and 
Romania. 
 
With respect to the concrete mechanism to harmonise the treatment of AFC in the 
Directive, there are three possible approaches: 
 
a) Establishing a maximum amount of AFC, e.g. 1.2% for flavoured wines and OFB and 
0.5% for beer – in line with some MS practices. 
b) Not establishing a maximum amount, but introducing a reference to the strictly 
necessary dose, in line with Regulation 251/2014.  
c) Combining the two approaches above, establishing that the addition of AFC should be 
limited to the strictly necessary dose and cannot exceed in any case certain 
thresholds. 
 
From a legal certainty profile, the first mechanism seem preferable, since it introduces 
an objective limit that is valid for all but it has two limitations: (i) it is challenging to 
ascertain the exact content of AFC through analytical methods (customs laboratory 
tests); (ii) it may encourage a use of AFC greater than the dose strictly needed. The 
second approach would be more in line with the principle that the tax break regards only 
                                                          
384 Regulation 1967/2005, Annex, point 1, page 8. 
385 These products are nonetheless taxed as Beer under Article 2 and not as OFB. 
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a ‘functional’ addition of alcohol (in the strictly necessary dose), but it would be more 
difficult to guarantee a coherent interpretation across EU28, so legal certainty would be 
hampered. The third approach seems more promising since it combines the principle of 
the pure functional addition (discouraging the abusive addition of AFC for fortification 
purposes), and the advantages of making reference to an objective, common threshold.      
 
 MARKET EFFECTS     
 
The dimension of the market of AFC-containing products is difficult to estimate, and we 
could only develop hypothetical scenarios in this regard (see Table 18 above). Based on 
fieldwork evidence, only a minority of MS do not formally accept products with a minimal 
addition of AFC as ‘entirely fermented beverage’ and taxed them as if they were fortified 
products. However, since detecting the addition of small amounts of AFC is analytically 
very complex, the evidence collected during fieldwork suggests that also in those 
countries a certain degree of tolerance exists.  
 
It seems very unlikely that the same AFC-containing beverage could be taxed as e.g. 
wine or beer in one MS and as an IP or ethyl alcohol in another MS. The tax differential 
would be so significant (with few exceptions) that more probably under such 
circumstances the product would not be commercialised. Therefore, formalising the 
existence of a margin of tolerance for AFC-containing beverage would have limited 
impact in terms of re-classification of existing products. On the other hand, this option 
would ensure a greater certainty in the treatment of certain products, with eventually 
beneficial commercial impact.   
 
Quantitative estimates in this area must be taken as purely indicative, however, it can 
be noted that flavoured products have register some of the highest growth rate in 
countries with an explicit ‘tolerance’ threshold, e.g. flavoured beer in the Netherlands 
(CAGR 2010-16 of +18.2%) and aromatised wine products (non-IP) in Italy (CAGR 
2010-16 of + 5.1%). It is possible that a favourable legal and administrative 
environment, among other things, has contributed to accelerating growth.  
 
In any case, the volume of market at stake is small, possibly comprised between 12 and 
30 mn litres for aromatised wine products and 23 to 70 mn litres for flavoured beer.386 
So, also a major contribution to growth of 3 to 5 percentage points would result in a 
volume increase of 2.0 – 3.5 mn litres, i.e. some 0.3% of the overall total sales of these 
products.                    
 
 TAX REVENUES      
 
The direct impact on tax revenues from this policy option appears very modest. First of 
all, it is unlikely that any of the existing products would change of tax category following 
the adoption of the policy option, since all relevant products are already taxed under the 
most favourable category. Secondly, the limited effects described above on market 
developments would translate in marginal variations of the tax base.  
 
Of relevance for tax revenue purposes is only the fact that the AFC contained in the 
concerned products is possibly not subject to the ethyl alcohol excise duty. Establishing a 
maximum threshold of 1.2% vol of AFC for aromatised wine products entails that up to 
between 0.9 to 2.7 mn litres of pure alcohol would therefore pay a lower rate excise duty 
(wine), with a virtual loss between EUR 16.4 mn and EUR 49.2 mn.387 A threshold of 
0.5% vol of AFC for flavoured beer would instead translate into 0.7 – 2.0 mn litres of 
                                                          
386 See the estimates laid down in the baseline assessment (Section 2.1.4). The scenario assumes benefits 
would regard only national markets that currently do not have a formalised tolerance mechanism for AFC (i.e. 
an estimated one-sixth of the EU market).  
387 Calculated on the basis of the average EU28 excise duty on ethyl alcohol of EUR 1,823.19/hlpa.   
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pure alcohol taxed as beer instead of ethyl alcohol, with an excise duty difference of EUR 
12.2 – 36.7 mn.           
 
 THE PUBLIC VIEW ON THE PROPOSED POLICY OPTIONS  
 
 
Box 24 – Results from the OPC: stakeholder views on a possible clarification of the 
terms ‘entirely fermented origin’ 
 
While stakeholders involved in the production of beer, wine and cider are in favour – if not strongly in favour 
– of a clarification of the concept of ‘entirely of fermented origin’ in connection with products containing 
alcohol as a flavour carrier, those involved in the production of spirits expressed a somewhat more cautious 
opinion, with only a relative majority in favour of such option. Over 70% of private individuals and the 
residual ‘other’ group of respondents also agree with the policy option. 
 
Question #19 - Please express your opinion on the following possible approaches to address the problems 
of the definition and classification of alcoholic beverages at the EU level. 
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry 
stakeholders with an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, 
public authorities, industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, 
etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
 
 
 
3.1.4 Establish a separate Excise Product Code for OFB  
 
3.1.4.1  Definition of policy options 
 
The policy option proposed to address the lack of a specific Excise Product Code (EPC) 
for OFB is straightforward and consists in revising the scope of codes W200 and W300, 
which currently merge wine and OFB (respectively still and sparkling), by introducing 
separate  codes for OFB (Option V). The two new codes should capture products falling 
respectively under Article 12(1) (still OFB) and Article 12(2) (sparkling OFB).  
 
Rather than a change of Directive 92/83/EEC this amendment would concern Annex II, 
Table 11 (Excise Product) of Commission Regulation 684/2009388, as well as of the EMCS 
and related systems, including at the level of MS authorities and economic operators. 
The major benefit that can be expected consists in an improved monitoring of the 
                                                          
388 Commission Regulation (EC) No 684/2009 of 24 July 2009 implementing Council Directive 2008/118/EC as 
regards the computerised procedures for the movement of excise goods under suspension of excise duty. 
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market and reduced risk of misclassifications and ensuing tax losses - of which there is 
limited evidence, however, since in most MS wine and OFB have the same tax 
treatment. The main costs envisaged relate to the legal and technical update of the 
current system.    
 
In the case Option (I) above is adopted, and the current OFB category is split into two 
separate tax categories, further EPC should be evidently introduced. We have assumed 
that the new category so created would be taxed differently, so the need for a separate 
code in the EMCS system would be enhanced. The implementation costs would not differ 
from the Option V analysed here.         
 
Table 59 - Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on differentiating EPC 
Policy Option 
(not requiring a revision of 
Directive 92/83) 
Impact Areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Introducing a distinct EPC 
for OFB (revision of 
Commission Regulation 
684/2009 and related 
technical documents)  
 
 
 Administrative burden    To legally and technically update the 
excise systems at EU and MS level.   
 Tax enforcement and 
revenues 
 Reduced risk of misclassification and 
of tax losses. 
 Improved market monitoring.   
 
 
3.1.4.2  Impact analysis 
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN 
 
The introduction of a separate excise product code for OFB does not require an 
amendment of the Directive but of the Annexes of Commission Regulation 684/2009 and 
of the technical and administrative rules of procedure implementing the EMCS.389 This 
would have inevitable cost implications for both national authorities and economic 
operators. The costs incurred by economic operators primarily concern the need to 
update the enterprise’s administrative system to manage the movement of products in 
compliance with the EMCS and its administrative requirements. The change envisaged is 
minimal, however all IT systems, templates, manuals etc. should be updated to include 
the new EPC. As a benchmark, we may consider that setting up and implementing an 
EMCS-compatible enterprise system ‘from scratch’ has an estimated cost of EUR 3,000 
for a micro/small company, EUR 6,000 for a medium one and EUR 60,000 for a big 
company.390 The exact costs of a revision of the system is difficult to calculate but it 
seems reasonable to assume it would not exceed 20% of the set-up costs. There are 
very few large producers of alcoholic beverages in all segments as compared to small 
and micro operators, so we may approximate total costs making reference to only two 
size groups: small/micro enterprises and medium ones (see Table 60). The estimates 
have been rounded upwards, to possibly include also a few wholesalers and distributors 
who operate in suspension of duty and might therefore be concerned. Although the unit 
cost of the update would be likely limited (possibly EUR 600 – 1200), the sheer number 
of undertakings affected makes the total administrative burden for economic operators 
amount to nearly EUR 127 mn. This figure has to be taken prudently, since the number 
of economic operators actually affected and the costs estimates are uncertain. 
 
Since the revision concerns only OFB, it is possible that only the economic operators 
active in this segment are required to change their systems and not the others. The 
technical feasibility of this solution has to be ascertained, but it is worth noting that such 
                                                          
389 In particular, Appendix B of the FESS (Functional Excise System Specification).  
390 Ramboll Management Consulting, ‘Evaluation of current arrangements for the holding and moving of excise 
goods under excise duty suspension’, DG TAXUD, 2015. 
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
208 
 
solution would radically reduce the overall impact of the proposed revision: if applied to 
cider-makers only, the total administrative burden would be approximately 1 million 
EUR. This scenario is somewhat conservative since some producers of wine, beer, and 
spirits also produce mixed drinks and other OFB beverages. However, also adding these 
players the overall scale of impact would remain limited.  
 
The administrative burden for public administrations involved are more difficult to 
estimate. The range of activities to perform is possibly greater and more heterogeneous, 
involving the amendment of regulation and standard operating procedures, informing 
and training operators at all levels, and obviously the direct costs of updating the IT 
systems. The unit cost per country would vary in accordance with the specificities of the 
administrative system in place and the size of the country, but interviewees were not 
able to provide a quantitative estimate. Actually, these are considered routine activities 
that are carried out regularly and do not have a separate budget (the IT system is 
constantly checked and updated, staff is regularly trained etc.).  
 
Regardless of the limitations in quantifying administrative burden, it can be certainly 
affirmed that the balance of costs and benefits of this option would likely fall on the 
negative side. In most EU countries the administrative distinction between wine and OFB 
is of no practical relevance since the same tax treatment is applied, so for the 
administrations and the operators from these countries the proposed revision would only 
bring additional cost and no benefits.   
 
Needless to say, in the event of further changes of the excise duty structure, such as the 
establishment of new tax categories to differentiate among OFB (Option II), the revision 
of EPC would become necessary for a proper management and monitoring of products 
movements, so the intervention would become justified also in costs/benefit terms.                      
 
Table 60 – Estimated administrative burden for SME from a revision of EPC  
 Size Wine-
makers 
Cider-
makers 
Breweries Distilleries Total 
Unit cost 
(€) 
Total costs 
(€) 
Total costs, 
only OFB (€) 
Medium  20,000 300 2000 12,000 34,300 €1,200 €41.2 mn €0.4 mn 
Small/ 
micro 
130,000 1000 5500 6,000 142,500 €600 €85.5 mn €0.6 mn 
Total €126.7 mn €1.0 mn 
Sources: Estimates on the number of undertakings have been calculating by extrapolating at EU level the 
figures collected in six sample countries (AT, BE, FR, IT, PL, UK) through trade associations, tax authorities and 
ministries of agriculture databases based on mixed sources.   
The unit cost per enterprise is estimated assuming that the revision of the enterprise’s administrative system 
(including IT) would cost a fraction (some 20%) of the overall cost of setting up and implementing an EMCS-
compatible system at enterprise level (including IT equipment, expertise etc.). The benchmark estimates come 
from the Ramboll evaluation of Directive 118/2008.  
Notes: The definition of micro/small varies across the industry sectors and depends on the amount of output. 
The distribution across industry sectors is mostly based on stakeholders’ qualitative estimates and has to be 
taken with caution. It is possible that a certain amount of undertakings are outside of the excise system and 
therefore not subject to additional costs.  
The estimated total costs do not take into consideration the amortisation period: the estimated total costs may 
be spread over a 3-5 years period.  
 
 TAX ENFORCEMENT AND REVENUES  
 
The main expected benefit of implementing this option regards tax enforcement and 
control. In the current situation, wine and OFB products have the same EPC. The 
different CN code allows to distinguish between them, but there are cases, especially 
with aromatised wine products (AWP), falling under heading 2205 or 2206, where it is 
not explicit if the W200 (or W300) code assigned calls for tax treatment under Article 8 
(wine) or Article 12 (OFB). In the vast majority of countries this does not make any 
material difference since the excise duty rate is the same, but where the applicable rate 
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is different (FR, HU, IE, MT, PL and RO)391 the issue is not trivial, and ‘mistreatments’ 
are in principle possible.392   
 
The analysis of impact can therefore be limited to MS where excise duty on wine and 
OFB are different. The total volume of OFB in these countries is below 100 mn litres, 
with Ireland accounting alone for nearly 70%. AWP (not including vermouth) possibly 
amount to some 55 mn litres. In terms of excise duty revenue, this amount correspond 
to an overall EUR 322 mn. With the possible exception of MT and RO, the difference in 
the excise duty is modest: in the six countries identified it amounts to approximately 
EUR 0.75 per litre (from EUR 0.05 in FR to EUR 1.85 in MT). There are no estimates on 
the frequency of ‘mistreatments’ and the evidence from fieldwork suggests they are 
quite rare in practice. For purely illustrative purposes, assuming that 1% of the products 
traded in these countries is erroneously classified, due to the indefinite EPC, and that the 
error is always in the sense that the lower excise duty rate is paid, the aggregated 
excise duty loss would be of EUR 1.1 mn.     
 
The adoption of a separate EPC for OFB may redress this problem and ensure a more 
accurate enforcement, reducing the risk of errors and the ensuing foregone revenue. The 
scale of the problem is however so small that it may not justify per se the adoption of 
this measure. Moreover, it is not evenly distributed across MS: for countries, like MT and 
RO, where the tax rate differential between wine and OFB is high, the reduction of 
classification errors may have tangible effects on the budget; for other countries it would 
likely be negligible.    
 
Finally, it is important to highlight that beyond tax revenues effects, the introduction of a 
separate EPC for OFB would bring significant added value in terms of monitoring and 
control of the market and excise duty trends (also in line with the proposed Option 
III.d). At present tax authorities are seldom able to differentiate, and therefore to 
appreciate the market trends of OFB, which is the category that mostly contains new and 
‘borderline’ products, so they have access to limited data evidence to support their tax 
policy decisions.     
 
 THE PUBLIC VIEW ON THE PROPOSED POLICY OPTIONS (OPC)  
 
 
Box 25 – Results from the OPC: stakeholder views on a possible differentiation of EPC 
 
As in various other instances, this option was characterised by a polarisation of industry respondents, with 
wine and spirits producers mainly against it (notably, over 70% of stakeholders involved in the production of 
wine were strongly against the policy option) while beer and cider producers mainly in favour. 
 
Question #19 - Please express your opinion on the following possible approaches to address the problems of 
the definition and classification of alcoholic beverages at the EU level. 
                                                          
391 In HU and RO the excise duty rate on OFB is greater than wine, in all other countries it is the opposite. 
392 In certain countries (e.g. IT) there exists national tax codes that distinguish between wine and OFB. 
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Source: OPC. 
Legend: B: industry stakeholders with an interest in the beer sector; W: industry stakeholders with an interest 
in the wine sector; C: industry stakeholders with an interest in the cider sector; S: industry stakeholders with 
an interest in the spirits sector; Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other (public health NGOs, public authorities, 
industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol, etc.). 
Note: producers and associations of fortified wines have been included in the wine industry group. 
‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed.  
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3.2 Exemptions for denatured alcohol  
 
As discussed in Section 2.2, problems in the area of denatured alcohol stem from the 
following issues: 
 
 Completely denatured alcohol (CDA): 
o Incomplete / inconsistent mutual recognition of CDA 
 So-called ‘partially’ denatured alcohol (PDA): 
o Proliferation of national approaches to PDA 
o Divergent interpretation of the terms of Article 27(1)(b) 
 Relevant to both CDA and PDA: 
o Risk of fiscal fraud and related health concerns 
 
This Section outlines a series of policy options to tackle these issues (in the order in 
which they are listed above – though note that fraud risks are covered as part of the 
options related to both CDA and PDA, rather than a separate set of options), and 
discusses their likely impacts, in comparison with the dynamic baseline (i.e. no policy 
change) and based on the available evidence.  
 
 
3.2.1 Full harmonisation of CDA formulations 
 
With the adoption of Regulation 2017/1112 and the entry into force of the new list of 
CDA procedures on 1 August 2017, the EU has taken a very significant step towards the 
harmonisation of formulations for completely denatured alcohol (CDA). As things 
currently stand, 25 MS393 are expected to recognise the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant, and only 
3 MS (CZ, SE, UK) recognise different concentrations of the same ingredients. In 
addition, from 2019 (when the authorisation of the remaining FI formulation expires), 
only 2 MS (CZ, EL) will still be using national formulations containing different 
denaturants. As described in Section 2.2, this greatly reduces (but does not completely 
eliminate) the scope for problems arising from the manifestly unclear rules on 
recognition of CDA formulations stipulated in Article 27(1)(a) of the Directive. 
 
An obvious policy option would therefore be to seek full harmonisation across all MS. 
This could entail: 
 Agreement on a single formulation, containing the same denaturants in the same 
concentration, for CDA across the entire EU.  
 Elimination of all remaining national formulations. 
 Potentially a significant change in the wording of Article 27(1)(a), as well as 3 and 
4, to reflect a new procedure for defining the common formulation, which would 
supersede the current process of notification by the MS. 
 
None of these aspects would be likely to be straightforward in practice, for the following 
reasons. The obvious candidate for a common formulation is the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant 
consisting of 1L of IPA, 1L of MEK, and 1g of denatonium benzoate per hl of absolute 
ethanol. However, it does not appear as if the MS that have so far insisted on higher 
concentrations were ready to accept this, due to concerns over the robustness of the 
lower concentrations of MEK and, to a lesser extent, IPA. Similarly, the MS that continue 
to use national formulations insist these are robust formulations within the spirit of the 
Directive, and are important to specific national industry sectors. They therefore see no 
reason to withdraw them. 
 
                                                          
393 This includes BG and RO, who have recently notified their intention to switch from 3-3-1 to 1-1-1, and HR, 
which has notified a concentration of ‘at least’ 1-1-1. 
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If agreement on a single common formulation could be reached, then it would appear 
sensible (although not strictly necessary) to also consider changes to the procedure 
whereby, currently, CDA formulations need to be notified by MS and approved (in 
accordance with Articles 27(3) and 27(4)). This meant that, prior to the adoption of 
Regulation 2017/1112, each MS intending to use the Eurodenaturant had to individually 
notify the Commission of this. In future, if a single formulation was in use across all MS, 
it might be preferable to write this directly into Article 27 of the Directive, and develop a 
new, ideally more agile mechanism for potential future changes. This could entail, for 
example, a procedure by which MS could raise concerns and/or propose alternative 
formulations via the Excise Committee. 
 
Most stakeholders who were interviewed for this study, as well as a slight majority of 
respondents to the open public consultation, were in favour of the full harmonisation of 
CDA formulations. However, as noted, there is strong opposition from a limited number 
of MS. Furthermore, even those MS that are in favour of the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant may 
wish to retain control over possible future changes, i.e. to still be able to notify 
alternative formulations if this were to be deemed necessary in future for whatever 
reasons. 
 
Therefore, this option is very unlikely to be feasible at the present point in time due to 
resistance from some MS. Full harmonisation was the explicit objective of the process 
begun in 2008, and has turned out to not be achievable so far. This could change 
if/when the MS that are currently opposed to adopting the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant and/or 
eliminating their remaining national CDA formulations, change their position. Until then, 
it appears futile to further pursue full harmonisation. 
 
 
3.2.2 Clarify mutual recognition of CDA 
 
In the absence of full harmonisation, it may still be worthwhile to clarify the rules for 
mutual recognition of CDA, and thereby eliminate any remaining room for divergent 
interpretations. In principle, there are three possible sub-options: 
 
1. Full mutual recognition: All MS would have to recognise all procedures notified 
by all MS, irrespectively of where the alcohol was produced / denatured. This 
would effectively eliminate all national differences, and mean that a formulation 
notified by a given MS could be used by producers across the EU, and the 
resulting alcohol recognised as completely denatured by all MS. 
 
2. Limited mutual recognition: Each MS would only be obliged to recognise its 
own formulation(s), but irrespectively of where the alcohol was produced / 
denatured. This would mean that a producer in a given MS would have to use 
different CDA formulations for different national markets. 
 
3. ‘Hybrid’ mutual recognition: Each MS would have to recognise CDA produced 
in another MS using the formulations notified by that particular MS, but not those 
notified by any other MS. This would mean that MS retain control over the CDA 
produced within their territories, while being obliged to also exempt any CDA 
legally produced in another MS.  
 
To illustrate the difference between the three approaches, consider the example of the 
remaining CZ national formulations: under the first approach, all MS would have to allow 
their economic operators to use these formulations. Under the second approach, alcohol 
denatured in CZ using these formulations would not have to be recognised as CDA by 
any other MS, although producers in other MS would be able to produce and move this 
to CZ as CDA. Under the third approach, the CZ formulations could only be used in CZ, 
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but alcohol denatured in CZ using these formulations would have to be treated as CDA 
and therefore exempted by all MS. 
 
The advantage of approaches 1 and 2 is that they would eliminate any discrimination on 
the grounds of where an economic operator is based. The rules would essentially be the 
same for all (across the EU in the case of approach 1, or in all national markets in 
approach 2). However, approach 1 would require MS to fully accept all formulations, 
thereby effectively turning the remaining national formulations into additional 
Eurodenaturants, which most would not find acceptable. Approach 2 would be preferable 
to those MS that insist on 3-3-1 or another variant of the Eurodenaturant, as it would 
shield their national markets from cheaper 1-1-1 CDA from other MS. However, it would 
be more restrictive than the current situation, and be challenging to monitor and 
enforce, as CDA produced legally in any MS is released for consumption, and would 
therefore be difficult to effectively keep from crossing intra-EU borders.  
 
The most realistic option is therefore approach 3, which is also most closely aligned with 
the current interpretation of Article 27(1)(a) by the Commission and most MS. While the 
requirements (including the formulations) for complete denaturation continue to differ 
between MS, CDA produced anywhere is exempted throughout the EU as long as it 
meets the requirements of the MS where it was denatured. To clarify this, the text of 
Article 27(1)(a) would need to be amended from ‘alcohol which has been completely 
denatured in accordance with the requirements of any Member State’ to ‘alcohol which 
has been completely denatured in any Member State in accordance with its 
requirements’ (or a different wording to the same effect).  
 
A potential issue with this wording is that it leaves open the question of how imports of 
CDA from third countries are treated. At present, most MS seem to take the view that 
these are exempt if denatured in accordance with the requirements of any MS (which 
gives third country producers a wider range of formulations to choose from than 
producers based in an EU MS). Although the amount of CDA imported from third 
countries is very small at present, this could potentially change in future, so legal 
certainty is important. It should therefore be considered whether the insertion of a 
clause to clarify this (e.g. ‘alcohol which has been completely denatured in, or imported 
from a third country to, any Member State in accordance with its requirements’) and/or 
the issuance of guidance, would be necessary. 
 
The main impact areas of this options are summarised in Table 61, and discussed in 
more detail below. Since most problems with mutual recognition have already been 
eliminated with the adoption of the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant as their only remaining 
national formulation by the majority of MS, and the option would essentially codify the 
approach to mutual recognition already taken by most MS, the actual economic impacts 
would be limited. However, it would enhance clarity and legal certainty, and thereby 
contribute to avoiding the occurrence of possible problems in future. 
 
Table 61 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on mutual recognition 
of CDA 
Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Clarify mutual 
recognition of CDA 
 Legal certainty for 
authorities and businesses 
 Avoidance of divergent interpretations by MS, 
disputes and associated costs 
 Single Market functioning  Reduction of the remaining trade barriers and 
distortions due to restrictive interpretation of 
mutual recognition by some MS 
 Operating costs for 
businesses 
 No impact on most businesses, as this would 
only codify the approach already taken by most 
MS 
 Positive impacts for producers and users that 
move CDA to / from MS with different national 
formulations 
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Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
 Negative impacts for producers of CDA in certain 
MS who may face increased levels of foreign 
competition 
 
 
 LEGAL CERTAINTY AND FUNCTIONING OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
As discussed previously, there have in the past been disputes between MS and economic 
operators over whether or not certain business practices qualify for the exemption as 
CDA, in particular the use of formulations notified by a MS other than the one where the 
denaturing process took place. To the best of our knowledge, all such cases have by now 
been resolved, and the widespread adoption of the Eurodenaturant greatly reduces the 
scope for disputes in future. Nonetheless, the current wording of the Directive could – in 
theory at least – still lead economic operators to claim they are entitled to use any of the 
formulations notified by any MS. For example, CDA producers in MS that require a higher 
concentration of the Eurodenaturant ingredients could attempt to force their authorities 
to allow them to use 1-1-1 instead to fend off competition from producers in other MS; 
while the authorities of those MS could attempt to restrict the free movement of 1-1-1 
CDA in their respective MS to protect their national producers. Although there are no 
indications of any plans for this at present, a clarification of the rules of Article 27(1)(a) 
could categorically rule out any such attempts, and thereby enhance legal certainty for 
CDA producers and users, avoid any costs related to legal disputes, and strengthen the 
Single Market from any possible protectionist tendencies by certain MS. 
 
 OPERATING COSTS FOR BUSINESSES 
 
Following on from the above, certain businesses in specific circumstances would benefit 
from the enhanced clarity and certainty. The extent of this would vary greatly depending 
on their specific situation, and is therefore not possible to estimate comprehensively. The 
main groups of businesses that would be likely to benefit are: 
 
 Producers of CDA located in a MS that has adopted the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant, 
and who wish to supply customers in different MS, as the likelihood of non-
recognition and the risks inherent in this would be further reduced. This could 
provide new opportunities to engage in intra-EU trade and benefit from cost 
savings and economies of scale due to the smaller number of formulations in use 
and associated storage and other costs. 
 Users of CDA – in particular those that are located in a MS that has not adopted 
the 1-1-1 Eurodenaturant – who might be able to source CDA more cheaply from 
a supplier in a MS other than their own, and benefit from the reduced likelihood 
of non-recognition. 
 
On the other hand, producers of CDA in ‘non 1-1-1’ MS are likely to see increased 
competition from abroad, as customers increasingly demand 1-1-1 CDA and switch to 
foreign suppliers.  
 
With all this, it is important to reiterate that by far the more significant impacts stem 
from the entry into force of Regulation 2017/1112. Clarifying the mutual recognition 
requirements is likely to contribute to securing and consolidating the cost savings that 
are likely to accrue to certain economic operators, and avoiding future disputes and 
complications. But the change to the wording of the Directive would be a minor factor, 
as it would not lead to any significant immediate changes in the interpretation of the 
rules. 
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3.2.3 Full harmonisation of PDA formulations 
 
As discussed in detail in Section 2.2, the non-harmonised regime for so-called ‘partially’ 
denatured alcohol (PDA) has fostered the existence of 28 national regulatory 
frameworks, each of which recognises different PDA formulations. This results in varying 
(and in some cases, very substantial) compliance costs for economic operators. In 
certain circumstances, when cross-border movements of PDA or products containing PDA 
are involved, it can also lead to legal uncertainty, barriers to trade, or an increased risk 
of fraud. At the same time, as noted in Section 2.2, this is most often due to the choices 
of MS authorities in implementing the Directive and supervising the production, 
movement and use of denatured alcohol, rather than issues with the text of the Directive 
itself. 
 
One way of reducing the existing disparities and thereby the barriers to cross-border 
trade would be to harmonise the PDA formulations that are authorised in the MS. Since it 
is universally recognised that different end uses call for different formulations, 
harmonisation would not mean a single formulation (as in the case of the 
Eurodenaturant for CDA), but a list containing several formulations, each of which might 
be applicable for one or more uses (such as the manufacture of cosmetic products; 
screen wash; printing ink; road fuel; etc.). Many MS already have such lists, and in 
theory at least, it should be possible to devise a common list containing a limited 
number of formulations. The system in use in the US is often mentioned as a reference 
point; in addition to 5 formulations for completely denatured alcohol, the relevant 
regulation lists 32 formulations for ‘specially’ denatured alcohol. Each formulation is 
assigned a number, and is authorised for one or more specific uses, of which there are 
over a hundred, each of which is also assigned a number.394 
 
Exploratory work on a harmonised list of PDA formulations has already been carried out 
within the Fiscalis Project Group for certain sectors, namely (1) perfumes, cosmetics and 
(personal) hygiene products, and (2) screen wash, de-icer and anti-freeze. Reportedly, 
the discussions regarding the former turned out to be particularly difficult, mainly 
because the national approaches are currently so different, with some MS authorising 
denaturation with ingredients of the final product (such as essential oils) in specific 
cases, while others have a strictly defined list (or a single formulation) that applies to all 
producers equally. Unless either group of MS is prepared to substantially alter its 
approach, agreement among all MS on a harmonised list covering all sectors therefore 
seems out of reach. Respondents to the OPC were split almost exactly evenly between 
those in favour and those against developing a common list of PDA formulations 
authorised across all MS, with representatives of the cosmetics and fragrance industry 
especially strongly opposed (since the sector currently benefits from the flexible 
regulatory approach in certain MS, including the option of using ‘in situ’ denaturation), 
and warning of significant cost implications of a change to the current flexible approach. 
In view of these challenges, we conclude this option is not feasible at the current point in 
time. 
 
 
3.2.4 Partial harmonisation of PDA formulations 
 
In view of the difficulties with full harmonisation, an alternative approach to the 
harmonisation of PDA formulations could be one that combines two elements: 
 
(1) a harmonised list that is applicable across the EU (as discussed under the 
previous option), and 
 
                                                          
394 See https://www.ttb.gov/industrial/sda.shtml. 
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(2) the ability for MS to authorise different formulations for specific uses 
where the fiscal risk is demonstrably low. 
 
Such an approach should make it easier for MS that currently employ a very flexible 
approach (such as DE, ES, FR) to agree to a relatively short, restrictive list of 
formulations, as they would still be able to deviate from the list in specific 
circumstances. Nonetheless, agreement is by no means guaranteed, as the extent to 
which MS would have to make changes to their current approaches to PDA under such a 
‘partially harmonised’ regime would depend on a number of factors, among them the 
process for developing and amending the harmonised list, and the criteria to determine 
what constitutes a ‘low’ fiscal risk.   
 
Indicatively, the following broad approach to implementing this policy option could be 
taken: 
 
 The existing FPG or another appropriate expert group would have to first define a 
list of uses, which might include around 5-10 specific industry sectors / types of 
products, as well as a category for road and heating fuels, and potentially one for 
‘general’ industrial use not falling under any of the other categories. It would then 
have to review formulations that are currently authorised in the different MS, with 
a view to developing a harmonised list containing a limited number of 
formulations per sector. 
 The conditions under which MS are allowed to authorise the use of formulations 
other than those on the harmonised list would need to be defined by an 
appropriate body. They should emphasise the concept of the fiscal risk arising 
from the products for which the PDA is used. Applying these criteria, the 
competent authorities of the MS in question could authorise specific non-
harmonised denaturants on a case-by-case basis if they deem it highly unlikely 
that the product could be used fraudulently (e.g. because its composition and/or 
retail price makes this non-viable). 
 It would also have to be clarified how this new approach could be enshrined in 
the text of the Directive, and what the procedures for amending the harmonised 
list would be. This includes consideration of whether a mechanism should be 
introduced to allow MS to challenge the specific ‘low fiscal risk’ authorisations 
granted by another MS to its economic operators. 
 
It follows that, if this option is pursued, further preparatory work may be required before 
legislative changes to the text of the Directive are made. MS would be far more likely to 
agree to such potentially far-reaching changes if they had a reasonably clear idea of the 
exact implications. 
 
Table 62 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on developing a 
harmonised list of PDA formulations  
Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Develop a harmonised 
list of PDA 
formulations, while 
allowing MS to 
authorise other 
formulations in cases 
where the fiscal risk is 
demonstrably low 
 Legal certainty  Transparency and certainty increased, but not fully 
guaranteed 
 Operating costs for 
businesses 
 Harmonisation would be beneficial for PDA 
producers and users that operate in more than one 
MS 
 Possible negative effects for users whose current 
PDA formulations are not on the harmonised list 
 Single Market 
functioning 
 Reduced barriers to intra-EU trade, fairer 
competition between PDA producers and users in 
different MS  
 Enforcement costs for 
national authorities 
 Time investment in developing harmonised list 
 Tests by customs laboratories less difficult – though 
a harmonised list could also make it more difficult 
to determine the origin of samples 
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Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
 Fiscal fraud risk  Reduced risk of fraud involving products containing 
‘weakly’ denatured alcohol (uncertain) 
 Risk could increase if MS apply the concept of ‘low 
fiscal risk’ too loosely 
 
The impacts of this option (as summarised in Table 62) are difficult to anticipate with 
certainty, as they would depend to a large extent on how exactly the option is 
implemented (including how extensive the harmonised list is), and how the competent 
authorities of MS would react to the new rules. Very broadly speaking, if MS use the 
opportunity to review their national approaches and genuinely aim to minimise the 
number of specific formulations authorised for individual firms to those cases where the 
use of one of the formulations on the harmonised list is not suitable, and the fiscal risk is 
minimal, the impacts could be significant. If, on the other hand, it would essentially 
mean a continuation of the status quo, and certain MS continue to rely primarily on 
individual authorisations, the benefits would be more limited. 
 
 LEGAL CERTAINTY AND FUNCTIONING OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
A harmonised list of PDA formulations would ensure a level playing field for economic 
operators across the MS, and the resulting transparency in this respect would make 
cross-border trade in PDA easier by removing the element of uncertainty. This could 
potentially result in cost savings for a range of economic operators as well as competent 
authorities (see below). At the same time, it needs to be reiterated that the different 
PDA formulations that are currently authorised are not the only barrier to trade or source 
of potential competitive distortions – in the view of most stakeholders, the 
administrative requirements stemming from the supervisory regimes are at least as, if 
not more, significant, and this option would do nothing to harmonise these. 
 
Furthermore, the possibility for MS to authorise exceptions (i.e. different formulations 
that are not on the harmonised list) for individual operators would limit the transparency 
and legal certainty, and consequently the benefits for the functioning of the Single 
Market from this option. If this possibility is widely used (by those MS that currently 
allow individual authorisations, and perhaps even by those that do not), the gains could 
be minimal, as the publicly available harmonised list would not be an accurate reflection 
of what formulations are authorised in practice. 
 
 OPERATING COSTS FOR BUSINESSES 
 
Certain producers and users of PDA could benefit from the enhanced transparency and 
legal certainty on the one hand, but also from the potential access to new PDA 
formulations on the other hand. This includes in particular: 
 
 PDA users from a potentially wide range of sectors that gain access to a greater 
variety of PDA formulations (because the harmonised list for their sector is more 
‘liberal’ than that currently in use in their MS). The extent of this potential impact, 
and who exactly would benefit, is impossible to anticipate without a detailed 
comparative analysis of the current national and future harmonised lists of 
formulations. 
 PDA users that operate in more than one MS, and will be able to use the same 
formulations in all of them, resulting in cost savings. This is likely to be the case 
of a few dozen medium-large businesses across the EU; the extent of the 
potential savings per business could vary hugely. 
 PDA producers for whom the enhanced transparency and legal certainty should 
make it less risky and costly to supply potential customers in other MS. 
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 PDA users who could benefit from slightly reduced PDA prices due to the 
increased international competition. However, it should be noted that, given 
existing price differences between EU MS tend to be small, and transport costs 
are an important factor, the gains are likely to be marginal. 
 
On the other hand, PDA users in certain MS and sectors may be negatively affected if the 
harmonised list is different from that which is currently in use in the MS in which they 
are based. Switching PDA formulations can incur significant transition costs, both from 
adapting production processes and supply chains, and from obtaining authorisations for 
these. Of particular concern would be cosmetics and fragrance manufacturers in MS with 
a flexible regime (such as DE, ES and FR) who currently use PDA formulations authorised 
for them specifically. In principle, such authorisations could be continued under the new 
regime where the fiscal risk is low, but how exactly this would work in practice, and 
whether it would cover all operators that currently work with individually approved 
formulations, would remain to be seen. 
 
 ENFORCEMENT COSTS FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
 
As discussed in chapter 3.2, the customs laboratories in certain MS (those where fraud 
with illicit including surrogate alcohol is a significant problem) reportedly suffer from a 
heavy workload due to the currently very large number of PDA formulations in use 
across the EU, which means testing suspicious samples of unknown origin is often very 
time and resource intensive. A harmonised list of denaturants would significantly reduce 
this burden (currently estimated to amount to around EUR 300,000 to EUR 500,000 per 
year across all MS), and enable laboratories to more systematically plan their approach 
and resources for testing.  
 
Finally, the development and agreement of a harmonised list of PDA formulations, and of 
criteria for what constitutes ‘low fiscal risk’, would require a potentially significant 
investment of (primarily human) resources by the MS and the Commission. To provide a 
benchmark, between 2009 and 2016, the Fiscalis Project Group on the Eurodenaturant 
(phases 1 and 2) met a total of 25 days (including one 3-day seminar), with an average 
of 25 MS and 3 Commission participants, which equates to a total of at least 700 days of 
staff time. Time invested outside of the formal meetings (including for laboratory tests), 
as well as travel and other expenditure, would need to be added. In view of this, the 
effort that is likely to be required to come up with a harmonised list for PDA should not 
be underestimated. At the same time, it is worth noting that a significant amount of 
exploratory and preparatory work has already been done within the FPG, including 
scoping of options for harmonised PDA formulations for two sectors (cosmetics and 
screen wash / anti-freeze). Any future work could build on this.  
 
 FISCAL FRAUD RISKS 
 
As outlined previously, the use of alcohol recovered from certain products that contain 
PDA for the production of illicit alcoholic beverages – or the consumption of such 
products ‘as is’ – is one of the main sources of fiscal fraud. While in the past this was 
reportedly less common than fraud involving CDA, its importance may well grow in the 
future, due to the recent replacement of many ‘weaker’ CDA formulations with the 
Eurodenaturant, which should make fraud involving CDA more difficult and/or costly, and 
is likely to lead fraudsters to consider alternatives. Certain MS are critical of the PDA 
formulations that are currently authorised in certain MS, which they argue represent a 
fraud risk, particularly when they involve ingredients that would be present in the 
finished product anyway, and lack a chemical marker. 
 
A harmonised list with a limited number of well-justified exceptions (i.e. instances where 
MS authorities authorise different formulations for individual users) would not eliminate 
such ‘weak’ formulations, but would restrict their use to cases of demonstrably low fiscal 
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risk, i.e. when the products in question do not lend themselves to fraudulent uses for 
price or other reasons. If implemented strictly, this has the potential to limit the use of 
such formulations to certain sectors and/or users, and provide some guarantees that the 
inherent risks (ideally for the EU as a whole, rather than only for the MS in question) 
have been properly assessed. This could have a potentially profound impact in terms of 
minimising fraud risks, and reducing the amount of excise duty revenue lost, primarily 
by EU-13 MS (estimated at somewhere in the region of EUR 170 million per year, 
although the exact amounts are not known). 
 
However, the competent authorities of those MS that currently authorise non-standard 
PDA formulations (i.e. formulations that are not contained in a positive list of authorised 
procedures) for individual users tend to argue that they already apply a risk-based 
approach when assessing such applications, and only authorise formulations / 
procedures they deem to be proportionate to any risks. As such, this option would only 
lead to a reduced risk of fraud if it led MS to modify their approaches to risk assessment 
in practice, and/or to require stronger evidence that none of the formulations on the 
harmonised list are suitable before authorising an exception. 
 
 
3.2.5 Database of national PDA formulations 
 
A ‘softer’ alternative to the harmonisation of PDA formulations would be a requirement 
for MS to notify their authorised formulations to the Commission, and for these to be 
published in a database that is accessible to any interested parties. This would enhance 
transparency, and allow economic operators to check whether a given formulation they 
would like to supply or procure is authorised in the relevant MS, thereby enhancing legal 
certainty and reducing a barrier to trade, which was described as non-trivial by some of 
the interviewed stakeholders. 
 
A ‘European alcohol denaturant database’ already exists; it was launched in 2011, is 
managed by the Commission (JRC), and is accessible to MS national authorities and the 
Commission only.395 However, according to the JRC, the database has fallen into disuse 
in recent years, as MS have failed to update it in a timely manner with details on their 
national formulations. To achieve its full potential, the information in the database would 
have to be comprehensive and up-to-date, and would have to be accessible to economic 
operators. Neither is the case at present. If this option is pursued, ways would need to 
be found to secure the MS’ collaboration in populating and updating the database on a 
regular (at least annual) basis. This may require a legal requirement to be inserted into 
the Directive. 
   
Another issue relates to the authorisation by some MS’ authorities of specific 
formulations authorised for individual users only. These can account for a significant 
share of PDA in MS such as DE, ES and FR, and are usually not in the public domain. As 
in the case of the previous option (partial harmonisation), their continued existence 
limits the effectiveness of this option, as the database (and therefore transparency) 
would never be 100% complete. This could be partly addressed by including a very clear 
reference in the database to which MS only authorise formulations that are on the 
published list (although they might amend / expand this list if the need arose), and 
which MS authorise other formulations for individual users on request (without amending 
the general list). 
 
                                                          
395 The database includes information on denaturants (including key characteristics such as how easy to 
remove they are and their toxicity) and on formulations (including approved uses, estimated number of 
manufacturers and users, etc.). 
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The impacts of this option are all related to the increased transparency, and would be 
broadly similar to those discussed under the previous option, albeit on a significantly 
smaller scale. No impact on reducing the risk of fraud is expected. 
 
Table 63 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on developing a 
database of PDA formulations in each MS 
Non-regulatory Option Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Develop a database of 
national PDA 
formulations in each 
MS 
 Legal certainty  Transparency and certainty increased, but only 
as regards those MS that operate a positive list 
of PDA formulations 
 Operating costs for 
businesses 
 Cost savings for producers of PDA wishing to 
supply customers in other MS due to the 
increased transparency 
 Single Market functioning  Reduced barriers to intra-EU trade due to 
greater transparency  
 Enforcement costs for 
national authorities 
 Positive impact, as competent authorities could 
refer to the database  
 Costs for the EU and MS to build, maintain and 
update the database (higher if in all EU 
languages) 
 
Taking these impact areas in turn: 
 
 Legal certainty: This would be enhanced as a result of the greater transparency, 
meaning interested economic operators and authorities could obtain accurate 
information on authorised PDA formulations online. The caveat relates to those 
MS authorise other formulations for individual users on request, as these would 
not be reflected in the database. 
 
 Operating costs: Producers of PDA who wish to supply customers in other MS 
would save time when it comes to checking the requested formulation is 
authorised in the receiving MS, and (where necessary) providing proof of this to 
their own national authorities. However, the cost savings from this would be quite 
minor (the equivalent of no more than a few hours’ time per process). 
 
 Single Market functioning: The lack of transparency concerning which 
formulations are authorised in different MS is a minor obstacle to intra-EU trade 
according to some economic operators; greater transparency would therefore 
result in slightly improved functioning of the Single Market for PDA. 
 
 Enforcement costs: In the sense that national authorities could also refer to the 
database, and have sufficient confidence in its content to use it when reviewing 
applications, there would be likely to be minor time and cost savings. On the 
other hand, there would be minor costs associated with building, maintaining and 
updating the database, some of which would have to be borne by the MS.  
 
 
3.2.6 Confidence / capacity building measures 
 
Finally, some stakeholders believe that many of the difficulties regarding the treatment 
of PDA arise due to a lack of trust between MS authorities, who use very different 
approaches to supervising the production of (partially) denatured alcohol, and are 
sometimes suspicious of the apparent lack of effectiveness of other countries’ procedures 
and formulations. It has therefore been suggested that some of the resulting difficulties 
could be resolved by more information sharing and, where appropriate, specific 
measures to enhance the supervisory capacity of MS that may have a need for this. This 
could involve seminars, study / working visits, twinning or exchange between the 
relevant departments of MS tax and customs administrations. The EU could provide 
financial support via the Fiscalis programme (which can also provide support for 
multilateral controls of taxable persons, where appropriate). 
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When interviewed, representatives of the national authorities were not fundamentally 
opposed to the idea, but found it difficult to anticipate what exactly they (or their 
counterparts) might learn as part of such an initiative, and therefore voiced doubts as to 
whether it was necessary or would have any significant effects in practice. 
 
What appears most promising would be actions to bring together officials from MS where 
fraud with surrogate alcohol is a significant problem, and those where it is not, to help 
them understand the challenges they face, respectively, if and how goods made with 
PDA in certain MS could be used to commit fraud in another, and how the risk of this 
occurring could be minimised. 
 
A clear majority (85% of those who expressed a view) of OPC respondents were in 
favour of this option. However, anticipating the benefits of such measures with any 
degree of confidence is very difficult, as any impacts would depend on changes in 
regulations and/or administrative practices MS decide to make based on the information 
and experience gained as part of the exchanges with other MS. 
 
Table 64 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on confidence / 
capacity building measures for MS 
Non-regulatory Option Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Fund confidence / 
capacity building 
measures for the 
competent national 
authorities 
 Enforcement costs for 
public authorities 
 EU funding via the Fiscalis programme 
 MS and EC human and financial resources 
 Single market functioning  Highly uncertain – may lead to fewer disputes / 
barriers if MS adopt more consistent rules / 
practices 
 Operating costs for 
businesses 
 Highly uncertain – may lead to reduced costs if 
MS adopt more consistent rules / practices 
 Fraud risk  Highly uncertain – may lead to reduced risks if 
MS adopt stricter rules / practices 
 
In summary: 
 
 Enforcement costs: The cost of such measures would obviously depend on their 
frequency and intensity. In addition to the funding from the Fiscalis programme 
budget, which covers in particular travel costs (for reference, approx. 22% of the 
Fiscalis budget – around EUR 35.5 million – was spent on joint actions during the 
2007-2013 programming period), MS authorities would have to make available 
the requisite human and other resources. 
 
 Indirect impacts: All other impacts – including an improved functioning of the 
Single Market, reduced operating costs for businesses, and a reduced fraud risk – 
would be dependent on improvements in the working practices of customs 
authorities made as a result of the confidence / capacity building measures. There 
is likely to be potential for such improvements based on weaknesses or 
inconsistencies identified as part of such measures, but any attempts to predict 
the extent to which these would be acted on, and the potential benefits from 
doing so, would be highly speculative. 
 
 
3.2.7 Clarify Article 27(1)(b), in particular the terms ‘used for the manufacture 
of’ 
 
The term ‘used for the manufacture of’ in Article 27(1)(b) is widely viewed as 
ambiguous, which has led to questions and divergent interpretations among MS as to 
whether indirect uses of PDA, such as cleaning or sanitisation of manufacturing 
equipment, are also exempt. Most but not all MS seem to interpret the term to mean 
that they are. And even though the Commission has previously expressed the view that, 
strictly speaking, Article 27(1)(b) only covers the direct use of PDA as an ingredient, 
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there is nothing to suggest that taking the opposite view would increase the risk of 
fraudulent use, as long as the alcohol in question is properly monitored, recorded and 
disposed of following its use. In the OPC, a clear majority of respondents (67% of those 
who expressed an opinion) disagreed that the term ‘used for the manufacture of’ should 
be restricted to the direct use, and not include indirect uses such as cleaning, 
disinfection or other adjacent activities. 
 
The ambiguity could be eliminated by clarifying the wording of the Article. In doing so, it 
would appear sensible not to restrict the use of PDA unnecessarily, and follow the 
approach taken by most MS (and preferred by stakeholders) of allowing ‘indirect’ uses to 
also benefit from the exemption. This could entail wording along the lines of ‘used as 
part of the manufacturing process, including for the maintenance and cleaning of the 
manufacturing equipment’, or a similar formulation that is deemed sufficiently 
unambiguous from a legal point of view. 
 
If Article 27(1)(b) is to be amended, it would also be worth considering whether its 
overall clarity can be improved. While a clear majority of OPC respondents agreed that 
the difference between the two categories currently defined in the Directive (CDA /PDA) 
is clear as well as useful in practice, the opinions as to whether implications of the two 
categories regarding the production and movement of denatured alcohol are clear were 
split almost evenly, with a large number of neutral responses (which may indicate views 
similar to those expressed by many interviewees, namely that the implications are not 
necessarily obvious from the text of the Directive itself, but have been largely clarified in 
its transposition into national law). In other words, while the distinction between CDA 
and PDA is generally well understood by those who deal with denatured alcohol, the 
wording of the Directive is not particularly helpful in this respect. It might therefore be 
useful to amend the text concerning PDA to read more or less as follows: 
 
‘when used as part of the manufacturing process of any product not for 
human consumption, including for the maintenance and cleaning of the 
manufacturing equipment, provided the alcohol has been denatured in 
accordance with the requirements of the Member State in which said 
production process takes place for such uses. Until the manufacturing process 
has been completed, the alcohol has to be processed, held, received and 
dispatched under a duty suspension arrangement in accordance with Directive 
2008/118/EC’. 
 
Table 65 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on clarifying the 
terms ‘used for the manufacture of’ (Article 27(1)(b)) 
Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Clarify Article 27(1)(b), 
in particular the terms 
‘used for the 
manufacture of’ 
 Legal certainty  Enhanced clarity regarding the legal meaning 
and uses of ‘partially’ denatured alcohol 
 Elimination of ambiguity and uncertainty 
regarding indirect uses of PDA 
 Single Market functioning  More equal treatment of PDA for indirect uses 
across the EU 
 Operating costs for 
businesses 
 Cost savings for users of PDA in MS that 
currently do not exempt indirect uses 
 Reduced risk of disputes and associated costs in 
future 
 
 LEGAL CERTAINTY AND FUNCTIONING OF THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
Improving the wording of Article 27(1)(b) would clarify the intended use and implications 
of so-called ‘partially’ denatured alcohol, thereby making the distinction with CDA 
(addressed in Article 27(1)(a)) clearer. While this would be unlikely to lead to any 
changes in the national laws transposing the Directive, or the way in which it is currently 
implemented, it may contribute to avoiding any possible future disputes or 
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misinterpretations by national authorities or economic operators concerning the correct 
treatment of CDA and PDA, respectively. 
 
The clarification that indirect uses such as cleaning manufacturing equipment do indeed 
qualify for the exemption would require a small number of MS to adapt their approaches. 
Based on responses to the 2016 evaluation questionnaire, this would be the case for CY, 
EE, IT and SI, which currently only exempt direct uses, and may be the case for AT and 
LV (which did not respond to this question). A consistent approach across MS would pre-
empt future disputes and associated costs, and put businesses across the EU on a more 
equal footing as regards this particular aspect. 
 
 OPERATING COSTS FOR BUSINESSES  
 
Based on the interviews conducted for this study, most economic operators would 
typically prefer to use CDA for cleaning purposes due to the less strict controls, and 
therefore not experience any impacts from this option. However, in certain highly 
specific environments CDA is not suitable, or operators may use PDA as an ingredient of 
the product being manufactured and find it easier / less costly to use the same 
substance for other (indirect) uses as well. 
 
In the (likely to be very limited) number of such cases where this is currently not 
possible due to the national interpretation of the terms ‘used for the manufacture of’, 
this option would result in modest cost savings, based on reducing complexities in terms 
of purchasing, storing and using different types of denatured alcohol as part of the same 
(wider) manufacturing process. The enhanced legal certainty would also reduce the risk 
of potentially costly disputes in future. These savings are not possible to quantify, as 
they are so dependent on the individual case.  
 
 
3.2.8 Clarify what constitutes a ‘product’ containing PDA 
 
This addresses the problem that, reportedly, there are different interpretations between 
MS, or sometimes even different customs offices within MS, as to what can be 
considered a finished ‘product’ (and can therefore be exempted from excise duty and 
released for consumption) and what is still PDA (and therefore subject to the duty 
suspension regime until incorporated into a final product). The risk is that, if a liberal 
approach is taken, potentially large quantities of products with a high content of ‘weakly’ 
denatured alcohol are moved without any controls, which implies a fraud risk (and there 
is anecdotal evidence that in a few instances, products consisting almost entirely of 
alcohol have been purposefully declared under CN codes other than 2207 20, in 
particular 3820 or 3824, in order to facilitate their fraudulent use). On the other hand, 
the risk of a very restrictive approach is that genuine products with a high alcohol 
content and a non-existent fraud risk (e.g. fine fragrances) would also have to be moved 
under duty suspension. 
 
Therefore, many national authorities and stakeholders are opposed to the idea of 
insisting that, in order to be eligible for the exemption, products have to in the form and 
packaging in which they are held out for sale, which would mean that products in bulk 
(e.g. in large tanks) would still be considered PDA and need to be moved under duty 
suspension. This interpretation was described as conceptually flawed (as the character of 
products should not be determined by their packaging, but by the degree of processing 
they have undergone), disproportionate (as, in principle, it would also apply to products 
containing only low concentrations of PDA), and difficult to enforce. In their OPC 
responses, the majority of stakeholders (60% of those who expressed an opinion) 
disagreed strongly with the notion that in order to benefit from the exemption, the 
product in question has to be a recognisable finished product and be held out for sale as 
such. 
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Finding an appropriate definition that would eliminate all uncertainty regarding what is 
and is not a finished product across product groups as diverse as cosmetics products and 
screen wash is very challenging. A solution to this problem could be two-fold: 
 
 Reference to a ‘recognisable finished product’: This could be inserted into the 
Directive to provide further guidance as to the correct classification of goods. If 
the wording suggested under the previous option is used, the final sentence could 
read: ‘Until the manufacturing process has been completed, and the product in 
question is in its recognisable finished form, the alcohol has to be processed, 
held, received and dispatched under a duty suspension arrangement in 
accordance with Directive 2008/118/EC’. While this form of words would not 
eliminate all uncertainty (as the term ‘recognisable finished form’ could still be 
subject to different interpretations), it would provide more clarity than is 
currently the case. 
 
 Definition of a threshold above which the duty suspension regime applies: As an 
alternative or in addition to the above, a quantitative limit could be defined (and 
either inserted into the Directive, or, perhaps more appropriately, defined via a 
Commission Implementing Regulation and/or a note to the Combined 
Nomenclature (CN)) above which a product containing denatured alcohol always 
needs to be classified as 2207 20 00 (and therefore be considered an excise good 
and treated as such).396 
 
Based on the information currently at our disposal, a limit of 90% ABV could be 
appropriate (but this would still have to be more systematically tested with 
stakeholders). A limit of 80% would also work for most products, and be more consistent 
with the current definition of CN code 2207,397 but would be problematic as many 
fragrances contain over 80% ABV. Therefore, if an 80% threshold were to be used, an 
exception for fragrances would also need to be considered. 
 
Table 66 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on clarifying the 
concept of ‘finished products’ in Article 27(1)(b) 
Regulatory Option 
(Revision of Directive 
92/83/EEC) 
Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Clarify Article 27(1)(b) 
by inserting a reference 
to a ‘recognisable 
finished product’, and 
defining an ABV 
strength limit above 
which CN code 2207 20 
always applies 
 Legal certainty  Greater clarity as to when products containing 
PDA can be released for consumption 
 Reduced risk of divergent / arbitrary 
interpretations by customs offices 
 Single Market functioning  More equal treatment of goods containing PDA 
across the EU 
 Operating costs for 
businesses 
 Lower risk of delays / costs associated with 
disputes with customs 
 Potential movement cost increases for a limited 
number of products 
 Fraud risk  Less scope for intentional misclassification of 
PDA so as to avoid controls 
 
 LEGAL CERTAINTY AND SINGLE MARKET FUNCTIONING 
 
This follows directly from the issues outlined above – as noted, the proposed clarification 
is expected to reduce the room for interpretation of the current rules, although it cannot 
eliminate it entirely, since the term ‘recognisable finished product’ could also leave room 
                                                          
396 It should be noted that a similar approach has been taken to clarify the classification of mixtures containing 
ethyl alcohol used as raw material to produce fuels for motor vehicles. See Commission Implementing 
Regulations 211/2012 and 626/2014. 
397 Which includes: 2207 10 00 - Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of 80% vol or 
higher; and 2207 20 00 - Ethyl alcohol and other spirits, denatured, of any strength. 
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for interpretation, albeit less so than the current situation. A more predictable and 
consistent classification of goods would, to a certain extent, lead to a more equitable 
treatment of goods across the EU, and thereby enhance the functioning of the Single 
Market for products containing PDA. 
 
 OPERATING COSTS FOR BUSINESSES  
 
The option would not have any impacts on the operating costs of the vast majority of 
businesses whose goods do not give rise to any doubts as to whether or not they 
represent finished products. However, in the case of certain legitimate products with a 
very high alcohol content that are frequently moved in bulk, in particular screen wash or 
anti-freeze, the combination of the clarified wording and quantified threshold should help 
avoid costs that may be accrued due to possible disputes with customs over their 
classification. It would also be advisable to consult producers of such goods specifically 
to confirm whether a quantitative threshold would be a cause for concern, i.e. whether it 
may mean legitimate products may be caught by it. If so, it would need to be considered 
whether the inherent fraud risk may nonetheless justify the option. For example, there is 
currently a German BTI398 that clarifies a precursor (‘Vorprodukt’) for the manufacture of 
car screen wash consisting of more than 90% ethyl alcohol is to be classified as 3820. 
This is clearly not a ‘recognisable finished product’ in the sense discussed above, and 
there would therefore seem to be a case for it to be moved under duty suspension until 
it is transformed into screen wash as such. 
 
 FRAUD RISK  
 
This option is primarily a fraud prevention measure. The suggested limit of the alcohol 
content would give the authorities a potentially effective weapon to avoid the intentional 
misclassification of those goods that are most likely to be used fraudulently (such as the 
example referred to previously of shipments of 99% denatured alcohol and 1% soap). A 
potential weakness could be regarding products that are just below the threshold (e.g. 
89% ABV), although it needs to be reiterated that these would only be considered as 
such if they are in their recognisable finished form. 
 
  
                                                          
398 BTI reference DE11134/11-1. 
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3.3 Reduced rates for small producers 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
This Section explores the policy options and presents the impact analyses concerning the 
three sub-problems identified in Section 2.3.2 above: 
1) improving the functioning of reduced rates for small breweries, by assessing the 
effects of clarifying the definition of economic independence and the application of 
the scheme to cross-border operators; 
2) improving the functioning of the reduced rates for small distilleries, by 
considering a higher output threshold; 
3) extending the reduced rates to small producers of other beverages, namely wine, 
other fermented beverages, and intermediate products. 
 
 
3.3.2 Improving the functioning of reduced rates for small breweries 
 
3.3.2.1 Definition of the policy options 
 
As discussed in the problem definition presented in Section 2.3.2, the main regulatory 
failures for small brewers concern (i) the existence of grey areas in the definition of 
independence; and (ii) the application of the provision to cross-border operators. On the 
contrary, no market or regulatory failures have been identified with respect to the 
current threshold, which is not considered to be distorting national markets, and which 
can be tailored by MS to their national specificities. 
 
To address the problems described above, a legislative revision of the Directive could 
be foreseen. One possibility could be to introduce detailed norms into the main text of 
the Directive. However, given that the issues at stake require detailed rules – as 
opposed to general principle norms – it could also be appropriate to include these rules 
in Annexes to the Directive. For instance, Article 4 could be revised as follows. 
 
Article 4 
 
[…] 
2. For the purposes of the reduced rates the term ‘independent small brewery’ shall 
mean a brewery which is legally and economically independent (as defined in Annex 
I to the Directive) of any other brewery, which uses premises situated physically 
apart from those of any other brewery and does not operate under licence. However, 
where two or more small breweries cooperate, and 
their combined annual production does not exceed 200 000 hl, those breweries may 
be treated as a single independent small brewery. 
3. Member States shall ensure that any reduced rates they may introduce apply 
equally to beer delivered into their territory from independent small breweries situated 
in other Member States. In particular they shall ensure that no individual delivery 
from another Member ever bears more duty than its exact national equivalent. Means 
for proving the status of small breweries are defined in Annex II to the 
Directive. 
 
There seems to be a limited need to further specify the conditions at which two 
companies should be considered as ‘partners’ or ‘linked’. Other areas of EU legislation 
and the CJEU jurisprudence already provide for the necessary guidance, which has been 
developed and consolidated over the years. The Annex could provide a more articulated 
definition of ‘independence’ based on the existing legislation, guidelines, and 
jurisprudence. More in detail, any clarification of the conditions for independence would 
need to focus on the forms of cooperation which may breach the economic independence 
of small brewers. This would consolidate the current practices on beer brewed under 
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license – based on the Minutes to the Ecofin Council - on the present national practices, 
as well as on contract brewing.399  
 
With respect to the means for proving the status of small brewers and the modalities for 
the exchange of information between tax or customs authorities,400 these could be 
specified along different, possibly complementary, lines: 
 
1. Ex-ante approach: all small brewers would be identified through a uniform 
certificate, designed at EU level, which would need to be presented when claiming 
reduced rates in a MS other than that of establishment. Such a certificate would 
state: (i) the brewery output level, as already communicated or available to the 
customs authority under tax warehouse obligations; and (ii) whether the brewer 
fulfils the criteria for economic and legal independence, based on additional 
documentation submitted by the operator. This certificate should be provided, 
upon request, by all customs authorities to all operators up to 200,000 hl, 
regardless of whether they can access reduced rates in their country of 
establishment.  
 
2. Ex-post approach: as in the current framework, a verification of whether a non-
domestic brewer meets the conditions for enjoying reduced rates would be done 
upon request of the authority of the MS of destination for specific players. 
However, these ex-post checks would be managed by means of an IT platform for 
the exchange of information, so that tax and customs authorities in the country of 
destination could inquire about an operator’s annual output and independence. 
Alternatively, each customs authority could prepare a list of breweries which 
qualify for reduced rates under the national scheme, and/or breweries which are 
both independent and with an output below 200,000 hl. 
 
As an alternative, these problems could be tackled by means of a soft law instrument, 
such as non-binding guidelines for the definition of economic independence or for the 
modalities for exchanging information on the status of small brewers. This solution would 
not require a legislative revision. The content of these guidelines would replicate what 
described above for the legislative revision. 
 
Table 67 below provides the impact areas and target groups which are relevant for the 
option at stake. The revision is not expected to change the competitive conditions for 
small versus large producers or the overall consumption and price of beer, as it does not 
touch the most important drivers, such as the threshold and the rate of reduction. 
Hence, no intra-market effects, impacts on tax revenues, or health effects will be 
caused. 
 
                                                          
399 The Fiscalis discussion document also mentioned two other possible problems, which have not emerged 
from the fieldwork: (i) mixing of beer from different brewers, which happens sporadically in the small brewer 
segment; and (ii) brew shops, that are economic operators offering to private persons the possibility to brew 
their own beer by means of the operator’s equipment. Both cases seem quite rare, and possibly limited to few 
MS (e.g., Denmark for brew shops). However, these and other aspects considered problematic by the MS could 
be usefully addressed by the intervention. 
400 In the various MS, the administration of the reduced rate scheme is managed by tax or customs authorities, 
or any other public authority entrusted to this purpose. In the remainder of the chapter, the term ‘customs 
authorities’ is used regardless of the national institutional setting to indicate either of them, as applicable. 
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Table 67 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on reduced rates for 
small brewers  
Regulatory option Impact areas Nature of impact expected 
Clarification of the 
conditions to determine 
independence and of 
the application of 
reduced rates to cross-
border operators 
 Legal certainty for 
economic operators and 
public authorities 
 Improvement of the legal certainty for small 
brewers having certain contractual relations 
with other brewers 
 Administrative burdens for 
economic operators 
 New administrative procedures for cross-border 
operators could affect administrative burdens 
 Enforcement costs for 
public authorities 
 New administrative procedures for cross-border 
operators could affect enforcement costs 
 SME competitiveness  Facilitation could enhance the growth of SME 
 Cross-border market 
effects for economic 
operators 
 Easier access to reduced rates in countries other 
than that of establishment 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Impact analysis 
 
In this Section, the impacts of a clarification of the framework for small brewers are 
discussed. Given that the impacts are expected to be of a small scale, as the magnitude 
of the problem discussed is limited (see Section 2.3.1), the analysis is mostly done in 
qualitative terms. As presented in Section 3.3.2.1 above, the policy option could be 
implemented by means of a legislative revision or non-binding guidelines, and due 
attention will be paid when the choice of the instruments is expected to trigger different 
impacts. A comparison of the policy options with the status quo is provided in Section 
4.3.1 below. 
 
The analysis is carried out under the assumption that MS implementation will not 
change, i.e. that (i) MS providing reduced rate to small brewers, (ii) the national 
threshold, and (iii) the discount rate will remain the same.  
 
 LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
The clarification of the conditions at which a small brewer shall be considered 
independent will benefit to the public authorities called to implement these provisions, as 
well as to small brewers.401 Indeed, should this clarification be introduced, it would be 
easier for public authorities and economic operators to determine whether certain 
business models or decisions are compatible with the reduced rate schemes. 
 
Public authorities expressed a limited appetite for a revision of the Directive, or for non-
binding guidelines. An intervention is considered appropriate if limited to the 
harmonisation of specific aspects of the definition of independence, such as contract 
brewing or other forms of cooperation. On their part, economic operators would be free 
to choose the most appropriate and efficient business model, comparing the benefits of 
certain forms of cooperation (e.g. make-or-buy decisions, outsourcing v. investment in 
internal capacity) while knowing whether they could retain or not the right to the 
reduced rate. For small brewers, this would reduce the risks connected to the entering 
into certain trade relationships, as well as the litigation costs associated to the cases in 
which the interpretation of the customs authorities will be challenged by the operator. 
Also, the discrepancies between MS, or between regions of the same MS – which have 
                                                          
401 On the contrary, there is no issue of legal uncertainty with respect to the application of reduced rates to 
cross-border operators – the Directive already includes an explicit obligation for MS to this purpose, and 
problems are mostly linked to the application and enforcement of the procedure rather than to the Directive 
provisions. See below when discussing administrative burdens and enforcement costs. 
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been sporadically reported – will be tackled, reducing the risk of an uneven treatment of 
similar situations. 
 
The choice of the means to introduce this policy option – hard versus soft law – would 
have impacts over the level of legal certainty achieved. A legislative revision would 
provide for a higher level of legal certainty in the short-term. However, the small 
brewers market is growing and evolving very fast at the moment, so that a definition 
‘cast in stone’ could become outdated in the medium-term, or be circumvented by the 
introduction of ‘borderline’ business practices. The main drawback of a piece of soft-law 
would be that MS would retain the power to apply it or not. However, two considerations 
should be brought forward: (i) there is a certain consensus that these aspects present a 
degree of subjectivity, and that there would be a merit from further harmonisation; as 
such, expectation would be that the existing demand for clarification would enhance its 
application by national authorities; (ii) MS were already able to settle the issue of 
licensed beer without resorting to any binding legislation, based on the consensus of 
national authorities402 and the minutes of the Ecofin Council. Given these considerations 
and in the context of such a revision, the net benefits of using a non-binding instrument 
would seem to outweigh those of a legislative revision.   
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS 
 
Any clarification to how reduced rates should be applied to operators established in a 
different MS than that in which the beer is released for consumption would affect the 
administrative burdens borne by economic operators and the enforcement costs borne 
by public authorities. The impacts are different depending on which of the two 
approaches described in Section 3.3.2.1 above is adopted, namely (i) the ex-ante 
issuance of a customs certificate to small brewers; and (ii) the creation of a platform to 
exchange information ex-post between customs authorities. 
 
In the ex-ante approach, a uniform certificate issued by customs authorities upon 
request to any EU brewer with an annual output below 200,000 hl could serve as a 
means of proving the status of small brewer. Such a certificate could be designed at EU 
level, included in a binding norm, and would be accepted by all customs authorities in 
the MS of destination. Such a certificate should provide information on: 
 
1) The annual output. This information is, in most cases, already available to 
customs authorities because of the record-keeping duties under the excise 
regime, or could be retrieved with limited efforts. Though some MS make 
reference to the current year output, referring to the previous year output seems 
an easier solution to implement, as this information is already available.  
 
2) The status of independent brewer. In MS where reduced rates for small 
brewers are available, the host MS customs authority could verify whether the 
operator asking for the certificate already enjoys such a status by looking at its 
excise declarations. However, problems could emerge in countries where reduced 
rates are not established, or for operators who are not small brewers according to 
the national threshold, but who could benefit from reduced rates in the MS of 
destination.403 In this case, the customs authorities would need to verify ex-novo 
if they fulfil the conditions for independence and this could create administrative 
challenges (discussed further below). 
 
                                                          
402 See ‘Fiscalis discussion document’, at p. 6-7. 
403 E.g. a British brewery with an output of 70,000 hl would not benefit from reduced rates on its domestic 
sales, but would if selling its product in France, where the reduced rates apply up to 200,000 hl. 
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Under this approach, companies which are already small brewers under national rules 
would incur limited enforcement costs – basically, the costs of requesting the certificate. 
Assuming that 20% of the operators in the sample MS engage in trade activities towards 
another MS where reduced rates exist, and considering one hour in total to retrieve the 
information, file the request, obtain the certificate, and transmit it to their local 
distributors, additional administrative burdens for the operators in the sample MS would 
amount to about EUR 13,000404 - or 2% of the burdens estimated for the overall 
scheme. 
 
The situation would be different for operators who are not small operators in their 
country (i.e. because larger than the national threshold, or because the MS has not 
opted for reduced rates). Therein, the brewer would need to prove his/her status as an 
independent economic operator, by submitting the customs authority the required 
company documents (e.g., copy of the company register, information on shareholding, 
company charter). Familiarising with this new information obligation, retrieving the 
documents and the information, filing the request and obtaining the certificate is 
estimated to require one person/day of a clerk. The population affected in the sample MS 
would include Italian small brewers as well as Austrian and British brewers producing 
less than 200,000 hl, but more than their respective national threshold. As above, it is 
assumed that 20% of Italian small brewers would engage in intra-EU trade. With respect 
to Austrian and British brewers, given their larger size, it is expected that 80% of them 
will engage in trade towards a MS with a higher reduced rate threshold. Administrative 
burdens for these players are estimated at about EUR 32,000, or 5% of the burdens 
estimated for the overall reduced rate schemes. All in all, additional administrative 
burdens seem to be limited, for this policy option, at 7.5% of those estimated under the 
baseline; they are summarised in Table 68 below. 
 
Table 68 – Administrative burdens linked to the uniform certificate for small brewers in 
the six sample MS  
 
Estimated number of 
intra-EU traders 
Admin burdens  
€ '000 
Share over total 
burdens from the 
scheme 
Small brewers currently under 
the scheme 
675 13 2% 
Small brewers not under the 
scheme 
180 32 5% 
Total 855 45 7.5% 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
Enforcement costs for public authorities considered to be modest, when dealing with 
operators already benefitting from reduced rates in their country of establishment. In the 
six sample MS, custom offices would have to issue maximum few hundreds of certificates 
per year to small brewers intending to sell their products in a MS where reduced rates 
are applied. It can be assumed that the certification of the information to be included 
would pose no problems for those operators already subject to the reduced rates in their 
home country. However, verifying the status of ‘independent operator’ for brewers 
currently not covered by the scheme, but with an output lower than 200,000 hl is likely 
to be more problematic. Indeed, customs authorities should (i) consider the documents 
and information provided by the operator; (ii) verify, on the basis of this information, 
whether the brewer fulfils the criteria set out in the Directive, in other parts of the EU 
acquis, and in the relevant secondary norms and circulars adopted at national level; and 
(iii) request additional information when needed, or carry out additional checks and 
verifications. Such a procedure could be particularly burdensome in the countries which 
have not implemented the reduced rates for small producers, and thus have limited 
                                                          
404 A Business-As-Usual factor of 1 is used, since the obtainment of the certificate is not part of normal 
business practices. 
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acquaintance with the implementation of the definition of ‘small operator’ and no 
secondary norms or circulars drafted to this purpose.405 In this context, a possible 
compromise would be for the customs authority to certify the output, and for the 
operator to self-certify the status of independent brewer – subject to the possible 
verification by the local customs office, on behalf of the customs authority, in the MS of 
destination. However, this possibility would encounter the resistance of those MS which 
already require a certificate and tend not to accept self-certification by small brewers. In 
any case, the feasibility for public authorities, and in particular for those of MS which 
have not opted in to the reduced rates, should be carefully considered when assessing 
the adoption of this approach. 
 
The second approach, the ex-post verification of the status of small brewer in the 
context of customs control, would require no effort by the producer, and thus negligible 
administrative burdens. However, it would entail enforcement costs for customs 
authorities; in any case, it presents less challenges compared to the ex-ante uniform 
certificate. This approach would firstly require the setting up of an IT platform for the 
exchange of information, so that the status of an intra-EU trader could be easily and 
quickly verified. This platform could be complemented by national lists of independent 
small breweries, which could be used as first step of the verification process.  
 
Impacts on administrative burdens for economic operators and enforcement costs for 
public authorities are invariant to the choice of the policy instrument, i.e. whether a 
legislative revision is proposed or non-binding guidelines are published. However, the 
choice of either one or the other approach would influence the determination of the 
policy instrument. Should a uniform certificate be introduced, a legislative revision would 
be needed, so that the format and content of the document could be fully harmonised at 
EU level. Should an ex-post customs verification system be put in place, this could be 
done by means of a non-legislative intervention (e.g. by means of coordination of 
national customs authorities, or through a Fiscalis project). 
 
 OTHER IMPACTS 
 
Two other impacts should be mentioned for the completeness of the analysis, although 
their magnitude is likely to be negligible to low. An improvement in the legal clarity of 
the provision for cooperating breweries, and a smoothing of the procedures for intra-EU 
trade are a positive factor for the competitiveness of SME. In particular, this would 
benefit larger players across the SME population, which are more likely to enter into 
cross-border trade or into more complex contractual relations, favouring their business 
growth. At the same time, more ease of doing business for intra-EU traders could have a 
positive market effect for cross-border operators, and eventually result in an increase of 
intra-EU trade flows. However, the scale of the problem at stake is modest, meaning 
that the procedures to apply the reduced rates do not represent a high barrier to the 
functioning of the Internal Market. Hence, benefits are likely to be modest. The choice of 
either policy option – binding or non-binding intervention – would not significantly affect 
these impacts; the only risk, in case of non-binding guidelines, is that a lower take-up by 
MS would reduce the magnitude of the positive effects. 
 
 STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEW 
 
Respondents to the OPC agreed with the option clarifying the rules for the cross-border 
recognition of small producers, as well as the rules to determine when a producer is 
independent. The consensus is almost unanimous within the beer industry, where more 
than 90% of respondents are in favour of these changes, without significant differences 
between SME and other entities. Also taking into account the whole sample of 
                                                          
405 I.e. CY, IT, LT, and SE. 
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respondents, more than 60% of them agreed or strongly agreed with these options. The 
provision of non-binding guidelines while leaving the legislative text unchanged was also 
positively assessed by respondents, from both the beer industry and the overall sample. 
However, the support for non-binding guidelines was much milder, with about half of the 
respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing to this instrument. 
 
Figure 24 – Public view on the proposed policy options on reduced rates for small 
producers 
Cross-border recognition of small 
producers 
Rules to determine independent 
producers 
Non-binding guidelines 
   
Source: OPC. 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
 
3.3.3 Improving the functioning of reduced rates for small distilleries 
 
3.3.3.1 Definition of the policy options 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1.1 above, the take up of the reduced rates for small 
distilleries is very low. This results from a combination of the limited number of MS 
applying the discount, as well as the low number of commercial operators falling below 
the threshold. The reasons why few MS opted in for the provision are manifold, including 
health policy, prevention of tax frauds, and costs for the public budgets. However, one of 
the reasons why MS did not opt in for this provision, and for sure the reason why very 
few operators could benefit from it even in those MS which did, is the level at which the 
threshold is currently set, which it too low.406 
 
Here below, the policy option to raise the output threshold for small distilleries is 
analysed. More in detail, two variants of this option are explored. In the first one, in line 
with the rationale of the current provision, which protects traditional ancillary producers 
rather than operators at a significant commercial scale, the threshold could be increased 
from 10 hlpa to 100 hlpa per year. Such a threshold would cover only very small 
distilleries, but at a commercial scale of production. In the second option, the threshold 
could be brought in line with that of beer, at 10,000 hlpa per year.407 This threshold 
                                                          
406 This is also suggested by Spirits Europe’s written contribution to the OPC. 
407 Considering the threshold for beer (200,000 hl) and an average beer strength of 5% ABV. This option would 
represent a radical change compared to the current situation. However, several stakeholders underlined the 
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would indeed cover small and medium distillers. Raising the threshold could be done only 
by means of a legislative revision. Table 69 below provides the impact areas and target 
groups which are relevant for the option at stake. 
 
Table 69 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy options for small distilleries  
Regulatory option Impact areas Nature of impact expected 
Raising the threshold 
for small distilleries up 
to: 
(i) 100 hlpa 
(ii) 10,000 hlpa 
 Tax revenues for public 
authorities 
 If more operators benefit from reduced rates, 
this would negatively affect tax revenues. 
 Market effects for 
economic operators 
 Tax reduction could result in (i) substitution of 
consumption from large to small producers; (ii) 
increase of overall consumption of ethyl alcohol.  
 Administrative burdens for 
economic operators 
 The increase in the number of operators 
concerned would increase total burdens. 
 Health impacts for 
consumers 
 If consumption of ethyl alcohol is increased, this 
could increase overall consumption of alcohol 
per capita. 
 SME competitiveness  Small distilleries below the threshold would 
enjoy an advantage compared to larger 
producers. 
 Enforcement costs for 
public authorities 
 Public authorities would have to manage a 
larger number of operators claiming reduced 
rates. 
 
 
3.3.3.2  Impact analysis: small distilleries 
 
In this Section, the impacts of a revision of the threshold for small distilleries are 
discussed. Unlike for beer, cider, and wine, data on the firm size distribution for 
distilleries and on their market share are scant. For this reason, the analysis is mostly 
qualitative, with quantitative examples or extrapolations when possible. A comparison of 
the policy option with the status quo is provided for in Section 4.3.2 below. 
 
In line with the current wording of the Directive, the reduced rates for small distilleries 
would remain optional. The impacts of any revision would thus depend on the MS’s 
choice to implement such an option. The analysis is carried out under the assumption 
that the sample MS for this policy issue would apply the exemption. Such a hypothesis 
will be discussed in the sub-section on stakeholders’ view, further below. 
 
 MARKET EFFECTS, TAX REVENUES, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 
 
Raising the threshold to 100 hlpa would hardly generate any market impact. Even at this 
scale, the qualitative information collected and the data available show that the market 
covered by the reduction is likely to be minimal. In Poland, about 45 agricultural 
distilleries below 100 hlpa are registered. Even assuming that they produce 100 hlpa 
each, their market share would be around 0.4%. If Poland were representative of the 
sample MS, such a negligible market share would not distort competition between small 
and large producers, let alone the price and consumption of spirits. As a consequence, 
health impacts from the introduction of this provision would be negligible. The higher 
threshold would generate small additional costs for the public budgets. Based on the 
Polish example, total foregone revenues in the sample MS would amount to about EUR 
17 mn, which is about 0.2% of the current revenues from ethyl alcohol.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
unevenness of the thresholds for small breweries and distilleries; this option is thus retained to identify the 
effects of fully redressing such an imbalance. See i.a. Spirits of Europe’s written contribution to the OPC. 
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To the contrary, raising the threshold to 10,000 hlpa would have a significant impact on 
the market. In mid-size countries such as Austria or Belgium, 10,000 hlpa represent 
respectively 9% and 7% of the market for spirits. Even in larger countries, 10,000 hlpa 
represent between 1% and 2% of the market. Table 70 compares the share of beer and 
spirit markets covered by a hypothetical firm producing 200,000 hl of beer or 10,000 
hlpa of spirits.  
 
Table 70 – Estimated market share of a hypothetical higher threshold for small 
distilleries, and comparison with the threshold applied to small brewers  
MS 
Beer 
200,000 hl 
Spirits 
10,000 hlpa 
AT 2.2% 9.0% 
BE 2.5% 6.8% 
FR 1.0% 0.7% 
IT 0.5% 2.0% 
PL 0.5% 0.9% 
UK 0.5% 0.9% 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from Brewers of Europe and IWSR.  
Note: Belgium consumption includes Luxembourg. 
 
The weight of excise duties over the price of spirits, which is considerably higher than in 
the case of beer, creates the risks that the advantages for small producers are 
excessive, hence possibly distorting the market for spirits. In the sample MS, the 
average weight of excise duties over one litre of spirits at 40% vol is between 25% in 
Austria and 49% in Poland.408 It means that the tax advantage for a small distillery 
would range from 12.5% to 24.5% of the final price.409 For beer, the share of excise 
duties over the average price is much lower, as it is comprised between 9% in Austria 
and 29% in the UK.410  
 
Moreover, the costs for the public budgets would be substantial, and higher than in the 
case of beer. This is because the threshold would capture distilleries with a significant 
dimension compared to the national market, and because of the levels of the excise rate 
on ethyl alcohol.411  
 
Finally, in the case of small brewers, most of the reduced rate benefited the producers 
and did not result in a reduction of the market price of beer. As such, health impacts 
were assessed as minimal. The pass-on mechanism for small distilleries could be 
different, because the tax discount over the price is higher. In a nutshell, while a small 
brewer would not be able to substantially reduce the price of its product, a small distiller 
could do so, given the higher tax burden. As such, the small distiller could have more 
incentives to pass-on part of the discount downstream, and gain in market share. Since 
the reduced rates currently cover only ancillary distilleries, this hypothesis could not be 
tested in the fieldwork, nor is it tested in the economic and business literature. However, 
if this were the case, the reduced rates would result in an increase in the consumption of 
spirits, with possible negative impacts on per capita alcohol consumption. 
 
 SME COMPETITIVENESS, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS, AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS 
 
Should the threshold be raised to 100 hlpa, this would hardly affect SME 
competitiveness. At the revised scale, the scheme would cover not only ancillary 
                                                          
408 IWSR data (2015). Estimate not reliable for BE, due to the aggregation of BE and LU data in IWSR. 
409 Without considering the possibility to introduce brackets or a degressive system. 
410 IWSR data (2015). Estimate not reliable for BE, due to the aggregation of BE and LU data in IIWSR. 
411 A quantification of foregone revenues is not possible given the lack of data on the number and volume of 
distilleries below 10,000 hlpa.  
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producers, but also very small commercial players, which would pay lower excise duties 
and would be likely to increase their profit margins. However, the measure would not 
affect the majority of SME on the spirit market, as they would remain over the threshold. 
Enforcement costs for public authorities could also increase, given the larger number of 
companies benefitting from reduced rates that would need to be controlled. That said, 
distilleries are already controlled more tightly than other operators on the beverage 
market, and the amount of revenues at stake (as estimated above) is too small to 
require the deployment of additional resources from customs authorities. New operators 
falling below the threshold would need to incur administrative burdens to benefit from 
the reduction; however, as estimated for small breweries, these burdens are unlikely to 
be significant, and would be, by large, justified by the tax advantage. 
 
Should the threshold be raised to 10,000 hlpa, this would have large positive impacts on 
the competitiveness of SME in the spirit industry. Most, if not all of SME could have 
access to the scheme, and the reduction would represent a substantial boost. As a 
consequence of the larger number of operators covered by the reduction, total 
administrative burdens would increase but, as in the case of small breweries, the 
magnitude of these burdens would be limited and the benefits would justify the 
additional paperwork. Finally, additional enforcement resources should be spent to 
control the functioning of the system and limit the risk of abuses and tax frauds, because 
both the increase in the number of operators covered by the proposal, and the revenues 
at stake would become substantial. Hence, enforcement costs would increase 
significantly for public authorities. 
 
 STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEW 
 
The working hypothesis that MS would implement the provisions on small distilleries 
should the threshold be raised at 100 hlpa or 10,000 hlpa seems far-fetched, based on 
the fieldwork carried out. Most of the authorities met expressed no desire for the 
revision of the threshold and no intention to implement an amended provision at national 
level. Reasons quoted against the possibility to implement the threshold at national level 
include health impacts and market distortions. Furthermore, most of the spirit economic 
operators and trade associations visited showed no or limited appetite for a higher 
threshold. 
 
As regard the OPC, respondents generally expressed disagreement with the idea of 
raising the threshold for small distilleries. More than two thirds of the ethyl alcohol 
industry and an almost analogous share of other industry respondents disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the proposal. A majority of SME in the ethyl alcohol sector was 
against the intervention. Only other respondents, and in particular private individuals, 
agreed to some extent to the proposal. Considering the overall number of respondents, 
negative views were expressed by a more than half of the sample.  
 
Figure 25 – Public view on a possible increase of the reduced rates threshold for small 
distilleries  
 
Source: OPC. 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
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3.3.4 Extending reduced rates to small producers of other beverages 
 
3.3.4.1 Definition of the policy options 
 
As highlighted in the Commission Report, and in line with the mandates granted by the 
Council of the EU, this Study analyses the effects of the policy options extending the 
reduced rates also to producers of wine, other fermented beverages, and intermediate 
products. The new schemes would be based on what is already provided for small 
brewers and distilleries, hence on the following principles: 
 
1. The reduced rates would remain optional for MS; 
2. Access to reduced rates would be based on the definition of an ‘independent 
producer’; 
3. Maximum yearly output thresholds for each fiscal category would be set in the 
Directive;  
4. A maximum discount rate compared to the standard national rate would be fixed. 
 
With respect to the conditions defining independence and the maximum discount, it is 
assumed that the new regimes would be in line with what already provided for small 
brewers and distillers. This includes both the provisions foreseen by the Directive (a 
player should be independent from a legal and economic point of view, and does not 
have to operate under license)412 as well as the interpretation provided by the CJEU 
jurisprudence and the work at ITEG and Fiscalis level. As for the maximum discount rate, 
it is assumed that it would be set at 50% of the standard national rate. 
 
With regard to the definition of the threshold, product specific considerations should be 
made.413 
 
 For still wine, reference would be made to the threshold already used to identify 
small producers in the Horizontal Directive and in the agricultural acquis,414 that is 
1,000 hl per year. 
 For cider, two choices are possible. First, the threshold could cover micro cider 
makers, i.e. ancillary producers only. In this case, it could be set at 100 hl per 
year.415 Or, the threshold could cover small cider makers as well. Based on the 
fieldwork and the Consultants’ analysis, it is suggested to apply a threshold covering 
not only ancillary producers, but also small cider makers. This preliminary choice is 
done considering that the market for cider is very similar compared to that of beer, 
with few industrial producers controlling more than 90% of the market and a large 
number of small operators. Hence, the rationale and coverage of the reduced rate 
regime should be similar. With regards to the exact output value, in the UK, the 
threshold dividing small- and large-scale producers is conventionally set at 15,000 hl, 
                                                          
412 The ‘use of premises situated physically apart from that of any other operators’ clause may pose problems 
for cider producers, since joint mills may be used by very small producers (including movable ones). 
413 To avoid unnecessary complexities, the analysis does not deal with the case of producers operating in more 
than one market. It is assumed that the threshold would apply independently, i.e. that an operator producing 
less than the maximum output of wine and of other fermented beverages would still have access to the 
reduced rates. 
414 See Article 22.b of Commission Regulation (EC) No 436/2009 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 as regards the vineyard register, compulsory declarations and the 
gathering of information to monitor the wine market, the documents accompanying consignments of wine 
products and the wine sector registers to be kept. 
415 In the UK, the exemption from excise duties is granted to cider makers up to 70 hl. In Poland, a 
simplification of the excise regime is granted up to 100 hl. Also in Latvia, a simplified regime is foreseen for 
producers of fruit wine (and wine) with an output below 150 hl per year. 
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based on industry practice.416 On the contrary, using the same threshold as for wine, 
i.e. 1,000 hl, would not be sufficient, because small cider producers are already 
beyond this threshold, and because of the different revenues generated by the same 
quantity of the two beverages. In the light of the above, it is suggested to base the 
analysis on a threshold of 15,000 hl. 
 Producers of fortified wines are included in the wine sector for purpose of agricultural 
regulation.417 As such, the threshold identifying a small producer of fortified wine is 
also set at 1,000 hl. 
 
 
Box 26 – Regulatory costs issues for micro-cider makers 
 
Granting reduced rates would not address the risks that regulatory costs of being part to the excise framework 
are excessive for ancillary producers, i.e. farmers which are also micro-cider makers. Eliminating these 
burdens is the rationale of the cider maker exemption, which is in force in the UK, where micro-cider makers 
below 70 hl are fully exempted from the excise framework. In the context of this Study, it would be hard to 
justify the introduction of an exemption – as opposed to a reduction – for commercial producers only in the 
case of cider. Such an exemption would create problems in terms of uneven treatment of alcoholic beverages 
similar to those the Commission has been asked to assess and possibly redress. In any case, two possible 
avenues emerge as worth exploring, at national level: (i) introducing flat-rate schemes, such as those targeted 
to ancillary distillers in Austria, which relieve producers of most of the regulatory costs; or (ii) exempting 
micro-cider makers from most of the excise obligations via Article 40 of the Horizontal Directive, given that, 
based on Article 15 of Directive 92/83/EEC, all norms referring to ‘wine’ in the Horizontal Directive could be 
applied to ‘other fermented beverages’ as well. 
 
 
The reduced rates would apply to the whole fiscal categories, and not only to the 
products discussed above, as in the case of small breweries and distilleries. This would 
mean that the threshold for still wine makers, cider makers, and producers of fortified 
wine would apply respectively to all wine products, other fermented beverages, and 
intermediate products. This assumption mimics the current structure of the reduced 
rates provisions, but should be further explored – for example, with the assumed 
thresholds producers of wine and wine-based aperitif would face different conditions. 
However, MS would remain free to apply the reduced rate to a subset of products within 
the same category, as they already do e.g. to cider and perry within the other fermented 
beverage category (e.g. UK and Poland), or to vin doux naturel within the intermediate 
product category (as in France), based on product definitions enshrined in their national 
legislation. 
 
Table 71 below provides the impact areas and target groups which are relevant for the 
option at stake. 
 
Table 71 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on extending reduced 
rates to small producers of other beverages  
Regulatory option Impact areas Nature of impact expected 
Extension of reduced 
rates to small producers 
of: 
(i) Wine 
(ii) Other fermented 
beverages 
 Tax revenues for public 
authorities 
 The extension to new categories of producers 
would reduce excise revenues 
 Market effects for 
economic operators 
 Intra-market effects: small operators would be 
subject to a lower tax burden than large 
operators 
 Inter-market effects: there would be an even 
                                                          
416 Discussing the threshold level with stakeholders, it was suggested that most of small producers, especially 
in traditional cider countries, would produce craft cider, which is made using fresh rather than concentrated 
juice – as much as small brewers are more likely to produce craft beer. The size of a craft cider maker is 
constrained by its production technique (i.e. the need to produce cider only when apples are available, rather 
than all year long – analogously to wine making), and could hardly go beyond 25,000 hl. 
417 See Article 1 of Regulation 479/2008 and Part XII of Regulation 1308/2013.  
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(iii) Intermediate 
products 
treatment of small producers of different 
beverages 
 Public health impacts   If consumption of alcoholic beverages is 
increased as a consequence of the lower 
taxation, this could have negative health effects 
 SME competitiveness  Small producers would enjoy a tax advantage 
and their competitive position would be 
enhanced 
 Administrative burdens for 
economic operators 
 Application for the reduced rates would 
generate administrative burdens 
 Enforcement costs for 
public authorities 
 Management and verification of the new 
reduced rate schemes could demand additional 
enforcement resources 
 
 
3.3.4.2  Impact analysis 
 
In this Section, the impacts of the introduction of reduced rates for small producers of 
wine, cider, and fortified wine are discussed. A quantitative analysis is provided for both 
wine and cider, while a qualitative analysis is provided for fortified wine. A comparison of 
the policy options with the status quo is provided for in Section 4.3.3 below. 
 
In line with the current wording of the Directive, the reduced rates for small producers 
would remain optional. The impacts of any revision would thus depend on the MS’ choice 
to implement the options. The analysis is carried out under the assumption that the MS 
would apply the exemption. However, such an assumption may prove unrealistic, and 
further elaboration is discussed in the sub-sections on stakeholders’ view. 
 
 SMALL WINE PRODUCERS 
 
 Market effects, tax revenues, and health effects. 
 
At EU level, a reduced rate for small producers of still wine would have a limited effect, 
because most of the still wine consumed in Europe is not excised. Indeed, still wine is 
subject to a zero or near-zero rate in 15 MS, representing 98% of still wine production 
and 78% of its consumption. On the contrary, MS applying a positive and non-negligible 
tax rate represent about 22% of the EU still wine consumption; hence, considering an 
average market share for small producers of 17%,418 about 4% of the EU still wine 
market would be significantly affected by the reduced rates. 
 
In zero or near-zero rate countries, the introduction of reduced rates would bring no tax 
advantage for small producers vis-à-vis large producers,419 the relative competitive 
position of drinks would not change, and there would be no costs for the public budget. 
The situation is obviously different in countries applying a positive rate. Among the 
sample MS, effects would materialise in Belgium, France, Poland, and the UK, and are 
summarised in Table 72.  
 
                                                          
418 Based on the market share of small producers below 1,000 hl in the 6 MS visited in depth.  
419 At least for domestic sales. 
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Table 72 – Tax impacts from reduced rates for small wine producers  
 
Excise 
Rate 
Excise rate as a 
share of average 
price 
Market for still 
wine* 
Revenues from 
still wine* 
Foregone revenues 
from the reduced 
rates 
 
€/hl % hl € mn € mn % 
BE 74.91 10% 2,122,313 147.62 13.5 9% 
FR 3.77 1% 11,362,681 92.44 7.4 8% 
PL 36.80 3% 1,057,050 89.54 3.3 4% 
UK 318.20 27% 10,680,570 4693.96 288.9 6% 
Source: Excise rate and revenues: EDT; Price and consumption: IWSR. 
Note: BE market data includes LU; PL revenues include sparkling wine. (*) market data and overall revenue 
data are drawn from different sources, and minor differences are possible. MS applying a zero rate are not 
analysed. 
 
Foregone revenues would be significant for the UK, at about EUR 300 mn; in relative 
terms, they would be the highest in Belgium, at about 9% of the excise revenues of still 
wine. At EU level, total costs would amount to around EUR 440 mn, or 7% of excise 
revenues from wine; the UK, with its large market and high rate, would thus bear two 
thirds of these costs. After the UK, costs would be the highest in the Scandinavian 
countries, in Ireland, and the Netherlands, in the EUR 15-45 mn range. 
 
In terms of market competition, the competitive position of small wine producers would 
gain relatively to both large wine producers and producers of other beverages, both if 
they were able to undercut their price or to increase their profits thanks to lower duty 
rates. With respect to inter-market effects, it is important to underline that the bulk of 
the gains would accrue to foreign producers: as the countries with a non-negligible 
excise rate on still wine represent only 3% of still wine production, but 22% of its 
consumption, foreign small producers of still wine would gain relatively to local producers 
of other alcoholic beverages.420 While this is, in principle, irrelevant for this impact 
analysis, which does not consider distributional impacts between domestic and foreign 
players, this factor is relevant for the likelihood of the uptake of this provision, discussed 
further below. Importantly, due to the WTO non-discrimination principle, the provision 
would also apply to third-country operators. Imports of wine is a significant part of the 
market: in 2015, the EU imported about 14 mn hl of wine, or about 9% of total 
consumption.421 
 
For both intra-market and inter-market competition, the size of the advantage enjoyed 
by small producers depends on the weight of the excise burden over the average price. 
In France, Belgium and in Poland, the situation is similar to what was described for beer, 
i.e. still wine is subject to relatively low taxation; as a consequence, the tax advantage 
would not represent a significant market distortion. On the contrary, in the UK, where 
the excise burden amounts to 27% of the average price, the tax advantage for small still 
wine producers would be substantial, and the norm could thus be distortive. 
 
Adverse health effects at EU level would be limited, because the market share 
significantly affected by the reduction – less than 4% – is too limited to result in an 
increase of wine consumption. However, in countries with a relatively higher taxation on 
still wine (such as Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the UK), the market distortion is 
expected to be significant, and as such it could trigger additional wine consumption, with 
uncertain effects on overall per capita alcohol consumption, depending on the rate of 
substitution with other beverages. 
 
                                                          
420 Excluding France, where the gains are limited given the current excise rate level. 
421 DG AGRI, ‘Dashboard Wine’ and ‘Extra-EU trade’, 2016. 
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 SME competitiveness, administrative burdens, and enforcement costs. 
 
The competitiveness of small wine producers would be positively impacted by such a 
norm, but the magnitude of impacts would be limited and concentrated in specific 
countries or groups of SME; in particular, the norms would produce uneven effects on 
the SME involved in the wine value chain: 
 
(i) First, the reduced rates would benefit only the small producers located in countries 
with a non-negligible excise rate on still wine, or those selling in these countries. The 
former group represent a negligible share of the SME in the wine sector. As for small 
producers selling their wine abroad, those are likely to be the largest in their cohort 
or those operating in high-quality niches, given that entering other EU markets is 
more difficult and relatively costlier for very small wine makers. As a consequence, 
the provision would have a beneficial effect on the entry rates in countries where the 
production of wine is very limited, and on the growth and competitiveness of a small 
part of the SME only. 
(ii) The competitive advantage would be limited to wine makers, excluding other small 
operators which do not vinify on their own, such as those who confer their output 
(grape, juice or bulk wine) to larger wine makers, cooperatives or negociants. 
 
In terms of administrative burdens, it is assumed that the burdens per company would 
be similar to those incurred by small brewers. In the sample MS, average annual 
burdens per company are thus evaluated at EUR 178. The population potentially covered 
by the provision is estimated at about 135,000 small producers.422 However, only a small 
part of them would be concerned, i.e. those established in MS with a non-negligible 
positive tax or selling their products therein. Based on the share of consumption of these 
countries, it is assumed that the provision would affect 22% of the universe, i.e. about 
30,000 still wine producers. Total burdens are thus assessed at EUR 5.3 mn; considering 
that the market share of small producers in these MS is estimated at about 9.1 mn hl, 
the average cost per unit of production amounts to 1.2 €/hl. Such a burden is higher 
than in the case of small brewers, due to the very large population of small wine 
producers concerned, but still negligible when compared to the average price of wine. 
 
The enforcement of this provision cannot be expected to be as smooth as in the case of 
beer. While in the case of beer cross-border trade is more the exception than the rule, in 
this case most of the still wine on which the reduced rate should be applied comes from 
foreign MS. This means that local customs authorities would have no means to directly 
control the independence and the output of the wine makers claiming the reduction. 
Enforcement would thus be more complex, in particular if the additional provisions 
considered for cross-border small brewers (i.e. the uniform certificate for small 
producers and/or a platform for the exchange of information) were not introduced. Also, 
the enforcement would be particularly difficult with respect to third-country small 
operators, which represent a non-negligible part of the market (9% at EU level, and 
even more so in non-producing countries where wine is subject to positive duty rates). 
 
 STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEW 
 
The risk of positive rates explains by far and large why several tax authorities and most 
of trade associations were against the option,423 with the exception of those representing 
small producers only. In the view of these stakeholders, the introduction of reduced 
rates for small producers is only the first step in mandating positive tax rates for wine, 
an outcome which would negatively affect all operators, both large and small. 
                                                          
422 Based on the number of small producers estimated in the 6 MS covered in-depth, and their share of 
production over total EU production. 
423 95% of respondents to the OPC from the wine industry considered this risk as likely or very unlikely 
(against 59% among all respondents). See i.a. the contribution of CEEV to the OPC. 
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In addition, generally speaking, MS which produce wine do not tax it; MS which tax wine 
do not produce it. As a consequence, it would be difficult to imagine that MS would 
decide to implement a tax break, which will benefit only or mostly foreign small 
producers and not local ones. Findings from the fieldwork were in line with this 
conclusion, as very few tax authorities expressed support for the extension of reduced 
rates to small wine producers, mentioning that they already enjoy significant 
advantages, such as the zero rate and the simplifications provided by the Horizontal 
Directive. The provision would become relevant, and thus more likely to be 
implemented, only if a positive EU minimum rate or positive national rates were imposed 
on wine. 
 
When discussing reduced rates with small wine makers engaging in intra-EU trade, the 
main perceived obstacle is not the level of duty rates, which does not create any 
competitive distortion between domestic, foreign, small, or large players. Rather, they 
were concerned with the procedures of paying excises in the MS of destination. However, 
this aspect is not regulated under Directive 92/83/EEC. As a consequence, it is extremely 
unlikely that trade associations and economic operators in the wine sector would 
demand for reduced rates, even if they were introduced in the Directive. 
 
As for the views from the OPC, they generally expressed disagreement with the idea of 
introducing reduced rates for small wine producers. On the one side, the industry 
perceived the risk that reduced rates for small producers could become a trojan horse 
for positive rates; on the other side, the other sectors were concerned that the relative 
position of wine makers, which are already at an advantage in their view, would be 
further enhanced. As a consequence, more than 80% of respondents from the wine 
industry and more than 62% of all respondents expressed disagreement with such an 
option. Considering all respondents, a majority of them disagreed to some extent with 
the extension.  
 
Figure 26 – Public views on the introduction of reduced rates for small wine producers 
 
Source: OPC. 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
 SMALL CIDER MAKERS  
 
 Market effects, tax revenues, and health effects. 
 
The analysis in this Section is based on 5 MS: France, Ireland, and the UK, each of them 
having a large cider market and production, as well as Poland and Italy, two marginal 
producers and consumers. These 5 MS represent 72% of the cider consumption in the 
EU.424  
 
                                                          
424 Based on AICV data. 
14 
89 
-
13 
3 
41 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Wine All respondents
Disagree or strongly disagree Neutral Agree or strongly agree
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
242 
 
The minimum rate for cider (and other fermented beverages) is set at zero as for wine. 
However, the number of countries where still and sparkling cider are subject to zero rate 
is lower than in the case of wine (9 MS).425 Most importantly, the largest markets have a 
positive tax rate: the 9 MS in which still and sparkling cider are not excised represent 
only 9% of cider consumption.426 Among the countries covered in-depth, only Italy 
applies a zero excise rate on cider. 
 
The market structure and the value chain for cider are different from those of wine, and 
much closer to those of beer. In most countries, cider makers are not intermingled in 
complex relationships, and small cider producers make cider themselves, rather than 
providing intermediate products to larger companies.427 In terms of market structure, 
micro and small cider makers represent the vast majority of the population (96% in the 
UK, 99% in France, 93% in Ireland), but a small share of the market. Only in France, 
small and micro cider makers are estimated to represent about 20% of the market; in 
both UK and Ireland, about 97% of the market is in the hands of a few large industrial 
producers. In the sample analysed, the market share of small producers is estimated at 
4.6%. 
 
Table 73 below presents the excise burden over the average cider price, and the costs 
for the public budget of a 50% reduced rate for small producers, based on small cider 
makers representing 4.6% of the market. Foregone revenues due to this option are 
unevenly distributed. Impacts on tax revenues are very small in Poland, due to the 
dimension of the cider market, as well as in France, where the excise burden on cider 
represents only 1% of the price; on the contrary, they are significant in the UK and in 
Ireland, where markets are large and taxation – especially in Ireland – is higher.428 
Extrapolating from these 5 MS to the EU level,429 total foregone revenues are estimated 
at about EUR 15 mn. 
 
Table 73 – Tax impacts from reduced rates for small cider makers 
 
Excise Rate 
Excise rate as a 
share of average 
price 
Market for cider 
Overall 
excise 
revenues 
Foregone revenues of 
the reduced rates 
 
€/hl % hl € mn € '000 
FR 1.33 1%  822,500   3,256   25  
IE 94.46 19%  625,000   1,137   1,358 
PL 22.59 6%  80,000   2,588   42 
UK 44.52 7%  9,500,000   14,441   9,727  
Source: Excise rate and revenues: EDT. Cider market: AICV (national association for PL). Cider price: IWSR. 
Note: MS applying a zero rate are not analysed. 
 
In terms of market competition, small cider makers would gain relatively to large ones, 
either because they are able to reduce their price or increase their profit margins (or a 
combination of both). The reduction would allow compensating for higher costs of 
production due to diseconomies of scale, which mirror those suffered by small brewers. 
The sheer difference in size between industrial producers and small cider makers, and 
the very small market share retained by the latter imply that reduced rates would hardly 
represent a significant competitive threat for large players. The situation could be 
different for France, where small players control about 20% of the market; however, the 
                                                          
425 Considering still cider only, it is subject to zero rate in 13 MS. 
426 Excise data from EDT; consumption data from AICV, ‘European Cider Trends 2016 - Update’ (data from 
national association for PL). The 13 MS in which still cider is not excised represent 14% of cider consumption. 
427 France is an exception, as cooperatives play an important role in the production of cider. 
428 Unlike in the analysis done for wine, it is not possible to compare the costs of the reduction with the excise 
rates from cider or other fermented beverages, because of the lack of disaggregated revenues statistics. 
Obviously, when expressed over total excise revenues from alcoholic beverages, the impact of this provision is 
minuscule (higher than 0.1% of current revenues only in Ireland). 
429 Based on the EU market share represented by these MS. 
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taxation is so low therein, that they would enjoy a negligible tax advantage. At the same 
time, small cider makers would gain also relatively to other small producers, both if they 
undercut their price or increase their profit margins, and in particular to small brewers, 
who can have access to reduced rates in 23 MS. 
 
The effects on per capita alcohol consumption, and consequently negative health 
impacts, are expected to be negligible. The portion affected by the extension, estimated 
at 4.6% of the cider market, is too small to affect the overall price and consumption of 
cider. In addition, cider represents a relatively smaller market compared to other 
alcoholic beverages in most of MS. Only countries with a very large cider market – 
mostly, the UK and Ireland – could see noticeable negative health effects, if deciding to 
introduce the reduction. 
 
 SME competitiveness, administrative burdens, and enforcement costs. 
 
The competitiveness of SME in the cider industry would be enhanced by the provision. 
Impacts could be estimated to be analogous to those enjoyed by small breweries, given 
the similarities in terms of market structures. As such, it can be expected that the 
provision would increase the profitability of small players, and allow them to offset the 
cost disadvantage due to their smaller scale of production. In most MS, unlike wine, all 
small operators in the cider market would benefit from this provision. The provision 
would not ensure the viability of ancillary producers, for whom the regulatory costs of 
being part to the excise framework are a higher barrier to entry than the duties payable.  
 
As far as administrative burdens are concerned, it is assumed that the annual burdens 
per company would be similar to those incurred by small brewers, estimated at EUR 178. 
The EU population potentially covered by the provision is estimated at about 1,145 small 
cider makers.430 Total burdens are thus estimated at about EUR 200,000. Considering 
the market share of small cider makers in MS applying a positive tax rate, and thus 
potentially affected by the provision, costs per unit of production would amount to 0.32 
€/hl. 
 
Finally, in terms of enforcement costs, public authorities would have to deal with a new 
scheme, and thus with the associated demands/self-certification to obtain the reduced 
rates. This would engender additional costs, but the number of players at stake is so 
limited that those costs would not be large. Problems could emerge with respect to 
cross-border operators, but, given the much smaller size compared to small brewers, 
intra-EU trade of cider, potentially benefitting from the reduced rates, is estimated to be 
marginal. 
 
 STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEW 
 
The implementation of the reduced rates for cider should not be expected to be large, 
because the consumption of cider is concentrated in a few national markets, and 
because 9 MS already foresee a zero rate for both still and sparkling cider. However, in 
most of the conspicuous markets, cider is taxed, so that there would be scope for a tax 
reduction. Tax authorities either welcomed or did not oppose the possibility of granting 
reduced rates to small cider makers. 
 
The respondents to the OPC provided a split view on whether reduced rates should be 
extended to small producers of other fermented beverages, with producers of other 
fermented beverages (or representative thereof) somehow more negative than others. 
                                                          
430 Based on the number of small producers estimated in the 5 MS covered in-depth, and their share of 
consumption over total EU consumption. 
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However, industry responses should be considered cautiously, because only one 
respondent out of 31 is active exclusively in the other fermented beverages market. 
 
Figure 27 – Public views on the introduction of reduced rates for small OFB producers 
 
Source: OPC. 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
 SMALL PRODUCERS OF FORTIFIED WINE 
 
Data on the production and market of fortified wine do not allow for any quantitative 
analysis. In qualitative terms, the impacts of applying the reduced rates would be as 
follows: 
 
1) Many small wine growers or wine makers operate in the value chain of fortified wine 
(e.g. 30,000 only for Port); however, most of them provide their juice or bulk wine to 
shippers, or bodegas, and hence are not producers of fortified wine. As a 
consequence, they would not be the direct beneficiaries of this reduction. Hence, as 
in the case of wine, the reduced rates would affect unevenly small companies in the 
fortified wine value chain, depending on the scope of their activities. 
 
2) When considering producers of fortified wine, small producers below 1,000 hl would 
have a limited market share. For this reason, the reduced rates, as in the case of 
beer or cider, would not affect a large part of the market; as a consequence, they 
would cause small losses in terms of tax revenues, and they would unlikely alter 
market equilibria, thus not affecting price and consumption of fortified wine (let alone 
other alcoholic beverages). Impacts on per capita alcohol consumption, and thus 
negative health effects from this reduction, would be negligible. 
 
3) Market distortions depend on the duty rate applied in each country to intermediate 
products and on its weight on retail price. Among the sample MS, the impact of 
excise on average price varies: less than 10% in Austria, Italy, and Poland, between 
10% and 20% in France and Belgium, and above 30% in the UK.431 Where the excise 
burden is low, the discount would thus be unlikely to introduce a significant market 
distortion. Importantly, discounted rates for specific products, not tied to the size of 
their producers, already exist in countries where the production and consumption of 
fortified wine are significant, such as for vin doux naturel in France (75% discount 
compared to the standard rate) or for Vinho de Madeira in Portugal (51% 
discount).432 
 
The likelihood of uptake of reduced rates for fortified wine is higher than in the case of 
                                                          
431 Source: EDT for excise rates; IWSR to calculate average price. 
432 EDT. 
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wine for two reasons. First of all, there is a positive minimum tax rate for intermediate 
products. Secondly, markets for fortified wine are larger in producing countries, so MS 
could have the possibility to favour local small producers. The five most important 
intermediate wine producing countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and France) 
represent about 65% of the EU market.433 
 
Finally, with respect to the public view on the proposed policy option, responses from the 
overall sample and from producers of intermediate products are shown in Figure 28. 
Disagreement with respect to the policy option was widespread within the industry, 
much more than in the overall sample. However, out of 23 operators or trade 
associations active in the intermediate product market, only 4 of them produce 
exclusively intermediate products, hence this opinion should be considered cautiously. 
Compared to wine, the overall assessment of this option was slightly more positive, even 
though half of the respondents still disagreed with it. 
 
Figure 28 – Public views on the introduction of reduced rates for small producers of 
intermediate products 
 
Source: OPC. 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
  
                                                          
433 IWSR data. 
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3.4 Reduced rates for low-strength alcohol 
 
In Section 2.4 we have analysed the extent to which the relatively low uptake of reduced 
rates for low-strength alcohol among MS is somehow connected to a lack of clarity on its 
purpose, in order to establish whether there is the need to re-state – e.g. via guidelines 
– the nature and magnitude of expected effects. The results of our analysis is that such 
intervention is not justified. In fact, various stakeholders (both national authorities and 
economic operators) have stressed that such guidelines would be both non-requested 
and ineffective: MS would continue applying reduced rates for low-strength alcoholic 
beverages based on different (sometimes combined) national priorities. For instance, 
guidelines stating that these provisions are intended to support public health policy 
targets would have no practical effects in those MS where taxation policy and health 
policy on alcohol are strictly separated nor in those where such provisions have already 
been implemented for public health purposes. In addition, the selection of 
targets/objectives would involve a high degree of uncertainty as there is limited evidence 
of public health impacts of such provisions, even in those MS where reduced rates for 
low-strength alcoholic beverages are applied. The only type of guidance that some 
stakeholders would consider effective would point at using reduced rates to approximate 
a system where alcoholic beverages are taxed based on their actual alcohol content – a 
view that is however opposed by several other MS authorities and stakeholders. The lack 
of interest in a formal clarification of the objective of these provisions is also confirmed 
by OPC results, with more than half of respondents either having no or neutral opinion 
and about 30% disagreeing with it. This option is therefore not assessed in the Study. 
 
Based on the baseline assessment, it seems instead useful to examine the possible 
impact of increasing the threshold for low-strength alcohol for beer as well as for wine, 
intermediate products and ethyl alcohol. As discussed in Section 2.4 it is useful to 
separate beer (option 1) from the other products (option 2) since the functioning of 
reduced rates and the level of demand is significantly different.    
 
As a general consideration it is important to underline that reduced rates would remain 
an optional measure and that thresholds represent maximum upper limit, so MS 
currently not applying reduced rates may continue doing so, and MS applying reduced 
rates may maintain their current thresholds, even if the EU-level maximum thresholds 
have increased. In these circumstances, a policy amendment would not necessarily 
translate into a policy change (and concrete impact) at MS level. 
 
 
3.4.1 Revised threshold for low-strength beer (option 1) 
 
3.4.1.1 Definition of the policy option  
 
To increase the relevance of the threshold identifying low strength-beer and provide 
incentives to produce/consume this type of beer, option 1 aims to amend Article 5(1) of 
the Directive and allow MS to apply reduced rates to beer with an actual alcoholic 
strength by volume not exceeding 3.5% vol (instead of 2.8% vol). 
 
This option is expected to generate impacts in terms of: (i) tax revenues, as larger 
shares of the market could benefit from reduced rates compared to the baseline; (ii) 
market effects, as lower taxation may lead to lower price for low-strength beer, hence 
an increase in demand; and (iii) ambivalent public health effects, as increased 
consumption of low-strength beer may (or may not) reduce the per capita intake of 
alcohol and, through higher availability, may increase the number of alcohol consumers, 
particularly among young people.   
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Table 74 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on revising the low-
strength threshold of beer 
Policy Option Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
New threshold to apply 
reduced rates to low-
strength beer set at 
3.5% vol. 
 Tax revenues (in MS 
applying reduced rates)  
 Reduction in tax revenues from consumption of 
beer 
 Market effects (for 
brewers of low-strength 
beer) 
 Reduction in price and increase in consumption 
of low-strength beer 
 New market opportunities/product innovation 
stemming from revised thresholds 
 Public Health   Change in consumption of low-strength beer 
may generate ambivalent public health impacts 
 
 
3.4.1.2  Impact analysis  
 
 IMPACT ON TAX REVENUES AND MARKET EFFECTS 
 
Tax revenues and market effects generated by option 1 depend on four main factors: i) 
the (actual/potential) size of the market for beer not-exceeding 3.5% vol; ii) the number 
of MS that will decide to apply reduced rates to beer below 3.5% vol; iii) the reduced 
rate applied to beer below 3.5% vol; and iv) the extent to which the discount is passed-
on to the consumer. For all factors, some assumptions are required to perform an impact 
analysis. 
 
As for the first factor, currently there are no statistics available to measure the size of 
the market for beer between 2.8% vol and 3.5% vol. In Finland, whereas in 2015 the 
share of the market below 2.8% vol corresponded to 1.6% of the total market for beer 
(see Figure 9 above), 94.4% of the beer consumption was comprised in the bracket 2.9-
4.7% vol.434 Based on stakeholders’ feedback, the distribution of the consumption in this 
bracket is not homogenous; in fact, the bulk of the market is just below 4.7% vol, which 
is the maximum threshold for off-trade sales in standard stores.435 In the UK, data from 
2009 pointed at a 1.2% market share for beer between 1.3% vol and 3.3% vol and a 
61.9% share for beer between 3.4% vol and 4.1% vol;436 ales tended to vary across the 
latter range (3.4-4.1% vol), while major lager brands were above 3.8%, with the 
average beer strength at 4.19% vol. A survey conducted by UK Society of Independent 
Brewers in 2016 led to similar results437: the average beer strength was 4.2% vol, there 
was no bestselling beer below 3.4% vol and only five independent brewers out of 344 
respondents to the survey reported that at least 40% of their production was in the 
bracket 2.9%-3.4% vol. In countries where reduced rates are not applied to beer, 
statistics on consumption of beer by alcohol content are not available. Based on 
stakeholders’ feedback, the Belgian market is historically dominated by special beer and 
there is almost no market for beer below 4.1% vol, except for radler that is generally 
below 2.8% vol. Similar considerations apply to Romania, where there is no demand for 
low-strength beer and even radler is losing momentum. In Italy and in Poland438, 
                                                          
434 For further details see Panimoliitto, ‘Domestic sales of beer, cider, and long drink (and soft drink) 1990-
2016’, http://www.panimoliitto.fi/app/uploads/2017/03/Kotimaanmyynti-1990-2016.pdf (last accessed on 30 
June 2017). 
435 Alcoholic beverages above 4.7% vol are only retailed by Alko, the national alcoholic beverage retailing 
monopoly in Finland (for further detail see https://www.alko.fi; last accessed on 10 July 2017). In this respect, 
some stakeholders have emphasised that the threshold banning sales in stores is more effective than any tax 
discount. 
436 For further details see BBPA, ‘Government review of alcohol taxation’, 2010, at: 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/bbpa-
prod/attachments/documents/resources/21180/original/BBPA%20Response%20to%20review%20of%20Alcoho
l%20Taxation.pdf?1328114934 (last accessed 10 July 2017). 
437 For further details see SIBA, ‘British beer’, 2017, at: 
http://www.siba.co.uk/SIBAMembersSurvey2017FINAL.pdf (last accessed on 10 July 2017). 
438 Where it is forbidden to sell alcoholic beverages above 3.5% in large public events. 
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instead, large producers are recently launching beer with 3-3.5% vol alcohol content, yet 
it is too early to capture the market share of such products. 
  
Against this background, it is apparent that the market share for low-strength beer 
between 2.8% vol and 3.5% vol across all MS is modest; nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
assume that the adoption of the 3.5% threshold would develop a new market ‘niche’ 
immediately below this limit. In what follows, this new market niche is assumed to be 
comparable in size to the current market for beer ranging between 0.5% vol and 2.8% 
vol.  
 
Whereas some estimates are possible with regard to the first factor, it is more difficult to 
predict the MS’ reaction to a change in the threshold defining low-strength beer. In fact, 
it is uncertain whether: i) MS currently applying reduced rates would accommodate an 
increase in the threshold; ii) MS not currently applying reduced rates would implement 
the provision allowing for a higher threshold. In addition, there are no indications about 
the level of the reduced rates that MS would introduce. In what follows, and for 
analytical purposes, ‘full- compliance’ is assumed, i.e. all sample MS would introduce 
reduced rates for low-strength beer not exceeding 3.5% vol. In this context, reduced 
rates for Belgium, Italy, Poland and Romania are assumed to be 50% of standard rate. 
As these countries compute tax on beer by applying the Plato method, for the sake of 
simplicity one Plato degree is assumed to be equal to 0.4% vol.439  
 
Finally, with regard to the pass-on rate, it is assumed that reductions in the payable 
excise duty are 100% passed on to consumers. This can be considered an average pass-
on rate in the market for beer if one considers that whereas supermarkets tend to apply 
a pass-on lower than 100%,440 on-trade sellers may apply a greater pass-on rate.441 
 
Table 75 summarises the main impacts stemming from the increase of the threshold for 
low-strength beer to 3.5% vol. The total foregone tax revenues (including both excise 
duty and VAT paid on excise duty) are expected to amount to less than 1% of the total 
tax revenue from consumption of beer in the selected MS. Foregone tax revenues might 
be even lower, if one considers that the new market for low-strength could partially 
flourish on top rather than at the expenses of the market for standard beer. The 
reduction in taxation would lead to a price reduction for new low-strength beer 
(compared to standard beer) in the area of 2% to 6% in Belgium, Finland, Italy and 
Romania, where excise duty on beer are relatively low. The change in price would be 
around -12% in Finland and -11% in the UK, where standard rates are relatively high 
and substantially larger than reduced rates. Nonetheless, by assuming a price elasticity 
of demand (PED) of -0.54 (this is the average PED of a 2014 British HMRC study),442 the 
change in per capita consumption of low-strength beer appears to be quite limited (from 
0.02L to 0.10L per year).  
 
                                                          
439 For further details see the Section of this Study on measuring the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured 
beer; European Commission ‘EU rules for the taxation of alcohol’, 2016; and London Economics (2010). 
440 A UK study found that supermarkets often avoid passing on excise duty to consumers, especially for 
cheaper products. This has been confirmed by both Italian and UK brewers interviewed for this Study. For 
further details, see Ally et al., ‘Alcohol tax pass-through across the product and price range: do retailers treat 
cheap alcohol differently?’, 2014, at http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/87746/7/WRRO_87746.pdf (last accessed 
on 10 July 2017). 
441 For further details, see BBPA (2010). 
442 For further details, see Sousa, ‘Estimation of price elasticities of demand for alcohol in the United Kingdom’, 
2014 at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387513/HMRC_WorkingPaper_
16_Alcohol_elasticities_final.pdf (last accessed on 10 July 2017). 
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Table 75 – Reduced rates for low-strength beer not exceeding 3.5% vol – impact 
analysis 
 
BE FI IT PL RO UK 
Current market covered by 
reduced rates (hl) 
- 61,910 - - - 244,973 
New market covered by 
reduced rates (hl) 
255,474 123,820 419,958 1,359,864 576,942 489,946 
Average foregone tax 
revenues linked to reduced 
rates (EUR) 
1,465,441 4,431,072 4,672,621 7,972,186 1,548,196 10,671,024 
Average foregone tax 
revenues linked to reduced 
rates as a share of total tax 
revenues from 
consumption of beer (%) 
0.51% 0.58% 0.59% 0.64% 0.70% 0.20% 
Change in price linked to 
reduced rates (%) 
-2.30% -12.43% -4.63% -5.54% -2.58% -10.71% 
Increase in per capita 
consumption linked to 
reduced rates (litre) 
0.03 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.02 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Excise Duty Tables (2015), based on IWSR and on Panimoliitto (for 
consumption of low-strength beer in Finland), and on BBPA’s elaboration of HMRC data for consumption of low-
strength beer in the UK. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015. 
 
 IMPACT ON PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Considering the above analysis of market effects, and more specifically the limited 
increase in per capita consumption of low-strength beer (from 0.02L to 0.10 L per year), 
any public health impact, either positive (in case the additional consumption of low-
alcohol beer is ‘at the expense’ of standard beer and other stronger alcoholic beverages) 
or negative (in case low-strength beer substitutes soft drinks and facilitates the drinking 
initiation of young people), is negligible. This is particularly true if one considers that the 
overall per capita consumption of beer in the sample MS ranges from 31 litres in Italy to 
about 70 litres in Belgium, Finland and the UK, to 80 litres in Romania and 90 litres in 
Poland. These findings are aligned with stakeholders’ feedback: several economic 
operators argued that the current segment below 2.8% is so narrow that any change in 
consumption due to a slightly increase in the threshold would have no noticeable impact 
on per capita alcohol consumption.  
 
 PUBLIC VIEW ON PROPOSED POLICY OPTIONS 
 
Results from the OPC conducted on this topic provide a mixed picture. While 47% of 
participants who responded to this question welcome an increase in the threshold of low-
strength beer from 2.8% to 3.5% vol, 44% of participants either partly or strongly 
disagree with this policy option (Figure 29). Most respondents who support the raise in 
the threshold for low-strength beer are beer producers (few brewers are against this 
policy option), while most respondents against it are producers of other alcoholic 
beverages (wine, OFP, intermediate products, and ethyl alcohol). 
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Figure 29 – Public views on a possible increase of the reduced rates threshold for low-
strength beer from 2.8% vol to 3.5% vol 
 
Source: OPC.  
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
 
3.4.2 Revised thresholds for wine, intermediate products and ethyl alcohol 
(option 2) 
 
3.4.2.1  Definition of the policy option  
 
In the same way as for beer, improving the relevance of the thresholds for low-strength 
wine, intermediate products and ethyl alcohol and fostering production/consumption of 
such products require a revision of Articles 9(2), 18(3) and 22(5) of the Directive with 
the aim to raise the thresholds to apply reduced excise duty rates. This policy option is 
expected to generate impacts similar to those registered in the market for low-strength 
beer. First, tax revenues would be affected, as larger volumes of alcoholic beverages 
could benefit from reduced rates. Second, market effects would be registered, as lower 
taxation would most likely lead to lower price (depending on the extent to which the 
discount is passed on to consumers) and increased consumption. Revised thresholds 
may also provide incentives to develop and commercialise new low-alcohol beverages. 
Finally, some public health impacts might stem from a greater consumption of low-
strength alcoholic beverages. Option 2 would need to be further detailed as, at this 
stage, there is no agreement among stakeholders or in the literature on possible 
alternative thresholds. Therefore, in what follows, the impacts generated by this option 
are assessed in a qualitative fashion. 
 
Table 76 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on revising the low-
strength threshold of other products 
Policy option Impact areas Nature of impact expected 
Increased thresholds to 
apply reduced rates to 
low-strength wine, 
intermediate products 
and spirits 
 Tax revenues (MS 
applying reduced rates) 
 Reduction in in tax revenues from consumption 
of wine, intermediate products and ethyl alcohol 
 Market effects (Producers 
of low-strength wine, 
intermediate products or 
ethyl alcohol) 
 Reduction in price and increase in consumption 
of low-strength wine, intermediate products and 
ethyl alcohol 
 New market opportunities/production innovation 
stemming from revised thresholds 
 Public health   Change in consumption of low-strength wine, 
intermediate products and ethyl alcohol may 
generate ambivalent public health impacts 
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3.4.2.2  Impact analysis  
 
 IMPACT ON TAX REVENUES AND MARKET EFFECTS 
 
As for wine, independent experts as well as stakeholders from several MS have 
emphasised that the bulk of the market is above 10% vol. Below this threshold, besides 
special wine and products based on wine (which tend to be even below 8.5% vol), there 
are mostly sweet wine (containing unfermented sugar) and some wine processed to 
reduce alcohol content. Interviewees also claimed that the potential to develop low-
alcohol products is rather limited in the wine market: i) the minimum alcohol strength is 
defined by Union law and international regulation; ii) wine is a product whose alcohol 
strength is determined by a number of natural production variables such as grape 
variety, climate, altitude and proximity to water; iii) the alcohol strength contributes to 
the specific taste of certain types of wine. Therefore, any change in the threshold (now 
at 8.5% vol) would provide only little incentive to produce/consume low-alcohol wine 
and would still leave most of the ‘traditional’ wine outside the scope of the provision, 
with limited impacts in terms of tax revenues and changes in consumption. The 
magnitude of tax and market effects of reduced rates for low-strength wine is further 
limited by the fact that wine already benefits from a zero rate in several MS. 
 
EU rules also set the minimum alcohol content for wine fortified for distillation (18-24% 
vol). Therefore, an increase in the threshold for low-strength intermediate products (now 
at 15% vol) may allow applying reduced rates to some ‘traditional’ intermediate 
products. Statistics on consumption of these products by alcohol content are not 
available; therefore, it is not possible to quantify the share of the market that would 
benefit from an increase in the threshold on low-strength intermediate products. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that in many instances traditional products have also 
access to the reduced rates established under Article 18(4) of the Directive, so the 
concrete effects would be limited.  
 
When it comes to ethyl alcohol, as discussed above, according to Union law, spirits have 
minimum alcohol strength of 15% vol; therefore, even a substantial increase of the 
threshold from 10% vol (current threshold) to 15% vol would have no impact on tax 
revenues, production and consumption of ‘traditional’ spirits. By contrast, an increase in 
the threshold would have an impact on the market for mixed drinks (i.e. long drinks, 
pre-mixed cocktails and FAB) and other special ‘products’. As discussed above, while 
some mixed drinks are still above 10% vol, a sizeable portion of such market is below 
15% vol and would benefit from an increase in the threshold. In this context, it is worth 
stressing that FAB, which in 2015 represented about 6% of the EU market for ethyl 
alcohol (in volume), are generally below 10% vol. Therefore, an increase in the 
threshold would mainly affect long drinks and pre-mixed cocktails. If one considers that 
a portion of the market for long drinks and pre-mixed cocktails is already below 10% vol 
and that in 2015 these products overall represented only 2.7% of the total EU market for 
ethyl alcohol, it is apparent that any increase in threshold would have limited tax and 
market effects. In addition, it is important to bear in mind that only Finland currently 
applies reduced rates to low-strength ethyl alcohol (below 2.8% vol) and any change in 
the threshold would not necessarily lead to a broader uptake of this provision by MS.  
 
 IMPACT ON PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
As discussed above, the impact of reduced rates for low-strength alcohol on per capita 
consumption – hence public health - may be ambivalent. On the one hand, tax 
reductions may favour substitution between standard alcoholic beverages and low-
strength alcoholic beverages, thus reducing alcohol intake by consumers. On the other 
hand, they may favour substitution between soft drinks and alcoholic beverages, 
incentivise consumers to drink larger quantities of alcoholic beverages and facilitate the 
drinking initiation of young people.  
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As mentioned, an increase of the thresholds for wine, intermediate products and ethyl 
alcohol is expected to have minor market effects when it comes to ‘traditional’ products. 
By contrast, it may affect the market for certain aromatised wine-based drinks as well as 
certain mixed drinks, which are relatively more appealing than traditional products to 
younger cohorts of consumers (according to various interviewees). Therefore, applying 
reduced rates on such products may eventually encourage consumption of alcohol 
among young people with negative impact on public health targets.  
 
 PUBLIC VIEW ON PROPOSED POLICY OPTIONS 
 
The results from the OPC indicate a very limited support by the industry stakeholders to 
the revision of the current thresholds for wine, intermediate products and ethyl alcohol. 
With regard to wine, over 70% of stakeholders representing the wine industry are 
strongly against any change, be it moderate or significant. Results for intermediate 
products are similar, with most of industry stakeholders against revising the threshold to 
apply reduced rates. Finally, when it comes to ethyl alcohol, almost 90% of stakeholders 
representing the ethyl alcohol industry are against either a moderate or substantial 
change in the threshold. Opinions expressed by private individuals were somewhat more 
varied across all questions, with relatively higher shares of respondents expressing 
agreement towards an increase of the thresholds. 
 
Figure 30 – Public views on a possible increase of the reduced rates threshold for low-
strength wine, intermediate products and ethyl alcohol  
 
Source: OPC. 
Legend: W: industry stakeholders with an interest in the wine sector; Int: industry stakeholders with an 
interest in the intermediate products sector; Eth: industry stakeholders with an interest in the ethyl alcohol 
sector; Ind: rest of the industry (not included in the previous category); Priv: private individuals; Oth: Other 
(public health NGOs, public authorities, etc.). 
Note: industry stakeholders with an interest in the production or end-use of industrial alcohol have been 
included in the ‘Ind’ category whenever present. If not present, they have been included in the residual ‘Oth’ 
category. 
 ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
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3.5 Exemptions for private production 
 
3.5.1 Definition of policy options 
 
The problem definition presented in Section 2.5.2 shows that in most MS the home 
production of distilled products is treated differently than fermented beverages. While 
home production of beer, wine, and other fermented beverages is legal and duty free, in 
4 out of the 6 sample MS private distillation is prohibited. The Council has thus invited 
the Commission to consider the possibility to redress this unequal treatment. This 
objective can be achieved by means of a legislative revision: extending the exemption 
for private production to intermediate products and ethyl alcohol.  
 
Specifically, it is assumed that the legislative revision would introduce exemptions for 
ethyl alcohol and intermediate products, which will be drafted along the lines of those 
currently included in Articles 6, 10, and 14: 
 
Subject to such conditions as they shall lay down to ensure the 
straightforward application of the exemption, Member States may exempt 
from excise duty [intermediate products / ethyl alcohol] produced by a 
private individual and consumed by the producer, members of his family or 
his guests, provided that no sale is involved. 
 
As a consequence: 
 
 the exemption remains optional for the MS;  
 in the MS where this option is applied, not only private distillation becomes duty 
free, but, most importantly, it becomes legal; conversely, MS retain the 
possibility to prohibit home distillation if they do not implement the option; 
 MS may stipulate the conditions that they consider appropriate to the 
management of the exemption, e.g. registration obligations, reporting duties, 
quantitative allowance, definition of the conditions at which ‘no sale is involved’. 
 
During the Inception Phase, it was suggested not to further consider the possibility to 
provide non-binding guidelines concerning the exemption for private production. Based 
on the findings described in Section 2.5.2, this is confirmed as appropriate, because: 
 
 No regulatory or market failure has been identified as regards the products for 
which the Directive already provides an exemption; public authorities, health 
organisations and economic operators expressed no concerns in this respect; 
 The uneven treatment of different alcoholic beverages can be solved only via an 
amendment to the Directive, as the exemption is not currently foreseen in the 
current text and could not be introduced via non-legislative interventions. 
 
Table 77 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy option on extending private 
production exemptions to other products 
Regulatory Option Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Extension of the 
exemption for private 
production to 
intermediate products 
and ethyl alcohol 
 Tax revenues for public 
authorities 
 If duty exemption led to a substitution of taxed 
products with home production, tax revenues 
could decline. 
 Market effects for 
economic operators 
(including cross-border) 
 If duty exemption led to a substitution of taxed 
products with home production, economic 
operators will be negatively impacted. 
 Health impacts for 
consumers 
 Allowing private distillation is likely to result in 
higher alcohol consumption and risks of 
methanol intoxication. 
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Regulatory Option Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
 Enforcement costs for 
public authorities 
 Additional enforcement resources should be 
spent in controlling compliance with the new 
regime. 
 Administrative burdens for 
private distillers 
 Reduction of administrative burdens is expected 
to be largely theoretical given current level of 
non-compliance; possible increase in case 
regulatory systems are put up at national level. 
 
 
3.5.2 Impact Analysis 
 
In this Section, the impacts of the extension of the exemption for private production are 
discussed. First, the expected change to the amount of private distillation is estimated in 
quantitative terms. Then, based on the magnitude of this change, the other relevant 
impacts are quantified, where possible – e.g. in the case of market effects and tax 
revenues – or discussed in qualitative terms – e.g. in the case of health impacts. A 
comparison of the policy option with the status quo is provided in Section 4.5.1 below. 
 
In line with the current wording of the Directive, the exemption for private production of 
intermediate products and ethyl alcohol would remain optional. Its impacts thus depend 
on both the amendments to the Directive, as well as on the MS’ choice to implement 
such an option. The analysis is carried out under the assumption that the sample MS 
would apply the exemptions. Such an assumption will be discussed in the sub-section on 
stakeholders’ view, further below. 
 
 
3.5.2.1  Impact on private distillation 
 
Extending the exemption for private production for own consumption to private 
distillation would have both a static and a dynamic effect: 
 
 The activity carried out by private distillers would become legal; it can be 
assumed that all current home distillers will carry on their activity under the 
exemption. 
 New private distillers may become active, or existing private distillers may 
increase their production. 
 
A quantitative assessment of the magnitude of this dynamic effect is therefore needed to 
estimate the changes in the amount of private distillation under the new regime.  
 
Economic operators and public authorities were surveyed during targeted interviews to 
understand whether and to what extent private distillation would increase as a result of 
this policy option. Many of them were not in a position to provide an estimate, but those 
who provided an assessment agreed that an exemption would generate an increase in 
private distillation in the countries where this is currently prohibited. In Austria, such an 
exemption would cover also citizens other than farmers. Only in Romania, where private 
production is more widespread – both licit and taxed at a reduced rate, and illicit – 
stakeholders suggested that an exemption would not result in an increase of its already 
high levels of private distillation. 
 
To estimate the magnitude of the dynamic effect, data from the OPC are resorted to. In 
Question 37, stakeholders were asked to estimate the likelihood of an increase in private 
distillation should this policy option be adopted. Figure 31 below provides the answers 
across various groups. 
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Figure 31 – OPC results for Question #37.2 
In your opinion, would an increase in private distillation occur if the exemption for private 
production were extended to intermediate products and ethyl alcohol? 
 Source: OPC. 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
The respondents to the OPC had split views on the likelihood of an increase in private 
distillation. In particular, 26% of private individuals443 – those directly affected by the 
exemption – considered an increase as ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’, and 79% of producers of 
ethyl alcohol and intermediate products did so.444 Private individuals’ view is considered 
indicative of the extent to which home distillation would increase.445 Hence, it is assumed 
that, due to the appearance of new private distillers or to an increased production of 
current private distillers, home production of distilled products would increase by 26% in 
the countries covered by the analysis, except for Romania, where it is estimated that 
such a policy change would unlikely alter a situation in which private distillation is 
already widespread. The increase in private distillation under this assumption for the 6 
sample MS is reported in Table 78. Extrapolation at EU level is done considering the 
share of unrecorded alcohol in the 6 MS over EU total (40%, based on WHO GISAH 
data). 
 
Table 78 – Impact of a possible exemption on the volume of private distillation 
  
Illicit private distillation 
(baseline) 
Private distillation after 
the exemption 
Difference 
hlpa 
Austria 1,103 1,389 287 
Finland 1,052 1,326 274 
Italy 13,103 16,510 3,407 
Poland 38,749 48,824 10,075 
Romania 25,119 25,119 - 
United Kingdom 6,409 8,076 1,666 
Total 85,535 101,244 15,708 
EU 212,264 251,245 38,982 
Source: Author’s analysis on WHO, IWSR, findings from the interviews and desk research. 
 
 
3.5.2.2  Market Effects and Impacts on Tax Revenues 
                                                          
443 Out of 27 private individuals responding to this question. 
444 Out of 24 entities active in the intermediate product or ethyl alcohol sectors responding to this question. 
445 Other quantitative parameters could not be identified during fieldwork and desk research, and the 
stakeholders interviewed could not suggest possible ranges. Indeed, laws on distillation and home distillation 
are considered very stable, the legal allowances and exceptions date back to a long time ago (e.g. they were 
introduced in 1830 in Austria), and the underlying social norms prove constant. In particular, no recent 
introduction of an exception or the removal of a prohibition could be identified, which could serve as a guidance 
to verify the magnitude of this effect. 
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An increase in private distillation could be neutral in terms of market effects if all 
additional home-made beverages would correspond to additional alcohol consumption. 
However, it is foreseeable that these new beverages would in part substitute existing 
products on the market, and in part result in new consumption. To make this clear, it 
implies that new private distillers would enter the activity446 and would produce home-
distilled products. These new private distillers are assumed to no longer buy commercial 
products (or no longer the same quantity thereof), hence substituting existing 
consumption; at the same time, it is also likely that they will increase their overall 
consumption of distilled products.  
 
To estimate the share of substitution, OPC data can again be resorted to. While 26% of 
private individuals expect an increase in home distillation, a lower share of them, 18% 
expect an increase in alcohol consumption. The ratio between these two shares (69%) is 
used as a parameter to estimate how much additional private distillation would result in 
additional consumption. Conversely, 31% of the new private distillation estimated above 
is assumed to substitute existing consumption on the spirit market. In all countries – 
except for Romania, where changes to private distillation are assessed to be nihil – a 
contraction of the market for spirits is estimated, but the magnitude of this impact is 
low, between less than 0.1% and 0.3%. Extrapolating results at EU level, based on the 
share of unrecorded alcohol consumption in the sample MS, the reduction of the spirit 
market is estimated at 0.1% of the current volumes. Results are shown in Table 79. 
Given such a low magnitude and the local circulation of home-made products, no cross-
border impacts are expected. 
 
Table 79 – Expected impacts of exemptions for private production on the market of 
spirits 
  
Expected reduction in the market of spirits 
In hlpa In hl As a % of current market 
Austria 89 222 0.1% 
Finland 85 212 0.1% 
Italy 1,056 2,640 0.2% 
Poland 3,123 7,808 0.3% 
Romania - - 0.0% 
United Kingdom 517 1,291 0.0% 
Total 4,870 12,174 0.1% 
EU 12,084 30,211 0.1% 
Source: Author’s analysis on WHO, IWSR, findings from the interviews and desk research. 
 
Impacts on tax revenues are threefold: 
 
(i) The fact that previously illicit private distillation becomes licit is neutral from a tax 
perspective – no tax was collected before, and no tax is collected afterwards; in 
other words, the option does not lead to the recovery of existing foregone 
revenues. 
(ii) New private distillation is tax neutral when it translates into additional alcohol 
consumption, while it leads to a reduction of excise revenues when it substitutes 
current market consumption; the impacts on excise revenues are reported in 
Table 80 below. As in the case of market effects, the magnitude of these impacts 
remain very limited, at about EUR 18 mn, or 0.3% of current revenues from ethyl 
alcohol. Only in Poland a loss of excises larger than EUR 10 mn is estimated. At 
EU level, reduction in excise revenues can be estimated at about EUR 45 mn, 
based on the share of unrecorded alcohol consumed in the sample MS. 
                                                          
446 Or that previously illicit private distillers would increase their production. 
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(iii) In Romania, where private distillation is allowed and a reduced excise rate 
imposed, the extension of the exemption, if implemented, would reduce excise 
revenues therein.447  
 
Table 80 – Expected impacts of exemptions for private production on excise duty 
revenues  
  
Reduction in excise duty revenues 
In ‘000 € In % of current revenue 
Austria 144 -0.1% 
Finland 966 -0.2% 
Italy 2,734 -0.4% 
Poland 10,373 -0.6% 
Romania - 0.0% 
United Kingdom 4,091 -0.1% 
Total 18,308 -0.3% 
EU 45,434 -0.3% 
Source: Author’s analysis on WHO, IWSR, findings from the interviews and desk research. 
 
With respect to the risk of tax frauds, they are expected to remain negligible.448 
Economic operators consider that private distillers remain unlikely to supply the informal 
or illicit markets with sufficient quantities and of sufficient quality to represent a 
competitive threat. While customs authorities remain concerned with tax frauds, they do 
not judge the additional risk as substantial. In some cases private distillation is 
associated with limited sales in local markets – which however customs authorities and 
economic operators do not perceive as a significant threat – and this risk would increase 
in line with the estimated growth in home-distilled products. Their main concern, 
especially in countries where the market for illicit alcohol is relevant, is with surrogate 
beverages obtained from denatured alcohol, and with clandestine distillation.449 
Economic operators confirmed that indeed the costs for surrogate alcohol and 
clandestine distillation are much lower compared to private distillation, and that these 
‘business models’ remain more profitable for criminal activities.  
 
With respect to cross-border effects, as discussed in the problem definition, the 
circulation of home-distilled products is very local, and no cross-border spill over was 
identified or reported. The modest increase in home distillation expected from this policy 
option is not expected to alter this situation, and cross-border negative effects are thus 
estimated to be minimal. 
 
 
3.5.2.3  Public health impacts 
 
As described in Section 2.5.2 above, with respect to per capita alcohol consumption, the 
primary harm from unrecorded alcohol, including home production, arises from the fact 
that it is typically much more available and accessible than recorded alcohol, thus 
leading to higher health risks.  
 
Furthermore, privately-distilled beverages result in higher health risks due to methanol 
intoxication; at the same time, health authorities reported that most of the cases of 
                                                          
447 No data or estimate could be retrieved on the amount of private distillation that is currently taxed, hence 
this assessment remains only qualitative. One Romanian stakeholder suggested that it would be unlikely that 
those who privately produce spirits paid the reduced excise duties, given that the likelihood of being caught by 
controls is very low. However, such an assumption could not be verified. 
448 55% of the respondents to the OPC expressed that an increase in the risk of tax frauds is likely or very 
likely (with no judgment on the magnitude of such an increase). During fieldwork interviews, operators and 
public authorities expressed limited concerns with the magnitude of this incremental risk. 
449 Though clandestine distillation could, in principle, be disguised as home distillation, the former requires 
possession of much larger-scale equipment, which could hardly be justified for the consumption of products ‘for 
own use’. 
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methanol intoxication are linked to surrogate alcohol or adulterated products, and that 
limited methanol-related negative effects can be traced back to home-distilled products.  
The exemption would result in an increase of private distillation and, thus, to a 
corresponding higher risk of adverse events. This was confirmed by the bulk of the 
stakeholders interviewed during the fieldwork, including public authorities, economic 
operators and health institutions, both in countries where private distillation is common, 
as well as in countries where it is not. In particular, since this policy option would attract 
new private distillers, these may have a lower expertise in handling the methanol 
removal process and would thus be at a higher risk of intoxication.  
 
In the OPC, respondents were asked to estimate to what extent an extension of the 
exemption would result in increased health risks. Most of respondents considered it to be 
likely or very likely, with only private individuals deeming that higher health risks were 
not probable. 
 
Figure 32 – OPC results for Question #37.5 
In your opinion, would private distillation increase the health risks for consumers if the exemption 
for private production were extended to intermediate products and ethyl alcohol? 
 
Source: OPC. 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ answers are not displayed. 
 
3.5.2.4  Other impacts 
 
Under the current regime, limited enforcement resources are spent by customs 
authorities to monitor private distillation. Should private distillation be allowed, it is likely 
that some MS would introduce some light form of regulation (e.g. registration of distillers 
/ distillation equipment and notification of the quantities distilled), as it is already the 
case where private distillation is legal, such as in Austria and Romania. These light forms 
of regulation would require deployment of additional enforcement resources. 
 
Private distillers currently do not bear, in practice, any administrative burden. Indeed, 
the regime applicable to licensed distillers is so burdensome that hardly any private 
distiller complies with the applicable regulatory framework. As a consequence, the 
extension of the exemption for private production to intermediate products and ethyl 
alcohol would not cause any savings in administrative burdens. The only country in 
which private individuals bear an amount of administrative burdens when doing home 
distillation is Romania, and those burdens could be saved if private distillation became 
duty-free and the registration duties were scrapped. On the contrary, additional burdens 
could arise for private distillers if the exemption is extended, depending on the 
regulatory regime set up at national level for monitoring purposes.  
 
 
3.5.2.5  Stakeholders’ view 
 
Even though the exemption for private production of intermediate products and ethyl 
alcohol were introduced in the Directive, the occurrence of the effects described above 
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would depend on the choice of each MS. In MS which decided not to implement the 
exemption, no increase of private distillation is likely, and hence there would be no 
further impact. 
 
According to the targeted interviews carried out during the fieldwork, tax and customs 
authorities expressed a mild to severe disagreement with the option. The main reasons 
mentioned against this possibility include: (i) risks of adverse health impacts, because of 
methanol intoxication; (ii) higher risk of tax frauds as private distillation is so dispersed 
as to become difficult to police and regulate; and (iii) the possibly negative symbolic 
effects linked to the liberalisation of distillation activities, which could result in an 
increase of spirit consumption. These findings are in line with those reported in the 
Ramboll Evaluation, where 17 MS opposed to the exemption, whilst only 8 were in 
favour.450  
 
Based on the information described above, the likelihood of the implementation of the 
exception for the private production of intermediate products and ethyl alcohol is low, 
and the take up of this provision would be limited to a minority of MS. Only in these MS 
impacts such as those estimated in this Section would arise. Given the minimal cross-
border spill overs expected, the decision of each MS would largely remain independent 
from the choice of the other and could reflect its own national preferences, traditions and 
culture. 
 
In the OPC, stakeholders were asked to provide their view on the extension of the 
exemption for private production to intermediate products and ethyl alcohol. As shown in 
Figure 33 below, considering all respondents, a plurality was against the extension to 
intermediate products (38%) and a majority to ethyl alcohol (54%). The number of 
respondents in favour of the extension was, for both categories, slightly less than one 
third of the total. Views remained quite split: private individuals were largely in favour of 
extending the exemption to both products, while manufacturers of ethyl alcohol and 
intermediate products were largely against it.  
 
Figure 33 – Public views on a possible extension of the exemption for private production 
to intermediate products and ethyl alcohol 
Intermediate Products Ethyl alcohol 
  
Source: OPC.  
                                                          
450 See Ramboll Evaluation, p. 74. 
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3.6 Measurement of Plato degree for sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
3.6.1 Definition of policy options 
 
The policy problem linked to the different existing methods to measure the Plato degree 
of sweetened/flavoured beer, can be addressed either amending the Directive or through  
non-regulatory measures. In particular (see Table 81): 
 
 Option 1. The regulatory option consists of an amendment of Article 3(1) to 
clarify what constitutes a ‘finished product’ when it comes to sweetened/flavoured 
beer. More specifically, the following approaches are possible: 
 
o Under option 1.A, the term ‘finished product’ would refer to the base beer 
before adding any additive. This is the approach A described in Section 
2.6.1.4. 
o Under option 1.B, the term ‘finished product’ would refer to the end-
product that is released for consumption. Such option can be further 
subdivided into the two approaches B1 and B2, described in Section 
2.6.1.4, depending on whether the sugar/flavour added after fermentation 
would contribute (option 1.B.2) or not (option 1.B.1) to the Plato degree 
of the end-product. 
 
 Option 2. The non-regulatory option consists of providing guidance on the most 
appropriate approach to measure the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer 
via non-binding guidelines of the Commission. In fact, this option can be either 
alternative or complementary to option 1, in the sense that guidelines could also 
support the implementation of the revised regulatory provision, suggesting 
technical solutions, procedures and other best practices to national authorities.   
Also option 2 would allow for three main sub-options, corresponding to the three 
main approaches to Plato degree measurement reviewed in this Study: 
 
o option 2.A - approach A (the ‘base beer’ approach); 
o option 2.B.1 - approach B1 (the ‘real extract’ approach); 
o option 2.B.2 - approach B2 (the ‘present extract’ approach). 
 
Table 81 – Structure of the proposed policy options on the measurement of Plato degree 
for sweetened / flavoured beer 
Options 
Type of option Selected measurement approach 
Regulatory 
Non-
regulatory 
A B1 B2 
Option 1.A X  X   
Option 1.B.1 X   X  
Option 1.B.2 X    X 
Option 2.A  X X   
Option 2.B.1  X  X  
Option 2.B.2  X   X 
 
All options sub-options revolve around the selection of one of the three existing 
approaches and, therefore, they would have the same ‘type’ (but not ‘magnitude’) of 
impact. As summarised in Table 82 all ‘change’ options would affect excise duty payable 
on sweetened/flavoured beer and the ensuing tax revenues in MS that currently follow a 
different approach. A change in the excise duty applied might have an impact on the 
retail price of end-products, in turn, on the demand, with possible consequences on per 
public health targets as well as on competition (as seen certain approaches may result in 
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sweetened/flavoured beer taxed more heavily than standard beer with the same alcohol 
content).451  
 
Different measurement approaches entail different procedures for checking the Plato 
degree of sweetened/flavoured beer released for consumption, with different 
enforcement costs for the responsible authorities. Finally, the adoption of a harmonised 
approach at the EU level may increase legal certainty and reduce the costs and burdens 
of disputes between tax authorities and producers. 
 
Table 82 – Overview of impact areas of the proposed policy options on the measurement 
of Plato degree for sweetened / flavoured beer 
Options Impact areas Nature of Impact Expected 
Selection and 
clarification of the most 
appropriate approach to 
measure the Plato 
degree of sweetened / 
flavoured beer  
(all options and sub-
options) 
 Tax revenues  
(for MS applying the Plato 
method) 
 Change in excise duty applied to 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
 Market effects 
(for brewers of 
sweetened/flavoured beer) 
 Change in (price and) consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
 Public health  
 In the event of substitution effects, resulting  
in a variation of per capita consumption 
(especially among young persons)  
 Enforcement costs 
(for MS applying the Plato 
method) 
 Any change between approaches requires 
new procedures for checking the Plato 
degree of sweetened/flavoured beer placed 
on the market 
 Unfair competition 
(for brewers of 
sweetened/flavoured beer) 
 Some measurement approaches may result 
in disparities of Plato degree between 
standard and sweetened/flavoured beer with 
the same alcohol content. 
 Litigation costs 
 Selecting the measurement approach at the 
EU level would increase legal certainty and 
reduce conflicts between tax authorities and 
brewers 
 
The impact analysis developed in the next Section is primarily centred on the effects of 
selecting one of the three methods, somehow irrespective of the regulatory or non-
regulatory option chose (i.e. amending Article 3(1) or providing non-binding guidance). 
Nonetheless, regulatory and non-regulatory options may be different when it comes to 
the implementation, so a specific Section on the likely ‘effectiveness’ of the two options 
have been added.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth remarking that the awaited judgement of the CJEU on the Polish 
case (Box 21) may contribute to address – and eventually clarify - the policy problems. 
In this respect, the impact analysis is not intended to support any of the existing 
interpretations, but aims at providing objective, factual evidence on the possible effects 
that would materialise under the different scenarios. 
 
 
3.6.2 Impact analysis 
 
3.6.2.1 Methodology 
 
In our analysis we focus on the effects in the six sample MS considered, which, as seen, 
represent the large majority of the sweetened/flavoured beer market in the EU countries 
that have adopted the ‘Plato’ method. Depending on which measurement approach is 
selected, a different number of MS would have to switch from their current approach to 
the selected one. More specifically, if approach B2 were selected, only 1-2 MS would 
                                                          
451 This chain of effects holds on the assumption that any change in excise duty is (either fully or partially) 
passed on to consumers.  
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have to adapt: Romania (currently using approach A), and Italy, that is however 
reportedly ‘in transition’. If approach B1 were selected, all sample MS would have to 
move away from their current approach (including Italy, that according to some 
stakeholders is potentially already oriented to it). If approach A were selected, only 
Romania may maintain its current approach, whereas all others would need to adapt. 
 
The impact analysis was carried out as follows. For each of the six MS we estimated the 
effect of changing the measurement approach on the applicable excise duty, and the 
consequences on price, consumption, and tax revenues.  
 
 First, the change in excise duty per hectolitre was calculated as the relevant 
excise duty rate multiplied by the difference in Plato degree from the baseline 
approach to the approach analysed. As shown previously (see Table 49), the 
change in excise duty differs for radler and other flavoured beer, based on the 
typical Plato degree per product. This reflects the fact that for radler the 
difference in Plato degree is greatest for different measurement approaches.  
 Second, bearing in mind that VAT is computed also on excise duty, the change in 
price was estimated as the sum of the change in excise duty and the ensuing 
changes in VAT.  
 Then, the change in consumption volume was computed using the percentage 
price change and a price elasticity of demand (PED) of -0.54. This is the average 
(between off- and on-trade) PED of a 2014 British HMRC study.452 It should be 
noted that the calculations were performed under the assumption that changes in 
the payable excise duty are 100% passed on to the consumer. In reality, this 
might not always be the case. On the one hand, large distribution for instance is 
often reluctant to increase beer prices following a rise in excise duty.453 On the 
other hand, in the on-trade market an excise duty increase may lead to retail 
prices rising by greater than the duty increase itself.454  
 Finally, based on the new consumption volume after the price change, the overall 
tax revenues (including VAT on excise duty) stemming from sweetened/flavoured 
beer were estimated. 
 
Before analysing the estimated impacts, it is worth reiterating that the analysis applies 
to beer where sugar/flavour is added after fermentation and not before it (in which case 
the Plato degree is not affected by the measurement approach). Since the IWSR market 
data used for the analysis do not distinguish between these two types of product we 
have carried out the impact assessment on the entire market of sweetened/ flavoured 
beer, but results should be considered as the upper bound estimates. 
 
 
3.6.2.2  Impacts on tax revenues and market effects 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
In the case of Austria the price of sweetened/flavoured beer would decrease by about 
6% and consumption (volume) would increase by about 3% when switching from 
approach B2 (baseline and no change scenario) to approach A or B1. Tax revenues 
(excise duty and VAT on excise duty) generated by sweetened/flavoured beer would 
decrease considerably by about 43%. The changes are significant, as the Austrian 
sweetened/flavoured beer market consists entirely of radler. Nonetheless, when 
compared with total beer consumption and total tax revenue (excise duty and VAT on 
excise duty) on beer, the magnitude of changes becomes minor: consumption of beer 
                                                          
452 For further details, see Sousa (2014). 
453 Ally et al. (2014). 
454 For further details, see BBPA (2010). 
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would increase by only 0.2%, tax revenues would decrease by about 2%, i.e. less than 
EUR 5 million out of more than EUR 226 million. 
 
Table 83 – Expected impacts of the proposed policy options on the measurement of Plato 
degree for sweetened/favoured beer in Austria  
Option  1.A / 2.A  1.B.1 / 2.B.1 
1.B.2 / 2.B.2 (no 
change) 
Approach A B1 B2 (Baseline) 
Average price of radler 
(EUR/hl)*  
 172   172   183  
 % Change in price  -5.9% -5.8% no change 
Overall consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer (hl) 
 492,260   491,826   476,952  
 % Change over 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
3.2% 3.1% no change 
 % Change over total beer 0.2% 0.2% no change 
Tax revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR)**   
 6,475,019   6,620,677   11,451,017  
 % Change over revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
-43.5% -42.2% no change 
 % Change over revenues from total 
beer 
-2.2% -2.1% no change 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015; *Based on IWSR the Austrian sweetened/flavoured beer market consists entirely 
of radler; ** Excise duty and VAT on excise duty. 
 
 BELGIUM 
 
In Belgium, the changes are weaker, given that the market is dominated by 
sweetened/flavoured beer other than radler. Still, tax revenues (including VAT on excise 
duty) fall by roughly 22-23% when changing from approach B2 (baseline and no change 
scenario) to approach A or B1. Price would only decrease by about 4% for radler and 
1.5% for other sweetened/flavoured beer; overall consumption of sweetened/flavoured 
beer would increase by some 1%. Again, such impacts appear to be marginal when 
compared to the overall beer consumption (+0.1%) and total tax revenues (including 
VAT on excise duty) on beer (-1.5%, i.e. EUR 3.5 million out of EUR 235 million). 
 
Table 84 – Expected impacts of the proposed policy options on the measurement of Plato 
degree for sweetened/favoured beer in Belgium  
Option 1.A / 2.A 1.B.1 / 2.B.1 
1.B.2 / 2.B.2  
(no change) 
Approach A B1 B2 (Baseline) 
Average price of radler (EUR/hl)   256   257   266  
 % Change in price  -3.8% -3.7% no change 
Average price of other 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR/hl)  
 406   405   411  
 % Change in price  -1.4% -1.6% no change 
Overall consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer (hl) 
 530,552   530,885   524,948  
 % Change over 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
1.1% 1.1% no change 
 % Change over total beer 0.1% 0.1% no change 
Tax revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR)* 
 12,341,679   12.075,829   15,795,902  
 % Change over revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
-21.9% -23.6% no change 
 % Change over revenues from total 
beer 
-1.5% -1.6% no change 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015; * Excise duty and VAT on excise duty. 
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 GERMANY 
 
Germany has a low excise duty rate on beer (EUR 0.79/hl/° Plato in 2017). The price 
changes from approach B2 (baseline and no change scenario) to A/B1 are thus rather 
low (-2.2% for radler and about -1% for other sweetened/flavoured beer), and so are 
the resulting changes in overall consumption volume of sweetened/flavoured beer. Tax 
revenues (including VAT on excise duty) generated by sweetened/flavoured beer would 
change by roughly one third compared to the baseline approach. Still, the loss in tax 
revenue (about EUR 7 million) does not even amount to 1% of the total tax revenue 
from consumption of beer in Germany (more than EUR 805 million). 
 
Table 85 – Expected impacts of the proposed policy options on the measurement of Plato 
degree for sweetened/favoured beer in Germany  
Option  1.A / 2.A  1.B.1 / 2.B.1 
1.B.2 / 2.B.2 (no 
change) 
Approach A B1 B2 (Baseline) 
Average price of radler (EUR/hl)   184   184   189  
 % Change in price  -2.2% -2.2% no change 
Average price of other 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR/hl)  
 229   229   231  
 % Change in price  -1.0% -1.2% no change 
Overall consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer (hl) 
 1,914,662   1,914,542   1,894,811  
 % Change over 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
1.0% 1.0% no change 
 % Change over total beer 0.0% 0.0% no change 
Tax revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR)* 
 12,779,642   12,794,961   19,806,253  
 % Change over revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
-35.5% -35.4% no change 
 % Change over revenues from total 
beer 
-0.9% -0.9% no change 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015; * Excise duty and VAT on excise duty. 
 
 ITALY 
 
Ad discussed above, Italy is undergoing a regulatory review process that embraces also 
the method for the measurement of Plato degree for excise duty purposes. According to 
some stakeholders, this may eventually result in a transition from approach B2 to B1, 
but since the competent authority has not yet adopted the secondary implementing 
regulation the outcome of the process is still uncertain (very likely a decision will be 
taken after the issuance of the CJEU judgement on the Polish case). Whereas taxes are 
currently computed based on approach B2 in our simulation we have assumed that the 
country has completed its transition to approach B1. It is important to highlight that this 
is a hypothetical assumption made for analytical purposes. Under this assumption,  
approach B1 is the baseline (and ‘no change’ scenario) while approach A and B2 are the 
‘change scenarios’.  
 
Due to the country’s relatively high excise duty rate (3.04 per hl/Plato degree) and the 
narrow market for sweetened/flavoured beer, which is dominated by radler, changing 
the measurement approach results in rather high percentage variations in tax revenues 
(excise duty and VAT on excise duty) generated by sweetened/flavoured beer when 
moving back from approach B1 to B2 (+72%). Changes from approach B1 to A are 
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rather minor.455 Interestingly, in light of the very limited size of the Italian market for 
sweetened/flavoured beer, any change in consumption and tax revenues is marginal 
compared to the entire market for beer. 
 
Table 86 – Expected impacts of the proposed policy options on the measurement of Plato 
degree for sweetened/favoured beer in Italy  
Option  1.A / 2.A 
 1.B.1 / 2.B.1 (no 
change) 
1.B.2 / 2.B.2 
Approach A 
B1 (hypothetical 
dynamic baseline 
scenario) 
B2 (Current 
situation)  
Average price of radler 
(EUR/hl)*  
 238   238   254  
 % Change in price  -0.2% no change 6.8% 
Overall consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer (hl) 
 217,481   217,246   209,213  
 % Change over 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
0.1% no change -3.7% 
 % Change over total beer 0.0% no change 0.0% 
Tax revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR)**   
 4,420,685   4,519,242   7,762,097  
 % Change over revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
-2.2% no change 71.8% 
 % Change over revenues from total 
beer 
0.0% no change 0.4% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015; *Based on IWSR the Italian sweetened/flavoured beer market consists entirely of 
radler;456 ** Excise duty and VAT on excise duty. 
 
 POLAND 
 
In Poland, where tax revenues are the highest among sampled countries due to the 
larger size of the market for sweetened/flavoured beer, the changes are modest in 
absolute terms, as the market is dominated by flavoured beer other than radler and the 
national excise duty rate is moderate (EUR 1.86/hl/° Plato in 2015). Tax revenues 
(excise duty and VAT on excise duty) generated by sweetened/flavoured beer would fall 
by more than EUR 15 million when changing from approach B2 (baseline and no change 
scenario) to A or B1, i.e. about -1.5% when compared to total tax revenues on beer 
(more than one billion EUR). Impacts on consumption are more limited (-2.6% over 
consumption of flavoured/sweetened beer; -0.2% over total consumption of beer). 
 
Table 87 – Expected impacts of the proposed policy options on the measurement of Plato 
degree for sweetened/favoured beer in Poland  
Option  1.A / 2.A  1.B.1 / 2.B.1 
1.B.2 / 2.B.2 (no 
change) 
Approach A B1 B2 (Baseline) 
Average price of radler (EUR/hl)   99   100   110  
 % Change in price  -9.4% -9.2% no change 
Average price of other 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
 198   197   203  
                                                          
455 As discussed previously, as the Italian authorities are still in the process of setting secondary rules to 
complete the transition from approach B2, it is still also possible a transition from B2 to A rather than to B1. In 
this respect, the impact analysis in Table 86 confirms that approaches A and B1 lead to very similar results in 
Italy. Therefore, the findings of the impact analysis performed in this Study remain largely valid, irrespective of 
whether Italy will eventually opt for approach A or B1. 
456 In Italy there is a small, but declining market for flavoured beer, which appears not to be recorded by IWSR 
data. Nonetheless, the Italian market for flavoured beer other than radler is dominated by beer with addition of 
flavour in the wort produced by craft brewers; the Plato degree of such beer is not affected by different 
measurement approaches. Hence, IWSR data allows capturing the entire market relevant to the policy 
problem.  
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Option  1.A / 2.A  1.B.1 / 2.B.1 
1.B.2 / 2.B.2 (no 
change) 
Approach A B1 B2 (Baseline) 
(EUR/hl)  
 % Change in price  -2.9% -3.3% no change 
Overall consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer (hl) 
 2,445,951   2,448,589   2,384,762  
 % Change over 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
2.6% 2.6% no change 
 % Change over total beer 0.2% 0.2% no change 
Tax revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR)* 
 56,537,824   55,445,881   72,404,261  
 % Change over revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
-21.9% -23.4% no change 
 % Change over revenues from total 
beer 
-1.5% -1.6% no change 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015; * Excise duty and VAT on excise duty. 
 
 ROMANIA 
 
Finally, Romania would see no change if approach A were selected. Switching to from 
approach A (baseline and no change scenario) to approach B1 would make almost no 
difference, whereas switching to approach B2 would result in a 2.3% decrease in 
consumption of sweetened/flavoured beer (price of radler would increase by 5%; price of 
other sweetened/flavoured beer by 1%) and a 56% increase in tax revenues (including 
VAT on excise duty) generated by this type of beer. However, this corresponds to only -
0.1% in total beer consumption and +0.8% in total tax revenue from excise duty on 
beer in Romania (i.e. less than EUR 2 million out of more than EUR 195 million). 
 
Table 88 – Expected impacts of the proposed policy options on the measurement of Plato 
degree for sweetened/favoured beer in Romania  
Option 
 1.A / 2.A  
(no change) 
 1.B.1 / 2.B.1 1.B.2 / 2.B.2  
Approach A (Baseline) B1 B2  
Average price of radler (EUR/hl)   92   93   97  
 % Change in price  no change 0.1% 5.1% 
Average price of other 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR/hl)  
 222   221   225  
 % Change in price  no change -0.2% 1.2% 
Overall consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer (hl) 
 369,663   369,509   361,127  
 % Change over 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
no change 0.0% -2.3% 
 % Change over total beer no change 0.0% -0.1% 
Tax revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR)* 
 2,692,520   2,700,865   4,190,476  
 % Change over revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
no change 0.3% 55.6% 
 % Change over revenues from total 
beer 
no change 0.0% 0.8% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015; * Excise duty and VAT on excise duty. 
 
 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS 
 
Some general observations can be made. Whereas approach A and approach B1 are very 
similar, approach B2 leads to fairly different results. Table 89 summarises the impacts of 
switching from the baseline approach (A for Romania, B1 for Italy (hypothetical), B2 for 
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Austria, Belgium, Germany and Poland) to a different approach.  
 
 It is apparent that selecting approach A or B1 would result in an overall 
reduction in tax revenues (excise duty and VAT on excise duty) from 
sweetened/flavoured beer of more than EUR 30 million (about -25%), compared 
to the baseline situation. Consumption, on the other hand, might increase by 
about 100,000 hl (in the six countries combined), i.e. less than 2% of the total 
consumption of sweetened/flavoured beer. Limited changes in consumption 
reflect limited changes in prices (see country-level analysis above).  
 Selecting approach B2 would result in minor changes as opposed to the baseline 
approach since this is the approach currently in force in most of MS considered. 
In particular, slightly lower consumption and considerably higher tax revenues 
can be expected. 
 
Expressing the changes as a percentage of the total beer market, the impacts 
become rather negligible: between +0.2% (moving to approach B2) to -1% 
(selecting approach A or B1) for tax revenues (including VAT on excise duty), and 
between almost nil (selecting approach B2) to +0.1% (selecting approach A or B1) 
for consumption volume. 
  
Table 89 – Aggregated impacts of the proposed policy options on the measurement of 
Plato degree for sweetened/favoured beer in the sample MS 
Option  1.A / 2.A   1.B.1 / 2.B.1 1.B.2 / 2.B.2  No change* 
Approach A B1 B2 Baseline* 
Overall consumption of 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(hl) 
5,970,569 5,972,599 5,851,811 5,868,381 
 % Change over 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
1.7% 1.8% -0.3% no change 
 % Change over total beer 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% no change 
Tax revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
(EUR)** 
95,247,370 94,157,454 131,410,006 126,669,196 
 % Change over revenues from 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
-24.8% -25.7% 3.7% no change 
 % Change over revenues from 
total beer 
-1.0% -1.0% 0.1% no change 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IWSR and EDT series. 
Note: Baseline year: 2015; *Approach A for Romania, approach B1 for Italy (hypothetical), approach B2 for 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Poland; ** Excise duty and VAT on excise duty. 
 
 
3.6.2.3  Other impacts 
 
Against this background, public health impacts potentially stemming from the 
harmonised adoption of either of the three approaches considered appear to be limited. 
In fact, the annual average per capita consumption of sweetened/flavoured beer in the 
six surveyed MS would range from 2.67 litres per annum (selecting approach B2) to 2.73 
litres per annum (selecting approach A or B1).457 The difference is clearly negligible 
when compared to average per capita consumption of ‘standard’ beer, which in sample 
MS exceeds 78 litres per annum. 
 
When it comes to enforcement, any change in current approaches would require some 
MS to adapt their monitoring and control procedures. As mentioned, approach B2 is the 
most used, so the overall number of countries that would have to modify their systems 
would be limited. Moreover, approach B2 allows to perform checks directly on the end-
products, with no need for on-site inspections and/or measurement during the 
                                                          
457 Estimate based on Eurostat date for total population above 15 years.  
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
268 
 
production process, and is therefore consider more cost-effective than the other 
approaches. For these reasons, the selection of approach B2 at EU-level would have little 
or neutral effect on the enforcement costs for MS authorities.  
Conversely, the customs authorities interviewed explained that, as things now stand, it 
is not possible to compute the parameters required to apply approach A or B1 by 
analysing the bottled ‘end-product’, since the current analytical methods do not allow to 
distinguish between beer and lemonade after mixing, nor do they allow separating the 
real extract from the present extract. Therefore, the enforcement of approaches A and 
B1 would require to perform checks at the production facilities, and these may generate 
new one-off costs to draft rules and install measurement equipment as well as recurring 
costs in the form of on-site inspections. An additional issue concerns 
sweetened/flavoured beer produced in another MS or third country, since the authority 
of the MS where the product is released for consumption could not directly conduct 
inspections and should rely on the information provided by the economic operators 
and/or, in certain circumstances, by the authority of the producing country. To prevent 
the risk of tax fraud, in case approach A or B1 is selected, it would be useful to put in 
place a coordinated mechanisms at EU-level for a streamlined and effective exchange of 
information.   
 
While approach A and B1 lead to similar value of the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer and somehow reflect its actual alcohol strength, approach B2 
leads to higher Plato degree, possibly greater than the Plato degree of a standard beer 
with an equivalent alcoholic strength. For instance, approach B2 results in almost double 
the Plato degree of a typical radler when compared to approach A or B1 (Table 48). In 
principle, approach B2 is therefore more prone to generate possible distortion of 
competition between standard and sweetened/flavoured beer. However, as the impact 
analysis showed, the actual changes in price level that can be expected from switching 
between different approaches are rather modest (especially for sweetened/flavoured 
beer other than radler), and of limited importance vis-à-vis other competitiveness 
factors. So there is overall a negligible risk of an excessive market distortion caused by 
the selection of either of the three approaches considered.  
 
Finally, the selection of a harmonised approach to measure the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer would increase legal certainty and eventually reduce the risk 
of disputes between tax authorities and brewers. As discussed in the next Section, the 
effectiveness in this area may vary if the regulatory or the non-binding guidelines option 
is chosen.    
 
 
3.6.2.4  Effectiveness 
 
As discussed above, policy option 1 and 2 have the same target (i.e. selecting a 
harmonised approach for the measurement of Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer) 
but are based on different measures: a regulatory amendment of Article 3(1) (option 1) 
or non-binding guidelines (option 2). The extent of the impacts expected clearly depend 
on the degree of adoption / compliance across MS. In the case of option 1 we can 
assume full compliance by all authorities, while the adoption of guidelines (option 2) 
would not be mandatory, so certain MS may not conform to the suggested measurement 
approach. This distinction is particularly important when it comes to impacts on legal 
certainty, since the persistence of disparities of interpretation across the EU may 
eventually encourage rather than decrease the risk of disputes between economic 
operators and tax authorities, especially in MS that would eventually not adopt the 
Commission’s guidance. 
 
As things now stand, in some MS included in the sample, all stakeholders (including beer 
producers) would only reluctantly switch away from approach B2. In other MS, brewers 
exerted some pressure to stop using approach B2, despite the latter is the preferred 
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approach by tax authorities; these countries may be more open for a change. MS 
currently adopting approach A or B1 are unlikely to change to approach B2 unless 
binding changes are made in the Directive.  
 
 
3.6.2.5  Public view on proposed policy options 
 
The level of agreement of OPC participants on the proposed policy options returns a 
blurred picture. A small majority of respondent (53%) believe it is necessary to amend 
Article 3(1) of the Directive and to clarify the term ‘finished product’ with regard to 
sweetened/flavoured beer; however, a significant 38% of them disagree with this option 
(Figure 34). The percentage of stakeholders against an amendment of Article 3(1) grows 
if only beer industry respondents are considered (56%, against only 37% in favour of a 
policy change). 
 
Figure 34 – Public views on clarifying the term ‘finished product’ with regard to 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
Source: OPC. 
 
There is instead greater consensus on the need to provide non-binding guidance on this 
issue: 61% of respondents (and 70% of beer industry stakeholders) are in favour of 
option 2 (Figure 35). In their qualitative contribution to the OPC, several industry players 
mentioned the need to adopt either approach A or B1, as approach B2 in their view is 
‘technically incorrect’. Interestingly, some respondents have emphasised that the most 
effective solution would consist in applying the ABV method (instead of the Plato degree 
method) to sweetened/flavoured beer. A few respondents seem particularly concerned of 
the uncertainty and significant room for tax fraud that would be generated by selecting 
approach A or B1. 
 
Figure 35 – Public views on providing guidance on methods for measuring the Plato 
degree of sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
Source: OPC.  
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4 COMPARISON OF OPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1 Classification of alcoholic beverages 
 
4.1.1 Comparison of policy options 
 
4.1.1.1  Uncertain scope of the OFB category   
 
The respective effects of the policy options analysed are summarised in the comparative 
Table 90 below. In particular, four scenarios have been considered: 
 
O. No change over the current situation, i.e. the tax treatment of ‘borderline’ 
products will continue being determined by the national interpretation of the 
subjective criteria laid down in CNEN notes 2206 00, and the legal and 
administrative rules and practices that individual MS have developed in this 
respect. This scenario includes the expected evolution in the near future 
(dynamic baseline). 
 
I. The introduction in the text of the Directive of the above CJEU criteria so as to 
allow the tax categorisation of certain ‘borderline’ products as ‘ethyl alcohol’, 
independently from CN classification and possible BTIs. This option implies the 
development of clear and agreed guidelines for the effective operationalisation 
of these criteria. 
 
II. The differentiation of the OFB tax category, currently laid down in Article 12, 
into two sub-categories with a different tax treatment. This option may be 
implemented in two different ways, with similar effects, i.e. by defining cider, 
perry and other specific beverages separately from other generic OFB – which 
would likely require a harmonised sectoral legislation, or by defining pre-
mixes / RTDs etc. separately from other non-mixed OFB. 
 
III. No revision of the Directive, but possible clarification of CN / CNEN and/or the 
adoption of classification guidelines at customs level, plus other possible 
measures outside the scope of the current impact assessment process, like 
the adoption of a sectoral regulation on cider and other specific OFB.    
 
The scenarios are compared with respect to the main impact areas identified and 
analysed in details in the previous Sections. For every impact area, a summary judgment 
is provided including (i) a rating of the positive or negative effect expected; and (ii) the 
main motivations underlying the rating. Needless to say, impact areas may have a 
different importance for the policy-making process so the ratings provided should not be 
aggregated straightforwardly. 
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Table 90 – Comparison of options: review of the scope of OFB category 
Impact area  0) No Change  
I) Clarify the excise duty structure 
for ‘borderline’ products 
II) Introducing a differentiation in 
the OFB tax category 
III) Other approaches not requiring 
a revision of the Directive 
Legal 
certainty 
0 
‘Difficult’ cases are 
generally declining, 
especially thanks to the 
adoption of clearer 
classification rules at MS 
level.  
Disparities across MS 
may persist.   
+1 
Improved coherence in the tax 
treatment of products within each 
country, but not necessarily 
across MS. 
Risk of inconsistencies with 
HS/CN coding and trade disputes. 
0 
Useful to remove/reduce MS-level 
sub-categorisations.  
Limited effect on cross-country 
disparities. 
Risk of incentivising new 
‘borderline’ products.   
+1/
+2 
Clear CN / CNEN and robust 
guidelines may solve most of 
inconsistencies at the core of the 
problem.  
A harmonised definition of 
certain OFB like cider etc. would 
be more effectively adopted in 
sectoral legislation.  
Effectiveness mitigated by the 
non-binding nature of measures. 
Competition 
and market 
effects 
0 
Other factors than taxes 
influence market and 
competition more 
pervasively. 
Very limited cases of 
competition distortion 
reported. No change 
expected. 
0 / 
+1 
Re-classification would lead to a 
significant reduction in sales of 
certain ‘borderline’ products 
especially in the category of 
‘borderline’ IP, redressing some 
apparent malfunctioning. 
However, several non-target CN 
2206 products would be 
unintendedly affected.   
0 /  
-1 
Market impact depends on the tax 
rate applied to the new category: 
an IP-like treatment would lead to 
a collapse of low strength mixed 
drinks, ‘borderline’ cider as well 
as other non-target products. 
Drawing a demarcation line 
between ‘traditional’ cider and 
‘mass-market’ products is 
sensitive and may easily result in 
competition issues.     
0 / 
+1 
CN / CNEN review and guidelines 
may have similar benefits and 
drawbacks as (I). 
Sectoral legislation for cider may 
reduce the risk of competition 
issues.   
Tax 
revenues  
+1 
Tax revenues have kept 
increasing and the 
magnitude of the issue 
potentially caused by 
borderline products is 
modest and declining.  
0  
The net effect on tax revenues is 
moderately negative due to the 
estimated elasticity of demand. 
No losses are actually expected 
due to substitution with other 
products that would likely occur.    
-1 
Risk of losses if the tax rate 
applied is high (a ‘per ABV’ 
structure would have more 
balanced impacts).  
As for option (I) substitution 
would mitigate losses. 
0  Likely same impact as option (I). 
Administra-
tive burden 
 
+1 
Limited in absolute terms 
and declining, thanks to 
the adoption of MS level 
approaches. 
-1 / 
+1 
Negative in the short term due to 
one-off initial costs. 
Positive in the long term due to 
reduction of the burden to deal 
with complex cases. 
-1 
Negative in the short term (as 
option I), with extra costs 
envisaged for updating the 
system.  
Not so effective in reducing the 
burden from complex cases. 
+1 
Like option (I), but with reduced 
initial costs, since no action at 
the level of the excise duty 
system is required. 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major 
negative effect expected. 
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4.1.1.2  Unclear application of the notion ‘entirely fermented origin’  
 
The comparison in this area is between the no change scenario (0) and one possible 
option (IV) for revision of the Directive (see Table 91 below), namely:  
 
O. The ‘no change’ scenario entails that MS continue to adopt at domestic level 
legal and administrative provisions to ensure a certain margin of tolerance for 
the addition of alcohol as a flavour carrier (AFC) or other functional purposes 
in manufacturing beverages that, according to the Directive, should be 
‘entirely of fermented origin’. 
    
IV. The policy option analysed consists of adopting a harmonised treatment of 
products containing AFC in the Directive, by either establishing a fixed 
threshold and/or allowing only the addition of the strictly necessary amount of 
AFC (both approaches can be currently found among MS). 
   
The scenarios are compared with respect to the three impact areas identified and 
analysed in details in the previous Sections. For every impact area, a summary judgment 
is provided including (i) a rating of the positive or negative effect expected; and (ii) the 
main motivations underlying the rating. Needless to say, impact areas may have a 
different importance for the policy-making process so the ratings provided should not be 
aggregated straightforwardly.   
 
 Table 91 – Comparison of options: clarify the treatment of AFC in products of ‘entirely 
fermented origin’ 
Impact area  0) No Change  
IV) Clarify the treatment of AFC-containing 
products 
Legal certainty -1 
More MS will likely adopt 
domestic measures for AFC 
in the absence of a 
harmonised one, with 
increasing cross-country 
disparities. 
The ambiguity with the legal 
text of the Directive would 
persist.  
0 / 
+1 
Introducing a margin of tolerance for AFC in 
the Directive would reduce the legal 
ambiguity and disparities across MS. 
The adoption of a subjective approach 
(strictly necessary dose) may generate new 
areas of uncertainties.  
Conversely, a fixed threshold may not be 
always coherent with the principle of the 
‘strictly necessary dose’.  
A combination of the two approaches seems 
the most effective.  
Market effects 
0 / 
-1  
It is possible (not 
demonstrated) that the 
ambiguity of the text 
constrains market 
development in certain MS.  
0 / 
+1 
More clarity and predictability may support 
market growth. 
In absolute terms, the volume of products at 
stake is very modest, so limited change in 
the overall market would be perceived.  
Tax revenues 0 
No relevant change 
expected. 
0/ 
-1 
No major changes expected. 
The adoption of a fixed threshold - higher 
than the strictly necessary dose - may 
translate in an excessive amount of alcohol 
(AFC) that is not taxed as ‘ethyl alcohol’. 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
 
4.1.1.3  Indefinite EPC for wine and OFB 
 
The issue at stake does not call for a revision of the Directive but of other legal and 
administrative provisions underlying it (e.g. Regulation 684/2009, as well as the EMCS 
rules and procedures). Under certain circumstances, it may connect also to the policy 
Option (II) discussed in Section 4.1.1.1 above. The two scenarios described in Table 92 
below, consist of:  
 
O. Maintaining the same EPCs for wine and OFB, i.e. W200 for still products and 
W300 for sparkling products. 
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V. Introducing distinct EPC for OFB (sparkling and still). In the event of the 
establishment of a new tax category for certain OFB (Option II above), this 
new category may adopt these new codes, while the remainder may 
eventually remain under W200 / W300 since the tax treatment will continue 
to be similar. But for monitoring and control purposes it would be ideal to 
have a higher level of disaggregation. 
   
The scenarios are compared with respect to the two main impact areas identified and 
analysed in the previous Sections. For every impact area, a summary judgment is 
provided including (i) a rating of the positive or negative effect expected; and (ii) the 
main motivations underlying the rating. Needless to say, impact areas may have a 
different importance for the policy-making process so the ratings provided should not be 
aggregated straightforwardly.   
 
Table 92 – Comparison of options: differentiate Excise Product Codes 
Impact area and 
target groups 
0) No Change  V) Creating separate EPC for OFB 
Administrative 
burden  
0 Not relevant. -1 
Legal and technical revisions required, 
both for economic operators and 
competent authorities. 
If the required change are limited to the 
OFB operators directly concerned the 
level of administrative burden would 
remain modest. 
Tax enforcement 
and revenues 
-1 
In the few countries having 
different levels of rates for wine 
and OFB, the risk of 
‘misclassifications’ may translate 
into incorrect excise duty levied 
and potential loss.  
The issue would be magnified by 
a possible adoption of a separate 
tax category for certain OFB.  
+1 
The risk of ‘misclassifications’ and 
ensuing tax losses would be bridged.  
Furthermore, there would be more 
clarity in the tax treatment as Article 8 
or Article 12 of certain aromatised wine 
products, useful for market monitoring 
purposes.   
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
 
4.1.2 Summary of findings and conclusions 
 
 The Directive defines the categories of alcoholic products subject to harmonised 
excise duty in accordance with their customs classification, i.e. the CN codes. The 
correspondence between the fiscal categories and the CN codes is however not 
straightforward, and certain novel products may take advantage in certain 
circumstances of an unduly favourable tax treatment. It has been observed that 
classification uncertainties may lead to disparities of treatment across MS and 
between similar products, due to different criteria used to determine the essential 
fermented character of certain beverages.  
 
 ‘Borderline’ products can be found primarily in the tax categories of ‘Other Fermented 
Beverages’ (OFB) – especially low-strength mixed drinks and certain types of cider – 
and among ‘Intermediate Products’ (IP) – i.e. products with a fermented base that 
are in many respect equivalent to certain spirits-based beverages. In absolute terms, 
the magnitude of the problem is modest and mostly stable:  ‘borderline’ 
products currently amount to an estimated 308 mn litres / year, i.e. less than 0.6% 
of the total market of alcoholic beverages in the EU. Nonetheless, for the tax 
categories concerned the issue is more substantial: nearly 17% of OFB and 24% of 
IP may consist of products to different extents exploiting an unduly advantageous tax 
treatment. Uncertainties with ‘borderline’ products may increase the classification 
burden for administrations and economic operators, which has been estimated 
around one million EUR per year.         
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 Three main policy options have been considered and assessed:  
 
(i) Revising the current definition of OFB and IP, and establishing common 
criteria (and implementation methods) to identify products that have lost their 
fermented character and should be therefore assimilated to ethyl alcohol (in line 
with the landmark CJEU rulings).  
(ii) Splitting the OFB category into two sub-categories, of which one would 
maintain the current treatment while the other – ideally comprising all ‘borderline’ 
products – would be defined and treated separately.  
(iii) The third option encompasses binding and non-binding measures that require no 
change of the Directive, and in this sense are mostly outside the remit of the 
regulatory revision process. These measures are not strictly alternative to the 
other two options above, but rather complementary and include: clarifying certain 
subjective criteria laid down in the CN / CNEN (drawn from the CJEU rulings); 
adopting non-binding classification guidelines; promoting a sectoral regulation for 
cider; and measures to enhance market monitoring and control.       
 
 All options may help reduce the classification uncertainties, but also present 
downsides. Option I would be effective in reducing the disparities of treatment of 
similar products in one country (also cutting the administrative burden), but not so 
effective against the risk that the same product is treated differently in different 
countries, and may cause troubles in external trade. Option II would enhance EU-
wide harmonisation, reducing the need for special national taxes for specific 
categories of products (like ‘alcopops’, ‘pre-mixes’ etc.), but would not effectively 
address inconsistencies generated at CN level, and would impose additional burden 
to economic operators and tax authorities. As regards Option III, the revision of CN / 
CNEN and the adoption of detailed classification guidelines may pre-empt the need to 
modify the Directive, while the adoption of sectoral regulation for cider would 
facilitate a coherent enforcement of classification rules. The major difficulty with 
these measures is that they fall outside the current regulatory process, so they 
require the involvement and consensus of several different services of the national 
and European administrations.      
 
 Under both regulatory options, the market impact for the target products would 
be significant, since their demand is quite sensitive to price. According to the 
results of the economic model used, a substantial decline of sales of ca. 80-200 mn 
litres/year can be predicted. This is a small amount if compared to the overall 
alcoholic beverage markets (less than 0.4% in the worst scenario), but substantial 
for the specific lines of products at stake. Regarding excise duty revenues, the 
decline in sales would not be entirely offset by the higher rates applied, so a net 
loss in tax revenue can be expected (down a maximum of EUR -247 mn) - very 
likely mitigated by consumer switching to other products.   
 
 Both policy options may unintendedly affect certain non-target products, 
especially aromatised wine-based drinks and cocktails that are currently classified as 
‘other fermented beverages’. The estimated market and fiscal impact for these 
products would be of the same scale of magnitude of target products (i.e. down 
approximately 78 mn litres / year), which may pose questions on the balance of such 
intervention. 
 
 Another issue at stake regards the addition of minimal amounts of alcohol as a 
flavour carrier (AFC) or for other functional purposes to certain flavoured wine and 
OFB. This practice seems in contrast with the ‘entirely fermented origin’ 
requirement laid down in the Directive’s definition for these products. The evidence 
from fieldwork revealed that various MS have already adopted legal and 
administrative provisions establishing a margin of tolerance for products containing 
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AFC, and would be in favour of harmonised rules in this regard. The Study 
findings show that the adoption of similar approaches at EU level would reduce the 
existing uncertainties and possibly improve the market functioning, while the impact 
on tax revenues would be minimal.      
 
 Finally, the lack of a separate EPC for ‘Other Fermented Beverages’ is not ideal 
for monitoring purposes and may fuel misclassifications and errors in excise duty 
payment, although the magnitude of concrete problems is minimal since most MS 
apply the same excise duty to wine and OFB. The introduction of a separate EPC for 
OFB would cause some initial (modest) administrative burden, which would be 
counterbalanced by improved clarity, reduced risks of errors and better market 
monitoring.    
     
 
  
Study on Council Directive 92/83/EEC on the structures of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages 
 
276 
 
4.2 Exemptions for denatured alcohol  
 
4.2.1 Comparison of policy options 
 
4.2.1.1 Incomplete / inconsistent mutual recognition of CDA 
 
Table 93 below summarises and compares the expected impacts of the different policy 
options considered to address the problems stemming from the incomplete / inconsistent 
mutual recognition of completely denatured alcohol (CDA). It should be noted that, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.1, the scope for problems arising from the manifestly unclear 
rules on mutual recognition stipulated in the Directive has been greatly reduced with the 
recent developments regarding the so-called Eurodenaturant;458 this is already factored 
into the baseline, i.e. the positive effects are deemed to have already occurred (and are 
therefore not reflected in positive scores in the table below). Complete harmonisation of 
the formulations across all MS has been discarded as unrealistic at the present time due 
to resistance from a few MS.459 Therefore, only the following two options have been 
considered: 
 
A. No change to the current situation. This scenario includes the expected 
evolution in the near future (dynamic baseline). 
 
B. Amend Article 27(1)(a) to clarify that each MS has to recognise CDA produced 
in another MS using the formulations notified by that particular MS, but not 
any other MS.  
 
Table 93 – Comparison of options to address mutual recognition of CDA 
Impact area and 
target groups 
A) No Change  B) Clarify mutual recognition 
Legal certainty 0 
No change, although practical 
implications of uncertainty are 
less significant following adoption 
of CIR 2017/1112. 
+1 
Avoidance of divergent interpretations 
involving MS that have notified 
formulations other than the 1-1-1 
Eurodenaturant, disputes and 
associated costs. 
Functioning of the 
Single Market and 
competition 
0 
Most problems resolved by 
adoption of CIR 2017/1112; no 
further change. 
0 / 
+1 
Reduction of any remaining trade 
barriers and distortions due to possible 
restrictive interpretation of mutual 
recognition by some MS. 
Operating costs and 
conduct of business 
0 
Most problems resolved by 
adoption of CIR 2017/1112; no 
further change. 
0 / 
+1 
No impact on most businesses, as this 
would only codify the approach already 
taken by most MS. 
Minor positive impacts for producers 
that sell CDA to MS with different 
national formulations, and users of CDA 
in these MS. 
Enforcement costs 
for national 
authorities 
 
0 No change. 0 No change. 
Fiscal fraud and 
associated revenue, 
health risk 
0 
Risk of fraud with CDA reduced 
significantly by adoption of CIR 
2017/1112; no further change. 
0 No change. 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Proliferation of national approaches to PDA 
 
                                                          
458 See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1112. 
459 In particular CZ, which insists on keeping the 3-3-1 Eurodenaturant as well as its national CDA formulation 
used for the production of biofuels.  
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In addition to the baseline, four policy options were considered to address the issues 
that stem from the national approaches to so-called partially denatured alcohol (PDA), in 
particular the many different procedures / formulations that are authorised in the 
different MS. One of these (full harmonisation of PDA formulations) was discarded 
because it would not be politically feasible at the present point in time. The options that 
were assessed were therefore: 
 
A. No change to the current situation. This scenario includes the expected 
evolution in the near future (dynamic baseline) 
 
B. Amend Article 27(1)(b) to achieve partial harmonisation, i.e. a harmonised list 
of PDA formulations that is applicable across the EU, and the ability for MS to 
authorise different formulations for specific uses where the fiscal risk is 
demonstrably low (further preparatory work may be required before the 
Directive is amended) 
 
C. Develop a database of PDA formulations authorised by the MS to increase 
transparency, building on the existing JRC database which is currently not up-
to-date and not accessible to industry (non-regulatory option) 
 
D. Support confidence / capacity building measures to enhance understanding 
and trust between the competent authorities of MS (non-regulatory option) 
 
It should be noted that these options are not mutually exclusive, and could be taken 
forward in parallel. 
 
The impacts of these options are summarised in Table 94 below. It should be reiterated 
that the compliance and administrative costs of the respective national supervisory 
regimes for denatured alcohol as such were not included in the analysis, since they are 
of purely national origin and relate only very indirectly to the Directive. It is also 
important to note that the scale of the benefits from the options is difficult to predict 
with confidence, as they are highly dependent on (1) the exact implementation of the 
options (e.g. the formulations included in a harmonised list), and (2) the specific 
situation and needs of individual economic operators depending on their size, sector, MS 
in which they are based, etc. 
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Table 94 – Comparison of options to address problems stemming from the proliferation of national approaches to PDA 
Impact area 
and target 
groups 
A) No Change  
B) Partial harmonisation of PDA 
formulations 
C) Database of national PDA 
formulations  
D) Confidence / capacity 
building measures 
Legal certainty 0 No change expected +1 
Transparency and certainty 
increased, but not fully 
guaranteed due to continued use 
of exceptions 
Potential for disputes over what 
constitutes ‘low fiscal risk’ 
0 / 
+1 
Transparency increased, 
but only as regards those 
MS that operate a positive 
list of PDA formulations 
0 No change 
Functioning of 
the Single 
Market and 
competition 
0 No change expected +1 
Reduced barriers to intra-EU 
trade, fairer competition between 
PDA producers and users in 
different MS  
0 / 
+1 
Slightly reduced barriers to 
intra-EU trade due to 
greater transparency  
0 / 
+1 
Highly uncertain – may 
lead to reduced barriers if 
MS adopt more consistent 
rules / practices as a 
result 
Operating costs 
and conduct of 
business 
0 No change expected +1 
Benefits for PDA producers and 
users that operate in more than 
one MS 
Possible positive or negative 
effects for users depending on 
whether the harmonised list is 
more or less exhaustive than the 
current national one 
0 / 
+1 
Minor cost savings for 
producers of PDA wishing 
to supply customers in 
other MS due to the 
increased transparency 
0 / 
+1 
Highly uncertain – may 
lead to reduced costs if 
MS adopt more consistent 
rules / practices 
Enforcement 
costs for 
national 
authorities 
0 No change expected 
-1 / 
+1 
Short-medium term: significant 
resources required for developing 
harmonised list 
Medium-long term: cost savings 
for authorities incl. laboratories 
-1 / 
0 
Minor costs for building and 
maintaining the database 
up to date 
Minor savings for 
authorities who can refer to 
the database  
-1 / 0 
EU funding via the Fiscalis 
programme 
MS human and financial 
resources 
May lead to savings if MS 
adopt more efficient rules 
/ practices 
Fiscal fraud and 
associated 
revenue, health 
risk 
0 / 
-1 
Adoption of 
Eurodenaturant for 
CDA may displace 
fraud towards PDA 
0 / 
+1 
Reduced risk of fraud involving 
products containing ‘weakly’ 
denatured alcohol (if ‘low fiscal 
risk’ criterion is implemented 
strictly) 
0 No effect 
0 / 
+1 
Highly uncertain – may 
lead to reduced risks if 
MS adopt stricter rules / 
practices 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major 
negative effect expected. 
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4.2.1.3  Divergent interpretation of the terms of Article 27(1)(b) 
 
In order to clarify the interpretation of Article 27(1)(b) and address the problems that 
are due to the current uncertainties, the following policy options were considered: 
 
A. No change to the current situation. This scenario includes the expected 
evolution in the near future (dynamic baseline) 
B. Amend Article 27(1)(b), to clarify the scope and main implications of the 
term ‘used for the manufacture of’, to include indirect uses such as the use 
of denatured alcohol in cleaning production lines 
C. Amend Article 27(1)(b) to include a reference to a ‘recognisable finished 
product’ and insert a note to the CN code to define that any product with an 
alcohol content above 90% ABV has to be classified as 2207  
 
It should be noted that these options are not mutually exclusive; both options B and C 
could be taken forward in parallel. 
 
Table 95 – Comparison of options to address divergent interpretations of Article 
27(1)(b) 
Impact area and 
target groups 
A) No Change  
B) Clarify ‘used for the 
manufacture of’ 
C) Clarify ‘recognisable 
finished product’  
Legal certainty 0 
No change 
expected 
+1 
Enhanced clarity 
regarding the legal 
meaning and uses of 
‘partially’ denatured 
alcohol 
Elimination of 
ambiguity and 
uncertainty regarding 
indirect uses of PDA 
+1 
Greater clarity as to 
when products 
containing PDA can be 
released for 
consumption 
Reduced risk of 
divergent / arbitrary 
interpretations by 
customs offices 
Functioning of the 
Single Market and 
competition 
0 
No change 
expected 
+1 
More equal treatment 
of PDA for indirect uses 
across the EU 
+1 
More equal treatment 
of goods containing 
PDA across the EU 
Operating costs 
and conduct of 
business 
0 
No change 
expected 
+1 
Cost savings for users 
of PDA in MS that 
currently do not 
exempt indirect uses 
Reduced risk of 
disputes and 
associated costs in 
future 
0/ 
+1 
Lower risk of delays / 
costs associated with 
disputes with customs 
Potential movement 
cost increases for a 
limited number of 
products 
Enforcement costs 
for national 
authorities 
0 
No change 
expected 
0 No change expected 0 No change expected 
Fiscal fraud and 
associated 
revenue, health 
risk 
0 
No change 
expected 
0 No change expected +1 
Reduced scope for 
intentional 
misclassification of PDA 
so as to avoid controls 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
 
4.2.2 Summary of findings and conclusions 
 
 Overall, the data collected and analysed as part of this Study suggests that the EU 
regulatory framework for exempting denatured alcohol from excise duty works 
relatively well. The majority of stakeholders consulted (including both national 
authorities and economic operators felt the current rules at EU level, although 
complex, were fit for purpose, and there is no need for any fundamental changes 
to the current framework. Nonetheless, problems can and do occur due to (1) 
an incomplete / inconsistent mutual recognition of CDA, (2) the proliferation of 
national regulatory approaches to PDA, and (3) divergent interpretations of 
certain terms related to PDA. It is evident (inter alia from the frequent discussions 
within the Committee on Excise Duty and the Indirect Tax Expert Group dating 
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back to 2008) that the provisions in Article 27 concerning denatured alcohol are 
not phrased in a completely clear and unambiguous way, which has given rise to 
uncertainties and disputes, especially when denatured alcohol is to be moved 
across borders between MS whose interpretation of the applicable rules do not 
coincide. Some of these uncertainties have non-negligible cost implications for 
producers and/or users of denatured alcohol, and can inhibit intra-EU trade in 
denatured alcohol. However, the evidence suggests that only a limited number of 
economic operators in specific circumstances have been affected. There are also 
concerns about fiscal fraud with denatured alcohol, which is estimated to result in 
lost tax revenues in the region of EUR 150-200 million per year across the 
EU (the bulk of which is in certain Central / Eastern European MS). 
 
 Regarding the mutual recognition of ‘completely’ denatured alcohol (CDA) 
produced in different MS, the unclear wording of the Directive has in the past led 
to a number of problems, primarily when economic operators wanted to produce 
or use CDA using a formulation notified by a MS other than their own. There have 
also been cases of fraud involving certain national CDA formulations. However, 
with the recent adoption of a common Eurodenaturant by a large majority of MS, 
the likelihood of these kinds of problems occurring in the future (and therefore the 
negative impacts) is greatly reduced. Nonetheless, since not all MS are able to 
agree on a single CDA formulation, a clarification of the wording of Article 
27(1)(a) would be beneficial to eliminate the remaining ambiguity, and 
thereby avoid potential future disputes. 
 
  The non-harmonised approach to ‘partially’ denatured alcohol (PDA) is 
welcomed by most stakeholders, as it allows MS to balance the needs of their 
national industry with the need to minimise the fraud risks in the way they deem 
most appropriate. However, the proliferation of national procedures and 
formulations can create uncertainties, risks and/or costs when more than one 
jurisdiction is involved – though larger firms are typically able to overcome these, 
while smaller ones tend to have few economic incentives to source denatured 
alcohol from abroad. There are also known cases of fraud involving products 
which have been manufactured with alcohol that has been denatured with a ‘weak’ 
formulation (e.g. because the smelling and/or tasting agents are relatively easy to 
remove / mask, and the absence of a chemical analytical marker makes it difficult 
for the competent authorities to detect the alcohol is illicit). 
 
 In theory, a complete harmonisation of PDA formulations for different 
sectors could further facilitate cross-border trade in PDA and alleviate the fraud-
related concerns. However, this would require MS to agree on compromise 
solutions to reconcile their (sometimes very restrictive, sometimes very flexible) 
views on the formulations they are prepared to authorise. Recent attempts to 
achieve such a compromise for certain sectors failed, and many MS seem not 
willing to accept full harmonisation, due to the potentially large cost implications 
for (certain sectors of) their national industries. 
 
 Partial harmonisation seems therefore more effective. It would involve 
agreement on a harmonised list of PDA formulations that is applicable across the 
EU, while allowing MS that wish to do so to authorise different formulations for 
specific uses where the fiscal risk is demonstrably low. This would enhance legal 
certainty and transparency to a significant extent, and thereby facilitate cross-
border operations as well as further restrict practices that might give rise to fraud, 
without requiring the minority of MS who currently authorise specific, tailored PDA 
formulations for individual users to categorically stop doing so. This option may 
require further preparatory work on the harmonised list and the definition of the 
concept of low fiscal risk, before these could be enshrined in the Directive itself. 
‘Softer’ policy options, such as a database of national formulations and/or EU-
funded measures to enhance confidence and trust between competent national 
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authorities could also be considered, although the benefits these would generate 
are likely to be more limited. 
 
 The text of Article 27(1)(b) should be amended so as to clarify the wording and 
address two issues that continue to cause uncertainties and discrepancies, 
namely: 
 
o Clarify that the term ‘used for the manufacture of’ includes indirect uses 
(such as cleaning manufacturing equipment and production lines). This 
would ensure a fairer treatment across the EU and reduce the costs for 
users in the minority of MS that currently do not consider that PDA used 
for these purposes qualifies for the exemption. 
o Clarify what can be considered a ‘finished product’ containing PDA that can 
be exempted from excise duty and released for consumption. This would 
enhance legal certainty and help reduce the risk of fraud by limiting the 
scope for the misclassification of PDA mixed with very small quantities of 
other substances (which should still be subject to controls under the duty 
suspension regime). 
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4.3 Reduced rates for small producers 
 
4.3.1 Comparison of policy options: small brewers 
 
The reduced rates for small brewers proved to work well, as demonstrated by the 
Commission Report and as acknowledged in the Council Conclusions. The baseline 
analysis singled out two areas where problems of a modest magnitude were identified: 
(i) the definition of the conditions for ‘independent brewer’, and (ii) the application of 
the discount to small brewers engaging in intra-EU trade. To address these problems, 
the Commission may decide to launch a revision of the Directive, providing for a 
clarification e.g. introducing provisions in an Annex to the Directive, or publishing a 
set of non-binding guidelines. 
 
On the basis of the impact analysis carried out in Section 3.3.2 above, the comparison 
via a multi-criteria analysis of the policy options at stake, including the no change 
scenario is provided in Table 96 below. For every impact area, a summary assessment 
follows, including (i) a rating of the positive or negative effect expected (between -2 
and +2); and (ii) the main motivations underlying the rating. Needless to say, impact 
areas may have a different importance for the policy-making process, so the ratings 
provided cannot be summed or aggregated.   
 
Table 96 – Comparison of options on reduced rates for small brewers  
Impact area 
and target 
groups 
A) No change B) Legislative revision C) Non-binding guidelines  
Legal certainty 
for economic 
operators and 
public 
authorities 
0/  -
1 
As the market for 
small breweries is 
evolving, business 
relationships may 
become more 
complex and 
cross-border flows 
are likely to 
increase, thus 
increasing the risk 
of legal uncertainty 
for economic 
operators. 
+1 
A binding revision 
would provide more 
legal certainty. 
However, as the small 
breweries segment is 
growing and changing 
fast, it risks becoming 
outdated or to be 
circumvented in the 
medium term.  
+1 
/+2 
Non-binding guidelines 
present the risk of MS 
not adapting their 
national frameworks. 
However, a certain 
degree of consensus 
already exists among 
MS authorities, and 
non-binding 
interventions have 
already proved effective 
in defining the 
conditions of application 
of reduced rates. 
Administrative 
burdens for 
economic 
operators 
+0 
The reduced rates 
for small brewers 
do not generate 
unnecessary 
administrative 
burdens and no 
evolution is 
expected. 
0/  -
1 
A small increase of 
administrative 
burdens could be 
expected in case a 
uniform certificate for 
small brewers is 
introduced. Impact is 
estimated at 7.5% of 
the current burdens. 
Negligible increase in 
case the ex-post 
approach based on 
customs-to-customs 
verification is adopted.  
0/ 
-1 
The choice of a non-
binding instrument 
would not entail any 
change in administrative 
burdens, which would 
be the same as under 
the legislative revision.  
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Impact area 
and target 
groups 
A) No change B) Legislative revision C) Non-binding guidelines  
Enforcement 
costs for public 
authorities 
0/  -
1 
Enforcement costs 
are considered to 
be minimal by tax 
and customs 
authorities. 
Increased 
complexity and 
cross-border flows 
may lead to small 
incremental costs.  
-1/  
-2 
Public authorities 
would incur additional 
costs under both 
approaches, and 
higher in case the ex-
ante uniform 
certificate is adopted. 
Enforcement costs 
would be concentrated 
in countries not 
having implemented 
the reduced rates for 
small operators. 
-1 
Under the non-
legislative option, the 
EU uniform certificate 
cannot be adopted, and 
hence enforcement 
efforts are lower. 
SME 
competitive-
ness 
0 / 
+1 
More players are 
likely to benefit 
from the reduced 
rates, given the 
growth of the 
small brewery 
market segment. 
+1 
More legal clarity and 
ease of doing business 
for cross-border 
operators would 
improve the 
competitiveness of 
SME, and facilitate the 
consolidation of 
medium players. 
However, given the 
limited scale of the 
problem, positive 
impacts are expected 
to be modest. 
+1 
Same impacts as 
described under the 
binding revision. 
However, their 
magnitude could be 
lower if MS decide not 
to conform to the non-
binding guidelines. 
Cross-border 
market effects 
for economic 
operators 
0 / -
1 
The expected 
increase in cross-
border flows may 
lead to a modest 
increase in the 
impacts of the 
minor disturbances 
to the Single 
Market identified.  
+1  
A more uniform 
approach to the 
application of reduced 
rates to small brewers 
would facilitate the 
ease of doing business 
for cross-border 
operators. However, 
given the limited scale 
of the problem, 
positive impacts are 
expected to be 
modest. 
+1 
Same impacts as 
described under the 
binding revision. 
However, their 
magnitude could be 
lower if MS decide not 
to conform to the non-
binding guidelines. 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
 
4.3.2 Comparison of policy options: small distilleries 
 
The uptake of the reduced rate scheme for small distilleries is low, given that only 7 
MS opted in for it. Moreover, the number of operators covered is limited, given the 
output threshold set in the Directive (10 hlpa). In particular, it is claimed that the 
threshold is too low for a small distillery to be commercially viable, and hence, that 
the reduction concerns only ancillary activities. It can then be concluded that the 
current threshold could explain, in part, the limited uptake of this provision. 
 
An impact analysis was carried out in Section 3.3.4 above to verify what the effects of 
a higher threshold would be. The comparison of the two variants proposed (100 hlpa 
and 10,000 hlpa thresholds) and the baseline scenario is done by means of a multi-
criteria analysis, summarised in Table 97 below. For every impact area, a summary 
assessment follows including (i) a rating of the positive or negative effect expected 
(between -2 and +2); and (ii) the main motivations underlying the rating. Needless to 
say, impact areas may have a different importance for the policy-making process, so 
the ratings provided cannot be summed or aggregated. 
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Table 97 – Comparison of options on reduced rates for small distilleries  
Impact area and 
target groups 
A) No change 
B) Raising the threshold to 
100 hlpa 
C) Raising the threshold to 
10,000 hlpa 
Tax revenues for 
public 
authorities 
0  
Foregone 
revenues are 
negligible and 
unlikely to 
change in the 
near future. 
0/ 
-1 
The number of operators 
and their market share 
would increase, but 
would remain low (e.g. 
0.4% of the current 
market for ethyl alcohol 
in Poland). As a 
consequence, foregone 
revenues would increase, 
but would remain low 
(estimated at 0.2% of 
the current revenues 
from ethyl alcohol). 
-2 
The reduction would cover 
mid-size operators and 
possibly a significant share of 
the market for spirits in 
certain MS. Given the duty 
rates for ethyl alcohol, which 
are higher than those for 
other beverages, foregone 
revenues could be 
substantial. 
Market effects 
for economic 
operators 
0 
The provision 
has no or 
negligible 
impacts on 
commercial 
operators, and 
no change is 
expected. 
0/ 
-1 
Some very small 
commercial distilleries 
would fall below the 
threshold, but their 
market share is 
estimated to be marginal. 
As a consequence, 
market distortions and 
negative effects on 
commercial operators 
above the threshold 
would be small. 
-1 
Given the fact that 10,000 
hlpa represent a sizeable 
part of the ethyl alcohol 
market, and given the weight 
of excise duties over the 
price of spirits, important 
market distortions would be 
introduced as a result of the 
new threshold. 
Health impacts 
for consumers 
0 
The provision did 
not affect the 
overall 
consumption or 
production of 
ethyl alcohol, 
and would not do 
so in the near 
future. 
0/ 
-1 
Given the small market 
segment that would be 
covered, no material 
effects on the price and 
consumption of spirits 
would materialise. Hardly 
any health impact would 
be caused by this option. 
-1 
In the case of spirits, the 
reduction of the excise 
duties, and thus the potential 
impact on price, would be 
larger than for beer. As a 
consequence, part of the 
discount could be passed-on 
downstream, with a possible 
increase in the consumption 
of spirits and, thus, in per 
capita alcohol consumption. 
SME 
competitiveness 
0 
The provision 
largely does not 
apply to 
commercially-
viable operators. 
0/ 
+1 
Few very small players 
would be covered by the 
measure, and would thus 
benefit from lower rates, 
resulting in higher 
profitability. However, 
most of the commercial 
SME in the spirits market 
would remain outside the 
scope of the provision. 
+2 
The new provision would 
greatly benefit the majority 
of SME in the spirit sector, 
the bulk of which would fall 
below the threshold. 
Administrative 
burdens for 
economic 
operators 
0 
Administrative 
burdens are 
minimal and will 
remain so. 
0/-
1 
The change of the 
threshold would increase 
the number of operators 
concerned, and hence 
total burdens. However, 
burdens per applicant are 
expected to be low – in 
line with those for small 
brewers. 
0/ 
-1 
The change of the threshold 
would increase the number 
of operators concerned, and 
hence total burdens. 
However, burdens per 
applicant are expected to be 
low – in line with those for 
small brewers. 
Enforcement 
costs for public 
authorities 
0  
Enforcement 
costs are 
minimal at the 
moment, and 
there is no 
indication that 
0 
to 
-1 
A rise in the number of 
operators would increase 
enforcement costs for 
public authorities. 
However, the revenues at 
stake would be too small 
-2 
A large number of operators 
and a significant size of the 
market would be covered by 
the reduction. Given the 
comparatively higher duty 
rates on ethyl alcohol, 
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the provision 
require 
additional efforts 
in the future. 
to require the 
deployment of significant 
additional resources. 
additional enforcement 
resources should be 
deployed to limit the risk of 
abuses and tax frauds. 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
4.3.3 Comparison of policy options: small producers of other beverages 
 
The Council gave mandate to the Commission to investigate the impacts of an 
extension of the reduced rates to small producers of wine, other fermented beverages 
and intermediate products. The analysis is carried out in Section 3.3.4 above, based 
on a framework which takes into account the reduced rates schemes already provided 
to small brewers and distillers, and product-specific thresholds. To analyse the market 
structure and define a threshold, the analysis is product-specific and focuses on the 
most representative products: still wine for wine, cider for other fermented beverages, 
and fortified wine for intermediate products. It is acknowledged that the application of 
the reduced rates would extend to the whole fiscal category. 
 
Table 98 below summarises the impacts of the policy options at stake, i.e. the 
extension of the rates to new product categories, including the baseline scenario. 
Importantly, option B, C, and D are not mutually exclusive, meaning that the 
Commission could decide to implement some or all of them. For every impact area, a 
summary assessment follows, including (i) a rating of the positive or negative effect 
expected (between -2 and +2); and (ii) the main motivations underlying the rating. 
Needless to say, impact areas may have a different importance for the policy-making 
process, so the ratings provided cannot be summed or aggregated.   
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Table 98 – Comparison of options on reduced rates for small producers of other products   
Impact area and 
target groups 
A) No change B) Introducing reduced rates for 
small wine producers 
C) Introducing reduced rates to 
small producers of other 
fermented beverages 
D) Introducing reduced 
rates to small producers of 
fortified wine 
Tax revenues for 
public 
authorities 
0  
Reduced rates cannot be 
granted to small producers of 
wine, OFB, and IP, and thus 
no costs arise for public 
budgets. 
-1 
Foregone revenues amount to 7% 
of the current revenues from still 
wine, or EUR 440 mn at EU level. 
The impacts arise only in the MS 
where wine is taxed at a positive 
rate. 
0/  
-1 
Impacts are estimated as 
negligible in most of the sample 
MS, and modest in Ireland and the 
UK. Total foregone revenues at EU 
level estimated at about EUR 15 
mn. 
0 / 
-1 
As small producers have a 
limited market share, 
foregone revenues are 
estimated to be low. 
Market effects 
for economic 
operators 
0  
The regulatory framework for 
alcoholic beverages foresees 
different treatment for 
different producers. However, 
the situation is not expected 
to change.  
0/  
-1 
Only producers established or 
selling their products in MS with a 
positive tax rate would see their 
position improving. The provision 
could produce distortive effects in 
certain countries, because of the 
higher excise burden over the price 
of wine. 
+1 
Small cider makers would gain 
relatively to large producers. 
Market effects are estimated to 
remain small, given the limited 
amount of sales covered by the 
reduction. 
0  
Market effects are 
estimated to be negligible, 
given the limited amount of 
sales covered by the 
reduction.  
Health impacts 
for consumers 
0 
As there are no reduced rates 
for wine, OFB and IP, per 
capita alcohol consumption is 
not affected. 
0/  
-1 
At EU level, the market significantly 
affected by the reduction – 4% of 
still wine consumption – is too small 
to trigger changes to per capita 
health consumption. These could 
arise in countries with a relative 
higher taxation of wine 
(Scandinavian countries, UK, and 
Ireland). 
0 / 
-1 
At EU level, the amount of 
alcoholic beverages concerned is 
very limited. Impacts could be 
noticeable only in MS with a large 
cider market (such as UK and 
Ireland). 
0  
The market potentially 
concerned by the reduction 
is too small to trigger any 
significant health impact. 
SME 
competitive-
ness 
0 
Current competitiveness of 
small producers will remain 
unchanged if no intervention is 
brought forward. 
+1 
The effects would be positive, but 
uneven. Only producers established 
or selling their products in MS with 
a positive tax rate would benefit 
from the reduction. Furthermore, 
the provision would not benefit very 
small players which do not vinify on 
their own. 
+2 
The competitiveness of small cider 
makers would be greatly enhanced 
by the provision. Diseconomies of 
scale and market access barriers 
could be counterbalanced. 
+1 
Most of the small operators 
in the value chain would 
have no access to the 
discount, as they do not 
produce fortified wine, but 
confer their production to 
larger players. 
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Administrative 
burdens for 
economic 
operators 
0 
The lack of reduced rates for 
wine, OFB and IP generates no 
administrative burdens. 
-1 
Administrative burdens for 
beneficiaries from reduced rates are 
estimated to be modest, at 1.2 
€/hl. Total burdens at EU level 
would amount to about EUR 5.3 
mn. 
0 / 
-1 
Administrative burdens for 
beneficiaries from reduced rates 
are estimated to be negligible, at 
0.32 €/hl. 
0 / 
-1 
Administrative burdens for 
economic operators are 
estimated to be negligible 
to low, as in the case of 
wine and cider. 
Enforcement 
costs for public 
authorities 
0  
The lack of reduced rates for 
wine, OFB, and IP generates 
no enforcement costs for 
public authorities. 
-2 
The number of operators potentially 
involved would be high. 
Importantly, most of the reduced 
rates would benefit cross-border 
operators, creating implementation 
problems, already experienced in 
the case of beer. 
0/  
-1  
The number of operators 
concerned, the amount of excise 
revenues at stake, and the 
marginal role of cross-border trade 
would not require significant 
additional resources.  
0 /  
-1 
The number of operators 
concerned and the amount 
of excise revenues at stake 
would not require 
significant additional 
resources.  
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major 
negative effect expected. 
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4.3.4 Summary of findings and conclusions  
 
 Member States have the option of granting reduced excise duty rates to small 
producers of beer and ethyl alcohol, in order (i) to support the competiveness of 
SME vis-à-vis large players, in the case of beer, and (ii) to protect traditional 
productions, in the case of ethyl alcohol. Reduced rates cannot be granted to small 
producers of wine, OFB, and intermediate products. This may affect conditions for 
competition, and prevents MS from pursuing the same policy objectives in the 
markets for the excluded categories. 
 
 In the 23 MS that have adopted reduced rates for small brewers, the scheme is 
estimated to cover 95% of active breweries, and 5% of the production (about 17 
million hl), and causes very modest foregone tax revenues (ca. 1% of the revenue 
from beer) and negligible administrative costs for operators. Two minor areas of 
improvement have been identified, which could be tackled by means of a 
legislative revision or non-binding guidelines: 
  
o Improving the clarity of the definition of ‘independent brewer’ and the 
conditions for recognising such brewers. In this area, non-binding measures 
(e.g. guidelines) seem more flexible and easier to update.  
o More straightforward application to cross-border operators, e.g. by 
establishing a mandatory uniform certificate for operators, or by means of an 
appropriate system for exchanging data among national authorities (the latter 
not requiring a legislative revision). 
 
 These measures may generate benefits in terms of legal certainty, competitiveness 
of SME, and cross-border trade, although on a limited scale given the small share 
of the market concerned. The implementation burden would also be modest, 
although concentrated on the customs authorities of the MS where reduced rates 
are currently not in place. Enforcement difficulties should be carefully considered 
when choosing among the different options. 
 
 As far as small distilleries are concerned, reduced rates are implemented in only 
seven MS and cover a very small number of operators. In particular, the very low 
threshold of 10 hlpa per year established in the Directive in practice restricts this 
facility to ancillary spirit production, which represent a negligible share of the 
market. Therefore, the option of raising this threshold moderately (to 100 hlpa) or 
significantly (10,000 hlpa) has been assessed in the Study. Under the first scenario 
the impact would be limited, since only very small commercial operators would 
gain access to the facility, whereas under the second scenario mid-size commercial 
operators would also be covered. So, the competitiveness of SME in the spirits 
market would be largely enhanced under the latter scenario, but this may also 
generate market distortions, substantial reductions of the excise duty revenues 
collected, negative public health effects, and the need to scale up monitoring and 
enforcement efforts.   
 
 Finally, the Study examined the possibility of introducing this option for the 
categories of products not currently covered, namely wine, OFB and 
intermediate products. The magnitude of the problem and the expected impacts 
would not be uniform:   
 
o For still wine, the scope of application would be limited, as 78% of the market 
is currently subject to zero rate. Moreover, small producers may already 
receive support to improve their competitiveness in the form of exemptions 
from several requirements of the excise legislation. Conversely, stakeholders 
perceive the risk that this option may eventually translate into the introduction 
of positive minimum rates at EU level.  
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o The competitive position of small cider makers vis-à-vis large producers is 
similar to that of small breweries, so the introduction of reduced rates for this 
category may have beneficial effects on their development with limited adverse 
effect in terms of foregone revenues and administrative burdens. The lack of a 
harmonised sectoral legislation on cider may represent an obstacle to an 
equitable implementation of the scheme.    
o Finally, extending reduced rates to small producers of fortified wine would 
trigger impacts which are, on the one hand, limited, and, on the other, uneven 
across operators active in the same value chain. Moreover, it would be 
somehow redundant with the reduced rates extended under Article 18.4 of the 
Directive. 
o Reduced rates may incite consumption, with negative public health effects 
especially in MS where these products are popular and standard rates are high. 
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4.4 Reduced rates for low-strength alcohol 
 
4.4.1 Comparison of policy options 
 
In light of the results of the impact analyses, a multi-criteria analysis is performed to 
compare each policy option with the no change scenario (Table 99 and Table 100). In 
particular:   
 
 Option 1 consists in raising the threshold for reduced rates applicable to low-
strength beer from the current 2.8% vol to 3.5% vol.  
 Similarly, Option 2 regards a possible increase of the thresholds for reduced 
rates applied to wine, intermediate products and ethyl alcohol.   
 
Both options touch upon the same impact areas and the overall effects are similar. In 
the comparison, full-compliance from MS is assumed, also where MS are in fact 
unlikely to adopt reduced rates even in the case of increased thresholds.  
 
For each impact area, a summary assessment is provided, including: i) a rating of the 
positive or negative effect expected (between -2 and +2); and ii) the main 
motivations underlying the rating. It is worth stressing that impact areas may have a 
different importance for the policy-making process, therefore ratings cannot be 
summed or aggregated.  
Table 99 – Comparison of options on increasing the threshold of reduced rates for 
low-strength beer  
Impact area  No Change  Option 1  
Tax revenues 0 
MS will keep applying the 
current structure and 
excise duty rates. 
-1 
In MS opting for the new provision, an 
additional share of beer consumed will 
benefit from reduced rates, thus tax 
revenues would decline. 
Market effects 0 
No change in taxation; 
therefore, no change in 
price and consumption. 
+1 
In MS opting for the new provision, 
low-strength beer will pay lower tax. 
Depending on the extent to which the 
discount is passed on to consumers, 
its price will decline and its 
consumption will increase. 
Public health  0 
No change in consumption, 
therefore, no impacts on 
public health. 
-1 
Public health impacts are negligible 
due to limited consumption growth in 
absolute terms (up to 0.1 L per capita 
of additional beer consumption) but 
some population groups e.g. youth, 
(pregnant) women could be adversely 
affected.   
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
Table 100 – Comparison of options on increasing the threshold of reduced rates for 
other low-strength products  
Impact area  No Change  Option 2 
Tax revenues 0 MS will keep applying the 
current structure and 
excise duty rates 
-1 In MS opting for the new provision, an 
additional share of wine, intermediate 
products and ethyl alcohol consumed 
will benefit from reduced rates, thus 
tax revenues would decline. 
Market effects 0 No change in taxation; 
therefore, no change in 
price and consumption. 
+1 In MS opting for the new provision, 
producers of AWP, mixed drinks and 
some traditional intermediate 
products might benefit from new 
market opportunities. As tax on 
consumption of low-strength alcohol 
will be lower, depending on the extent 
to which the discount is passed-on, 
consumers will pay a lower price and 
consumption is expected to grow. 
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Impact area  No Change  Option 2 
Public health  0 No change in consumption, 
therefore, no impacts on 
public health. 
-1 Public health impacts remain 
ambivalent, since low-strength 
beverages may substitute 
consumption of standard alcoholic 
beverages or other soft-drinks. 
Negative health effects may be 
caused by the better tax treatment of 
certain products appealing for young 
people and women (e.g. FAB). 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
 
4.4.2 Summary of findings and conclusions  
 
 Articles 5, 9, 13, 18, and 22 of the Directive allow MS to apply reduced rates on 
low-strength alcoholic beverages. The level of uptake of this option across MS 
is uneven, primarily due to the specificities of national fiscal priorities and targets 
rather than to lack of clarity on its objective in the text of the Directive. 
Furthermore, there is scant evidence on its potential contribution to public health 
objective (i.e. in the form of a reduction of the overall per capita consumption of 
alcohol). In fact, tax reductions for low-alcohol beverages may affect 
consumers’ behaviour in opposite ways: on the one hand reducing the amount 
of pure alcohol consumed by regular consumers, on the other hand potentially 
encouraging the initiation of abstainers (including young persons) to the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages.  
 
 For each product category, the Directive establishes the thresholds under which 
MS may apply reduced rates. From a market perspective, these thresholds are of 
limited relevance (with the exception of OFB), since only a small share of 
existing products are eligible. Therefore, the Study investigates the possibility 
of raising the existing thresholds to encourage MS uptake and, by consequence, 
more pervasive effects.  
 
 In the case of beer, there is some consensus among stakeholders – with a few 
notable exceptions - on the benefit of raising the current threshold to 3.5% 
vol. This amendment would expand the scope of application, and eventually 
encourage the development of this segment of the market. In fact, lower taxation 
may result in lower retail prices (depending on the extent to which the discount is 
passed on to consumers) and encourage price-sensitive consumers to shift from 
stronger products. The proposed option may lead to foregone tax revenues of 
about 1% of the current level. The price reduction may generate a small increase 
in per capita consumption of low-alcohol beer (between +2 cl and +10 cl per year 
based on a sample of MS). 
 
 As regards the other alcoholic beverages, there is limited appetite for revising the 
current thresholds, and no alternative thresholds have been proposed. 
Furthermore, higher thresholds for intermediate products and ethyl alcohol may 
eventually turn out advantageous for certain new products like mixed drinks that 
are particularly appealing to young people, thus resulting in negative impacts for 
public health policies.   
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4.5 Exemptions for private production 
 
4.5.1 Comparison of policy options 
 
Under the current Directive, there is an unequal treatment among alcoholic beverages 
with respect to the exemption for private production for own consumption: MS can 
apply it to fermented beverages (including beer, wine and other fermented 
beverages), whilst this is not possible for intermediate products and ethyl alcohol. The 
policy option considered in Section 3.5.1 above would redress this situation by 
extending the exemption to any alcoholic beverage, henceforth covering private 
distillation as well.  
 
However, as explicitly called for by the Council mandate, the right balance should be 
struck between such an extension and the risk of (unintended) negative effects. To 
assess such a balance, an impact analysis has been developed in Section 3.5.2 above. 
On the basis of this impact analysis, the comparison, via a multi-criteria analysis, of 
the policy option at stake with the no change scenario is provided in Table 101 below. 
For every impact area, a summary assessment is provided, including (i) a rating of the 
positive or negative effect expected (between -2 and +2); and (ii) the main 
motivations underlying the rating. Needless to say, impact areas may have a different 
importance for the policy-making process, so the ratings provided cannot be summed 
or aggregated.   
 
Table 101 - Comparison of options: extension of the exemptions for private production  
Impact area 
and target 
groups 
A) No Change  B) Extension of the exemption to 
intermediate products and ethyl alcohol  
Tax revenues 
for public 
authorities 
0/ 
+1 
Private distillation is expected 
to decline in most of MS, so 
that part of the currently illicit 
consumption would be 
substituted by commercial 
products.  
-1 
The option would not lead to any recovery of 
foregone revenues. In addition, due to the 
partial substitution of existing spirit 
consumption, the option would have a small 
negative impact on tax revenues, estimated 
at EUR 45 mn and 0.3% of excise revenues 
from ethyl alcohol in the at EU level (between 
0.1% and 0.6% of the current excise 
revenues in each sample MS). 
Market effects 
for economic 
operators 
(including 
cross-border) 0  
Market effects are considered 
negligible (in AT, FI, IT, and 
UK), modest in PL, and 
significant only in RO. Given 
the current trends, there is no 
indication that the situation is 
going to worsen in the future. 
Cross-border spill overs were 
not identified. 
0/  
-1 
This policy option would result in a modest 
increase in private distillation. As a 
consequence, negative market effects for 
legal operators would also modestly increase, 
due to the partial substitution of market 
consumption with private distillation (up to -
0.3% of the spirit market). Cross-border 
effects remain negligible. 
Health impacts 
for consumers 
0/ 
+1 
Private distillation is expected 
to decline in most MS, and so 
are intake of privately-distilled 
alcohol and the risk of 
methanol poisoning. 
-1 
The exemption would result in an increase of 
private distillation, and, thus, to a 
corresponding higher consumption and risk of 
adverse events. Also, new private distillers 
may be less familiar with the methanol 
removal process.  
Enforcement 
costs for 
public 
authorities 
0 
Private distillation is considered 
a no or limited issue in most of 
the sample MS (AT, FI, IT and 
the UK), or a lower 
enforcement priority compared 
to other forms of illicit alcohol 
(PL and RO). As such, it does 
not absorb significant 
enforcement resources and is 
unlikely to do so in the future. 
0/ 
-1 
It is likely that MS would introduce a light 
form of regulation of private distillation (as it 
is already the case in AT and RO). As a 
consequence, a modest increase to 
enforcement costs is expected from this 
policy option. 
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Administrative 
burdens for 
private 
distillers 
0 
Only where private distillation 
is legal (AT and RO), 
individuals bear a limited 
amount of administrative 
burdens, and this is unlikely to 
change in the future. 
0/   
-1 
Even though the extension of the exemption 
would remove private distillers from the 
scope of the excise framework, real savings 
of administrative burdens would be 
negligible, as hardly any private distiller 
currently complies with the applicable 
administrative regulation. National forms of 
regulation (if introduced) could generate 
additional administrative burdens. 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral 
impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major negative effect expected. 
 
 
4.5.2 Summary of findings and conclusions  
 
 MS can exempt from the payment of excise duties the production of ‘fermented 
beverages’ (i.e. beer, wine and other fermented beverages) for own consumption. 
With very limited exceptions, this activity is unregulated. On the contrary, such an 
exemption is rarely granted to the production of spirits and fortified products, as 
private distillation is considered more dangerous from a public health perspective. 
The exclusion of intermediate products and ethyl alcohol may constitute a case 
of unequal treatment, which may need to be redressed, if no significant negative 
effects are triggered. 
 
 The amount of illicit private distillation is estimated to be low in most of the 
countries reviewed (between 0.5% and 2.5% of the current market for spirits), 
and more significant in a couple of them (respectively 3.5% and 6%). At EU level, 
it is estimated to represent about 2.3% of the spirits market. Foregone excise 
revenues in the six sample MS examined amount to about EUR 100 mn (1.4% of 
the revenues from ethyl alcohol); at EU level, tax losses can be estimated at 
about EUR 250 mn (1.6% of the revenues from ethyl alcohol).  
 
 The option to introduce an exemption for private production of intermediate 
products and ethyl alcohol would have modest but negative impacts in terms of 
tax revenues (EUR -45 mn, or -0.3% of the excise revenues from ethyl alcohol at 
EU level), and market effects (-0.1% of the current production of spirits). 
Additionally, it could be harmful from a public health perspective since it may 
increase: (i) the risks of methanol intoxication; (ii) the accessibility and 
consumption of distilled products. The option is also likely to generate some 
additional administrative burdens and enforcement costs for public authorities. In 
any case, MS that would not take up this option would bear minimal negative spill 
overs, as cross-border effects are estimated to be negligible. 
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4.6 Measurement of Plato degree for sweetened/flavoured beer 
 
4.6.1 Comparison of policy options 
 
Based on the above impact analysis, Table 102 provides a comparison, via a multi-
criteria analysis, of the policy options at stake with the no change scenario. For each 
impact area, a summary assessment is provided including: i) a rating of the positive 
or negative effect expected (between -2 and +2); and ii) the main motivations 
underlying the rating. As impact areas may have a different importance for the policy-
making process, such ratings cannot be summed or aggregated. In this context, it is 
worth reiterating that both options (1 and 2) potentially lead to results of the same 
kind, since both consists of selecting a harmonised approach (A, B1 or B2) to 
measuring the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer. In addition, the two options 
can be complementary; in fact, an amendment of the Directive (option 1) could be 
accompanied by further guidance on measurement approaches (option 2). For this 
reason it seemed more informative to present the comparison of option by selected 
approach instead of by regulatory or non-regulatory measure (adding qualifications 
where required). In particular:   
 
 Option 1.A and 2.A would select approach A, i.e. ‘base beer’ approach, by either 
an amendment of Article 3(1) (option 1.A) or through Commission’s guidelines 
(option 2.A).  
 Option 1.B.1 and 2.B.1 would select approach B1, i.e. the ‘real extract’ 
approach. Option 1.B.1 would entail a Directive amendment, while option 2.B.1 the 
adoption of non-binding guidelines.  
 Option 1.B.2 and 2.B.2 would select approach B2, i.e. the ‘present extract’ 
approach, by either an amendment of Article 3(1) (option 1.B.2) or through 
Commission’s guidelines (option 2.B.2). 
 
It is worth stressing that the awaited decision of the CJEU on the Polish case (Box 21) 
may help clarifying how to interpret Article 3(1) for sweetened/flavoured beer and 
eventually affect the baseline/no change scenario, since non-compliant MS may be 
required to revise their measurement method.460 As discussed, the CJEU is called to 
rule on whether the Plato degree of sweetened/flavoured beer should be measured by 
considering either the ‘real extract’ (approach B1) or the ‘present extract’ (approach 
B2). The Court is not asked to decide whether the calculation of the Plato degree 
should be done before adding sugar (i.e. on the ‘base beer’) or after adding sugar (i.e. 
on sweetened beer). Nonetheless, it should not be excluded a broad ruling, providing 
an interpretation of the term ‘finished product’.  
                                                          
460 In each MS, the no change scenario represents the approach that is currently into force (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Poland and Romania) or will possibly be adopted in the near future (Italy) in the 
absence of any EU intervention. 
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Table 102 – Comparison of options: alternative methods for measuring the Plato degree of sweetened / flavoured beer  
Impact area  No Change/ baseline Option 1.A/2.A Option 1.B.1/2.B.1 Option 1.B.2/2.B.2 
Tax revenues 0 
MS will keep applying their 
preferred approach. 
-1 
This approach leads to a lower Plato 
degree for sweetened/flavoured 
beer.  
Most MS will have to change their 
current approach. 
-1 
This approach leads to a lower 
Plato degree for 
sweetened/flavoured beer.  
Most MS will have to change their 
current approach. 
0 
This approach leads to a higher 
Plato degree for 
sweetened/flavoured beer.  
Few MS will have to change their 
current approach. 
Market effects 0 
No change in taxation; 
therefore, no change in price 
and consumption. 
+1 
In most MS, sweetened/flavoured 
beer will pay lower tax. Depending 
on the extent to which the discount 
is passed on to consumers, price 
will decline and consumption will 
increase.  
+1 
In most MS, sweetened / 
flavoured beer will pay lower tax. 
Depending on the extent to which 
the discount is passed on to 
consumers, price will decline and 
consumption will increase. 
0 / -1 
In few MS, sweetened/flavoured 
beer will pay higher tax. Depending 
on the extent to which the 
additional tax is passed on to 
consumers, price will increase and 
consumption will decrease. 
Public health 0 No change in consumption. 0 
Public health impacts are negligible 
due to limited consumption growth. 
0 
Public health impacts are 
negligible due to limited 
consumption growth. 
 0 
Public health impacts are negligible 
due to limited consumption 
reduction. 
Enforcement 
costs 
0 
MS will keep applying current 
enforcement procedures. 
-1 
Most MS will have to implement 
new enforcement procedures to test 
the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer and 
perform on-site checks. 
Coordination at the EU level 
required for beer moved across 
borders.  
-1 
Most MS will have to implement 
new enforcement procedures to 
test the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer and 
perform on-site checks. 
Coordination at the EU level 
required for beer moved across 
borders. 
+1 
All MS will be able to measure the 
Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer based 
on the analysis of the final product  
Market 
distortion 
-1 
Some competition distortions 
in MS applying approach B2 
are possible, and may grow 
with the growth of 
sweetened/flavoured beer 
market. 
+1 
Approach A does not create relevant 
disparities in the level of taxation of 
sweetened/flavoured beer and 
standard beer of the same alcohol 
strength. 
+1 
Approach B1 does not create 
relevant disparities in the level of 
taxation of sweetened/flavoured 
beer and standard beer of the 
same alcohol strength. 
0 / -1 
Approach B2 may create disparities 
in the level of taxation of 
sweetened/flavoured beer and 
standard beer of the same alcohol 
strength. Since most of MS already 
adopt approach B2 and the market 
of these products is small, the 
overall impact on market 
functioning would be modest. 
Litigation 
costs 
0 / 
+1 
The pending CJEU judgment 
(C-30/17) may eventually 
shed light on the correct 
interpretation of the terms 
‘finished product’. 
+1 
Increased legal certainty (yet, in the 
short-run non-binding guidelines 
may increase litigation costs). 
+1 
Increased legal certainty (yet, in 
the short-run non-binding 
guidelines may increase litigation 
costs). 
+1 
Increased legal certainty (yet, in 
the short-run non-binding 
guidelines may increase litigation 
costs). 
Legend: +2 major positive effect expected; +1 moderate positive effect expected; 0 no effect or neutral impact expected; -1 moderate negative effect expected; -2 major 
negative effect expected. 
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4.6.2 Summary of findings and conclusions 
 
 Article 3(1) of the Directive allows for levying excise duty on beer with reference 
either to the Plato degree or ABV strength of ‘finished product’. This Article results 
in different interpretations when it comes to measuring the Plato degree of 
sweetened/flavoured beer, i.e. mixture of beer with non-alcoholic additives or 
beverages. In particular, there seems to be three different approaches (A, B1 and 
B2) to measuring the Plato strength of sweetened/flavoured beer:  
 
o Approach A measures the Plato degree of the base beer, prior to the addition of 
sugar/flavours.  
o Approach B1 measures the Plato degree of the final product after the addition 
of sugar/flavours taking into account only the ‘non-fermented (real) extract’, 
i.e. the extract of the base beer without considering sugar/flavours added to 
the sweetened/flavoured beer after fermentation.  
o Approach B2 measures the Plato degree of the final product after the addition 
of sugar/flavours taking into account the ‘present extract’, i.e. the extract of 
the sweetened/flavoured beer including also the sugar/flavours added. 
 
 Different approaches lead to different values of the Plato degree. In particular 
Approach A and B1 generally result in a lower Plato degree than Approach B2. 
Such difference has evidently an impact on the applicable excise duty. 
Assuming the excise duty is consistently passed-on to retail price, it may also 
affect the competitiveness of products and the related demand and 
ultimately cause disparities of treatment and potential distortion of the market. 
The different methods are also the basis of a legal dispute that has been brought 
before the CJEU, whose judgment is still pending.   
 
 To address the problems caused by diverging interpretations two policy options 
have been considered: (i) a review of Article 3(1) to clarify what is meant by 
‘finished product’; and (ii) the issuance of guidelines to harmonise the calculation 
methods. Overall, the option consisting in reviewing Article 3(1) seems 
more effective, since non-binding measures cannot ensure compliance from all 
MS and would therefore not eliminate the risk of legal disputes, and related costs 
for both authorities and brewers. 
 
 Since the CJEU case is still ongoing, the Study does not recommend any of the 
possible interpretations, but focuses on assessing the impact from the three 
different scenarios. In particular:  
 
o Approach B2, would result in only minor changes since it is already the choice 
of several MS. The change in the overall market volume would be negligible 
and the tax revenue from beer would increase by +0.2%.  
o Approaches A and B1 would have a similar market impact: sales may decrease 
by -1% and tax revenue may increase by 0.1%.   
o Furthermore, Approaches A and B1 would generate higher enforcement costs 
than approach B2, as customs laboratories cannot measure the tax base by 
checking the Plato degree of the end-product; rather, they would need to 
perform checks at the production facilities. 
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HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 
 
Free publications: 
• one copy: 
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 
 
• more than one copy or posters/maps: 
from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm); from the 
delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm); 
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or calling 00 
800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 
 
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or 
hotels may charge you). 
 
Priced publications:  
• via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu).  
 
Priced subscriptions:  
• via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union 
(http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm). 
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